Why have the Japanese defeated us ?



The Japanese had beaten us in Malaya, because they were better in all. At first they were good prepared on the warfare under those climatic circumstances as we found on the Malayan peninsula.


They had lighter uniformes with shorts and boots with rubber soles. In colour and cut those uniformes sometimes differed, but all were in a good camouflage style crediting to the jungle green. They wear the most differing types of headgear, cotton caps, steelhelmets or hats which they collected from the captured and dead. The even wore Malayan sarongs, two prisoners which we captured at Batu Pahat were fully dressed as Chinese kulis. This all has made irritations amongst our soldiers, especially because this was a land in which they simply couldn't differ between enemies and allies. Those which observed the battlefields the first time listened to rumours about "fifth columns". So more and more British were convinced that the whole domestic population was fighting against them, because they couldn't differ Japanese from Chinese and Malayians.


In terms of food the Japanese were better too. Because their main food was rice, they easily lived from that, which was enough to them. The British units have to transport their various goods on long and winding paths. The Japanese soldier had with him a can of water, cooked rice and some salted dry fish, which lasts for three or four days.


Almost all Japanese were armed with machine pistols or other automatic weapons, which were very suitable for hand-to-hand fighting in the jungle. Ours were usually armed with to heavy rifles and only few of them had automatic weapons. Most of our officers were convinced until the end of the fighting, that the exact firing rifle is superior to the inaccurate machine pistols, but to me this is not valid in jungle fightings, because shooting on long distances as not possible here. The Japanese had with them 6-8 ammunition magazines for every automatic weapon, all other ammunition was carried behind them by ordinary bicycles through the narrow jungle paths.


Beside their machine-guns their favourite weapon was the 50 mm mortar, which could be carried easy by two men. Artillery almost wasn't used until the siege of Singapore. For fighting in the thickness, hand grenades were also used in greater numbers. Sometimes they climbed on trees and threwed the grenades down on our vehicles. Very dangerous too, were their sharpshooters, good hidden in the woods.


Perhaps the greatest surprise was the intense use of bicycles which they brought with them or had confiscated or bought from the domestic inhabitants, which were paid occasionally with banknotes, which were special issued for the Malayan campaign. In colour and size they were similar to the pound notes of that time which certainly secured a lot of irritations among the population. Also this indicates how well the Japanese were prepared for this war. With bicycles they raised their fastness and agility in a way which provide their troops to advance much faster.


The British were far from being so moveable. This is commented by a look on our soldier on the way to the battlefield, who had to carry his knapsack, steelhelmet, gasmask, large boots, tent, rifle, bayonet, not to speak about ammunition. Food and other stuff were transported by vehicles, but what that means under jungle conditions you can easy imagine. Even credited to the fact, that they were good motorized, our units were condemned to stand still.


Also the Japanese tactic was good considered. Small groups of men and even to every man, were shown their targets kilometres away, to which they have to fight their way through. This small groups were marching through the jungle to clear up enemy positions, following enemies tracks, and finally to unify themselves with greater units. To stay into contact with the supply units in their back they established wireless stations. When they met a far stronger enemy they avoid an encounter left him in their back and marched onwards. This tactic was not only ordered for small platoons, but even for brigades and divisions. It was successful mainly to the fact that the Japanese were thorough trained on jungle warfare and instructed in measures and structure of the terrain on their way to their targets.




(Gordon Lee, Battle for Malaya)

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

Basically, the Japanese were organized as a light infantry unit that was operating in its ideal environment. I've read somewhere that UK units anchored their defenses' strongpoints on roads and were easily bypassed by the Japanese.
Similar tactics were used in the Japanese campaign in the Philippines in 1942.
Correct me if I am wrong but I think similar infiltration tactics were used against the Marines in Guadalcanal. If these same tactics worked in Malaysia and the Philippines, why did these fail for the Japanese in Guadalcanal?

I know very little about the Pacific battles or even the Pacific wars, other then the Australians at war, so my question comes from a part in JCF's post about submachine guns. I didn't know that the Japanese had any Sub machine/Machine pistols, everthing I have ever read about them points only to there rifles and knee mortars and so on.

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They shall grow not old as we that are left grow old Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We shall remember them. Lest We Forget

Japanese WWII Submachine Guns
Top: 8mm Type 100 with Folding Stock ... Middle: 8mm Type 100 (1944 model)
Bottom: 7.63mm Bergmann 1920 (SIG, Swiss) used by Japan

"Until the thirties, the Japanese purchased Bergmann submachine guns manufactured by SIG in Switzerland. These are basically the MP 18.1 modified for a box magazine and chambered for the 7.63mm Mauser cartridge, with a bayonet mounting bar. The Type 100 was developed as a replacement, in 1940."

Japanese WWII Submachine Guns

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

Japanese Type 100 Submachine gun


The Japanese were surprisingly late to design a submachine gun, an oddity considering the length of their conflict with the Chinese prior to 1941 and the number of different submachine gun designs brought into Japan for examination and study. It was not until 1942 that the first example of what had been a low-priority development left the Nambu production lines in the form of the Type 100, a sound but unremarkable weapon that was to be the only submachine gun the Japanese produced in any number.
The Type 100 was moderately well made but had several odd features. One was the use of a complex ammunition feed device that ensured the round was fully chambered before the firing pin would operate. The exact purpose of this feature is unknown (other than the safety aspect for the operator). The cartridge used by the Type 100 was the underpowered 8 mm Japanese pistol round, a rather weak and ineffective choice that was not aided by its bottle shape which added to the feed problem. The weapon's barrel was chrome plated to aid in cleaning and to reduce wear. To add to such niceties, the design had a complex system of sights and a curved magazine that stuck out of the left side of the weapon. Also some versions had a complicated muzzle brake and a large bayonet mounting lug under the barrel, some even sported a bipod.
There were three versions of the Type 100, the first being described above. The second had a folding stock for use by paratroopers: the stock was hinged just behind the gun body allowing the stock to fold along side of the main weapon. Handy for carrying when parachuting, it weakened the weapon in combat situations and relatively few were produced.
The third version of the Type 100 appeared in 1944 at a time when demands for submachine guns were coming from all fronts. In order to expedite production the Type 100 was greatly simplified and in the process the design was lengthened slightly. The wooden stock was left with a rough finish and the rate of fire increased from 450 rpm to 800 rpm. The sights were reduced to little more than aiming posts and the large bayonet lug was replaced with a simpler mounting. At the muzzle, the barrel protruded from the perforated jacketing and the muzzle brake was replaced with two vents drilled in the top of the muzzle. Welding, often rough, was used whenever possible. The result was a much cruder weapon than the early Type 100s, but one sound enough for it's purpose.
The main problem for the Japanese by 1944 was not so much that they Type 100 was not good enough but the capacity to turn out the huge numbers needed. Consequently the Japanese had to fight their last-ditch defense at a permanent disadvantage against the better equipped Allied forces.
As a whole all of Japan's arms were inferrior and outdated. The lack of a semi-automatic rifle also hurt. The Type 100 was designed to fill the same role as the American Thompson and "Greese gun." Unfortunatly due to production and complications combined with the allied bombing of factories the Type 100 could not be produced in great quantities. For most of the war only the most elite units of the Japanese army were equiped with the Type 100. By the time the regualar army started recieving the Type 100, the quality had deterriorated, at times the weapon's assembly included nails. What few attributes the Type 100 had it quickly lost as quality declined.
Specifications

• Caliber: 8mm
• Length: 900mm (35.43 in)
• Length of barrel: 230 mm (9.06 in)
• Weight loaded: 4.4 kg (9.7 lb)
• Magazine: 30 round curved box
• Rate of fire, cyclic: 450 rpm or 800 rpm
• Muzzle velocity: 335 m (1,100 ft) per second

Type 100 Submachine gun@Everything2.com

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

The Japanese beat the British in Malaysia first and foremost through British blunders not through any tactical brilliance on their part.

If you start with the defense orgainzation itself, the British relied initially totally on Commonwealth troops of indifferent qualtiy. This is as much a penchant by the British to not give their best, or even equal, equipment to Commonwealth troops along with accepting poorer standards of training etc. In the case of Malaysia, the forces defending the country initially consisted of two Indian and one Australian infantry division each with just two brigades. These were backed by a further four independent brigades of even more indifferent quality. The British contengent was merely several battalions of infantry not integrated into the larger units.

The command itself was lethargic and made little attempt to fortify the country prior to the war. They regularly defered to local business interests when it came to building fortifications of private land. Note, that Britain was already at war so this should have been no real obstacle to fortification. There were plenty of land mines, barbed wire, and other engineering materials for use in fortifying positions.

Compounding this was an unrealistic plan to aggessively meet an expected invasion from Siam. It called for the 11th Indian Division to advance into Siam and take positions on likely landing sites fore going any attempt to defend the critical trunk roads into Malaysia.
Had the unit instead been fortified astride the roads at Jitra the Japanese would have found a tough nut to crack dug in behind mines and wire with plenty of anti-tank weapons and artillery.

Basically, without recounting the whole campaign, the British expected too much of units that did not have the training and resources at their disposal to perform the jobs assigned.

Hey it's JITRa,my hometown....

Notes on Japanese Warfare on the Malayan Front
Military Intelligence Division, Information Bulletin No. 6, January 9, 1942
[DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from a WWII U.S. War Department Information Bulletin. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]


NOTICE
The information contained in this series of bulletins will be restricted to items from official sources which are reasonably confirmed.
This document is being given an approved distribution, and no additional copies are available in the Military Intelligence Division. For provisions governing its reproduction, see Letter TAG 350.05 (9-19-40) M-B-M.
FOREWORD
The information in this bulletin, other than photographs and descriptions of weapons, has been extracted from reports submitted by American official observers with Allied Forces now engaging the Japanese in the Far East. The photographs are reproduced from an album recently published by the Tokyo Asahi ("Morning Sun"), one of the leading vernacular newspapers in Japan, showing Japanese troops in their operations against the Chinese. These photographs should be accepted with reserve, because they were published as propaganda. Nevertheless, they give a general idea of the Japanese soldier's equipment and his methods of warfare. In order that our troops may familiarize themselves with the appearance of their enemy, it is suggested that these photographs, which are themselves not classified as Restricted, might be removed and placed on bulletin boards.
CONTENTS
1. TACTICS OF GROUND FORCES
2. TACTICS OF AERIAL ATTACKS ON AIRDROMES
3. AERIAL ATTACKS ON GROUND TROOPS AND INSTALLATIONS
4. ANTITANK DEFENSE
5. MATERIEL
6. SUPPLY
7. THE FIFTH COLUMN
8. REPORT OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT


1. TACTICS OF GROUND FORCES
a. The Japanese use roads until contact is established with hostile forces. Then, avoiding frontal attack, they make, wherever possible, flanking movements through the jungle and the rubber plantations. The Japanese also make expert use of small craft, including launches and landing boats, in carrying out flanking movements by river or along the coast.
b. Japanese companies advance behind one and two-man patrols which are armed with submachine guns. When the patrols are fired upon, they do not stop, but maneuver around the flanks and infiltrate deep into the British position toward their objective, attempting to reduce any opposition met.
c. If British units counterattack, Japanese advance parties permit them to pass through and then turn and deliver fire on the flanks and rear of the counterattacking troops.
d. The Japanese work their way through the Jungle with ease. They display considerable initiative, vigor, and physical stamina and patiently wait under cover to take advantage of an opportunity to advance.
e. The Japanese have used the following tactics:
(1) Orders are issued orally for attacks on specific objectives;
(2) Small tanks accompany infantry attacks;
(3) No type of terrain is considered an obstacle;
(4) Attacks are by aggressive infiltration, followed up by the forward elements of the supporting troops and determinedly pushed toward a successful conclusion;
(5) Front-line troops are equipped with submachine guns and light machine guns, thus providing a volume of fire that seems to indicate heavier armament than that actually possessed.
f. So far the Japanese have used mainly machine guns, submachine guns, mortars, and grenades, but not much artillery. They are, however, beginning to increase the use of artillery. Mortars and grenades especially have been very effective.
g. The British have come to the following conclusions in regard to the tactics of the Japanese:
(1) A linear or static defense is ineffectual. To overcome such a disadvantage, the best system of defense would be self-contained combat posts as pivots of maneuver for an aggressive reserve. These self-contained posts would have all-round defense.
(2) The Japanese have unusual aptitude for overcoming terrain obstacles.
(3) After infiltrating to the flanks and to the rear of the opposing forces, the Japanese press home the assault with great determination.
h. Night Operations. The Japanese are reported to have been rafting troops down rivers at night.
2. TACTICS OF AERIAL ATTACKS ON AIRDROMES
a. Japanese bombers attack airdromes while their fighters draw R.A.F. fighters into combat. The bombers fly some distance from the field after the initial attack and wait until the R.A.F. fighters, because of lack of fuel, are compelled to land. Then the Japanese bombers return and attack the R.A.F. fighters before they can refuel and take to the air again. The R.A.F. is thus unable to intercept the bombers. Of course, the success of these tactics is made possible by the small number of R.A.F. fighters in the area.
b. Effective bombing of objectives around the edges of airdromes, sparing the runways, has been accomplished because the Japanese bombers have been confronted with little opposition. When the leader in the formation signals, all the planes in the formation release bombs simultaneously. Airdrome strafing is the main activity of the Japanese fighter planes.
3. AERIAL ATTACKS ON GROUND TROOPS AND INSTALLATIONS
a. Small flare bombs in strings of six to eight are being dropped by some Japanese planes. These flares have a percussion-striker explosive charge in the nose; and when they burst on impact, they give off a flash and cloud of smoke. On the ground they leave a brown stain.
b. Japanese planes attack communications, and trucks left exposed during daylight hours have been destroyed.
4. ANTITANK DEFENSE
The British have found it difficult to maintain tank obstructions on the roads, because the Japanese steadily harass the British flanks by infiltration. Tanks are employed with tactics similar to those used by the infantry, as described in Section 1.
5. MATERIEL
a. Anti-personnel Air Bomb. This bomb has a relatively ineffective shrapnel load encased in lead.
b. Individual Equipment
(1) Only a minimum of equipment is carried in addition to arms and ammunition, and this is generally very light.
(2) Rubber belts which can be blown up for crossing rivers are a part of the equipment.
(3) Dress is often varied and non-military. At night, commanders wear crossed or single white sashes; N.C.O.'s, white arm bands.
c. Small Arms. The regular bullet used in the rifle and in the light and heavy machine guns is a 6.5-mm. pointed Spitzer-type nickel-steel-coated lead projectile which leaves a small wound. The 6.5-mm. bullet is approximately .25 caliber.
d. Grenades and Submachine Guns. Among the light equipment are many grenades and a large proportion of submachine guns. See figure 1 for a group of grenade throwers. The following description of the Heavy Grenade Thrower, Model 89, is taken from the Japanese Handbook (WD TM 30-480, May 14, 1941), pages 79-80: Weight (total) _ _ _ _ _ 10.5 lbs.Length _ _ _ _ _ 20 in.Length of tube _ _ _ _ _ 10 in.Caliber _ _ _ _ _ 50 mm. (about 2 in.)Ammunition used _ _ _ _ _ Model 89 shell Time-fuze hand grenade Signal grenade Smoke grenade Practice grenadeRange for model 89 shell _ _ _ _ _ 140 to 700 yds.Range for other ammunition _ _ _ _ _ 40 to 200 yds.Signal, vertical _ _ _ _ _ 100 yds.Time of fuze _ _ _ _ _ 7.5 sec. after discharge or on impactRate of fire _ _ _ _ _ One man--10 shots per min.; two men--20 shots per min.Effective area of burst, model 89 shell _ _ _ _ _ 50-yd. radiusTime-fuze hand grenade _ _ _ _ _ 25-yd. radius

e. Machine Guns
(1) Light Machine Gun. Figure 2 shows the Nambu Light Machine Gun, Model 1922. The following description of this weapon is taken from the Japanese Handbook, pages 76-77:
(a) The Nambu Light Machine Gun, Model 1922, is a gas-operated, air-cooled, hopper-fed gun with a bipod support permanently fixed to the piece near the muzzle. It is normally fired from the prone position at ground targets. The hopper has a capacity of 30 rounds, which are loaded by placing in the hopper, one on top of the other, six 5-round clips of rifle ammunition. These are forced into the feed mechanism by a follower pressing down from above. The principal measurements and characteristics of this gun are as follows: Weight _ _ _ _ _ 22.44 lbs.Length, over-all _ _ _ _ _ 43.5 in.Caliber _ _ _ _ _ 0.256 in. (6.5 mm.)Rifling _ _ _ _ _ 4 grooves, right twistRear sight _ _ _ _ _ Graduated from 328 to 1,640 yds.; no windage or drift correctorMuzzle velocity _ _ _ _ _ 2,375 ft. per sec.Maximum range _ _ _ _ _ 4,374.4 yds.Cyclic rate of fire _ _ _ _ _ 500 rds. per min.Effective rate of fire _ _ _ _ _ 150 rds. per min. in bursts of five

(b) Although the light machine gun is usually fired from the prone position supported by its bipod mount, a tripod mount, model 1922, is carried by the gun squad for use as desired. When the legs are fully extended and the tripod is raised to its maximum serviceable elevation, the gun is about 4 feet from the ground. The tripod contains both traversing and elevating devices, but when the piece is to be used against aircraft, the elevating device is unfastened so that the weapon may be moved freely, both vertically and horizontally. When the piece is mounted on this tripod, the legs of the bipod are folded back along the barrel. The weapon is essentially a machine rifle when the bipod is used and a light machine gun when mounted on the new tripod.
(2) Heavy Machine Gun. Heavy Machine Gun, Model 92 (1932) (figure 3), is an improvement on Heavy Machine Gun, Model 3 (1914) (figure 4), which is described in the Japanese Handbook, page 77. Model 92 is now in general use in the cavalry and infantry arms, though, it is estimated, not in sufficient quantity to equip the entire Japanese Army in a large-scale offensive. The description of Model 92 which follows is taken from a report of an official observer:
(a) Mount. The mount is geared for elevating, and a small hand-wheel on the front of the tripod connects with the elevating screw. At the end of each of the tripod legs are attachments allowing for the insertion of handles. The rear handle is U-shaped. These handles add greatly to the ease of manipulation, and are also utilized for antiaircraft fire. In the latter case the U-shaped bar becomes the supporting spade of the gun, and two soldiers elevate the muzzle by means of holding the front handles over their heads. Such a firing position for this comparatively heavy gun gives poor accuracy.
(b) Measurements and Characteristics: Weight, gun _ _ _ _ _ 61.6 lbs.Weight, tripod _ _ _ _ _ 60.5 lbs.Length of gun _ _ _ _ _ 43 in.Length of bore _ _ _ _ _ 25 in.Caliber _ _ _ _ _ 0.303 in. (7.7 mm.)Rifling _ _ _ _ _ 4 grooves, right twist, one turn in 20 cm.Life of barrel _ _ _ _ _ 40,000 rds. (approx.)Traversing angle _ _ _ _ _ 360° of which approx. 35° on arc graduated in mils Maximum angle of elevation _ _ _ _ _ 11° Maximum angle of depression _ _ _ _ _ 15°Ground clearance of barrel: Low firing position _ _ _ _ _ 14.4 in. High firing position _ _ _ _ _ 21.4 in.Rear sight _ _ _ _ _ Graduated from 300 to 2,700 m.; no correction for windage or driftCyclic rate of fire _ _ _ _ _ 450 rds. per min.Maximum effective rate of fire _ _ _ _ _ About 200-250 rds. per min.Muzzle velocity _ _ _ _ _ 2,700 ft. per sec. (estimated) Maximum range _ _ _ _ _ 4,587 yds. (4,300 m.)

The clip holds 30 rounds of ammunition and is inserted into the gun from the left side. These clips are made of pasteboard and are loaded at the factory, thus eliminating pre-loading preparation on the part of the gun crew. When not in firing position, the gun is covered with a leather case.
(c) Antiaircraft Adapter (figure 3). The gun is equipped with an antiaircraft adapter, which is inserted between the gun proper and the tripod elevating screw. This adapter allows a maximum angle of 80 degrees and a vertical range of 1,000 meters. It requires less than a minute for an experienced crew to attach this adapter to the gun.
A brace attached from the adapter to the gun is telescopic and allows the gun to be held firmly at any desired elevation. The high elevated sight is detachable and is used only when the gun is operated as an antiaircraft weapon. When the sight and the adapter are not in use, they are carried in a canvas-covered case slung over the back of one of the ammunition carriers.
f. Mortars. The Japanese have at least four experimental mortars. Figure 5 stows the 90-mm. Mortar, Model 94. Its characteristics have been reported as follows: Maximum range _ _ _ _ _ 4,155 yds.Minimum range _ _ _ _ _ 612 yds.Weight of bomb _ _ _ _ _ 11 lbs. 10 ozs. (with chemical filling)Total weight in action _ _ _ _ _ 350 lbs. 8 ozs.

A mortar projectile of unknown caliber has been reported to have a small blasting effect.
g. Infantry Battalion Gun. The Japanese have another weapon which combines the lightness and portability of the mortar with the stability of a field gun. This weapon is called the Infantry Battalion Gun, Model 92, and is shown in figure 6. Figure 7 shows the same model with a redesigned carriage. Because of the weakness of the crank-shaped axle, it is presumed that the newer models have straight axles and so mount the gun higher. The following description of this weapon is taken from the Japanese Handbook, pages 82-83:
(1) General. The Infantry Battalion Gun, Model 92, is a 70-mm. rifled gun capable of delivering fire from a range of 200 to 2,800 yards. Its characteristics are-- Weight: Gun _ _ _ _ _ 101 lbs. Mount _ _ _ _ _ 77 lbs. Mounted gun and caisson _ _ _ _ _ 420 lbs.Length of bore _ _ _ _ _ 50 in. (approx.)Over-all length _ _ _ _ _ 27 in.Mounted over-all length _ _ _ _ _ 5 ft. (approx.)Width of wheel tread _ _ _ _ _ 27 in. (approx.)Effective range _ _ _ _ _ 300 to 1,500 yds.Traverse _ _ _ _ _ 45°Elevation _ _ _ _ _ -10° to +50°Danger area of burst _ _ _ _ _ 40 yds. (approx.)

(2) Breechblock. Two threaded segments rotating and opening downward.
(3) Carriage
(a) Recoil Mechanism. Length of recoil, about 4 inches.
(b) Traversing and Elevating Mechanism. Traversing hand-wheel on the left of the barrel and elevating handwheel on the right. Both handwheels are operated by the gunner, who lays first for direction, then for elevation. Elevating mechanism is similar to that of our old pack howitzer. Traverse is about a heavy pintle mounted on the axle.
(c) Shield. Armor plate about one-eighth of an inch thick.
(d) Trail. Split 5 feet long, welded except where riveted to spade.
(e) Panoramic Sight (same as field artillery). Mounted on the sight bracket on the left side of the piece. The sight bracket includes a range drum with four divisions marked in mils, an elevating bubble, and a cross bubble for correcting for difference in level of wheels.
(4) Ammunition. Semifixed with brass case. High explosive shrapnel and smoke shells are used. The range is extended by increasing the powder charge. At maximum range the time of flight for the different powder charges is-- Charge No. 1 _ _ _ _ _ 50 sec. (3,075 yds.)Charge No. 2 _ _ _ _ _ 25 sec. (1,975 yds.)Charge No. 3 _ _ _ _ _ 20 sec. (1,300 yds.)Charge No. 4 _ _ _ _ _ 15 sec. (985 yds.)

Minimum permissible ranges with instantaneous fuzes employing low-angle fire varies with the powder charge, elevation of gun, and target. With ground level ranges are-- Charge No. 1 _ _ _ _ _ 1,100 yds.Charge No. 2 _ _ _ _ _ 660 yds.Charge No. 3 _ _ _ _ _ 225 yds.Charge No. 4 _ _ _ _ _ 110 yds.

Minimum ranges with delayed-action fuzes ground level are-- Charge No. 1 _ _ _ _ _ 660 yds.Charge No. 2 _ _ _ _ _ 330 yds.Charge No. 3 _ _ _ _ _ 330 yds.Charge No. 4 _ _ _ _ _ 330 yds.

Rate of fire: 10 rounds per minute, 5 rounds per box.
(5) Other Vehicles
(a) Limber. This is a simple box mounted on an axle. Two boxes of ammunition, sights, and accessories are carried in the limber chest.
(b) Caisson. Similar in construction to the limber and contains three boxes of ammunition.
6. SUPPLY
Figures 8 to 12 inclusive are included simply to show some methods used by small units in supplying ammunition, food, and water to the front lines. Of particular interest is the method employed by the Japanese soldier in transporting ammunition (figure 9). It will be noted that the ammunition boxes are carried as shoulder packs, leaving the arms free for negotiating difficult terrain and permitting greater freedom of action under fire. Figure 10 shows the preparation of simple food, and figure 11 shows a method of getting it forward over exposed terrain. This method is of interest, for it indicates that advance elements, even though they may be held to the ground by hostile fire, can still be fed by a simple process. What holds true for the supply of ammunition to small units also holds true for the supply of water, as large canteens strapped on the back of the soldier will be noted in figure 12.
7. THE FIFTH COLUMN
a. According to a prisoner taken in northwestern Malaya, the Japanese landed without rations and got help from Fifth Columnists.
b. The Japanese are making wide use of propaganda leaflets dropped from the air.
c. Civilians dressed in the uniforms of British-Indian soldiers have operated with the Japanese. In some instances they oven know the British-Indian N.C.O.'s by name.
8. REPORT OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT
The following excerpts from an account by a war correspondent with the British Forces in Northern Malaya showing Japanese methods of warfare are included in this bulletin for informational purposes. The account has not been confirmed, but the reader can in some instances draw his own conclusions from the confirmed data contained in Sections 1 to 7 inclusive of this bulletin.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"Japanese successes have been attained through superiority of numbers and equipment and the use of clever but simple tactics especially adapted to the tropical lands. British officers at the front describe Japanese losses as 'enormous', but emphasize that the attackers keep pouring in, apparently determined to advance at any cost....
"The Japanese equipment includes one innovation, a two-man carrier, probably especially designed for use in the tropics. This little carrier can negotiate smaller streams, rice fields, rubber groves, and thin jungles, but is not heavily enough armored to resist British antitank rifles. It is proving a useful weapon in combination with the heavier tanks and armored cars that the Japanese possess.
"The Japanese tactics are based on infiltration and mobility. Apparently groups of men are simply being told to reach a certain objective many miles ahead, and they scatter all over the map to do it. When groups encounter a British strong point, they do not attack, but melt away and filter past along the flanks of the British position, concealing their movements in jungles of rubber trees. The strong point is later attacked by strong Japanese forces armed with heavy equipment, and simultaneously the Japanese close in on the flanks and rear.
"Japanese advance patrols armed with tommy guns sometimes for days are constantly working toward an objective, often lying low in the dense undergrowth to conceal themselves from the British. A number of advance units are sent to attack the same objective, so that if some meet grief on the way, the others will slip through and gain the goal. The Japanese obviously have made an intimate study of their terrain and apparently know every road and path in Northern Malaya.
"The Japanese regulars have a unique uniform, consisting only of light khaki shorts, a sleeveless upper garment that looks like an undershirt, and low rubber shoes. The Japanese tactics are leading to a savage warfare of movement, ambush, surprise, and encirclement. An American military observer I met at the front said:
"'It is like Indians fighting with tommy guns.'
"The Japanese have air superiority in Northern Malaya, but so far they have not been using planes much at the actual front in bombing or strafing. The raids on British airdromes are bringing air battles in which the British, despite numerical inferiority, emerge victorious.
"British land forces are rapidly adapting themselves to the Japanese type of jungle fighting, and much of the struggle at the front now consists of patrols stalking patrols, infiltration and counter-infiltration, intermingled with hard battles for strong points in which artillery is brought into use.... "British officers have been in the thick of close-in fighting, and I heard many stories of officers leading Indian units in savage charges." (By F. Tillman Durdin, New York Times, December 18, 1941)

Notes on Japanese Warfare on the Malayan Front, U.S. WWII Military Intelligence Division, Information Bulletin No. 6, January 9, 1942 (Lone Sentry)

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

I vasillated for years about the true effectiveness of the mythical Japanese soldier and mostly found him lacking.

First and foremost the majority of the Imperial Japanese Army fighting men were not overall better equipped for jungle warfare than their opponent. On Guadalcanal they were lost in the jungle, lacking food and had heavy weapons that could not be transported through the dense vegitation.

Perhaps it is still some vestage of American propaganda that was needed in 1942 to stimulate guys to enlist but the cunning, jungle expert IJA grunt never existed in my opinion.

If we look at the very 1st place the IJA had to prove itself, Edson's Ridge, we see a vastly outnumbered USMC force producing a staggering body count in a ratio more akin to Zulus vs. British rifles in South Africa than a modern army.

In too many cases the Japanese fell back onto some fatalistic banzai tactic even when circumsatnces weren't nearly desperate enough to justify a "last ditch effort." In open confrontation they were all too ready to expend their lives for literally nothing.

Their island fortifications and determination to fight to the last man did slow the US schedule drastically and caused many casulaties. But again with what premise- everybody die! The firearms were poorly designed for the most part and of poor quality. The exceptions were not nearly numerous enough to be a cause for any tipping of scales in most circumstances.

While I personally admire their stoic attitude to a great degree along with their fatalistc, determination to perform, their lack of respect, yes respect, for their own grunts using them as chattel like Zulu kings did show me nothing of a disclipined, organized savvy band of intrepid warriors of the tropics. Far too often rag tag groups wandered about out of communication, with little ammo and food completely ineffictive.

Years later we allowed propaganda to build up the Soviets into a 10 foot tall super soldier and again we learned it was all bullcrap, myth, innuendo and half truths.

Frankly I look back in perspective and think even if the IJA grunt was dressed in body armor and armed with laser rifles they would have still chosen to banzai their way to tthe next world instead of fight rationally.

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Those Siamese help them anyway....and the Brit's don't provide us enough weapon for stopping the Jap's..it's the intensive campaign from Jap's toward the Brit's in Malaya..

Japanese Invasion of Malaya
December 8, 1941 - January 31, 1942






The British possession of Malaya was a major source of rubber and tin. At its tip was the powerful naval base on the island of Singapore. Veteran Japanese troops of the 25th Army landed in the north and pushed through the jungle terrain. British armed forces, though nominally more numerous, were poorly equipped and inexperienced and were defeated by the end of January 1942.

The Battle of Pasir Panjang Revisited

by Mr Lim Choo Hoon

On 15 February 2002, the long awaited World War II Interpretative Centre at Pepys Road was opened to the public.1 The centre is located in a pre-war building where the last battles of Singapore at the Pasir Panjang Ridge were fought 60 years ago. In these battles, units of the Malay Regiment defended Point 226 gallantly against the Japanese 18th Division troops' attack. The opening of the exhibition centre was timed to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942.

The question of the importance of the Battle of Pasir Panjang and the Malay Regiment has been a controversial one. British military histories provide very little details about this battle. Even the official British historian Woodburn Kirby has only a scant description of the battle.2 The only British official who commented favourably on the battle and the Malay Regiment was General A. E. Percival, the Commander-in-Chief of the Malayan Command. Commenting after the war, Percival remarked :

"When war broke out in the Far East, the (Malay) Regiment was in process of expansionlike many other units of our Imperial Force, (it) was not fully prepared for the ordeal which it was to face. Nevertheless, these young and untried soldiers acquitted themselves in a way which bore comparison with the very best troops in Malaya. In particular, by their stubborn defence of the Pasir Panjang Ridge at the height of the Battle of Singapore, they set an example of steadfastness and endurance which will become a great tradition in the Regiment and an inspiration for the future generations."3

Even for the Japanese, most accounts of the Malayan Campaign in World War II have ignored the Battle of Pasir Panjang completely.4

Historians in this region, on the other hand, treated the Malay Regiment and the Battle of Pasir Panjang quite differently from their western and Japanese counterparts. They felt that it was one of the fiercest battles fought before Singapore fell and the great sacrifices by officers and men of the Malay Regiment to fight to the last marked the highest form of "honour, duty, and courage" for the professional armed forces.5

Who were these Malay Regiment units? How important was this battle to the British? Was the Malay Regiment, one of the smallest units of the British forces, deserving of such attention in this battle? And, in what ways can we justify that the event and the battle site are worth remembering and publicising? This article hopes to look at these questions.

Article (V28N1 - The Battle of Pasir Panjang Revisited)

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.