I think it was Kokura, but I may be wrong.

JD,

You have jogged my (old) memory, I am fairly sure you are right.

OJ

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"I disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it". - Voltaire.

over the years. Don't forget that on March 9-10, 1945, General Curtis LeMay had launched an all-out low altitude fire bomb raid on Tokyo with 334 B-29s. Flying fast and low, stripped of guns for greater bomb load and speed, carrying over 1,600 tons of incendiaries between them, they burned out about 15.8 square miles of Tokyo, killing between 80,000/100,000 people that evening alone. It is also certain that raid injured about a 1,000,000 more (41,000 died later of infections). However since in many cases the records were burned with the citizens the total death tally may never be known definitively. I have trouble figuring out if it is worse to be dragged slowly into a firestorm by hurricane force winds to die; dying later of infection from the "natural fire" burns, or if it is worse to cease to exist in the nanosecond of an atomic blast or die later of radiation burns. Seems a bit of a toss up as to "inhumane", but then again war itself is "inhumane" is it not?

Anyway, starting an evening later, between March 11-18, 1945, LeMay launched fire raids with similar tactics on Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe; the second, third, and fourth largest cities in Japan. An additional 16 square miles of cities are turned to ash, killing at least another 50,000 people outright. Those who died later of infection and starvation are also not recorded due to each city having its documents held in the cities. LeMay was ordered in this time-frame to halt bombing of the Tokyo area and the Imperial Palace specifically as; "Emperor Hirohito and the internal structure of the Japanese government may become more of an asset than a deficit at a later date."

A meeting of the Target Committee in May to select alternate targets for atomic bombing originally included Kyoto. And another seventeen targets are selected for study: Tokyo Bay (for a non-lethal demonstration), Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Hiroshima, Kokura, Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Sasebo (some of these are soon dropped because they had already been burned to the ground). The target list was eventually "whittled down" to Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Niigata. However in late May, the Secretary of War (Stimson) rules out Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan and religious center, as its destruction may (politically) actually prolong rather than shorten the war. This moved Kokura (with its arsenal) and Nagasaki up in the list of targets.

Although Kokura was the primary target of the Nagasaki mission, neither it nor Niigata were included on the new target list submitted on August 14th. That list, in order of priority was: Sapporo, Hakodate, Oyabu, Yokosuka, Osaka, Nagoya. (see Downfall, R. Frank; p.303)

And let’s not forget the OWI notice #2106 (dubbed the "LeMay bombing leaflet") dropped over 35 Japanese cities on August 1st, 1945 was a picture of "B-sans" flying in formation. The Japanese text on the reverse side of the leaflet carried the following warning:

"Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative or friend. In the next few days, some or all of the cities named on the reverse side will be destroyed by American bombs. These cities contain military installations and workshops or factories which produce military goods. We are determined to destroy all of the tools of the military clique which they are using to prolong this useless war. But, unfortunately, bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with America's humanitarian policies, the American Air Force, which does not wish to injure innocent people, now gives you warning to evacuate the cities named and save your lives. America is not fighting the Japanese people but is fighting the military clique which has enslaved the Japanese people. The peace which America will bring will free the people from the oppression of the military clique and mean the emergence of a new and better Japan. You can restore peace by demanding new and good leaders who will end the war. We cannot promise that only these cities will be among those attacked but some or all of them will be, so heed this warning and evacuate these cities immediately." (See Richard S. R. Hubert, "The OWI Saipan Operation," Official Report to US Information Service, Washington, DC 1946.)"

Notice there are no references to atomic bombs, only "American bombs".

Days after the leaflets are dropped, on August 6th; The world's second atomic explosive device (and the first one to be air-dropped), "Little Boy", is detonated 1,900 feet above Hiroshima, Japan. It has a yield of approximately 15 kilotons TNT. Some 90,000 to 100,000 persons are probably killed immediately (again records are also incinerated); another 45,000 total persons will eventually perish from radiation sickness as a direct result of the bombing of Hiroshima so the total might be as many as 145,000 eventually.

On August 7th, the day after the Hiroshima bombing, it was undertaken to print and distribute millions of leaflets to other major Japanese cities warning of "future atomic attacks". Clearly NOT before the "atomic" drop on Hiroshima. The leaflet dropping, and warnings to Japan by Radio Saipan began on August 8th, between the two "atomics". Nagasaki itself did not receive any "atomic" warning leaflets until August 10th, the day after its own bombing. Another "first air-dropped" atomic weapon. The plutonium "implosion stlye Gadget" was a proof of principle, not really a "bomb".

The August 9th Nagasaki bombing was "limited" in its damage by the "terrain" as the target drop was focused generally on the industrial centers. Even though it was the "lesser" in atomic related deaths, it still totaled about 74,000 from a combination of the initial blast effect, and later radioactivity related deaths. Upon hearing the news of the first atomic bombing of Japan on his way home from Potsdam (ironically aboard the same ship which had transported FDR to meet Churchill [the "Augusta"] ). President Truman remarked that this was "the greatest thing in history."

Clearly we (America) warned, cajoled, and attempted to get the Imperial Japanese to surrender on the terms we dictated, and wouldn't negotiate. See:

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-08-06&documentid=6-2&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1

To read the declassified leaflet which was dropped in the millions over Japan on Aug. 7th (their time), Aug. 6th (our time).

Whether or not the second bomb was "necessary" in the overall scheme of things, its use was directly linked to the Japanese surrender. It is not outside of the realm of possibility that even if it and the first one had been "duds", LeMay would have destroyed it and even more cites with his firebombing.

Why people continue to believe America had used up all its "atomics" is a mystery. Here is a timeline sort of compiled from the NARA records:

July 16: At 5:29:45 a.m. The "Gadget" is detonated in the first atomic explosion in history. The explosive yield is 20-22 kilotons (initially estimated at 18.9 kt), vaporizing the steel tower.
July 19: Oppenheimer suggest to Groves that the U-235 (target and projectile) from Little Boy be reworked into uranium/plutonium composite cores for making more implosion type bombs (4 implosion bombs could be made from Little Boy's core alone). Groves rejects the idea since it would delay combat use.
July 23: Secretary Stimson, in Potsdam, receives a new target list. In order of choice it is: Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata. He also receives an estimate of atomic bomb availability: The uranium gun-type "Little Boy" will be available for delivery on Aug. 1st. The second plutonium implosion-type "Fat Man" should be ready for use on Aug. 6th , and a third implosion-type might be ready between Aug.17/24th. Additionally, since the production plants were finally approaching reasonable efficiency, three more cores should be available in September. With more being produced each month, topping off, or reaching seven a month or more by December.
July 30; The nuclear components are inserted into "Little Boy", bomb unit number L11.
July 31; The assembly of Little Boy is completed. It is ready for use the next day with the initiator to be installed in flight.
August 1; A typhoon approaching Japan prevents launching an attack with Little Boy. Several days are required for weather to clear.
August 2; "Fat Man" (implosion type) bomb cases F-31 and F-32 arrive on Tinian (two half cases/one bomb), and Fat Man assembly begins. Oppenheimer cables Groves with a shipping schedule, and Groves reports that the next plutonium core would be ready for shipment on August 12 or 13, with a bombing possible on August 17 or 18.
Aug.11; Oppenheimer believes that the third implosion case will arrive in the Pacific at this time (he missed by a day).
August 12; un-named (implosion type) bomb cases F-33 and F-34 arrive on Tinian, but the next completed plutonium core is recalled from shipment and returned to Los Alomos the next day, and not used until the Bikini Island "Operation Crossroads" test. This core and case becomes the "Able" bomb which is air dropped in '46.
Aug.14; a fourth implosion case is completed, and this unit becomes "Baker" in the Bikini "Crossroads" tests.

Even with the reduced production due to the surrender of Imperial Japan, and the transfer of the atomic production from the MED to the NRC, America had 4 of the 5 Little Boy bombs in stockpile by 1948, and another set (over 100) of the Fat Man type implosion types in stockpile by the time Joe One was tested.
So it must be remembered that even with production at "peacetime levels" and those five implosion types used in tests Crossroads and Sandstone (pre-1948), America had thirteen other atomics in "stockpile" when Berlin was blockaded by the Soviets in June of 1948. Including the remaining four "gun-type" HEU as well as nine "Fat Man" implosion types. That blockade move radically altered the American production levels of atomics and the B-36 production too, which had been sort of on again off again since 1941. Then by the time the Soviets exploded their first "Joe One" in 1949 (a month or so after the blockade was lifted), America had about another 120 "atomics" completed and in stockpile up from 13, not too shabby for a one year "peacetime" run, huh?

Once the production facilities for both plutonium (Hanford WA.) and HEU (Oak Ridge TN), as well as the Los Alamos "core forming" unit for the plutonium, they could be made in rather rapid fashion. I don't know that "easy" is the word I would use, but once the R&D was behind you, the production (which America has always excelled at) itself is less difficult. Not "easy" exactly, but certainly less cumbersome and time-consuming.

Hey everyone, I am in a junior at Illinois State University and am assigned to participate in a public forum to do with American Military History. What do you guys think about the United States decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? On a website that I looked at, The Seattle Times | Seattle Times Newspaper, it mentioned arguments for and against the decision. Here they are:
For:

1) The Japanese had shown fanatical resistance, and fought to the last man. The firebombing of Tokyo, which killed some 100,000 people had no visible affect on the Japanese leadership. Only the atomic bomb could make them surrender.

2) The U.S. only had two bombs ready at the time, it was too risky to "waste" a bomb on a demo in an unpopulated area.

3) An invasion of Japan would have produced casualties on both sides greater than those seen at Hisorshima and Nagasaki.

4) Immediate use of the bomb convinced the world how terrible it was and prevented further use.

5) The bomb impressed the Soviet Union enough and ended the war quickly enough so that the Soviet Union did not demand a joint occupation.

Against:

1) Japan was ready to call it quits anyways. Over 60 of their cities were destroyed, the home islands were blockaded by the U.S. Navy, and the Soviets had begun to fight the Japanese in Manchuria.

2) American refusal to modify its "unconditional surrender" demand to allow the Japanese to keep their emperor needlessly prolonged Japan's resistance.

3) A demonstration explosion over Tokyo harbor would have convinced Japan's leaders to quit without killing many people.

4) Even if Hiroshima was necessary, the U.S. did not give enough time for word to filter out of its devastation before bombing Nagasaki.

5) The bomb was used partly to justify the $2 billion spent on its development.

6) The two cities were of limited military value. Civilians outnumbered troops in Hiroshima five or six to one.

7) Japanese lives were sacrificed simply for power politics between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

8) Conventional firebombing would have caused as much significant damage without making the U.S. the first nation to use nuclear weapons.

Those were the reasons listed, I don't know if they will sway you one way or the other, but I thought they should be mentioned. Anyway, what do you guys think?

You might want to do a seach for this. There are a few threads where it was discussed. Quite a bit of info and views in them. And comments from those who served in the Pacific during the war.

Was nuking Japan necessary?

http://www.ww2f.com/war-pacific/2388...ved-lives.html

Atomic bomb

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

While this is known in hindsight, Truman and his advisers could not predict that the atomic bomb would cause the Japanese government to surrender. It was thought that such was the case, but the use of the bomb was decided upon because it appeared to be far better than the alternative courses of action

This is incorrect. The US actually had three atomic bombs available; the third one was in the process of being shipped to Tinian and would have been available for use around August 19-20. In addition, the US had in place a "production line" which would have been capable of producing about one bomb every ten days. The committee of scientists who were advising Truman and his military advisers had determined that a "demonstration" bombing would not convince the Japanese because they would have no way to judge how much destructive potential it had.

This is true, although no one was willing to try and quantify the possible casualties. It's also important to note that trying to blockade/bombard (with conventional bombs) Japan into surrender (but without an invasion), would have produced massive numbers of Japanese civilian casualties, mostly due to starvation and disease.

I think this is questionable. Atomic bombs may still be used in a war someday. It certainly doesn't amount to a good reason for the use of the atomic bombs against Japan.

This is not true. Stalin did initially press Truman for a role in the occupation of Japan. He abandoned that demand only when Truman refused and told Stalin that the US would not allow it under any circumstances

Against:

This is also not true. The Japanese government was not ready to "call it quits" until the first atomic bomb was dropped and then only part of the government. The Japanese Army which controlled the War Council wanted to keep fighting even after the Hiroshima bomb, and only the Emperor had decided that the war should be ended. The Soviets did not attack Manchuria until August 8, two days after the first atomic bomb was dropped, and the news did not reach Tokyo until a few hours before news of the Nagasaki bomb. So the Soviet entry into the war had no effect on Hirohito's decision.

Again, not true. The Americans were aware that the Japanese government had specifically rejected the idea of surrendering, even if the Emperor's position were guaranteed. The Japanese government was not willing to surrender on any terms acceptable to the US government until after the atomic bombs were dropped.

This idea was specifically rejected by the American scientific advisory committee because an explosion over an uninhabited area, especially over water, would give no indication of the destructive power of the atomic bomb. It was felt that the Japanese would suspect that it was merely a large conventional explosion made to appear visually impressive by the addition of magnesium or some other material.

Not true. Word of the tremendous destruction wrought in Hiroshima was actually being discussed by the War Council members in Tokyo when news of the Nagasaki bomb reached them. It was imperative that the US demonstrate that the first bomb was not an isolated event. The Japanese military actually argued that the US could not have more than a single bomb after Hiroshima; the news of the second bomb effectively undermined this argument.

Probably partially true, but so what? This was a legitimate concern for the political leadership of the US, especially when one considers the huge cost in American blood that the US would have incurred if the bomb had not been used.

Not true. The ratio of troops to civilians is only part of the equation. There were large numbers of military targets in the form of war plants and military infrastructure in both cities. The bombs were specifically targeted to destroy these legitimate military targets

This is patently untrue. The cost in lives, Japanese, American, and the citizens of Japanese occupied territories, alone was enough to justify using the bombs. Not to mention the uncertainty, delay, and material cost of the alternatives. However Truman perceived the effect of the atomic bombs on the the Soviets attitude, it was not a major factor in the decision to use the bombs.

So what? In 1945, the atomic bomb was perceived as just another, albeit extremely powerful, kind of explosive. Besides that, firebombing would not have saved a significant number of civilian lives compared to the atomic bombs, and would have cost a significant number of American lives. Firebombing offered no military advantages over the atomic bombs.

It's a fairly representative cross section of the reasons more or less uninformed persons would offer, pro and con for and against the use of the atomic bombs on Japan.

If you haven't already done so, I would reccommend that you obtain a copy of Richard Frank's book, "Downfall; The End of The Imperial Japanese Empire". This book sets forth all of these issues and examines them in the light of recent historical research. It is probably the definitive study of the use of the atomic bombs and Japan's subsequent surrender.

Sorry, but trying to second guess historical decisions from 63 years after the fact is a futile effort with without having lived through the time period.

A recent documentary on the Enola Gay and BocksCar crews found that none of them had any regrets in their actions to deliver the nukes on target. The driving factor: negating the need for Operations Olympic and Coronet (invading mainland Japan) thereby saving over a million US casutilies and probably more Japanese lives as well.

Utilmately, Truman made the decision based on the best possible data available at that time. That's all that a commander can ever do.

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“The first lesson is that you can't lose a war if you have command of the air,
and you can't win a war if you haven't.” - General Jimmy Doolittle

Blimey, we are back here again. Apart from Jc's threads that he quotes, there are numerous others that ended up discussing the same thing.

Far from saying lets not do all that again its a good idea to revisit on occasions. New blood on forums etc. New outlooks.

I say the same thing or imply same thing in all threads relating to this that I have responded to...

I point to Frasers, Quartered Safely Out Here...A British writer, Flashman etc...who eloquantly gives as good a reason as any Ive heared for the bombs being dropped.

I cant find it at mo but will...and then bow out.

Meanwhile though, one thought though, are we more concened not just in these threads but in forums on politics, school discussion groups and down the bar and pub with the weapon used rather than the need etc...Would it have been ok to fire bomb the place as in other cities and cause same amount of casualites etc or is it just because of the bomb itself. Was the one horror better or worse than the other?

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

Would't it be better to merge this thread with one of the previous ones in order to avoid repetition? This is one of those subjects that crop up once in a while and it's pointless rolling the same arguments all over and over and over again.

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thereby saving over a million US casutilies and probably more Japanese lives as well.

Allied casualties too my friend, Burma etc. Many serving there would agree with your synopsis too.

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

Like everyone else we were glad it was over, bought to a sudden devastating stop, by those two bombs that fell on Japan. We had no slightest thought of what it would mean for the future, or even what it meant at the time, we did not know what the immediate effect of those bombs had been on their targets, and we didn’t much care.
We were of a generation of whom Coventry and the London Blitz and Clydebank and Liverpool and Plymouth, were more than mere names, our country had been hammered mercilessly from the sky, and so had Germany. We had seen the pictures of Belsen and of the frozen horror of the Russian front. Part of our higher education had been devoted to techniques of killing and destruction, we were not going to lose sleep because the Japanese homeland had taken its turn. If anything, at the time, remembering the kind of war it had been, and the kind of people we personally, had been up against, we probably felt that justice had been done. But it was of small importance, when weighed against the glorious fact that the war was over at last.

There was certainly no moralising, no feeling at all of the guilt which some thinkers nowadays seem to want to attach to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And because so many myths have been carefully fostered about it, and so much emotion generated, all on one side, with the real thought for those most affected by it on the Allied side, I would like just to look at it briefly, from our minority point of view. And not only ours, but perhaps, yours too.

Some years ago I heard a man denounce the nuclear bombing of Japan as an obscenity, it was monstrous, barbarous, and no civilised people could even have contemplated it, we should all be thoroughly ashamed of it.

I couldn’t argue with him, or deny the obscenity, monstrosity and barbarism, I could only ask him questions, such as
Where were you when the war ended?
In Glasgow.

OK, will you answer a hypothetical question: If it were possible, would you give your life now, to restore one of the lives of Hiroshima?
He wriggled a good deal, said it wasn’t relevant, or logical or whatever, but in the end, to do him justice, he admitted that he wouldn’t.
So I asked him: By what right then do you say that Allied lives should have been sacrificed to save the victims of Hiroshima?

Because what you are saying is that, while you re not willing to give your life, Allied soldiers, should have given theirs, mine, for one, possibly…
It was a bit unfair, perhaps, if only because I am rather heavily built and he was an elderly philosopher and I was obviously much moved.

Which may have flustered him, because he was unwise enough to say that this was the point – we were soldiers, the bomb victims were civilians. I did not pursue the question whether the lives of your own soldiers should be sacrificed for the safety of enemy civilians, because if you get into that particular moral jungle you ‘ll never come out. But I did point out that we were in fact, civilians too = civilians in uniform, and could he understand our possible resentment that people whose lives and liberties we had been fighting to protect (him, in fact) should be ready to expend us for the sake of Japanese?

He was getting quite alarmed now, because I do have a tendency to raise my voice in debate, but he stuck to his guns and cited Japanese women and children! – I conceded this, and pointed out that I had three children, but if I’d gone down in Malaya they’d never have been born, they would in f act have been as effectively deprived of existence as the children of Nagasaki. Was he advocating that?

He pointed out, fairly, that I might not have gone down in Malaya, to which I only too glad to escape from the argumentumal hummem which I’d introduced because it makes you sound like a right moaning I was there jungle basher…retorted that someone would surely have bought his lot in Malaya and how about his children?
He bolted, predictably, along the only escape route open to him and a well worn o ne it has become by saying that the bombs were unnecessary because Japan was ready to surrender anyway, and it was only done because Truman wanted to use the thing to frighten the Russians, and all this talk that it would have cost 50,000 Allied lives to storm Japan was horse manure, because it would never have come to that.
You think, I said, you hope, but you don’t know that…
Yes he did and cited authorities.

All right, I said, leave aside that I am arguably in a better position than you are to judge whether Jap was ready to surrender or no t, at least at the sharp end, whatever Hirohito and co were thinking – are you saying that the war would have ended on August 15 if the bombs had not been dropped?
No of course not, but not long after….a few weeks…months maybe…
Possibly, not likely.

But at any rate some Allied lives would have been lost, after August 15 – lives which in fact were saved by the bombs…
Yes he admitted, some additional Allied lives would have been lost, he didn’t say they were expendable, but he plainly thought so.
And that would have been all right with you? British, Indian, American, ustralian, Chinese – my God yes even Russian – all right for them to die, but not the people of Hiroshima – or you?

He said something about military casualties being inevitable in war….
He was telling me……..but that the scale of Hrioshima, the devastation , the after effects the calculated immolation of a whole city’s population…

Look I said, I’m not arguing with you, I’m not necessarily disagreeing with you, I just wanted to know where you stood and to mention some points which you may not have considered, and to have you ask yourself, if you are really in a position morally speaking, to say who should have died and who shouldn’t?

Well…he said, looking aggrieved, where do you stand?
None of your goddam business, I said sweetly, reasonable, as always….but wherever it is, or was, it is somewhere you have never been, among people whom you wouldn’t understand, which was a bit over the top, but these armchair philosophers, who live in their safe havens of the mind, and take their extensive moral views without ever really thinking, or exploring those unpleasant dark corners of debate, which they don’t like to think are there – the can get on my wick.

The dropping of the bombs was a hideous thing, and I do not wonder that some of those who bore a part in it have been haunted by it all their lives. If it was not barbaric the word has no meaning..
I led 9 section for a time, leading or not, I was part of it,. They were my mates, and to them I was bound to ties of duty, loyalty and honour. Now take 9 section as representing those Allied soldiers who would certainly have died if the bombs had not been dropped and remember that 9 section might well have been not representatives, but the men themselves,. Could I say, yes, Grandy or Nick, or Forster were expendable, and should have died rather than the victims of Hiroshima. No never…and that goes for every Indian, American, Aust5ralian, African, Chinese and other a soldier whose life was on the line in August 1945. No…drop the bomb.

And it was not only their lives as I pointed out to my antibomb disputant. To reduce it to a selfish personal level…If the bombs had been withheld and the war had continued on conventional lines, then even if I’d failed my board and gone with the battalion into Malaya, the odds are that I’d have survived 4 to 1 actually speaking, on the sections Burma fatalities,. But I might have been that one, in which case my three children and six grandchildren would never have been born. And that, I’m afraid is where all discussion of pros and cons evaporates and becomes meaningless, because for those nine lives I would pull the plug on the whole Japanese nation and never even blink. And so, I dare suggest would you…..

And if you wouldn’t you may be nearer to the divine than I am but you sure as hell aren’t fit to be parents or grandparents
It comes to this then….that I think the bombing was right.? On those two counts, without a doubt, if it wasn’t right, what were we fighting for?

George Fraser....Quartered safe out here.

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

I have read a lot of the pacific war and the end of the war. There is no doubt we would have invaded and there would have been massive Japanese and American deaths. How could Truman face the American people and know that he had a weapon that could have ended the war and saved those lives and had not used it. Death wise the fire bomb raids were just as bad as the nuclear raids, just a different way to die. The Japanese army was not ready to surrender and would have fought on. The reason they did not want to demonstrate the bomb was the posibility it would not go off and the problems that would have caused with the Japanese.

Or use the search feature!!

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Scott