MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War against Japan
MacArthur, Stilwell, and Special Operations in the War against Japan
DAVID W. HOGAN, JR.
From Parameters, Spring 1995, pp. 104-115.
To begin a study of American theater-level organization and conduct of special
operations in the war with Japan, one can consider two images. First, picture
native stevedores at a port in the occupied Philippines unloading, under cover
of darkness, crates of cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, candy bars, sewing
kits, and pencils from a huge cargo submarine, each item bearing the inscription
"I shall return" over a facsimile of the signature of General Douglas MacArthur.
Then imagine Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell at lunch with members of his
personal staff in the dining room of the Imperial Hotel in New Delhi, India
when, at an adjacent table, an officer of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
stands up and opens his bush jacket. Five pigeons, freed from confinement, rush
into the air and disappear through an open window in the ceiling. The general
leaps from his chair, but, after a momentary glare at the perpetrator, resumes
his seat and his meal without further ado.[1]
The two vignettes say much about MacArthur, Stilwell, and their respective
approaches to special operations in the Southwest Pacific and China-Burma-India
theaters. MacArthur appears in his role, both bestowed and self-manufactured, as
symbol of resistance, spiritual leader, and redeemer of the Philippine nation in
its hour of need. Stilwell comes across as the hard-boiled pragmatist who could
tolerate a band of free-spirited eccentrics as long as they produced results. In
the context of an Army which had given little prewar thought to what we today
call special operations, each commander had to make his own way in a largely
unfamiliar field with little if any guidance from doctrine on the place of
special operations in theater organization and strategy. Considering the
contributions which special operations made in the two theaters, they did quite
well.
The Aristocrat and the Doughboy
The suave, charismatic MacArthur seemed uniquely qualified to direct special
operations in the Southwest Pacific theater (SWPA). Imaginative, widely read,
with a quick, flexible intellect, he sensed the importance of spiritual and
moral, as opposed to material, factors in warfare, and he knew from history and
his father's own experiences in the Philippines how effective a force of
guerrillas could be. Even for an American Army officer, his extensive experience
and close ties with the Philippines were unusual. He had lived much of his life
in the islands, adopting them as his home, and he had long been involved in the
task of creating a national identity for the Philippines, notably through his
service as field marshal of the fledgling Philippine army in the years before
the war. He had a keen sense for Filipino politics and had established close
friendships with Filipino leaders, particularly Commonwealth President Manuel
Quezon, the godfather of MacArthur's son and contributor of a $500,000 nest egg
to his former field marshal's bank account. These considerable ties of emotion
and self interest were sealed by MacArthur's genuine and deep sense of
obligation to those he had left behind on Bataan and Corregidor and his near
obsessive need to remove the blot of those defeats from his record.[2]
In most respects, Stilwell was about as different from MacArthur as can be
imagined. In contrast with MacArthur's aloofness, urbane grace, and aristocratic
paternalism, Vinegar Joe prided himself on his candor, lack of polish or
pretension, and identification with the common soldier. Having served
extensively in China during the interwar years, he knew the country and could
speak Chinese fluently, but his tendency to let people know what he thought of
them ill-suited him for a post with such strong diplomatic overtones. Yet, the
abrasive exterior concealed a keen intelligence, a willingness to innovate, and,
like MacArthur, an unusually great sensitivity to Asiatic cultures. His acid was
balanced by a human kindness and an ironic sense of humor which could tolerate
the mavericks often found in the special operations community. Like MacArthur,
Stilwell had a score to settle. For a man who had despised the Japanese since a
visit to Japan in the 1920s, defeat in the Burma campaign of early 1942 must
have been a bitter pill to swallow. He was, therefore, inclined to be open-minded
toward anyone who could help him avenge that defeat and regain Burma.[3]
From the time he assumed command of US Army forces in the Far East in July 1941,
MacArthur displayed both an interest in special operations and a desire to keep
independent practitioners out of his theater. Early in his tenure, he maneuvered
to cut Philippine High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre out of war preparations,
and he would manage to limit the Department of the Interior's role in Philippine
affairs for the rest of the war. Similarly, he and his staff blocked all
attempts by William J. Donovan's OSS to gain a foothold in the theater until the
closing days of the conflict. Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, SWPA's
vain and domineering intelligence chief, later claimed that MacArthur, in the
midst of a shooting war, could not afford to wait for the new OSS to establish
itself in the theater, but the explanation does not ring entirely true.
MacArthur and his staff were apparently suspicious of semi-autonomous agencies
with a separate chain of command back to Washington, and they also believed
themselves to be quite capable of handling special operations in the Philippines
without any help from the OSS.[4]
MacArthur's expertise in special operations was belied by his initial
performance. Before the outbreak of the war, he had given some thought to
guerrilla warfare by Filipino reservists and had taken steps to organize an
underground intelligence service among Filipino officials and American residents
of the islands, but these plans amounted to very little. MacArthur overestimated
both the time available before the Japanese attack and the ability of his force
to halt the enemy on the beaches, and he did not want to dampen Filipino morale
by premature preparations for guerrilla warfare. When the Japanese broke through
his beach defenses, forcing a withdrawal into Bataan, MacArthur improvised as
best he could, organizing an intelligence net based in Manila, sending officers
behind Japanese lines to organize resistance, and accelerating preparations for
guerrilla operations in Mindanao and the other southern islands. Evacuated to
Australia, he hoped to direct guerrilla warfare from his theater headquarters
there. Unfortunately for his plans, the War Department designated Lieutenant
General Jonathan M. Wainwright as the commander of all American troops in the
Philippines, and, when Wainwright surrendered in May 1942, he ordered all units
under his command to follow suit, uprooting most of the seeds sown by MacArthur.
Not until late 1942 did a largely spontaneous guerrilla movement finally contact
MacArthur in Australia.[5]
Whereas MacArthur was interested in special operations from the beginning,
Stilwell had to be sold on such activities. An orthodox soldier and admirer of
infantry, he initially dismissed guerrilla warfare and sabotage as "illegal
action" and wanted to concentrate on building a powerful Chinese army.
Nevertheless, the potential for special operations in his China-Burma-India
theater (CBI) drew the kind of entrepreneurs that MacArthur had kept out of the
Philippines. When Commander Milton S. Miles arrived in May 1942 with vague
orders from the Navy Department to undertake operations which would do maximum
possible damage to the enemy, Stilwell, eager to hit back at the Japanese in
some way, gave him free and exclusive control over special operations in CBI.
Two months later, Major Carl Eifler, an old acquaintance from Stilwell's
interwar service on the Mexican border,[6] appeared in Chungking at the head of
an OSS mission that Stilwell had initially rejected. The CBI commander sent him
to Burma, as much to keep him clear of Miles in China as for any other reason.
Over time, Stilwell's estimation of special operations rose, partly due to his
close relationship with Eifler and partly out of fascination with the Kachin
natives among whom Eifler's OSS Detachment 101 worked, but mostly because of the
valuable intelligence which Eifler's men were providing by early 1943.[7]
Command and Control
Both Stilwell and MacArthur dealt directly with their special operations chiefs
but at different levels of involvement. While MacArthur left many details of
Philippine affairs in the hands of his chief of staff, Lieutenant General
Richard K. Sutherland, he insisted on personally interviewing escaped prisoners
and returning agents from the islands and otherwise kept in close touch with
developments through Colonel Courtney A. Whitney, whom Sutherland brought into
the theater in May 1943 to take charge of the Philippine Regional Section. A
former lawyer and acquaintance of MacArthur in prewar Manila, Whitney has
acquired a reputation as a sycophant who, according to Paul Rogers, "simply
mirrored what he thought was the true MacArthur." Attempting to pacify an
aggrieved guerrilla leader, Whitney wrote:
In my own case when recommendations I have made have been partially or wholly
disapproved, despite my conviction that I was right in the first instance, I
have always sought to find the soundness in his [MacArthur's] decision and I
have never failed to do so. This results in a wholehearted acceptance of adverse
decisions and much happier resulting service. I think that once you realize that
it is General MacArthur and he alone who defines all Philippine policies and
makes the decisions upon questions emanating from the Islands you too will find
the way to see in his decisions, however contrary to your views, constructive
soundness. By that I do not mean that we are a bunch of "yes" men around the
General in these matters--to the contrary we are as independent as a bunch of
"hogs on ice." But ours is the pick and shovel work in the orientation of policy
for his consideration--his the final word.[8]
Whitney was apparently responsible for the decision to create, in SWPA
propaganda, a cult around MacArthur and his pledge to return, a campaign which,
however effective in some quarters, led some guerrillas to adopt the derisive
motto, "We Remained!" Still, the Colonel did possess a keen, if rather
conservative and paternalistic, sense for Philippine issues, and, more
important, he enjoyed the ear of his commander.[9]
The emergence of Whitney's Philippine Regional Section (PRS) ignited a turf
battle within MacArthur's theater headquarters. Before Whitney arrived, special
operations in SWPA, including the work of the PRS, came under the Allied
Intelligence Bureau (AIB), an inter-Allied agency which operated under the
coordination of Willoughby's intelligence section (G-2). As the activities of
the PRS in establishing Filipino agent nets and supporting guerrillas expanded
during the spring of 1943, however, the section achieved a semi-independent
status, under which Whitney reported directly to MacArthur and Sutherland,
although he continued to coordinate his activities through G-2 and relied
heavily on the AIB for support. The PRS's status irritated Willoughby, who, in
late February 1944, recommended that Philippine activities be split among the
staff sections. As Allied forces neared the islands in late May, Sutherland
acted, assigning intelligence tasks to G-2, supply to G-4, and direction of
guerrillas to the G-3 Operations subsection; but instead of assigning Whitney to
G-2 as Willoughby had hoped, he detailed the bulk of the PRS and its chief to G-3
Operations. Despite petty sniping from G-2 over such matters as PRS's waste of
maps and poor standards for dispatches, Whitney's stature with MacArthur
continued to grow, to the point that by war's end he had become MacArthur's
chief confidant.[10]
Compared to MacArthur, Stilwell took a more detached approach to special
operations, working directly with Miles and Eifler when necessary but giving
them an almost entirely free hand. In theory, the intelligence section of
Stilwell's rear headquarters echelon in New Delhi supervised Detachment 101's
operations, but in practice Eifler often dealt directly with Stilwell. Eifler
would be waiting at the airstrip when Stilwell's plane, dubbed "Uncle Joe's
Chariot," made one of its periodic stops in Detachment 101's area. More often
than not, Stilwell would notice the burly colonel, call out, "Buffalo Bill! Come
on over!" and then introduce Eifler to senior officers as the "Army's number one
thug." Eifler would take the opportunity to report, answer questions, and make
requests. On at least one occasion, Stilwell intervened to provide Eifler with
an advance when his OSS superiors in Washington were not forthcoming with needed
funds. Once the 1944 campaign in North Burma began, Detachment 101 came directly
under Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), Stilwell's tactical headquarters, and
its activities were controlled by Stilwell in person.[11]
Detachment 101 was fortunate to have direct access to Stilwell, for the special
operations chain of command in the CBI theater was a nightmare. At the Navy
Department's insistence, Miles had a separate chain of command back to
Washington, although Stilwell supposedly had complete authority over Miles where
"necessary." To avoid jurisdictional clashes with Miles, Donovan agreed to
designate him as the OSS Strategic Services Officer (SSO) for the theater, but
the arrangement did not work well. Miles was determined to remain independent of
OSS, which, in turn, increasingly saw him as a tool of the Chinese and an
obstacle to their plans for an espionage net in China free of foreign control.
At first, Stilwell got along well with Miles and backed those activities which
he thought might prove productive, but he came to regard Miles as a loose cannon
when the latter attempted to expand his sphere by sending liaison officers to
the 14th Air Force and Lord Louis Mountbatten's new Southeast Asia Command.
After a visit to the theater in late 1943, Donovan removed Miles as OSS's
theater chief, relieved an exhausted Eifler, and extensively reorganized OSS in
the theater. Colonel John Coughlin became the new SSO, reporting directly to
Stilwell and possessing supervisory authority over Detachment 101, now under
Colonel W. R. Peers.[12]
Even if special operations agencies could straighten out the chain of command
within the theaters, they still faced difficulties in securing cooperation from
the more conventional services, which could be counted on to view their
unorthodox enterprises with skepticism. Since those agencies were not self-sufficient,
they had to rely at least partly on the services for support when the services
themselves were struggling with inadequate resources. Fortunately, the services
soon understood the benefits that special operations could provide to them. In
Burma, Eifler pointed out to the commander of the Air Transport Command the
value of operatives who could help downed pilots escape from the forbidding
North Burma jungle, and the general arranged for Eifler's command to parachute
agents into the region. Tenth Air Force later expressed its gratitude for the
target acquisition and other intelligence provided by the detachment by giving
an L-5 liaison plane to Peers. In SWPA, the Seventh Fleet was hesitant to divert
submarines from other missions to run supplies into the occupied Philippines,
but Whitney's PRS offered coast-watcher stations and naval intelligence in
return for supply missions and radios. Those missions were arranged by
Lieutenant Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons, chief of the PRS's support effort,
and Captain A. H. McCollum, Director of Naval Intelligence for the US Seventh
Fleet, and they were carried out by Seventh Fleet's "Spy Squadron" of
submarines.[13]
Informal working relationships and salesmanship could ease many problems of
cooperation between special operations agencies and the services, but they could
not always overcome differences among allies separated by politics and culture.
In SWPA, the AIB had originally been created in July 1942 to bring under one
roof several mainly-Australian organizations involved in intelligence
collection, sabotage, and propaganda. An Australian "controller" provided loose
coordination under the overall direction of MacArthur's headquarters.
Unfortunately, national, philosophical, and personal differences within the AIB
caused it to pull in different directions, resulting in its reorganization in
early 1943 along the lines of Australian, Dutch, and American spheres of
interest, rather than function. From the viewpoint of MacArthur's headquarters,
AIB's "intermittent mania for complete independence" and tendency to go off on
"semi-political" tangents from the main focus of the theater, the drive to the
Philippines, provided a constant irritant. MacArthur's grant of semi-independent
status to the PRS, like his designation of Sixth Army as Alamo Force, probably
represented a tactic to remove Philippine affairs, in which he possessed both a
national and personal interest, from any control by the Australian-dominated
AIB.[14]
In CBI, Stilwell had to work not only with the Chinese, but also with the
British, sovereign in India and prewar rulers of Burma. Miles may have been
correct in his insistence that it was impossible to conduct special operations
in China without going through the Chinese government, but that did not make
dealing with the byzantine, corrupt Chinese bureaucracy any easier. As for the
British bureaucracy in India, it had its own misgivings about special operations
and vigorously opposed the establishment of an independent American intelligence
net in India. With regard to OSS operations in Burma, it expressed much more
tolerance, but OSS Detachment 101's relations with its British allies were often
turbulent, particularly when Special Operations Executive/India infringed on
what Eifler considered his turf. Into this picture came Lord Mountbatten's new
Southeast Asia Command, an Allied headquarters established by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff in late 1943 to infuse new vigor into the war in Burma. For the
1944 offensive into Burma, the Allies envisioned an expanded role for Major
General Orde C. Wingate's long-range penetration groups, which would include a
new American contingent code-named Galahad. The prospect of the only American
combat unit in the theater serving under a British general was enough to arouse
every Anglophobic instinct in Stilwell, and when Wingate stated that he could
not use Galahad before April 1944, Stilwell prevailed on Mountbatten to transfer
Galahad to his control.[15]
Roles and Missions
Along with complications of command and control, MacArthur and Stilwell faced
the problem of defining new concepts in a field that had received little
attention in the prewar Army. Within SWPA there existed several differing views
on the proper role and capabilities of guerrillas. In March 1943, MacArthur, in
accord with Quezon's wishes, directed the guerrillas to "lie low" and focus on
organization and intelligence. The order seemed sensible at the time and
undoubtedly spared many Filipinos from reprisals, but it created problems for
guerrilla commanders who found it hard to remain idle in the face of popular
demand for action against a brutal occupation. When Whitney arrived in May 1943,
he pushed for more aggressive exploitation of the guerrilla potential by forming
a battle detachment in every area and arming every guerrilla by the time of
liberation. More often than not, his views prevailed, due to MacArthur's
emotional commitment to the guerrillas, and the PRS expanded its supply effort
into the islands. By the eve of the invasion of Leyte in October 1944, however,
SWPA and Sixth Army still took care to list combat intelligence as the primary
mission for guerrillas and warned against their use in attacks on fixed
positions. Significantly, the guerrillas on Leyte would come under Sixth Army's
intelligence section during the invasion.[16]
Within the CBI theater, considerable debate existed over the proper role of
long-range penetration groups. The Army guide to these units, taken almost
entirely from Wingate's report, stated that they consisted of separate, self-contained
columns which, supplied by air and directed by radio from a group headquarters,
would operate independently for as long as three months deep in enemy territory.
The main point of dispute seems to have been whether these columns would operate
more or less independently against Japanese communications or in closer
coordination with units in contact with the principal Japanese forces. The
orthodox Stilwell took the latter point of view, envisioning Galahad as a kind
of strategic cavalry conducting envelopments around the Japanese flank while his
Chinese divisions advanced on the enemy front. Whatever his view of Galahad's
eventual mission, however, he seems to have viewed this "tough-looking lot"
first and foremost as a model, the American combat unit he had long been seeking
to show the Chinese how to fight. It is interesting in this regard that the
commanders of Galahad, while they noted differences in training and organization
between their unit and other American formations, seem to have viewed themselves
more as conventional infantrymen than as a special force.[17]
During the initial stages of the drive down the Hukawng Valley in February and
March 1944, Stilwell took precautions against misuse of Galahad. For the command
of Galahad, he chose Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, an old intimate and
former theater G-3 who had already been involved in planning the campaign.
Throughout the campaign, Stilwell stayed in close touch with Merrill, often
planning operations with him. In late February, following his concept of long-range
penetration groups, Stilwell sent Galahad on a march around the Japanese right
flank to cut the enemy's line of retreat at Walawbum while the Chinese attacked
in front. At the same time, he ordered Merrill to avoid unnecessary heavy
combat. Galahad carried out its mission, but the glacial pace of the Chinese
advance left Merrill's 3000 lightly armed troops exposed to a riposte by the
Japanese 18th Division, forcing the Americans to evacuate their roadblocks.
After the battle, Stilwell told Merrill that he would never again leave one of
his few American combat units in such an exposed position. For the next
envelopment to Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng, Merrill arranged for two Chinese
regiments to follow and take over the roadblocks, leaving Galahad free to use
its light, mobile battalions to best advantage.[18]
Much as Stilwell and Merrill would have liked to spare Galahad from prolonged
line duty, circumstances and coalition politics intervened. When a Japanese
force threatened to outflank Galahad's own envelopment toward Inkangahtawng,
Stilwell's staff, in his absence, ordered Merrill to establish a blocking
position. At Nhpum Ga, Merrill's 2d Battalion stopped the Japanese but at a
heavy cost in dead and wounded. Although Galahad desperately needed rest and
reorganization, Stilwell was eager to capture the key airstrip at Myitkyina
before the monsoon season. Believing that Galahad was his only reliable unit,
Stilwell ordered Merrill to strike for the airfield. Revived by promises of a
long rest upon completion of the mission and reinforced by Chinese troops and
Kachins, Galahad drove over the rugged Kumon range and captured the airstrip in
a surprise attack on 17 May. At that point, Galahad could reasonably have
expected relief, but Stilwell could not afford to rest his Americans while other
nationalities who were equally exhausted continued to fight. Nor could Stilwell
get reinforcements from other sectors of the Allied front. Thus, Galahad stayed
in line, desperately throwing ill-trained fillers into the ranks to replace
veterans evacuated with wounds and disease, with disastrous results for unit
morale. Only a fraction of the unit remained by the fall of Myitkyina on 3
August 1944.[19]
Contributions to Victory
Galahad's tragic fate obscured a generally good record for special operations in
the CBI theater. True, special operations in China, Indochina, and Thailand did
not really get under way until the last months of the war. In Burma, however,
the effort that Stilwell authorized in 1942 paid off handsomely. OSS Detachment
101 provided much essential information, including, by Peers' estimate, up to 90
percent of Northern Combat Area Command's intelligence in the 1944 offensive.
Its Kachin confederates also guided and screened columns, helped downed fliers
to escape, and provided a potent guerrilla army. Galahad's sacrifice made
possible the capture of Myitkyina, greatly easing the aerial transport of
supplies over the Hump and making it possible for the Ledo Road from India to
link up with the North Burma road system on its way to a final junction with the
old Burma Road. If Stilwell thought about it at the time of his relief in
October 1944, he could have taken considerable pride in CBI's performance of
special operations during his tenure.[20]
After a rocky start, the investment of MacArthur and his staff in the Filipino
guerrillas likewise paid off to a large degree. Although often plagued by
internal rivalries and, despite SWPA's efforts, lack of resources, the
guerrillas still performed valuable services in guiding American units,
harassing Japanese movements, assisting downed pilots, guarding captured areas,
and eliminating bypassed enemy detachments, thereby releasing American troops
for other duties. Guerrilla reports, though often exaggerated and unreliable,
still represented the single most important source of intelligence for American
forces. Volckmann's North Luzon guerrillas actually approached Whitney's dream
of a guerrilla army. As for the Filipinos themselves, the guerrilla experience
left several troubling issues to resolve after the war, but it also provided a
people with a badly needed sense of national pride on the eve of full
independence in 1946.[21]
MacArthur and Stilwell were different men who took different approaches to
special operations in their respective theaters. MacArthur's was based on a
romantic vision, drawn from history and legend, of a people's war against brutal
oppressors. The SWPA commander turned to special operations early, developed an
extensive support organization, and closely supervised its work. Stilwell's
approach was more cautious and pragmatic, judging special operations
entrepreneurs by their results. Although he permitted direct access and made
sure that the special operators obtained their share of resources, he generally
adopted a hands-off tack, giving each entrepreneur a mission and letting him
carry it out without much interference. Yet, for all their differences, the two
commanders shared some basic traits. Both, by the late spring of 1942, were
driven men, eager to avenge recent defeats and ready to adopt almost any means
to achieve victory over a despised enemy. Thus, while both were basically
orthodox soldiers who relied on the big battalions, both were ready to turn to
special operations to aid conventional forces. Because of their support, special
operations forces were able to make significant contributions to victory in the
war against Japan.
NOTES
This article was originally delivered as a paper at the Conference of Army
Historians in June 1994. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Rich Boylan of the National Archives and, in particular, Jim Zobel of MacArthur
Library.
1. John Keats, They Fought Alone (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963), pp. 324-25;
Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History (New York: Knopf,
1956), pp. 133-34; Richard Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979), p. 117; US Army Military History Institute
(USAMHI), Senior Officers Debriefing Report: Conversations Between Lieutenant
General William R. Peers and Lieutenant Colonel Jim Breen, Lieutenant Colonel
Charlie Moore (Carlisle, Pa.: USAMHI, 1977), I: 3-4.
2. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1975), I: 557-59, 571-75, II: 90-91, 153-54, 509; Stanley L. Falk, "Douglas
MacArthur and the War Against Japan," in William M. Leary, ed., We Shall
Return!: MacArthur's Commanders and the Defeat of Japan (Lexington: Univ. Press
of Kentucky, 1988), pp. 1-2; Carol M. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine
Years (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1981), pp. xvi-xvii, 63, 134, 191, 207-10,
215-19, 243; Paul P. Rogers, The Good Years: MacArthur and Sutherland (New York:
Praeger, 1990), pp. 61, 80-82, 218, 239-41.
3. Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945
(New York: Macmillan, 1971), pp. xi-xiii, 4, 87, 125-30, 170-71, 198-99, 300-01,
392; Peers interview, I: 4, 6, II: 24; George A. McGee, Jr., The History of the
2d Battalion, Merrill's Marauders: Northern Burma Campaign of 1944 (Braunfels,
Tex.: George A. McGee, Jr., 1987), pp. 63, 207. See also Theodore H. White, ed.,
The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane, 1948).
4. R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central
Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), pp. 250-51;
Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York:
McGraw Hill, 1954), p. 144; Rogers, The Good Years, pp. 79-82, 247; Kermit
Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2 vols. (New York: Walker, 1976), II: 359,
365; Petillo, The Philippine Years, pp. 233-34; Michael Schaller, Douglas
MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 95-96;
Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, 2 vols. (New York: Walker, 1976), II:
358; Larry S. Schmidt, "American Involvement in the Filipino Resistance Movement
on Mindanao," master's thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1982,
p. 195; James, The Years of MacArthur, II: 510-11.
5. David W. Hogan, Jr., US Arms Special Operations in World War II (Washington:
US Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1992), pp. 65-68; James, The Years of
MacArthur, I: 583, 594, 609, 616, II: 26, 91, 105, 141-42, 145, 149; Rogers, The
Good Years, pp. 213-15; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, US Army in
World War II (Washington: GPO, 1953), pp. 502-03; US Army, GHQ, US Army Forces,
Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, "Intelligence Activities in the
Philippines During the Japanese Occupation," 2 vols., CMH, I: 1-6, 12-13;
"Guerrilla Activities in the Philippines, CNO, Dept Navy, 14 Sept 44," pp. 1,
14, HRC Geog S. Philippines 370.64 Guerrilla Activities, CMH Archives; David J.
Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II (Ann Arbor: Univ. of
Michigan Press, 1967), p. 21; Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951,
pp. 46-47, 54, 57-60; Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History
(New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 39, 44-48, 55-58; Jonathan M. Wainwright, General
Wainwright's Story, ed. Robert Considine (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1946),
pp. 120, 130-33, 136, 140-41; Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1964), pp. 141, 145-46, 202-04.
6. Eifler, a 250-pound mountain of a man who "seldom spoke more softly than a
loud roar" would soon become a legend. Lieutenant General William R. "Ray"
Peers, who succeeded Eifler as head of OSS Detachment 101, recalled that when he
met Eifler, his new boss "took a stiletto type dagger and drove it a good two to
three inches into the top of his desk. He looked pleased." See Dunlop, Behind
Japanese Lines, pp. 69, 79. When questioned by the author about some of the
stories in circulation, Eifler responded, "Well, there's the legend of Carl
Eifler and there's the real Carl Eifler," but he readily admitted that Peers'
story was true.
7. Hogan, Special Operations in World War II, pp. 98, 101, 105-06; Smith, OSS,
p. 243-45; Thomas N. Moon and Carl F. Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel (New York:
Vantage Press, 1975), pp. 9, 36-40, 53, 58-61, 329-32; Milton E. Miles, A
Different Kind of War, ed. Hawthorne Daniel (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1967), pp. 76-90; Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines, pp. 67, 69, 90, 109, 177, 309-11;
William R. Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," Military Review, 28
(June 1948), 11-13; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, II: 360-61, 369-70, 374,
376; Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942, OSS History Office Files, Entry 99,
Box 49, RG 226, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington,
D.C.; "OSSSU Detachment 101: A Brief History of the Detachment for NCAC
Records," March 1945, OSS History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 51, RG 226, NARA.
8. Whitney to Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, 12 May 1944, Whitney, Courtney--Semi-Official
Letters, April 1943-August 1944, Folder 1, Box 9, Courtney A. Whitney Papers,
Douglas MacArthur Library, Norfolk, Va.
9. Courtney A. Whitney biography, Folder 1, Box 1, Whitney Papers; "Intelligence
Activities in the Philippines," p. 31; Paul P. Rogers, MacArthur and Sutherland:
The Bitter Years (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 124, 164, 290; James, Years of
MacArthur, II: 509-10, 598; 27 October 1944 entry, Royce Wendover diary, USAMHI;
Edwin P. Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele, Lieutenant Ramsey's War (New York:
Knightsbridge, 1990), pp. 226, 317; Colonel Macario Peralta to MacArthur, 11
March 1944, Folder 3, Box 1, Whitney Papers; Whitney to Sutherland, 1 June, 9
July, 15 July 1943, in Folder 12, Guerrilla Movement in the Philippines,
Correspondence, 1943, Box 3, Whitney Papers; Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 341,
347; Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine: The Story of Charles Parsons and
the Guerrilla Soldiers in the Philippines (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1945),
pp. 141-42. See also Russell W. Volckmann, We Remained: Three Years Behind the
Enemy Lines in the Philippines (New York: Norton, 1954).
10. The repeated changes in high-level supervision of special operations in the
Philippines contributed to wasteful duplication as PRS installed its own
American-dominated intelligence nets, leaving the old Filipino-dominated G-2/AIB
nets to atrophy; see "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," I: 23, 27,
30; Jesus A. Villamor, They Never Surrendered: A True Story of Resistance in
World War II (Quezon City, Philippines: Vera-Reyes, 1982), pp. 219, 243. See
also "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," I: 7-11, 29-34, 58; General
Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff,
"Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, GHQ, SWPA," 3 vols., CMH Library,
I: 1, 4-8, 58; Rogers, The Good Years, p. 247; Whitney to Chief, G-3 Operations
Division, GHQ, SWPA, 16 June 1944, Willoughby to G-3, 14 June 1944 and 25 May
1944, Folder 7, Memorandums to and from G-3, 1944-1945, Box 4, Whitney Papers;
Willoughby to Sutherland, 20 May 1944, Folder 7 Whitney, Courtney--Personal
Correspondence, 1940-1944, Box 8, Whitney Papers; G-2 to G-3, 25 May 1944,
Folder 10, Philippine Regional Section Reactivation, Box 5, Whitney Papers;
Whitney to Controller, AIB, 29 May 1943, Folder l, Operations 1943, Box 63,
Whitney Papers; James, Years of MacArthur, II: 510.
11. Historical Section, China-Burma-India Theater, "History of the China-Burma-India
Theater, 21 May 1942 to 25 October 1944," unpublished manuscript, vol. 2, pt. 2,
CMH Archives, Section AG, p. 3, Section JICA, p. 2, Section PW, pp. 2, 5-6;
Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942; Moon and Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel, pp.
63, 68-69, 108; Peers interview, I: 3-4, 14, 17, II: 24, 26.
12. Moon and Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel, pp. 111, 169, 173; Stilwell to
Marshall, 21 February 1943, Stilwell Radios-Personal File, File I, Items 142-209,
Stilwell to Marshall, 6 March 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 210-327,
File I, 2 June 1944 correspondence in Items 2501-2298, Marshall to Stilwell, 21
June 1944, Stilwell to Marshall, 19 July 1944, Sultan to Hearn, 14 August 1944,
and Marshall to Stilwell, 14 August 1944, in Stilwell Radios Personal File,
Items 2649-2822, File VII, Box 4, in US Army China-Burma-India Theater of
Operations, Commanding General: Miscellaneous Notes and Correspondence, Personal
Message File, "Oklahoma File," Diary of Operations, RG 493, Washington National
Records Center (WNRC), Suitland, Md.; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, II: 360-64;
Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942. Miles continued in the theater in his
capacity as commander of Naval Group China.
13. Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942; William R. Peers and Dean Brelis,
Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force
(Boston: Little Brown, 1963), pp. 65-67, 107, 109-10, 114, 122-24, 129, 148,
219; Peers interview, I: 1; Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines, pp. 147-48, 281, 327;
Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, II: 371, 381, 387; "Allied Intelligence
Activities in the Philippines," I: 19; Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine, pp. 135-36;
Whitney, MacArthur, pp. 132-33.
14. "Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau," I: i-ii, 5, 7-9, 13, 18-19,
33-36, 92, 115-16.
15. Hogan, US Arms Special Operations in World War II, pp. 103, 112-14; Charles
F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, US Army in World
War II (Washington: GPO, 1955), p. 35; Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS, II:
372; Eifler to Donovan, 24 November 1942; Moon and Eifler, The Deadliest Colonel,
pp. 71, 162, 167, 179; Pape to Stilwell, Ferris, 18 June 1943, Stilwell Radios
Personal File, Items 501-591, File II, Box 1, Pape to Stilwell and Ferris, 27
July and 28 July 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 591-701, File II,
Box 2, Marshall to Stilwell, 1 September 1943, and Stilwell to Marshall, 3
September 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 702-812, File II, Box 2,
and Ferris to Stilwell, 21 October 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items
1001-1101, File IV, Ferris to Stilwell, 5 November 1943, Stilwell Radios
Personal File, Items 1102-1183, File IV, Stilwell to Marshall, 11 November 1943,
Marshall to Stilwell, 14 November 1943, Ferris to Hearn, 27 November 1943, in
Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 1184-1299, File IV, in Commanding General:
Miscellaneous Notes and Correspondence, Personal Message File, "Oklahoma File,"
Diary of Operations, RG 493, WNRC; "History of the China-Burma-India Theater,"
unpublished manuscript, I: 132, II: GA-2, 7; McGee, History of the 2d Battalion,
pp. 25-26.
16. "Intelligence Activities in the Philippines," I: 7, 15, 19, 31-34; Ingham,
Rendezvous by Submarine, pp. 135, 141; Rogers, The Bitter Years, p. 122; Annex
11 to FO 25, Control of Filipino Forces, 6th Army, 6 October 1944, in "Report of
the Leyte Operation, 20 October 1944--25 December 1944," Box 1478, Philippine
Archives, Liberation/Postwar: Liberation of the Philippines, RG 407, NARA;
memorandum for G-3 Planning, 29 September 1944, Folder 7, Memorandums to and
from G-3, 1944-1945, Box 4, Whitney Papers; Schmidt, "American Involvement," pp.
108-09, 189-91, 202; Robert Ross Smith, "The Hukbalahap Insurgency," unpublished
manuscript (1963), pp. 43-44, CMH Library; Marking and Yay Panlillo to Colonel
James W. Atwell, Chief of Staff, I Corps, 15 September 1943, HRC Geog S.
Philippines 370.64--Guerrillas--Markings, CMH Archives; Fertig to MacArthur, 18
June 1944, GHQ, Fertig to MacArthur, Vol. 10, Box 607, SWPA, Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Guerrilla Resistance, RG 338, WNRC; Whitney, MacArthur, pp. 91, 133;
Keats, They Fought Alone, pp. 202, 339; Volckmann, We Remained, pp. 120-21.
17. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 36, 131, 149; Riley
Sunderland, comments relating to Scott R. McMichael, "Common Man, Uncommon
Leadership: Colonel Charles N. Hunter with Galahad in Burma," Parameters (Summer
1986), pp. 5-7, 12, in Scott R. McMichael Papers, USAMHI; McGee, History of the
2d Battalion, pp. 11, 45, 67; White, The Stilwell Papers, pp. 219, 280; Marshall
to Stilwell, 4 October 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal File, Items 1001-1101,
File IV, and Merrill to Stilwell, 6 November 1943, Stilwell Radios Personal
File, Items 1184-1299, File IV, in US Army CBI, Commanding General:
Miscellaneous Notes and Correspondence, Personal Message File, "Oklahoma File,"
Diary of Operations, RG 493, WNRC; Peers interview, I: 5-7; Military
Intelligence Division, War Department, Merrill's Marauders (February--May 1944),
American Forces in Action (Washington: War Department, 1945), p. 16; David W.
Hogan, Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry?: The Changing Role of the US Army Rangers
from Dieppe to Grenada (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 63-64;
Charles N. Hunter, GALAHAD (San Antonio, Tex.: Naylor, 1963), pp. 146, 172.
18. "History of the CBI Theater," I: 158, II: GA-13, 30, 50; Stilwell Papers, p.
280; McGee, History of the 2d Battalion, pp. 25, 39, 50, 63, 66-67, 71, 88;
Hogan, US Army Special Operations in World War II, pp. 114-17; Romanus and
Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 149-58, 175-80; Peers interview, I:
7; Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry?, p. 65.
19. Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 181-82, 188-91,
201-02, 211, 221-37; Hunter, GALAHAD, pp. 136, 176; Hogan, US Army Special
Operations in World War II, pp. 117-19; Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry?, pp.
65-68; Sunderland comments, pp. 7-11; Stilwell Papers, pp. 295-301, 304;
"History of the CBI Theater," I: 160, II: GA-55, 83-84; McGee, History of the 2d
Battalion, pp. 3, 104, 108, 115, 119, 133, 136, 139, 154, 161, 166, 187, 193,
199, 205, 214-15; Hunter, GALAHAD, pp. 168-69. See also Boatner's letters to
Stilwell in HRC Geog U. Burma 370.2--Myitkyina, CMH Archives.
20. Hogan, US Army Special Operations in World War II, pp. 119, 122, 127-28;
Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry?, pp. 67-68; Peers interview, I: 5.
21. Hogan, US Army Special Operations in World War II, pp. 68, 70, 85-90; James,
Years of MacArthur, II: 688; Steinberg, Philippine Collaboration in World War II,
pp. 2-3, 167.
David W. Hogan, Jr., is a historian in the General Histories Branch at the US
Army Center of Military History. He received his B.A. from Dartmouth College in
1980 and his Ph.D. from Duke University in 1986. After teaching at Elon College,
he joined the Center in 1987. He is the author of U.S. Army Special Operations
in World War II, published by the Center of Military History, and Raiders or
Elite Infantry?: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army's Rangers from Dieppe to
Grenada, published by Greenwood Press. This article, in its original form, was
delivered as a paper at the Conference of Army Historians in June 1994.
__________________
For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.
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