Introduction

The Royal Netherlands and East Indies Forces operated from Australia as part of the allied opposition to Japan during World War Two.
The Netherlands and the USA were the only non-Commonwealth allies to establish bases in Australia during the war. When the Netherlands East Indies (now Indonesia) fell to the Japanese, remnants of naval, army, air and merchant marine forces relocated to Australia. They were joined here by Dutch people from Europe and other areas to form fighting and support units. Operating from Australian bases for the rest of the war, these Dutch forces made an important contribution to the defence of Australia and eventual allied victory. Queen Wilhelmina of The Netherlands announced her government declared war on Japan in 1941, making the Dutch and Australian peoples allies in the forthcoming struggle.


A Brief History

The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, and in the next three months overwhelmed much of South East Asia and the islands to Australia's north. The Philippines fell quickly, along with the Malay Peninsula and the vital British base of Singapore. Such was the speed of the Japanese advance that only ten weeks after Pearl Harbour, they attacked Darwin. Eager to secure vital war-fighting resources, particularly oil and rubber, they rapidly moved towards the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia).
The Netherlands had built up land and sea forces, each with air support, within the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.). These NEI forces became part of a hastily formed American, British, Dutch and Australian (ABDA) alliance to oppose the Japanese. Unfortunately, ABDA did not have time to become a cohesive force and although many elements fought bravely, it was no match for the highly trained, well equipped and well led Japanese.
When the Japanese Imperial navy destroyed the Dutch-battle cruisers De Ruyter and Java, the HMAS Perth and the USS Houston to win the Battle of the Java Sea on 26 February 1942, all chance of saving the NEI was gone. Selected elements of the NEI forces were relocated to allied countries, including Australia.
In some ways Australia was an "any port in a storm" choice, for it too was threatened. The Japanese had moved into northern New Guinea, hoping to take over the whole island. This would complete their dominance of Australia's northern approaches, greatly reducing Australia's usefulness as a base for allied counter attacks. Their ability to invade Australia would also be much enhanced. Denying the Japanese control of New Guinea and the nearby approaches to Australia thus became a key allied strategy.
The Battle of the Coral Sea prevented Japanese naval forces from helping to take over the southern areas of New Guinea. Everything now depended on the land and air battles. It was here that the relocated NEI forces played a vital and decisive role.
Relocated NEI forces included six warships, nine submarines, over 1,000 troops and a number of aircraft, mostly transports. These resources were warmly welcomed and quickly integrated with Allied forces. But even more important in those dark days were the KPM company's merchant ships now located in Sydney.
Australia then had virtually no merchant navy.
The 28 KPM ships now based in Sydney became the major Allied supply line during the most critical, early stages of the New Guinea campaign. Indeed, they became a life line to Australian and U.S forces in New Guinea, delivering some 1 000 000 tons of supplies and 100 000 troops to the allied forces. Their contribution is hard to overstate. 19 of the 21 merchant ships allocated , to General MacArthur's command were Dutch. In all probability, without the KPM merchant fleet, the Allies could not have beaten the Japanese in New Guinea in 1942-43. Australia may have been invaded and the Allies would certainly have had a much harder and longer task to win the war. The urgent need saw unarmed KPM ships pressed into service almost immediately they arrived in Sydney. On 6 April 1942, only six weeks after leaving the NEI, the Cremer, van Heutz, Tasman and Maetsuycker ferried American troops, who had just arrived on the Queen Elizabeth, from Sydney to New Guinea.
With time KPM ships were armed, albeit rudimentarily. By December 1942 the "Lilliput" convoy system was devised to support allied forces. Dutch involvement in Lilliput convoys was high throughout, resulting in the worst losses of any allied force.
Experienced seamen were always in short supply. Ships' crews were often undermanned and routinely included Australian merchant and naval personnel and men from other allied countries - in one case the crew was almost entirely Filipino.

The Janssens.
The best known of the 28 Dutch Merchant ships that carried over 1,000,000 tons of supplies and 100,000 troops to New Guinea. The Janssens was a civilian supply and accommodation ship for Dutch submarines, winning fame for its daring operations.

Many ships became well known to allied fighting men. The Balikpapan served throughout the war, ferrying troops. Even better known was the Janssens, commanded throughout by the tall, thin, unflappable Captain G.N. Prass. She sailed under charter to the Dutch Navy as an accommodation and supply ship for Dutch submarines, but always with a civilian crew. Prass once took his ship, with a scratch crew and without a pilot, through a mine field in pitch darkness and heavy rain, only to be attacked by Japanese zeros next day, taking many casualties and sustaining considerable damage, but still making it to a safe port. For most of the war, the Janssens' only armament was two twin machine guns scrounged from a wrecked Catalina flying boat.
The naval ships and submarines based in the NEl joined with other ships of the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNN now RNLN) to operate in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. RNN submarines from Ceylon sank Japanese ships in the Indian Ocean, so helping defend Australia.. In early 1943 Dutch ships based in Fremantle helped escort the Australian 9th Division back from the Middle East. A Dutch submarine rescued thirteen crew from HMAS Yarra when she was sunk in March 1943. An early version of what became the US 7th Fleet was a multinational force of US, Australian and Dutch ships. Two thirds of the fleet's cruisers were Dutch, as were two destroyers, two submarines and a minesweeper.
Ships are essentially self-contained units, and surviving elements of the RNN sailed readily to Australia and quickly became an effective part of the Allied force. The NEI Army, the KNIL, lacked this mobility. A force of 90,000 - 40,000 regulars and 50,000 Reserves - it had no evacuation plan, and most KNIL members who survived the fighting were taken prisoner.
During 1942, 1074 KNIL members reached Australia from Java, New Guinea and other islands. By mid-1942 they had a Headquarters in Melbourne and a 745 strong force garrisoning those parts of the NEI not occupied by the Japanese. Despite some heroism, they were outnumbered everywhere and withdrawn. From then on, KNIL forces operated mainly with the Australian Army.

In December 1941 Australian troops were sent to Timor, considered a stepping stone to Java. The island was half Dutch and half Portuguese. Portugal was neutral, but few expected the Japanese to respect that fact. Local forces were small - 500 Dutch and 500 Portuguese. On 26 January 1942 Japanese aircraft attacked Dili in Portuguese Timor and by late February Japanese troops had landed in force. Australian and Dutch troops fought a Guerrilla style war, assisted by some Timorese. Reinforcements were sent from Australia, but the Japanese strength continued to build.
In early December 1942, 59 KNIL reinforcements died when their ship was sunk near East Timor. Soon after, the decision was made to withdraw. When this occurred in late December 1942, East Timor guerrillas numbered some 400; including 192 Dutch, 64 Australians and 87 Portuguese.
KNIL companies fought with the 7th Division and the 26th Australian Brigade. In June 1944, the 1st Battalion - with a strength of509,was set up with people drawn from as far afield as Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. It included infantry, technical rehabilitation experts and a company of guides and interpreters who accompanied allied troops re-taking Dutch territories. . From May to July 1945, KNIL troops fought alongside Australians in Tarakan and Balikpapan.
The Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service collected information and conducted special operations (sabotage, setting up undergrounds etc.) in former Dutch territories, including the NEI. 250 people did 36 operations. About half were successful, but they paid a high price, with many captured and 42 killed by their captors.
By war's end the KNIL numbered some 5 000, including a Women's Corps of 120, and a Papua Battalion formed and based in New Guinea.
Those NEI air units who flew to Australia did so mostly in flying boats and transports, as these aircraft had the necessary range and could carry passengers. A flight of flying boats made it to Broome, but were attacked on the ground, destroying the aircraft and killing some seventy refugees. A variety of transport aircraft made it to Australia. NEI air personnel were mostly aircrew. Lacking groundcrews, they could not quickly become operational and most of the refugee transport aircraft were soon transferred to the US forces to fill urgent needs.
Netherlands East Indies B25 Mitchell bombers in Canberra 1942.
The NEI had ordered and paid for aircraft from the US and three squadrons were formed in Australia. No.18 Squadron formed in Canberra on 7 APril 1942 flew its B25 Mitchell bombers. The majority of the aircrew were Dutch, mostly from the NEI. Others came from Dutch training courses run in the USA and the rest were Australians. Most groundcrew were Australians from the RAAF. The B25s formed a composite squadron within the RAAF that flew over 900 operational sorties during WW2.
In June 1942 the squadron consisted of 242 Dutch and 206 Australians. The Squadron was commanded by Dutch officers but was under the operational command of the RAAF, being part of 79 Wing.
An early success was the sinking, on 5 June 1942, of a Japanese midget submarine 115 km east of Sydney by Captain Gus Winckel in a B25. Apparently the midget submarine, having just attacked Sydney, was lost and so unable to rendezvous with the mother ship when sighted on the surface.
Later in the war, No.18 Squadron moved to Bachelor in the Northern Territory, and flew missions to the north of Australia and back over the NEI.
From there they moved into the South West Pacific, operating from a number of fields, and eventually flying over 900 operational sorties.
No 19 Squadron flew the famous C47 Dakota throughout Australia and to points north.
A memorial erected in Cairns in 1989, following the recovery of remains of a crashed Dutch C47 in North Queensland, provides a permanent reminder of their contribution and sacrifice.
The other squadron was No 120, flying Kittyhawks in New Guinea. They operated from the Dutch base at Merauke (in the south of what today is called West Irian) providing air defence for Merauke and contributing generally to the allied effort in the region.
Throughout, they worked closely with the RAAF Kittyhawk squadrons, training with them and at times sharing maintenance and other support.
Several thousand Dutch refugees had escaped to Australia in 1942 and the Netherlands East Indies Government-in-Exile was based in Brisbane during 1944-45, the only foreign government established in Australia during the war.
Along with the Dutch Armed Service personnel, this brought the number of Dutch people in Australia during the war to well over 10 000. Some settled in Australia, helping to keep alive the memories of the substantial contribution their fellow countrymen made to the defence of their adopted country in its darkest hours.
The Netherlands Australia Memorial in Canberra consists of four panels commemorating the naval, army, air and merchant marine components, together with a large panel displaying the bronze lion from The Netherlands coat of arms. The Memorial was officially dedicated by His Excellency, the Governor General Mr. Bill Hayden on 7 December 1991.
The re-development of the Defence Complex at Russell required that the Netherlands Australia Memorial be removed in 1997. Because important elements of the Memorial could not be saved it was decided to design and construct a new Memorial.
The new Netherlands Australia Memorial was re-dedicated on 7 December 1999.
Navy League of Australia - State Divisions

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

a adventure that deserves to be known. The Dutch contribution was valuable . Does someone have a picture of the Cairns memorial?

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I would think one of our Australian posters would post one .

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Very interesting stuff JCF!
Thanks, I recall seeing a book about The Janssens in a local bookstore. I'm going to have to go look at that! Thanks again!

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Members of the Dutch Resistance with 101st AB, Eindhoven. Operation Market Garden.

Scott

Thanks all. I am really trying to highlight some of the more lesser known forces that participated in the Far East region. Im going to keep looking for more . I also found out that the Dutch KNIL was sort of like the French and Spanish Foreign Legions.

"The KNIL was largely made up out of foreigners just like the French Foreign Legion only the troops got the keep their own identity. Up until after the Aceh war the KNIL drafted many Europeans (Germans, Belgians, Swiss etc), natives (Molukans Timorese and Mandorese) and even the Ashanti (African Ghanese tribe) to fight in the jungles of the East Indies. After the Aceh war the Dutch mainly drafted the natives, Indo Europeans and Dutch living in the East Indies. It was actually forbidden by law to send Dutch consripts to the Dutch East Indies. The ratio of foreign troops to Dutch troops was 60% to 40%."
Militaire Luchtvaart - Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger (ML-KNIL)


"De geest van de Hollander - "The Ghost of the Dutchman"

"After the fall of Celebes Island, February 1942, a small KNIL detachment, consisting of two Dutch officers (Lieutenant De Jong - commander and Lieutenant Van Dalen), four Dutch sergeants and 150 KNIL soldiers, continued with a guerilla war against the Japanese. They carried out several successful ambush attacks in Kolonodale area, killing many Japanese soldiers, but they were eventually all either captured or killed. Both officers were taken in captivity on 19 August 1942, and promptly beheaded after they refused to say that they regretted what they did to the Imperial Japanese Army. The only who managed to save himself by hiding in the dense jungle was KNIL Sergeant Jan Klinkhamer. Japanese offered a reward of 100 gulders to the local population for betraying him or handing-over. Only few local Indonesians knew where is he hiding and brought him food on several occasions. Other natives had spotted him twice vaguely in the foggy woods, and, therefore, started to call him "The Ghost of the Dutchman". He successfully stayed hiding in the jungle until 1945, when natives have finally informed him that Japan had capitulated. Only then he came from his hideout in the jungle, after spending more than three years in it."

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Attachment 2023

is this what you were wanting to see from a australian member
best krieg

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]for thow . will be ours someday .we shall have it all
. . und mear....


,

Attachment 2026

this one is a lot better to look at.. krieg

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]for thow . will be ours someday .we shall have it all
. . und mear....


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Thanks krieg

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Nice! Thanks krieg!

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Members of the Dutch Resistance with 101st AB, Eindhoven. Operation Market Garden.

Scott

no problem at all a shame there wosen't a biger pic a close up
still looking
krieg

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]for thow . will be ours someday .we shall have it all
. . und mear....


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Well keep looking . And BTW Im glad some of you are appreciating the info.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Really intresting post just goes to show how much more we can still learn about all areas of ww2 would love to know if you find out any more and if there are any books covering the KNIL, and "The ghost of the Dutchman" well done top post

Im always keeping my eye out for information like this. I will post more when I do.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Civilian Heroes of the Pacific War in World War II


One of the least known group of heroes on earth is the little group of blockade runners of the Dutch East Indies in 1942, who, at the request of the Australian, British, Dutch and American (ABDA) Command in that area, made desperate and dangerous supply runs to starving US forces in the Philippines who were then cordoned off by a powerful Japanese naval and air blockade, in the dark weeks and months after Pearl Harbor.
Only a few weeks earlier, US Marine Major Jimmy Devereaux had valiantly fended off a superior Japanese force in its attempts to capture Wake Island. Many historians now believe Devereaux's forces could have succeeded in denying Wake to the Japanese had the US Naval commander in the area at that time--Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher--been more bold. Fletcher chose not to attack the relatively smaller Japanese naval forces off Wake with his own powerful task force in the area, in support of Deveraux, for fear this would tip off the Japanese as to his force's locations, and allow them to bring in larger forces. Some military historians today see this as over-caution, as the Japanese forces were then pinned down and occupied with other areas to capture. In any event, in the midst of Admiral Fletcher's hesitation, a group of civilians on Wake with Devereaux's Marines did not hesistate: they took up weapons and fought the Japanese invaders, greatly bolstering Devereaux's tiny force and allowing Wake to hold out until just before Christmas, 1941.
Only a few months after the events on Wake and the events in the Dutch East Indies we will describe below, in late 1942 brave partisans in Yugoslavia would bring the German army occupying that area to the brink of disaster, as they hit behind the German lines in Russia and disrupted vital Nazi communications. At the same time, brave Polish Jews, in the underground in Warsaw, rose up in the ghetto there, and, for months, fought the German army in Poland to a standstill. These groups, along with the civlian laborers around Stalingrad who helped "freeze in" Hitler's invasion of Russia by winter 1942, and the French partisan guerillas who were to capture Paris from the Germans before the Allied armies had even entered the city, had one thing in common: they were composed, not of regular military units, but of civilians. I quote extensively below from Destination Corregidor by Robert L. Underbrink (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1971)
"The arduous process of supplying both the North and South Luzon forces during the withdrawal to Bataan was complicated by the shortage fo supplies and supply officers, the urgency of transporting food stocks and equipment to the peninsula, and the destruction of goods that could not be saved. . .
"A particularly vexing problem was the supply of rice...Quaertermaster officers immediately began buying all available rice; 5000 tons had been acquired and stored at Cabanatuan . . . by December 23, 1941. The trouble came when the quartermasters attempted to move the rice. In an effort to assure civilians an adequate supply of staples, the Commonwealth Government had decreed that neither rice nor sugar was to be removed from the provinces without governmental approval. General Drake vigorously protested this restriction and repeatedly asked for permission to transport both commodities to Bataan, but the Government ignored his appeals. As a direct result, the USAFFE was deprived of enough rice to have supplied Bataan for a year.
"Also lost were 2000 cases of canned fish and corned beef and a stock of clothing stored in Tarlac, but owned by Japanese wholesalers. Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Lawrence, commander of the Quartermaster Depot in Tarlac, tried to confiscate these supplies, but USAFFE Headquarters issued specific orders to the contrary. Lawrence was warned that he would face a courtmartial if he took control of the Japanese-owned stocks of food and clothing (17-18).
"In the late afternoon of 19 January 1942, Colonel John A. Robenson, US Army base commander at Darwin, Australia, received an urgent radio message from Headquarters, USAFIA, at Melbourne, instructing him to round up six resourceful junior officers of sound judgment and lfy to Java on a mission that would be described in a following letter.
"The following day Robenson slected Captain S.J. Randall, 1st Lt. F.H. Andrew, 1st Lt. J.C. Boudoin, 1st Lt. A.B. Cook, 2nd Lt. P.M. Nestler, and 2nd Lt. R.E. Stensland. A short time later, he added Private J.E. Lundberg, who turned out to be the mainstay of the mission, to handle the paper work.
"Despite the obvious urgency of the original message, it was three days before a plane brough from Melbourne a long, detailed letter spelling out the difficult assignment Colonel Robenson had been given. Stated simply, the Robenson Mission had as its objective the organization in the Dutch East Indies of ships, crews, and cargoes for prompt dispatch to General MacArthur's forces in the Philippine Islands (59)."
"Colonel Robenson was directed to dispatch two of his men to the Celebes, one to Makassar, the other to Buton, while he and the remainder of his staff organized efforts in Java. The Celebes-bound agents were to have ample funds--approximately three quarters of a million dollars--at their disposal to hire ships and crews to deliver cargoes to the Philippines. Recognizing the hazardous nature of the duty, Robenson and his agents were authorized to pay whatever sums were necessary, including large bonuses, to get cargoes safely delivered to the Philippine Islands, preferably the Manila Bay area.

"The Colonel was encouraged to seek assistance from nearly everyone in the East Indies, especially Dutch and British, both of whom were being informed of his mission. He was directed to purchase supplies as needed and to call upon the U.S. Army, Air Corps, and Navy--even the RAAF--if it appeared they could further his mission. Robenson was reminded that though risks were great, the dispatch of many small ships on a broad front over many routes would succeed. (60)."

"On [January 22, 1942, USAFIA Commander at Melbourne, General] Brereton received a message from Admiral Hart at Surbaya, recommending that the Mauna Loa and the Coast Farmer be sent directly to Mindanao, where small ships were available to carry cargoes to Corregidor. Hart reported that Makassar and Buton were not suitable for transhipment operations, and he warned that cargo ships proceeding north in waters west of 130 degrees longitude would run a heavy risk. Since 130 degrees longitude lies only a short distance west of New Guinea, this ruled out the movement of large cargo carriers into the NEI, and it also greatly reduced the number of routes believed open to blockade runners attempting to reach the Philippines from either Java or Australia (61)."
". . . Andrew and Stensland soon found that shipping was might hard to come by in Celebes..
"Only hours after Robenson departed for the Indies, he received new instructions cancelling plans for the transshipment of cargoes from the Celebes. Following receipt of Admiral Hart's warning, USAFIA had decided against delivery in the Celebes of rations and ammunitiion to be forwarded to the Philippines. The two officers were to be sent to Makassar and Buton, as ordered in the original directive, but their job was limited to the pruchase of subsistence and the movement of foodstuffs north by interisland cargo vessels. . . (62)."
"Captain Lewis J. Connelly, flying Lieutenants Andrew and Stensland to the Celebes in the Beechcraft, took off first. Upon the outbreak of war, Connelly, an experienced commercial pilot in the Philippines, had been commissioned in the Air Corps, and since that time had made hazardous flights all over the southwest Pacific in tired, old unarmed transport planes. The first leg of the journey, from Darwin to Koepang, Timor, was uneventful. But the second leg, the 450-mile hop to Kendari, the airfield nearest to Buton Island, nearly proved to be Captain Connelly's last flight.
"His original plan was to fly straight to Kendari, where he would deliver a tire for a grounded B-17 bomber. Andrew was to get off at Kendari and head for Buton while Connelly and Stensland would fly west to Makassar. However, Captain Connelly knew that Japanese aircraft had made several light raids on Kendari, usually between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. For some unknown reason--perhaps a hunch on his part--a short distance form Koepang, Connelly elected to go to Makassar first. He explained to Lieutenant Andrew that he didn't have enough gas to reach Kendari, but he could make it to Makassar. Yet this seems strange for the distances are almost identical. In any event, Connelly altered his flight plan. When the men landed at Makassar after dark, they learned that the Japanese had captured Kendari that very day. Had Captain Connelly followed his original plan, the plane would have dropped unwittingly into enemy hands, and the three men would probably never have been heard from again."
". . .Colonel Robenson ordered the men to meet him at the Oranje Hotel in Downtown Surabaya. . .
"Robenson ordered Lieutenant Cook to obtain from Mr. McLean of the firm, Frazier Eaton, four or five vessels of form 200 to 1000 tons, regardless of the price. Nestler was given an equally important assignment: the purchase of dry rations and caned goods--anything that could be transported to the Philippines. Colonel Robenson believed that they would have little diffiulty rounding up ships, crews and cargoes. But he soon learned that money wasn't everything (64-5)."
[It is interesting to note here that John Toland's But Not In Shame (NY: 1961: "This Naked Island") cites the large number of ships sunk during this period of time of the Japanese invasion and conquest of Malaya and Singapore. Toland noted that perhaps hundreds of vessels were sunk in the Indies waters below Singapore by Japanese aircraft. This explains a good part of the reason for the lack of such shipping. Note here, too, the role reversals we are seeing here: military personnel buying groceries, while civilians are flying hazardous missions for the military. Meanwhile, this very mission is attempting to utilize civilian shipping companies and personnel to get into places that Admiral Hart and his Navy staff and facilities have recently evacuated because they were "militariliy untenable," such as Manila Bay!--mcs]
"Lieutenant Cook reported that the Florence D., a small, fast cargo ship anchored in the harbor [of Surabaya, Java], seemed ideal for thier purposes. when the Colonel learned that the ship was under charter to the United States Navy, he made a beeline for Headquarters, US Asiatic Fleet, [the command of Admiral Hart, a man some fellow officers were already regarding as "overly cautious" due to his pessimistic statements about potential shipment of supplies to the Philippines for the Netherlands East Indies, or NEI], located in a large residence in the outskirts of Surabaya. But the Navy flatly refused to release the Florence D. Colonel Robenson ppointed out that General MacArthur and an army of 50,000 men were literally starving to death up on Bataan and Corregidor and stated in unmistakable language that he was going to move heaven and hell to get supplies into the Philippines. The Navy took the position that the Philippine garrison was doomed, and the dispatch of unarmed and unescorted cargo ships north was inviting their destruction. Robenso refused to give up. He promised to return the next day, and to keep coming back until they gave him the Florence D.
"As good as his word, Colonel Robenson continued to hound the Navy until finally, on 2 February (1942)--perhaps to get rid of him--the vessel was released. Another good break followed: the cargo ship Don Isidoro, which had been partially loaded at Brisbane, Australia and had circled the Australian continent, had just steamed into Batavia for additional cargo before making her run for the Philippines...(67)."
"The Philippine Don Isidoro, plain built in Germany in 1939, displaced 3200 tons and had a speed of 19 knots . . . When Colonel Robenson and Henry Quade inspected the ship, Captain Rafael J. Cisneros assured them that he and his men would do their best to deliver food and ammunition to the Philippine Islands. ..(67).

"While at Batavia, Robenson and Quade ...discovered that Mr. A.C. Bodeker, an authority on shipping in the NEI, was staying at the Hotel des Indies. The Dutchman agreed to make a survey of shipping available for blockade running to the Philippines. Bodeker found 13 vessels of British and Norwegian registry, ost of them small China coasters of ancient vintage, that might be pressed into service. When Robenson tried to lay hands on these ships, he ran into red tape shoulder high. "He immediately asked that the ships be held in port until he could originate a formal request for their use. However, before the restraining order was issued, the British Vice-Conssul at Surbaya, where most of the ships lay at anchor, sent six of them on their way, and it was not practicable to recall them.
"When Colonel Robenson attempted through official channels to obtain the release of the remaining seven vessels, he discovered that he had to have the approval of nearly every person of authority in the Netherlands East Indies: General Wavell, Supreme Commander, ABDA; Admiral Hart, Allied Naval Commander; Admiral Helfrich, the Dutch Naval Commander; Commodore Collins, the British Naval Commander at Batavia; the British Consul General at Batavia; the British Vice-Consul and the Chinese Consul at Surabaya. The Dutch officials, and especially Admiral Helfrich, were in the end the only persons who took any interest in Robenson's dilemma. ..(68)."
"All commercial shipping in the NEI technically came under Dutch control at the outbreak of war, yet the Netherlanders were hesitant to requisition ships without the consent of the British Government...[so] the colonel's real problem was to win British support...68)."
"On 10 February 1942, Robenson received by courier Henry Quade's resignation from the mission, written at Bandoeng the previous day. Quade remained there long enough to further Colonel Robenson's request for shipping. But by the time the request was submitted to ABDA Command, which had been moved to Lembang, only four of the original 13 ships were still available. Robenson's proposal had, in fact, been brought to the attention of the High Command twice, and it was decisively scuttled during the second meeting when both British and American naval authorities agreed that it was no longer feasible to move supplies into the Philippines. The implication was that the Philippine garrison was already lost...The four old coastal steamers Robenson had requested were free to go on their way.
"Incensed at the outcome of their joint efforts, Quade continued: 'During about eleven days of intensive scurrying around trying to locate ships and then to find who had authority to release them, we had almost no cooperation whatever--and apparently very little sympathy. When we finally pinned down the only quarter that presumably had power to act in this matter, our efforts were completely squelched. NO one wanted to take responsibility of issuing a direct order which was the only way we could get the ships (74)."
"During the time Robenson's request was being considered at Lembang, the officer conferred with Captain Manzano and drew up a contract covering the compensation, insurance, and conditions of performance for the forthcoming voyage to Mindanao. The contractual agreement between the US government and Captain C.L. Manzano, Master of the Florence D, dated 9 February, 1942, stated that the ship and crew were to undertake a special mission. In return for this service, the Captain was to receive 20,000 gilders, the Chief Engineer half that amount and each of the ship's remaining officers 5000 guilders, and all were to be insured.
"The twenty-eight crewmen of the Florence D. were to receive four times their normal salaries, and each man was insured for $500. The contract stated: 'This bonus to be effective only during the actual time necessary to deliver the cargo and if return passage is made, to be effective from the date of the departure of the Florence D , until its arrival at the port . . .'
"Since life insurance companies in the NEI refused to insure anyone involved in the mission, the contract stated that the US Army, through the Chief Finance Officer in Washington, assumed the life insurance liability of the officers and crew for the amounts indicated. Coveage was effective only for the period required to accomplish their mission, up to 60 days from the date the }{\plain \i Florence D.}{\plain left Surabaya. Should death result while engaged in the mission, appopriate compensation would be paid to the beneficiaries set forth in the contract. Madrigal and Company, Manila, PI., owners of the vessel, were to receive just compensation should the }{\plain \i Florrence D.}{\plain be lost as a result of enemy action. The agreement also stipulated that Captain Manzano would scuttle the ship rather than to allow it to fall into Japanese hands.
"When the ship was nearly loaded, Colonel Robenson gave Captain Manzano a case of beer to be delivered to General Jonathan M. Wainwright in the Philippines. Robenson and Wainwright, classmates at West Point, had "galloped many a dusty mile together," and were friends of long standing. Colonel Robenson remembered the General loved his beer. Included with the package was a letter in which Robenson said, '...This ship contains...practially all the 3" AA ammunition there is in the Far East...You're doing a great job . . .'
"On 12 February, while Robenson and his men labored to finish loading the Florence D. at Surabaya, the 3300 ton Don Isidoro stood out of Batavia with a cargo of flour, dry ratiions, and ammunition. Her course, as chartered by the Dutch Admiralty, was west from Batavia, south through the Sunda Strait, thence eastward through the Timor Sea. In the vicinity of Bathhurst Island, she was to swing north, through the Arafura and Banda Seas, then make a straight run for Mindanao. MacArthur had recently radioed that blockade runners were to be sent to Anaken, Mindanao, on Gingoog Bay, and that the Anakan Lumber Company would handle unloading operations. But fate had other plans.
"That same day, Cook went to the U.S. Navy Headquarters for routing instructions for the Florence D. Aside from a single native soldier, the former Headquarters building was deserted. The only information the native had was 'everybody gone.' Cook returned to the Oranje. Private Lundberg was unaware that the Navy had pulled out and Colonel Robenson was out of the city. On a hunch, lieutenant Cook turned on a radio for the regular noon broadcast by Tokyo Rose, who gave all the news, including the move of Navy Headquarters and the new address. Cook went to the address, found the Navy offices and obtained routing instructions for the blockade runner.
"The smaller 2600-ton Florence D was now ready to shove off for the Philippines. Within 24 hours after the Don Isidoro left Batavia, the Florence D left Surabaya. 'It might have been wishful thinking,' said Colonel Robenson later on, 'but somehow as I watched that ship stand down the bay I'd have bet my boots and spurs that she was going to get through to Mindanao. It seemed to me that she just hadM to get through--that God would let no one stop her.'
"It appeared that Colonel Robenson's efforts were beginning to pay off, and that afternoon General Brett radioed MacArthur at Corregidor the good news that the two blockade runners were on their way. He reported that the total cargo included 500,000 rations, 10,000 rounds of three-inch ammunition, quarter of a million rounds of .50 calibre, and three million .30 calibre. The Florence D's cargo also included canned fruits, jams, jellies, candies, cigarettes, and beer--items certain to be welcome on Bataan (74-6).
"That night Colonel Robenson learned of the surrendor of Singapore. The loss of Singapore, ' . . . One of the most bitter and decisive defeats ever suffered by the forces of the British Commonwealth,' imperiled the entire west flank of the Malay Barrier defense line. Only one day earlier, 800 enemy paratroopers dropped on Palembang, Sumatra, had been annihilated . . . (84)."
"The pilots and crews mannning the northbound aircraft provided invaluable assistance to forces in the Philippines by carrying cargo to Mindanao, yet the more arduous task of transporting it on to Luzon fell to an ephemeral unit called the Bamboo Fleet. A decrepit high-wing Bellanca cabin plane, nicknamed 'Old Number Nine,' and two other planes, owned and operated before the war by the Philippine Air Transport Company, with William R. Bradford general manager and senior pilot. At the outbreak of war, the eight-year-old Bellanca, an ancient Waco cabin plane, and a four-place Beech biplane were commandeered by the US Army. Bradford was commissioned a captain in the Air Corps...(181-2)."
"Bradford's successful [first] night flight to Cebu sparked the idea of an air shuttle sevice between Bataan and American-held bases in the south.

"Operating out of Mindanao, the antiquated aircraft of the Bamboo Fleet were soon carrying foodstuffs and medical stores to Bataan Field, returning with key personnel . . .
"The vest-pocket airlift by the three ramshackle planes of the Bamboo Fleet was a strictly fly-by-night operation. And for good reason. With Japanese bombers and fighter aircraft freeling prowling the skies by day, the light planes were forced to operate during the hours of darkness.
"Few pilots at any time in any war have had a more hazardous assignment. Unarmed and dangerously overloaded, the little planes were highly vulnerable. Apart from the danger of enemy interception, the old airplanes pressed into service were old and tired, barely