http://www.cneti.com/~chs/ww2.htm

At noon on August 15 1945, a personal proclamation from the Emperor was broadcast. This was the first time that any Japanese emperor had ever spoken to his subjects. The night before the broadcast there had been an unsuccessful attempt by rebellious elements of the Imperial Guard Division in Tokyo to seize the recorded message and prevent its broadcast.

Once the Japanese had agreed to sign the Instrument of Surrender that would finally end WWII, there remained difficulties with communication, distance, language, and so forth. Therefore, it took several days for the actual fighting to wind down following the Japanese decision to surrender. Great caution was used to ensure the safety of those empowered by the Japanese Emperor to make any arrangements the Allies directed to enable the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to set up the formal surrender. It was later learned that Captain Yasuna Ozono, who commanded the 302 Kokutai (naval air corps) stationed near Tokyo, committed hara-kiri the night prior to the departure of the Japanese delegation because his officers did not fully support him in his pledge to destroy the transport planes. Another threat to the envoys still existed from Japan's Tokko Tai (air attack units) who were threatening to shoot down the Japanese emissaries, thus preventing Japan's surrender.

There was the perception that the Allies had to avoid any chance of another sneak attack even this late in the war. And so, the little island of Ie Shima became a place of strategic importance. MacArthur ordered that the Japanese delegation travel in clearly marked planes to a secret destination where the delegation would be transferred to American planes for the remainder of the trip to Manila.

On General MacArthur's orders, the Japanese planes were painted white and large green crosses replaced the emblem of the rising sun. These crosses symbolized that rather than being on a hostile mission, the planes carried 16 representatives of the Japanese Government sent to Manila by Emperor Hirohito to assist Allied forces with the surrender and occupation of Japan.

On August 19 the delegates boarded the planes for their unknown destination. When they were in the air, the pilots opened sealed orders to discover that their destination was Ie Shima, the island where Ernie Pyle had died four months earlier. The Japanese bombers were given specific flight coordinates and were to be escorted by American fighter planes. As the two planes moved into Allied airspace, their aircraft was instructed to use the identifying call signs of Bataan 1 and Bataan 2.

When the Allied planes first approached the planes carrying the Japanese delegation, the Japanese planes radioed the password, Bataan. The reassuring reply was, "We are Bataan's watchdog. Follow us." The twelve fighters flew around, above, and below. They did acrobatics, diving past the slow two-engined Bettys. The high spirited acrobatics of the escorts did not detract from their determination to protect the Japanese envoys so that the threat from the kamikazes was over. Top cover for the Bettys was provided by B-25s from the 345th Bomb Group.

General Kawabe was on the second plane to land and it parked immediately behind the first. He was the first to leave the plane and his officers followed by rank. Having unloaded from the Japanese bomber with all their luggage, the Japanese delegation prepared to be received by the American delegation before reloading on an American transport plane, a C-54, which was responsible for transporting them to Manila.

The head of the Japanese delegation was the first to load onto the C-54 in preparation for leaving for the Philippines. In all, the landing, receiving of the delegation, and loading for transporting to the Philippines took approximately 20 minutes.

The Japanese and the Americans specialists worked through the night of August 19th and into the early morning hours of the 20th. And the translators worked all night to put MacArthur's requirements into accurate Japanese. It was very, very important that all documents be correctly translated so that there would be no misunderstandings.

All of the envoys could not be transported in the one remaining Betty; therefore, the group and documents were divided so that if one plane were to be lost, the other would carry the conference documents to Tokyo. Kawabe asked for volunteers to remain with the Betty until it could be repaired. Late in the afternoon, the first of the two converted Bettys left for Tokyo with General Kawabe and seven other delegates on board. It was almost midnight when the sleeping delegates were awakened by the pilot who ordered them to prepare for a crash landing. A fuel tank had sprung a leak and they were heading for the nearest land. Everyone was instructed to put on life jackets in case the plane failed to make landfall.

Their greatest concern was for the safety of the documents; therefore, they were entrusted to a delegate, Okazaki, who had represented Japan in the 1924 Olympics. Soon the engines ran low on gas and began missing and the plane lost altitude. The bomber roughly skipped along the sea until it hit something and suddenly came to a stop. The pilots stumbled from their cockpit. One pilot checked on the passengers while the other moved to open the rear door. As he did, water gushed into the plane. The pilot stepped out and instead of disappearing under the sea, the water reached only to his knees. Amazingly, the pilots had landed the Betty in the surf along a beach near Hamamatsu. They were still 130 miles from Tokyo but there were no fatalities and the precious documents were safe.

A fisherman showed the soldiers to a phone and they called Hamamatsu Air Base for help. By seven that morning of August 21, Kawabe and the other delegates left Hamamatsu for Tokyo with the surrender documents. Later that same morning, the envoys who had remained on Ie Shima left on their repaired aircraft. These delegates had an uneventful trip.


Although of great historical interest, neither of the two white-painted Betty bombers that transported the Japanese delegation survives. One plane arrived safely in Tokyo. After leaving Ie Shima for Tokyo, the other Betty crash landed in the surf of a beach near Hamamatsu, about 130 miles from its destination. That plane submerged and was not salvaged. The other Betty went to Kisarazu Air Base and was later intentionally destroyed by fire.

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"The Bombing of Tokyo"

Doolittle's Raiders

http://sandysq.gcinet.net/uss_salt_l...5/dolittle.htm

President Franklin D. Roosevelt secretly authorized an extremely dangerous mission to retaliate against the Japanese Empire. This Expeditionary Mission was to bomb major industrial targets in Tokyo and other large cities on the Japanese homeland.

One obstacle was how to place heavy Army bombers in range of Tokyo,to accomplish this, the aircraft carrier USS HORNET was used.On April 1, 1942, 16 Army B-25 bombers were towed to the dock alongside the HORNET and hoisted aboard in Alameda Naval Air Station in San Francisco Bay.
On April 2, the HORNET sailed under sealed orders, with its screen of Cruisers and Destroyers.

That afternoon Captain Marc A. Mitscher revealed our destination over the loudspeaker system. We were going to span the Pacific Ocean, over 5000 miles, to bring Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle's bombers and crews within striking distance of Tokyo. The HORNET's job was to get the bombers within 400 miles of Japan, then streak from there as fast as possible.

The fleet crossed the 180th Meridian on Friday, April 17, in a latitude considerably higher than Tokyo and following the same route that the Japanese took to bomb Pearl Harbor. At 2 P.M. that day we heard "Tokyo Rose" speaking from the Japanese Radio Station JOAK, telling her listeners why it was impossible that Tokyo would ever feel the sting of bombs.

At 2:10 A.M. that morning 18th April, we picked up two blips on the Radar Screen showing enemy ships dead ahead. We altered course to avoid them, and at dawn we launched reconnaissance planes from the ENTERPRISE. At 5:00 A.M. the ENTERPRISE pilots reported a picket boat 42 miles ahead, and an hour later a third vessel was sighted visually from the HORNET. Within ten minutes our cruisers and dive bombers were blasting them from the water, but there could be no assurance that they had not successfully sounded a warning.

Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle conferred with Admiral "Bull" Halsey and they decided to launch the aircraft as soon as they could be made ready. Gasoline tanks were topped off and extra fuel in five gallon cans were stowed aboard each airplane, as every ounce of fuel was needed to help the fliers reach their final destination.

The wind and seas were so strong that morning that sea water broke over the HORNET's flight deck. Lt. Col. Doolittle, in the first plane to be launched, charged off the deck at 8:24 A.M. on its way to Tokyo. The Flight Deck Launching Officer had to time each takeoff to coincide with the rise and fall of the bow to give the planes as much of a boost as possible when they left the fight deck. All planes were airborne by 9:20 A.M. But not without cost, one sailor in the flight deck handling crew lost his arm after being struck by a propeller.

Tokyo had been alerted for a large air raid with Japanese planes conducting a mock air raid. The real raid by the American planes followed so closely that the Japanese public never knew of our attack until it was over. No air raid sirens sounded for at least 15 to 20 minutes after Doolittle's Raiders were over the cities. The actual damage inflicted by our bombers on the enemy cities was not great by later bombing standards, but the Japanese officials had a difficult time explaining how such an attack could have happened and they suffered considerable "Loss of Face." The news of the attack on Tokyo gave a great boost to American and allied morale.

None of our attacking bombers were lost over Japan; one landed in Russia, fifteen others in China. Seventy-one of the 80 pilots and crewmen, including Lt. Col. Doolittle, survived the raid. One crewman was killed when he bailed out, two were killed in crash landings, five were interned in Russia, eight were captured by the Japanese and the rest managed to reach Free China and safety. Of the eight that were captured, three were executed, one died and four were freed at the end of the war.
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Ah, the story behind kamikaze...??

Their kamikaze mystique constituted a spiritual fortress around the Japanese homeland. No foreign attacker had seriously threatened Japan's sacred soil since Kublai Khan in 1281. And on that occasion a violent storm had turned back and devastated the Mongol invader's fleet; the Japanese called the magical occurrence kamikaze--"divine wind."

http://history1900s.about.com/librar...doolittle1.htm
--------------

http://www.grunts.net/wars/20thcentu...doolittle.html

The first plane off the Hornet was, of course, flown by Doolittle, and left at 0820 hrs.

Lead Aircraft
Pilot Lt.Col. James Doolittle
Co Pilot Lt Richard Cole
Navigator Lt Henry Potter
Bombardier S/Sgt Fred Braemer
Engineer/gunner S/Sgt Paul Leonard

Other planes bombed Tokyo except:

Plane no 11:bombed a factory between Tokyo and Yokohoma.

Plane No 12: bombed a refinery in Yokohoma and strafed a power station.

Plane 14: to Nagoya and bombed military targets before heading after the others to China.

Plane No 15: them to Kobe where they bombed an industrial complex.

Plane No 16: bombed their target in Japan
( Tokyo? or somewhere else? Not said here)

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This historic painting was made from an original scetch created in those early dawn hours.

http://www.navyart.com/bidpages/hornet.htm



[img]smile.gif[/img]

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Surrender Speech by Japanese Emperor Hirohito, August 14, 1945

The surrender announcement, broadcast by radio, was the first time Japanese people had ever heard the voice of their leader.

To our good and loyal subjects: After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.

We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration.

To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors and which we lay close to the heart.

Indeed, we declared war on America and Britain out of our sincere desire to insure Japan’s self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of our servants of the State and the devoted service of our 100,000,000 people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest.

Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.

Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of our subjects, or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our imperial ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.

We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia.

The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with death [otherwise] and all their bereaved families, pains our heart night and day.

The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers and of those who have lost their homes and livelihood is the object of our profound solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great.

We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the [unavoidable] and suffering what is insufferable. Having been able to save and maintain the structure of the Imperial State, we are always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.

Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion that may engender needless complications, of any fraternal contention and strife that may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the world.

Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, nobility of spirit, and work with resolution so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and keep pace with the progress of the world.




Emperor before WW2
124th Emperor of Japan
"Imperial Son of Heaven of Great Japan"

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General MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito

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the bomber that dropped atom bomd on hiroshima was "e n o l a gay "

the bomber that dropped atom bomb on nagasaki was not given the target of this city. but due to fog on the target city the first priority in case of lack of visibility was given to nagasaki

Very interesting information, Kai! Thanks! And the photo of Hiro-Hito and McArthur is amazing!

Just let's hope you don't become a PTO fan, we need you for the encirclement of Moscow!

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Heh!

Thanx Friedrich! But not to worry, I am just visiting this part of war, my "heart" will always be in the Ostfront!

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The Japanese paratroopers
in the Dutch East Indies, 1941-1942

http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastin...paratroop.html

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Pearl Harbor and the Japanese subs:

http://www.navalships.org/shipwrecks2.html

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http://history1900s.about.com/librar...idgetsubs1.htm

The raid on Pearl Harbor was a short episode in a very long war. But it is fair to say that rumor and speculation surround the Japanese attack more than any other battle in recent history. Mines in the channel, amphibious landings, enemy paratroopers and Japanese aircraft carriers south of Oahu were all reported by nervous Americans that morning. Crewmen from USS Phoenix even stated in the ship’s after-action report that the attacking planes had German, Japanese and American markings.

What is known today about the five Japanese midget submarines? They were launched the night before the attack from 7 to 10 miles south of Oahu by the Type-C1 fleet submarines I-16, I-18, I-20, I-22 and I-24. Given the geography, the navigation problems and the finicky nature of the small boats, the midget submarine crews faced a task requiring real courage, skill and luck if they hoped to succeed.

The low-lying entrance to Pearl Harbor would have been difficult to locate at night against the black background of the island, particularly when viewed from sea level through a small periscope. The only realistic way for a submarine crew with such limited vision to find the channel entrance in the dark was by following a ship. There were two opportunities to do that before sunrise on December 7, when Crossbill and Condor entered the channel separately between 5 and 5:30 a.m. No other ships came in until the Coast Guard cutter Tiger did so shortly before 8 a.m., although the fleet tug Keosangua left the channel shortly after 6:30 a.m. to meet the cargo ship Antares and take a barge in tow. The channel would have been easier for the midgets to locate after sunrise (about 6 a.m.), but crewmen aboard the 10 American vessels at or near the channel entrance could easily have sighted a periscope at that point. Of course, once the air attack began, a submarine could not have entered because of the likelihood that ships would be leaving the harbor through the narrow channel.

One midget submarine—designated “Midget B” by Lt. Cmdr. A.J. Stewart in a 1974 U.S. Navy Proceedings article—did manage to enter Pearl Harbor in the darkness, probably by following Crossbill or Condor, and speculation that a second midget also entered has been rampant since 1941.

Moored near the entrance to Middle Loch, the minesweeper Breese reported sighting two submarine conning towers at about 8:30 a.m., not long after the final wave of Japanese planes had attacked the harbor. The other nine ships near Breese reported sighting only one submarine. Five ships fired at the midget, and Curtiss hit it once before Monaghan rammed and depth-charged it. The crew of Breese mistook driftwood or debris for another submarine, or perhaps a buoy. That is understandable given the smoke, fear, adrenaline levels and confusion of the morning.

Shortly after 9 on December 7, the Japanese fleet submarine I-69 watched the dark skies above Pearl Harbor light up like a fireworks display from her position several miles southwest of Oahu. The midget submarine from I-16 sent two radio messages, one of which said “successful surprise attack.” The Japanese navy interpreted the message to mean that the midget had waited until night to attack and the fireworks display was the result of a ship exploding after the midget’s torpedo hits.

Based on vague evidence (explosions seen from a distance and unclear radio messages), the Japanese concluded that several midgets had penetrated Pearl Harbor and one of them attacked a battleship. They identified Arizona as the ship attacked by the midget sub. However, the fireworks that I-69’s crew saw over Pearl Harbor that night were actually the product of nervous crews on various American ships in the harbor, startled when planes from Enterprise tried to land at Ford Island. Some of those planes went down in flames, adding to the display.

A captured Japanese chart accounts for another myth. Submarine I-24 launched her midget, Ha-19 (“Midget C”), later than the others because the midget had a faulty gyroscope. Her young skipper, Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki, chose to go anyway. Unfortunately for Sakamaki, his submarine had handling and navigation problems from the start of the mission. After a day of being lost, depth-charged and grounded on reefs, Midget C drifted through the night, finally washing ashore near Bellows Field, on the eastern side of Oahu. The dazed Sakamaki was captured after he tried unsuccessfully to destroy his boat, becoming the first Japanese prisoner captured by Americans during the war. The chart recovered from Midget C shows a track around Ford Island, complete with headings and times marking turns. However, the track and notes on the chart indicate that it was a planning tool for the midget submarine portion of the attack rather than a record of what one of the midgets actually did. The chart shows the midgets rounding Hospital Point at 4:30 a.m. Tokyo time (9 a.m. in Hawaii) and traveling counterclockwise around Ford Island. That plan meant that the torpedo bombers would have finished their attacks before the midget submarines approached Battleship Row, lessening the chance of one being hit by a torpedo intended for an American battleship. Thus, the chart led to mistaken assumptions.

Russ Hamacheck’s book, Hot, Straight, and True, contains the humorous story of another false submarine report two weeks after the Japanese attack, when PT-28 and another PT-boat were notified about a sound contact in Pearl Harbor. The PT-boat crews dropped a lot of depth charges on the spot, only to find out later that it was a cast iron sewer pipe running under the harbor from the Navy hospital. Water running through the pipe when toilets were flushed had caused the noise reported as a sound contact by the yard boat. Ensign Bob Williamson, skipper of PT-28, reported that the sewer pipe was destroyed.

The argument that everyone was watching the attacking planes and failed to see the submarine is not credible. There were more than 40 reported submarine sightings and contacts, at least 11 of which were inside the harbor, by crewmen aboard 25 ships and three PBYs, as well as by two medical corpsmen at Hospital Point. When a midget submarine actually did appear in the harbor, eight ships sighted it immediately and five ships opened fire before Monaghan sank it. Obviously, not everyone was looking at the sky.

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The Japanese midget subs and Pearl Harbor

None of the 10 crew members of the attacking midget submarines expected to return. To his shame, Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki was captured, and the remaining nine crewmen were declared "hero gods" by Japanese propagandists.

http://starbulletin.com/2002/09/01/news/story4.html



Mr Sakamaki and the sub he used later on




From left above, is the crew of midget submarine I-16tou, Masaji Yokoyama and Sadamu Uyeda; I-18tou, Shigemi Furuno and Shigenori Yokoyama; I-20tou, Akira Hiro-o and Yoshio Katayama; I-22tou, Naoji Iwasa and Naokichi Sasaki; and I-24tou, Kazuo Sakamaki and Kiyoshi Inagaki.

[ 28. March 2003, 04:29 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

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http://www.kensmen.com/dec41.html

Monday 8 December 1941
The first word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is received on Luzon, Philip-pine Islands by commercial radio between 0300-0330 hours local. Within 30 minutes radar at Iba Field, Luzon plots a formation of airplanes 75-miles (120-km) offshore, heading for Corregidor Island. P-40's are sent out to intercept but make no contact. Shortly before 0930 hours, after Japanese aircraft are detected over Lingayen Gulf heading toward Manila, B-17's at Clark Field, Luzon are ordered airborne to prevent being caught on the ground. Fighters from Clark and Nichols Fields are sent to intercept the enemy but do not make contact. The Japanese airplanes swing East and bomb military installations at Baguio, Tarlac, Tuguegarao, and airfields at Cabantuan are also attacked. By 1130 hours, the B-17's and fighters sent into the air earlier have landed at Clark and Iba Fields for refueling, and radar has disclosed another flight of Japanese aircraft 70-miles (112-km) West of Lingayen Gulf, headed South. Fighters from Iba Field make a fruitless search over the South China Sea. Fighters from Nichols Field are dispatched to patrol over Bataan and Manila. Around 1145 hours a formation is reported headed South over Lingayen Gulf. Fighters are ordered from Del Carmen Field to cover Clark Field but fail to arrive before the Japanese hit Clark shortly after 1200 hours. B-17's and many fighters at Clark Field are caught on the ground, but a few P-4O's manage to get airborne. 2d Lieutenant Randall B. Keator of the 20th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor), 24th Pursuit Group (Interceptor), shoots down the first Japanese aircraft over the Philippines. The P-40's earlier sent on patrol of the South China Sea return to Iba Field with fuel running low at the beginning of a Japanese attack on that airfield. The P-40's fail to prevent bombing but manage to prevent low-level strafing of the sort which proved so destructive at Clark Field. At the end of the day's action it is apparent that the Japanese have won a major victory. The effective striking power of Far East Air Force has been destroyed, the fighter strength has been seriously reduced, most B-17 maintenance facilities have been demolished, and about 90 men have been killed.

Tuesday 9 December 1941
Shortly after 0300 hours, Japanese aircraft attack Nichols Field. This attack, added to the previous day's raids on Clark and Iba Fields, leaves the Far East Air Force strength reduced by half. Only 17 of 35 B-17's remain in commission; about 55 P-40's, 3 P-35's, and close to 30 other aircraft (B-10's, B-18's, and observation airplanes) have been lost in aerial combat or destroyed on the ground. During the morning and afternoon, B-17's from Mindanao Island fly reconnaissance missions and land on Clark and San Marcelino Fields on Luzon. Several more B-17's are flown from Mindanao Island to these Luzon bases for resistance against a possible invasion attempt.

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http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far_East_Air_Force

Airfields of the Far East Air Force
Within 130 km of Manila, there were 6 airfields. Outside of Luzon, there were another 6 airfields. Clark Field was the only one that could support heavy bombers, until the December completion of Del Monte Field. Another bomber base was scheduled for construction, in the Visayas.

In August of 1941, $10,000,000 was spent to improve the airfields. Most of these funds were spent on Nichols and Clark Fields, with the rest spent mostly on auxiliary fields at Iba, on the Zambales coast, to the west of Clark, and various points on northern Luzon.

More:

http://www.whoa.org/publications/stories/barbedwire/


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Sunday, December 7th, 1941


The Japan's first act of war that day is not the bombing of Pearl Harbor, but the laying of mines off the coast of Malaya to cover the forthcoming invasion. The British planes on Malaya still had difficulties with low thick clouds, yet on several occasions they could see the Japanese invasion fleet steaming toward Malaya. The reports were, however, so unclear, that they couldn't make a clear picture toward which place are they sailing to. At the end they dispatched two flying boats Catalina futher to the north to observe the bays on the west coast of Indochina. One plane returned, not noticing anything, while the second plane never returned. The flying boat PBY Catalina of No.205 RAF Squadron captained by Flying Officer Bedell was shot down by Japanese aircraft whilst attempting to monitor the progress of the Japanese fleet and all his crew died. They were the first Allied casualties of the war with Japan. Shortly after midnight the Indian guards at Kota Bharu observed three large transport ships dropping anchor approximately 3km's from the coast. Several minutes afterwards the shelling starts. Rough seas and strong winds hampered the operation and a number of smaller craft capsized. Several Japanese soldiers drowned. Despite these difficulties by 12.45 the first wave of landing craft carrying troops under the command of Colonel Masu were heading for the beach in four lines. The Japanese soldiers, the veterans of the 56th Infantry Regiment, came ashore, and ran into stiff machinegun fire from British and Indian troops of the 8th Indian Brigade (Brigadier B.W. Key). After a short and tough fight with Key's Indians, the Japanese managed to create a solid bridgehead. Having been alerted of the Japanese landing, Hudsons of No.1 RAAF Squadronn began taking off to bomb the transports. Despite the intensity of the AA gunfire, the Allied planes scored several hits and severly damaged the ships.
The attackers had risked. They were on land 70 minutes before the Pearl Harbor strike , and any news about the attack might warn the Americans on Hawaii. Fortunately for the Japanese this didn't happen.

http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/december2.html

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http://www.texasescapes.com/DEPARTME...rMidgetSub.htm

Midget sub commander tells of his role in the attack on Pearl Harbor

NAGOYA, Japan, Dec. 7, 1948—(UP)—

Kazuo Sakamaki, only Japanese survivor of the midget submarine attack on Pearl Harbor seven years ago today, has had enough of war.

But seven years ago, Sakamaki was one of five officers who set forth in five midget submarines ready, indeed eager, to die for the glory of his country in the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Each submarine carried two persons each was 74 feet long, weighed 30 tons, had a maximum speed of 24 knots and a cruising range of about 400 miles, and was equipped with radio transmitters and two bow torpedoes.

Sakamaki trained long and hard for what he sincerely believed was his date with destiny. He studied at the naval academy, learned to fly at Kasumigatura, practiced seamanship aboard the training ship Abukuma and underwent special training at Chujo Bay, which closely resembles Pearl Harbor. He was commissioned a sub-lieutenant.

He recalled vividly how his midget submarine was launched from its "hanger" on the afterdeck of a mother submarine off Pearl Harbor on the moonlight night of Dec. 6. He was 23 years old then.

His orders read to coordinate an underwater attack with the aerial bombardment of Pearl Harbor. He was instructed to attack, in order, aircraft carriers, battleships, and heavy cruisers.

The instructions said that he should rendezvous after the attack at point 7 off Lanai Island. But he knew that was only a formality. All were expected to die for their country.

"I said good-bye to the captain of the mother sub and 10 minutes later we surfaced so that we could enter our midget submarines," he said.

"It was then I got a nasty shock. My gyrocompass was out of commission. Why, I don't know. There was no time for repairs. After consulting the captain, I decided to attempt to make the journey anyway."

Without the gyrocompass, Sakamaki said he found his craft almost unnavigable and unmaneuverable.

"But I finally got to the entrance to Pearl Harbor just before 7 a.m.," he said. "We were to attack at 7:50."

For the next three hours, he said, he "hung around" Pearl Harbor trying to make repairs and trying to find a target.

Several times he surfaced and was depth-charged. He saw several small craft — mine sweepers and destroyers — but he wanted to save his torpedoes for bigger game. Through his periscope he saw columns of smoke rising over the harbor.

The midget submarine grounded several times on reefs. Bilge water spread to the battery racks and deadly gases began to fill the submarine. Depth charges rocked in.

Their senses dulled, Sakamaki and his fellow crewman, Petty Officer Kiyoshi Inazaki, decided to try to make Lanai. Then the ship grounded for the 10th and last time.

Sakamaki swam for the shore of what he thought was Lanai. His companion drowned.

Collapsing on the shore, Sakamaki remembered nothing until he was shaken by an American soldier pointing a pistol at him, he had been traveling in circles and was back on Oahu.

"I was terribly ashamed," Sakamaki said. "I asked for an opportunity to die an honorable death, but they just laughed at me."

The commanders and crewmen of the other midget submarines were lost and were enshrined by the Japanese as "war Gods" soon after Pearl Harbor Day. The Japanese made no mention that Sakamaki had fallen into American hands.

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Urgh,

Something on the key words you gave:

http://www.wolftree.freeserve.co.uk/Burma/Burma.html

The actual fighting in Burma was divided into 4 main phases
Spring 1942, Spring 1943, Spring 1944 and Spring 1945.

A brief run down of the fighting vehicles used by both sides


The early allied tanks used were Stuarts and Valentines. These started being replaced in 1943 with Lee/Grants and later Shermans.
The Japanese used Type 94 Tankettes, Type 95 Light Tanks and Type 89 Medium tanks.
They also used several captured British tanks.
British 14th Army
English, Irish, Welsh, Scots
New Zealanders, Australians, NewFoundlanders, Canadians, South Africans, Chinese, East and West Africans
Chins, Kachins, Karens, Burmans, Sikhs, Pathans, Garhwalis, Gurkhas.


Head gear: turbans, slouch hats, berets, tank helmets and khaki shakos.

The forces that retreated from Burma

7th Armoured Brigade: 7th Queen’s own Hussars and 2nd Royal Tank Regiment
17th Indian Division
1st Burmese Division
Spring 1942: The British 7th armoured Brigade, which only arrived in Burma in February, scuttled all but one of their own Stuart tanks on the banks of the Chindwin, having successfully covered a British retreat. The Brigade under Brigadier J.Anstice was composed of 2RTR and the 7th Queens own Hussars. Other attachments included 414 Battery Royal Artillery (Essex Yeomanry). Having covered the retreat out of Burma, the 7th Armoured Brigade returned to the Middle East, eventually finishing up in Italy.

Operations Spring 1943

14th Indian Division
146 Regiment RAC equipped with Valentines
Most of the Valentines used in this operation were lost as they were unsuitable for the terrain.
Offensive January 1944
This largely envolved elements of 15th Corps who endured attacks from Japanese troops who had surrounded their position.

5th Indian Division under Major General H.R. Briggs
7th Indian Division under Major General F.W. Messervy
2 Brigades 81st West African Division
25th Dragoons under LT-Colonel H.R.C. Frink
Other units later engaged in this area.
26th Indian Division

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http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-C-Burma/

Less than a week after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese planes took off from captured bases in Thailand and opened the invasion of Burma by bombing the Tavoy airdrome, a forward British outpost on the Andaman Sea south of Rangoon. The next day, 12 December 1941, small Japanese units began the ground offensive by infiltrating into Burma. Not having prepared for war, Imperial British forces in Burma lacked even such rudimentary necessities as an adequate military intelligence staff. Although a civil defense commissioner had been appointed in November 1941, the British had not made contingency arrangements, such as military control of the railroads and the inland waterways. The only British forces in Burma were a heterogeneous mixture of Burmese, British, and Indian units known as the Army in Burma. Their air support consisted of some sixteen obsolete Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters.
The only American combat force even remotely available at the onset of the fighting was the fledgling American Volunteer Group (AVG). Organized by retired Army Air Forces Col. Claire L. Chennault, with the approval of both the Chinese and American governments, the AVG was preparing to provide air support to the Chinese Army against the Japanese in China. The AVG had begun training during the summer of 1941 in Burma to be out of range of Japanese air raids until ready for combat.

Chennault had hoped to employ his three squadrons of fighter aircraft, after thorough training, as a single unit in China, but the outbreak of war in the Pacific and subsequent Japanese invasion of Burma quickly changed his priorities. In response to a British request for support on 12 December, one squadron of the AVG moved from the training base in Toungoo to Mingaladon, near Rangoon, to help protect the capital city and its port facilities. The two remaining squadrons deployed to China to protect Chinese cities and patrol the Burma Road.

When Japan began operations in Burma, the United States recognized that the British would need assistance. The American Military Mission to China (AMMISCA), under Brig. Gen. John Magruder, had been in Chungking since September 1941 to coordinate, among other things, American lend-lease aid for China. On 16 December the War Department gave Magruder authority to transfer lend-lease materiel awaiting transportation in the port of Rangoon from Chinese to British control. The transfer, however, was subject to Chinese approval since, in accordance with lend-lease agreements, title for the materiel had been technically transferred to China when it left the United States.

Other problems originated with the British, who were jealous of their imperial prerogatives. The Chinese were willing, even anxious, to provide troops to assist in the defense of Burma. The generalissimo offered two armies with the proviso that they would operate in designated areas under Chinese command and would not be committed to battle piecemeal. Reluctant at first to permit large Chinese forces to operate in Burma, the British agreed to accept only one division of Chinese troops. Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell, British commander in chief in India, believed the Japanese offensive in Burma was overextended and would only end in failure; Chinese forces were not required for victory. Accepting the use of one Chinese division, he judged, was an adequate response to the generalissimo's offer.

Although the British were lukewarm about Chinese participation in the defense of Burma, the Americans embraced the idea. When the Chinese threat of stopping cooperation with Britain after the Tulsa incident had reached the Allied Arcadia Conference in Washington, D.C., the Americans reacted with alarm, fearing China might actually elect to withdraw from the war. This fear was exacerbated by the continuing string of Japanese successes in the Pacific (Hong Kong had surrendered on Christmas Day and Manila was declared an open city the next day).
Singapore surrendered with 80,000 troops on 15 February; eight days later the British-Indian brigades in Burma were crushed in the Battle of the Sittang Bridge, a defeat that effectively left the path to Rangoon open to the Japanese advance. On 25 February, the Australian-British-Dutch-American Command (ABDACOM), the Allied command established on 15 January to defend the region, was dissolved in the face of continued Japanese pressure. Although Stilwell was assigned duties in China,events in Burma thus dominated his first months as Chiang Kai-shek's Allied chief of staff.

With Rangoon threatened, Magruder ordered the destruction of all lend-lease stocks in an effort to deny them to the invading Japanese. As the Japanese approached, there had been frantic activity to move as much materiel as possible north to the Burma Road, but it was still necessary to destroy more than 900 trucks in various stages of assembly, 5,000 tires, 1,000 blankets and sheets, and more than a ton of miscellaneous items. Magruder transferred much materiel to the British forces, including 300 British-made Bren guns with 3 million rounds of ammunition, 1,000 machine guns with 180,000 rounds of ammunition, 260 jeeps, 683 trucks, and 100 field telephones. In spite of the destruction and transfer to the British, however, over 19,000 tons of lend-lease materiel remained in Rangoon when it fell to the Japanese on 8 March.

The movement of the two Chinese armies into Burma proved arduous. Troop transport was scarce, and the Chinese Army had little or no internal logistical support system. Moreover, the Chinese se