The French would have won the Gembloux battle if they hadn't withdrawn. to spare their surviving tanks for another battle. On paper they had many other ones , but in fact these were often outdated or not operational and experienced crews were lacking. As a result they had no more reserves for large tank battles and hoped the bunkers would replace them. Nobody expected the Germans to roll through the less denfended low countries and Sedan instead.

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The French had no choice but to withdraw at Gembloux. The DLM's lacked the means to hold the ground with the tiny number of infantry troops available in them backed by very little artillery. Basically, the infantry component of a DLM was arranged much as later US mechanized cavalry was. That is, they had limited numbers of fairly well armed infantry and were intended primarily to supplement the armored units in reconnnissance missions and for use in screening (such as setting up a picket line) but lacked the depth and numbers to hold ground in the face of serious opposition.
The French tanks could not hold the ground on their own. They had little infantry or artillery support. The Germans were rapidly reinforcing with regular infantry divisions that were well supported.
Given the situation, what other choice did they have?

So all in all. The reasons for France's lack of successful armor was because of no communications, spreaded armor and unorganized tactics? or somebody else sum this up :S

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Time is only enemy you'll never get rid of.

You are correct.

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In fact by withdrawing they saved some tanks (for a while) but they still had not enough left.

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Thats part of it.

In the case of the 1st DCR it was several changes of orders, leading to a last minute change from a counter attack vs a bridgehead at Dinant to a suprise meeting engagement while refueling much later than intended. So add supply problems to that one.

The 2d DCR was caught scattered across fifty kilometers of countryside while moving from its reserve position near Rheims to a new assembly area in Belgium. The tanks companys had just uloaded from railcars and were to far apart to support each other, while the infantry and artillery battalions were still far south in France.

The 3rd DCR was frittered away in small attacks despite every advantage of artillery, infantry, and supply support.

The fourth DCR was hastily assembled and made a couple of unsupported attacks which scared the s...t out of the local German soldiers and maybe Hitler but accomplished little else.

The 1st DLM was sent off with a motor infantry divsion to secure the approaches to the critically important port of Antwerp and to establish a safe route to Holland. It arrived a few hours to late, gave the 9thPz Div a rough day, then was ordered back south to block the advance of Kliests armored group to the Channel. It fought Kleists right flank for a day or two then was ordered back to prepare for a new larger attack. Eventually it was simply worn away by the long road marches and three or four battles.

2d & 3rd DLM fought a three day delaying action (12 13 14 May) between Hannaut and Enghlize to cover the establisment of the French 1st Army in the Gembloux region. On completing that mission they werre withdrawn into 1st Army reserve and dispresed into several battle groups. After the 1st Army withdrew toward Lille they fought another brief rearguard action, made two counter attacks (Arras ect...) on the flank of Kliests 'panzer corridor' and spent their last strength as reaguard of the retreat to the Channel.

The five mechanized cavalry divsions (DLC) were sent into the Ardennes to support the Belgians in delaying the German advance there. The Belgians retreated beefore the French arrived and four of the DLC were suprised by seven German armored divsions with over 2000 tanks, vs 300 light models of the DLC. In less than three days the last of them were chased back across the Meuse with heavy losses. Subsequently they were used as reinforcements for other larger formations, or as screens and blocks where there was nothing else.

In late may the French completely reorganized the DLC and two remaining DCR into a half dozen ad hoc armored divsions with whatever tanks and motorized battalions were available. Three of these were grouped together and counter atacked a German armored corps in the June offensive. After initial sucess the group was attritioned away by superior numbers of tanks, artillery, and air. The other armored divsions met similar fates as they made several counter attacks vs the new German advance into central France.

As it was between the 15th & 17th of May there was one slight chance to use the 2d & 3rd DLM in a decisive way. Instead of dispersing them into reserve positions behind the 1st Army north of Namur, they could have been ordered to attack south into the flank of Kliests breakthrough south west of Namur. There they would have cut behind the German armored divsions, rather than hitting them directlly as at Arras. I say again this is a very slight chance as the French Generals in Belgium did not understand yet what was going on to their south, and few to none of them would or could have acted with the necessaary speed. Still a pair of armored divsions followed by a couple of motorinfantry div into the rear of Kliests panzer group would be trouble.

One thing that really needs to be understood is just what the French armored formation TO&E's were. The DLC's for example were divisions in name only. They were really large regiment sized units more closely comparable to US mechanized- horse cavalry regiments of the same period. That is, a couple of battalion sized cavalry and infantry units with a small armored component. For the role they were given, it is absurd to think they could do more than present a thin screen that maintained contact prior to engagement at a MLR.

considering the odds it's surprising they did quite a good job at Gembloux prior to withdrawing. By the way isn't Gembloux in belgium?

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Yes, in Belgium.

Gembloux is a small city or large town located north an a bit west of Namur. In it self it was insignificant to the campaign. The general region lay along the main zone of resistance for the projected 'Dyle Line'.

The French 1st Army drew the mission of defending this sector, with one flank anchored on the fortresses of namur (defended by a Belgian corps), and the other flank on the BEF covering the critical industrial city of Louvain to the north. This are is some times refered to as a "land bridge" as it lies astride the high ground between the Meuse River to the south and east, and the other small rivers flowing north ans west to the North Sea. With only very small streams, no forrests, and a very gently rolling plain between the bridges leading to Masstrict and west into the central Belgian plain it seemd a ideal line of advance for a modern mechanized force. Consequently the French covered this sector with their best mobile force - Gen Pirouxs corps of the 2d & 3rd DLM, and they assigned better trained infantry divsions to the First Army.

In that respect they were closer to the US Armys Armored Cavalry Groups that were used in Europe in 1944-45. Perhaps a bit heavier on artillery and a bit lighter in tank size. The DLC had a properly organized artillery group ad only light tanks, the US Armored Cav Grp had some medium tanks, but the artillery divided amoung the squadrons. The DLC also had the residual horse mounted brigades attached. These were to be be detached, but had not yet been removed in may 1940.

The DLC were certainly inadaquate for their mission. The French of course failed to anticipate the advance of three armored corps in that area, they thought maybe one. And, it was assumed the Belgians would delay the enemy east of a line along the Ourthe river for three or more days. The DLC cavalry screen was expected to delay the enemy five days, until after the 16th of May. Instead it was chased back across the Meuse on the evening of the 12th, hardly two days. This left the preperations of the French 2d and 9th Armys nearly a week behind schedule when the Germans assualted the river defenses on the 13th.

So pretty much the made the wrong move in checkers... and the Germans got kinged?

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Time is only enemy you'll never get rid of.

...while clearing half the board with one piece!

The problem wasn't so much with the French tanks as it was with French doctrine and planning. The French and British believed that the war would be much like WWI. Initially, this is also what the Germans planned but after a copy of the plans fell into Allied hands, Hitler became nervous with the plan and decided to go with a Maverick Officer's idea of going through the Ardennes.

Criminal was the fact that the Allies had not one single contingency plan for what to do if their lines were breeched. Criminal was the pacifist attitude of the countries north of France like Holland and Belgium who refused to allow France and Britain to continue the Maginot line through their countries thinking this would just provoke Hitler. Even more criminal was thinking that when a man has shown the willingness to go to war that you should not build up your defenses and war production.

Britain and France wanted to start building defensive fortifications in the lowlands as soon as it was clear that Hitler was up to no good but Holland and Belgium refused thinking ti would just anger Hitler and provoke war.


French doctrine was totally wrong in that they spread out their tougher tanks sometimes just a single B1 Bis on the line with many miles to the next one. Instead they should have grouped their tanks in large formations behind the lines.

The Germans tactic was to set up lines of Pak 36's and once the French tanks came in contact with them and stopped, the Panzers would flank and finish off the survivors. This tactic was tried against the Matilda tanks at Arras but failed miserably. If not for Rommel bringing up his 88mm Flaks to do what the Pak 36s had failed to do, he could not have stopped less than 25 Matilda MkIIs and about 60 MG armed Matilda MkI's. When the Panzersfinally did flank, they got their butts handed to them.

What stopped the attack was the 88mm and since they were taking casualties with little to no hope of being able to retain the land captured, the Matilda Commander decided to withdraw. Imagine what would have happened had the Allies paid attention to what happened in Poland and had many more Matildas on the Mainland and had Spitfires on the mainland which were the best match for the 109s.

This was another problem compounded by the French who were reluctant to commit their best air forces to the battle leaving many frustrated pilots sitting far behind the lines in reserve.

To sum up, the problem wasn't so much the problem with French armor as it was arrogance on the side who had nearly lost WWI but in the end won and thought themselves and their tactics/strategy superior.

Too many Professional soldiers riding on their laurels and not doing their jobs which is to plan for every contingency and train their soldiers in those contingencies so that when communication is cut off, they know what to do.

The Allies needed air power to keep the Stukas off them and they needed their tanks in larger mobile groups not spread out as part of a static defensive line. They also needed their tanks to operate more closely with infantry and anti-tank guns which is what Germany did.

This is what Germay taught us, that you don't want your armor separated off in autonomous groups but instead group them in armored battalions consisting of AA, infantry, anti-tank units and armor.

In reality, if you draw it up on paper just looking at the units of both armies and the on paper abilities of the equipment, the Germans should have been hurt so bad that they wouldn't have thought about going to war for many years.

It would be easy to blame the French for the longer misery that ensued but in truth, this might have saved us more misery. Imagine what could have happened had the German scientist remained in Germany and eventually developed even better weapons including nukes.

All of this ignores the fact that had France And Britain not pressed Germany for war reparations, Hitler could never have come to power in the first place.

Just wanted to add a couple of good reads .

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/cmc.pdf
http://web.mit.edu/polisci/students/...ers_thesis.pdf

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

A little off topic...but what do you think would have happened if the French and Germans switched tanks?

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See Russel's post above. Nothing would change if they didn't switch doctrines as well.

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No Rest for the Wicked!

True, the French chose to scatter their tanks and back their infantery with a few of them, the Germans used their tanks for massive group attacks and could take the French tanks out one by one this way. Had the French gathered their tanks more often as they did in Gembloux, strategies would have been very different, but they failed to consider tanks as independent weapons and prefered to use them in the old fashioned way as infantery support, which obviously could do little against the Bltizkrieg strategy.
besides we have been talking about the Somua and the B1, but unfortunately these were not that many and quite often the chars that were facing the Panzers were pathetic FT-17s that were nothing but updated relics from WWI.

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double post - sorry!

Reading this thread a bit late. From the few sources I have on hand, I think it's important to note that while French doctrine for armored engagement is recognized as obsolete by the time of the Blitz, the prevailing wisdom often concludes that the French didn't know what they were doing. I would contend that at a wide level, this was true, but it is unfair to overlook periods where in some cases, they dealt the Germans a hard blow when least expected.

Gembloux, Stonne, and Montcornet are examples of what they were capable of when properly lead, despite the whatever faults or drawbacks in the actual machines they were operating. One point I find missing from the threads on this particular post, is that German airpower isn't mentioned, when in fact the Luftwaffe played a very large part in decimating/scattering French armored units. perhaps more than Heer/Panzer counterparts wish to admit.

What I find most interesting in reading conversations about the Battle of Gembloux (or Battle of Hannut), is that initial German objectives actually failed, and that for the brief time they reorganized to continue the assault on May 15, on the 14th they had actually given up the battlefield by sheer force of arms. The fact that the French were ordered to withdraw soon afterwards was definately a shame, rather than pressing on. However, this doesn't overlook the fact that for a very short time, the French not only held off an attack but it even prevented it's own complete annihalation under the most severe circumstances.

In my book, that is a French tactical victory, however short and brief it may have been.

I'm also glad to see Pallud's book mentioned. It contains some impressive photos of German tanks which fell victim to French tanks.

The fact remains that after the experience of the Poland campaign the French tank doctrine did not buge, so whatever local victories there were, were totally irrelevant within a wider strategic environment, "victories without a tomorrow" per the title of the book by Gen. René Prioux.

Name me a single dedicated LW anti-tank aircraft. It's still a bit early for the Ju 87G or the Hs 129, but I'll grant you that the logistical trains are very sensitive to air action.

In the meantime I found this http://funsite.unc.edu/hyperwar/UN/U....html#contents

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No Rest for the Wicked!