then the philippines would have tried to stay neutral, possibly offer production sharing agreements with the japanese for stuff like rice, cordage, wood, copper, paper, and iron. that would have been much more advantageous to the japanese than having to invade the country and operate the farms and gold/copper mines through a combination of volunteer and slave labor. but the thing is, by 1941, the americans and british would have enjoyed nearly 40 years of exploitation of philippine resources.

I agree with Falcon Jun. Regardless of how the Japanese viewed the Philippine Islands economically, the Luzon Straits represented a chokepoint on the sea lanes between Japan and the Southern Resources Area (SRA). It made absolutely no sense for the Japanese to go to war to seize the SRA and leave Luzon in the hands of a third power, neutral or otherwise. The Japanese had to invade at least Luzon in order to assure their control of, and access to, the SRA.

The natural resources of the Philippines did not represent any materials which were vital to the Japanese, although most would be found very useful in their war economy. However, they would not be likely to tolerate, nor respect, Philippine neutrality for three reasons. First, the military reason mentioned in the paragraph above. Second, the Japanese government strove for economic autarky, that is, the political control of all economic resources that would be required to make Japan self-sufficient. Third, Japan envisioned the Philippines as part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which, in practice, meant it would become a colony of Japan, to be economically exploited for Japan's benefit.

For these reasons, I believe that no matter what country; Spain, Britain, France, Germany, the US, or an independent Philippine Republic, might control the islands in the early part of the 20th Century, by 1942, the Japanese would control them, politically, economically, and militarily. The only difference would be when that control would be established.

This is not unlike the position of Siam or Thailand. While the Thai had little interest in Japans war or empire they were in the path to Maylasia, Singapore, and Burma. The Japanese Army saw little point in respecting Thai nuetrality and Japans diplomats made the Thai governement a offer it could not refuse. Judging from that historical example DA's take on the fate of the Phillipines is a very likely outcome.

As a side note: When the US OSS went poking into Thailand in 1944 looking for a anti Japanses undground to contact, they were led straight to the Thai government. It appeared the Thai had long anticipated how the war was going and were busy getting ready to run off the Japanese as they weakend.

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I forgot my password, can I use yours?

If the Japanese had control of the PI by 1941, then there was no rational argument for the US to support the Brits and Dutch in their colonies from further Japanese aggression.

I see no way for the US to support them without having major ports along the way from which to operate from.

All very true.

However, Thailand did have something in common with Japan; it had never been a colony of another power. Japan managed to maintain that status with a strong military, Thailand did it with diplomacy.

Another interesting point is that Thailand, at Japan's behest, declared war on the United States on January 25, 1942. The Thai ambassador in Washington, however, refused to deliver the declaration of war to the US State Department, and the US, although aware of Thailand's action, ignored it and never reciprocated.

The US had plenty of logical reason to support the British and Dutch possessions in Asia, with or without the Philippines in US hands. There was the war in Europe in which the US had undertaken to guarantee that Britain would not be defeated by the Axis powers; allowing valuable British and Dutch colonies in Asia to fall into the hands of another Axis power would seriously undermine that guarantee and hand an important advantage to the Germans.

Furthermore, US foreign policy in Asia was in direct conflict with Japanese policy in Asia. Allowing Japanese aggression againt British and Dutch possessions in Asia would seriously imperil an independent China, to which US policy was dedicated. In addition the US realized that possession of the British and Dutch colonie in Asia would significantly strengthen Japan and make the US foreign policy objective almost impossible. All of these goals were taken quite seriously by the US and were the reason that the Roosevelt administration pledged to militarily support British and Dutch efforts in the Pacific if either, or both, were attacked by Japan, even if US territroy were not directly involved.

Without a major naval base in the Philippines, the US could still be able to support British and Dutch forces in the Southwest Pacific. WP 46, adopted in 1939, assumed that the US Philippine bases would rapidly be lost or at least made unavailable for use by the US Pacific Fleet. Therefore, WP 46 directed the US Navy to secure the supply lines, through a chain of US islands from Hawaii to Samoa, to Australia; this task was started before the war even began. Australia was to be held against the Japanese and provided important bases for action against Japanese forces in the SWPA. Further, Britain and Dutch representatives offered the US the use naval facililities in Singapore and the NEI to deter Japanese attack. In the event, the offer, except for minor use of Dutch facilities, was not accepted, but the US definitely had numerous options for basing it's forces in Southeast Asia in order to oppose Japanese aggression.

Claiming that the Philippines were the only reason for US involvement in the Western Pacific is an extreme example of historical tunnel vision.

why can't the US bring the war straight to tokyo bay?

There's a vast difference in wishing to support, and being able to support.

Without a reason to have the American fleet in Asia for purposes other than to defend European colonies, Id say the political will to fight the Japanese was not there. It was marginal in real life (on the eve of Pearl Harbor) and it sure wouldn't be there as long as the Japanese do not attack the US directly.

And the bases in the South Pacific were not going to be able to handle the Pacific Fleet for several years. So why even bother sending your fleet into harms way, far from home and for no reason.

It did in 1945.

In 1942, there was an obstacle called the Imperial Japanese Navy.

See posts 4, 5, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32, 35, 37, 39, 49, and 56 for an explanation of why the US would still have reason to be involved in any Pacific war, absent it's possession of the Philippines.

Clint's post # 29 demolishes the myth that there was no support for a war against Japan prior to Pearl Harbor; both the Roosevelt administration and the American public supported a war to stop Japanese aggression on the Asian mainland; and that support was motivated not by any unrealistic hopes of maintaining possession of the Philippines, but by concern for the US "Open Door" policy in China.

And, as I have explained several times, the Philippines were not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, US interests in Asia and the western Pacific. Without the Philippines to worry about, the US would still have substantial forces in the Pacific.

As for the bases in the South Pacific, they did, in fact, support significant elements of the US Pacific Fleet within six months of the outbreak of war. In point of fact, the US Pacific Fleet was able to successfully take the offensive just eight months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor using the bases established in the South Pacific. Your assertions do not hold water.

In this scenario, the P.I. are not in American hands.
This assumption does not negate the need for Japan to attempt to cripple whatever US forces are in the Pacific because of the growing feud between the two countries over their differing policies. So whether the US fleet is based in Pearl Harbor or wherever in the Pacific, the Japanese will do something, especially with the embargo that the US had imposed on Japan.
Sycom, since it is the US government that had been leading the effort to thwart Japan from reaching its objectives, it follows that the US effort would also mean deployment of the needed resources, both diplomatic and military, even if there is minimal public support for such actions. That's an executive decision. And with Europe at war and British resources stretched thin, the US was the one left most able to fill the gap to do something for those European colonies in Asia, which Japan covets.
And when there's a military move on the US side, Japan couldn't ignore such an action. Japan will do something, especially with the US holding Japan in an economic stranglehold. The stage is set for a confrontation, whether anyone likes it or not.
And Mac, we both know that when one's forces are not sufficient, we don't dare do such a foolhardy thing such as entering the lion's den. It's better to do what we can with what we have and, as much as possible, make the foe fight the way we want him to fight, not vice versa.

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That's about it,
Fil

Absolutely correct. The feud you mention was not primarily over the Philippines, but over China and Japanese aggression on the Asian mainland. As I pointed out in post # 27, The US Pacific Fleet was not sent to Pearl Harbor in 1940 to make it easier to defend the Philippines; WP 46, the war plan in effect in 1940, had no provision for the USN to defend any US possessions west of Midway. The Pacific Fleet was sent to Pearl Harbor to underline the US determination to oppose Japanese aggression against China. Thus, the Pacific Fleet would have been at Hawaii in 1941, even if the US had never held possession of the Philippines.

And with the Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Japanese planners could not risk the assumption the US wouldn't support the British and Dutch if they were attacked; they HAD to assume the US would react to an attack on Malaya and Singapore as though it were an attack on it's own territory. This was especially true since Roosevelt had publicly proclaimed such support would be forthcoming in the event of a Japanese attack on British and Dutch possessions in the Pacific.

With respect to why the US Pacific Fleet couldn't proceed directly to Tokyo Bay, it boils down to the fact that Japanese naval and air bases in the Mandates meant that the US had to secure air and logistical support bases in the western Pacific before it could project power across the Pacific. It would have been as foolhardy for the USN to attempt a direct attack on the Japanese Home islands as it was for the IJN to attempt an attack on Hawaii in 1942. The USN had not yet created the fleet train of service and support squadrons that allowed it to exert true power projection in 1945. That was the same reason the IJN was defeated at Midway in June, 1942; Yamamoto forgot that the IJN could raid very effectively, but it could not stay operational at sea for more than a couple of weeks, and thus had only a transitory effect in any given area.