I'm not missing your points at all. I think I addressed them quite clearly. Our problem seems to be that we are talking past each other, nobody really understanding what the other means.

The saying "amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics" is (IMHO) a lot of rubbish, because if you don't make logistics part of your strategy, you have already lost. To speak of a "strategy" that does not include logistics is pointless, but the saying implies that they are two completely different things! [img]smile.gif[/img]

But anyway, if we want to solve our little dispute here, my feeling is we should go point by point and consider solutions for each one. The last three or four posts (indeed most since my last one) seem to be on the border of obtuse, resorting to overgeneralisations and oversimplifactions and language usually heard in the sandbox. [img]smile.gif[/img] Perhaps I myself am also guilty of this, in which case I apologise.

But let's try and get some structure in here, shall we? What are the issues?

1. Increasing War Production
2. Adapting the "War Plan"
3. Fighting the War (and saying why which side would win)

Ad 1: Naturally if you increase war production, you must decrease civilian production. Labour was there, just take the women. The whole of the Wehrmacht never numbered more than 10-13 million at any time, and in 1941 it was even somewhere like 5-6 million I believe. Germany had over 80 million inhabitants with all the annexed territories, so the labour shortage is not as acute as thought before if we calculate in the use of women. I'm trying to play out a "best-case" solution first. That the Nazis wanted the wife standing in the kitchen and taking care of the children must be swept under the carpet for now. [img]smile.gif[/img] And who doesn't!
So even an increase in production without a significant (or shall we say threatening) decrease of civilian production would have been possible. This must be common sense, as Britain managed it as well.
Concerning resources - synthetic oil was made out of coal, I believe, and Germany had quite a sizable share of the world supply of that. A few more plants to create this (this IS a best-case scenario!!) and all fuel problems fly into the wind until a serious bombing campaign starts.

Ad 2: later [img]smile.gif[/img]

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„Solange man nicht mit dem Kopf unterm Arm rumläuft geht es doch noch!" Erwin Rommel

Germany did have a large share of synthetic oil but only because no one else had a need for it. Germany began producing synthetic oil in the thirties but at its highest production rate it only accounted for 3% of German oil consumption. Its a nice idea but very expensive and time consuming to produce and not really viable on any large enough scale to meet required needs, not to mention the wastage of large amouts of coal. It matters little how much stuff you build, what really matters is if you have the fuel to put in them.

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

Good point. So we really need to know whether or not Germany COULD cover its fuel needs with synthetic oil.

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„Solange man nicht mit dem Kopf unterm Arm rumläuft geht es doch noch!" Erwin Rommel

No chance. They would never have been able to make large enough quantities of synthetic oil to cover their wartime consumption. They could not make enough to cover peacetime consumption. It was only ever regarded before the war as a stop gap/ emergency supply. But if it had been researched further who knows where it could have led.

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

Agreed, Andreas. Back to some intelligent discussion! The logistics issue frustrates me, because I study it alot, whereas much historiography on ww2 seems only concerned with Rommel and Stanlingrad, etc etc,.

RedBaron is getting at my main idea here. Germany was way too dependent on synthetic oil. And as an aside, from what I've read (which is not defeinitive, so we could look for better info), the process of creating syntheitc oil from coal was inefficient and costly for the yield recieved.
But more to my point- RedBaron points out the difficulties Germany had with fuel, and I think he's right on- Germany BARELY had enough fuel throughout the war. THEN, combine this shortage with all the other resources needed for war. Tungsten- that was one that really hurt. Among other things, AP and FlaK ammunition require large amounts of Tungsten- amounts that germany had to import. Even more common (to us, anyway!) was copper- required for any electrical wiring and many other things realted to armaments. Germany also repeatedly, especially in 44, suffered from copper shortages. Molybendum- required for high grade steel, and VERY rare. Manganese- the list goes on and on. And germany had no consistent supply of any of the above.
And the main problem with all this is, ALL the resources like the above were necessary-wether in small or large quntities, all were needed. In some cases, germany was able to work around shortages. But quality often suffered. And there were shortages that could not be worked around- like fuel and steel.
Decreasing civilian production would have had some effect, but there still would have been the resource issue, because most civilian production did not utilize as many resources. Slowing Civilian production would have had some impact on some of the resources, like making more copper and rubber available. But the problems germany had with some of the more "exotic" resources would still have remained.
So, IMHO, any scenario relating to increased production for germany has major problems because of these resource shortages. I do think germany could have addressed the manpower and labor issues. But resources were another thing entirely.
So in essence, Anreas, using your post above- the problems inherent with #1 made #s 2 and 3 non-issues. Germany could not adequatley address a major aspect of #1 (resources), so increased production on a wide scale was not really possible.
One thing that could have effected this, and could make an interesting production-oriented discussion- what if germany had SHIFTED production areas? Say, more aircraft at the expense of armor? or vice versa?

and on the amatuers statement- that was mainly due to frustartion. Apologies! The idea there was not to seperate the two, but a complaint that logistics often gets ignored as part of strategy.

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

Good post and many good points. AFAIK, Poland is actually sitting on one of the largest copper deposits in the world, but apparently it wasn't yet discovered back then, because copper was a constant theme even in the OKW. "Discovering" this deposit in time might have helped!

In the early part of the war, would it have been possible to increase production by increasing the imports from the Soviet Union for example?

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„Solange man nicht mit dem Kopf unterm Arm rumläuft geht es doch noch!" Erwin Rommel

Andreas

As well as Polish Copper I think Hitler would have been far more interested in North Africa if he had known how much oil the Italians were sitting on in Libya. Germany did have the Austrian oil fields and progressive access to Rumania, but as for all the other rarities like Chrome, Tungsten, Manganese, Aluminium and Rubber had to come from somewhere.

Could the USSR have filled this shortfall? The question is would they have been willing to?

Jumbo

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"Capital! We're nearly out of ammunition! Now we can get at them with the bayonet!" General Paddy Gough, 1st Sikh War

Good point, Andreas. I think the russians would have been perfectly happy to increase supplies to germany. The treaty signed by Hitler and Stalin in 38 (? 39? 40?- don't remember exact year) stipulated that russia provide germany with goods and resources. Considering how focused Stalin seemed to have been on appeasing germany, I'd think he would have OKed the extra resources. But again, this goes back to Hitler. Hitler didn't think that germany needed any extra resources at the time. It wasn't until germany attacked russia that germany's resources shortages became apparent, so it's kind of a catch-22. Germany could have gotten more resources from russia, but didn't need those resources but for attacking russia... (I think that makes sense )
Jumbo, I thought Hitler did know about the oil deposits in Libya and Egypt, and that that was one of the aims of the N. African campaign. Did they know about the oil?

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

That is true Crazy. As a matter of fact, Stalin did increase the shipments of resources to Germany when he was getting information (of which he refused to believe) of Germany's buildup along the border and her intent to invade. I think Stalin was hoping the increase would appease Hitler. He also did not believe even though he was being told by different sources of Hitler's intent.

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American by birth, TEXAN by the grace of GOD!

Crazy

Well if Hitler knew about the Libyan oil he didn't tell the Italians! They were busy scuttling around East Africa looking for it in the 30's but ignored Libya. I don't think the Libyan reserves were tapped until the early 60's. Until that point the Libyan cash-crop was scrap metal from vehicles destroyed during the war in the desert.

The big sources of British oil were the gulf and Persia, especially through the old anglo-iranian oil company.

Jumbo

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"Capital! We're nearly out of ammunition! Now we can get at them with the bayonet!" General Paddy Gough, 1st Sikh War

That makes some sense, Jumbo. Hitler may have been daft in some areas, but I'm sure he would have put a high priority on African oil.

One of the amusing things here- Many of Hitler's strategic decisions and ideas during the war were, shall we say, ineffective. The funny thing is, many of Hitler's worst moves were based on securing resources and logistics! When he ordered Army Group South to hold the Caucasus at all costs, for example. Hitler did not account for the drastic situation and lessened strength of Army group south, which was forced to retreat rather quickly anyway. His hold fast order cost many lives and equipment. But despite Hitler's ignorance in that area, the idea behind holding the Caucasus was correct- germany needed the oil and iron resources. In other words, again a catch-22- Hitler wanted AG south to hold territory and secure resources, but AG south did not have the resources to hold! (again, I think that makes sense!)

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

Hitler did indeed make most of his military decisions based on a resource-holding mentality. That's why he nearly halted the advance into France after the coal fields in the north had been secured.

Later on, he did the same on the Eastern Front. This was also a reason why it was nearly impossible for generals to argue with him about the neccessity of moving the front back. Hitler would always play the resources card.

According to Manstein, however, he (Manstein) went into the resource matter and discovered that the largest part of the "valuable resources" that Germany was holding were either unusable by Germany (bad quality coal for example) or unused due to lack of labour and machinery in the East.

The point I'm trying to make is whether resources in a place such as the Caucasus would make any significant impact on production even after one or two years. How quickly would Germany be able to extract oil from the fields? And in which quantity?

Also, does anybody have some information on the amount of resources gleaned from the occupied Soviet Union in comparison with the rest of the German-controlled world?

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„Solange man nicht mit dem Kopf unterm Arm rumläuft geht es doch noch!" Erwin Rommel

You're completely right, Andreas- Hitler was generally ill-informed on even his resource-related decisions. Let me clarify- I wasn't saying that Hitler's decisions were SMART, just that they were based on resources. Hitler consistently failed to take smaller details into account. Your point on labor and machinery is very good here- there may have been resources in the Caucasus, but actually getting them back to germany and making use of them was very difficult. DIstance, partisans, differing rail guages- all made logistics very difficult in russia.
I think your last point is the trick here- Russia did not actually provide huge amounts of resources- not as much as France, Rumania, Bulgaria, and some of the other occupied countrys. This would partially explain germany's resource position later in the war. Despite the problems and retreats the germans had on the eastern front, their resources and production actually increased throughout 43 and 44. This would suggest that only a small portion of resources were being imported from russia. one of my books does have some tables and data on resources and importation- I'll see tonight if I can get anything...

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

Back into the fire again!!!

Kein Problem, crazy! I am a bit stupid sometimes

Logistics are a very important tactic level. But all those things some of you posted at the beggining of this thread about T-34s and 88mm guns are minor tactical details and they can be ignored. That thing could be resumed in saying that the thing Mark III vs T-34 is like the thing Sherman vs Panther. It did not matter. But logistics do make a big difference. I have never said the opossite.

Indeed, we did bomb London with petrol from the Caucausus. And we ate grain from the Ukraine, etc.

That thing about Hitler and the resources. That shows that Hitler was a strategist, and a good one. And as I have pointed out, he ruined things when he got down to the minor tactic levels, because of his tremendous lack of experience. But the main ironny here is that Hitler knew that the USSR could only be defeated by a single lightning campaign. Then why did he want to secure strategic points needed for a long war like the fields of the Ukraine and the Caucasus' petrol? That would have come later... But anyway.

All of you have good points on several things. But let me say something, crazy. If production in 1944 was higher than 1941 that means that more resources were used in 1944, right? And by 1944 the railroads, trade and sea lines had been destroyed by Allied aircrafts, right? All those things did not happen in 1941. Would have been possible in 1941 to have more resources from wherever (Norway, Hungary, Romania, etc.) easily? Fine railroads and no air attacks would have meant that those resources could have reached their destination safely. Do you get my points here? I know about the dependence of Germany on other countries in many important resources and I will not deny the fact that even with undisturbed supply lines, the resources needed would have been pretty hard to get.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Good points, Friedrich- I figured you'd bring up something like that. The answer to Germany's resources in 1944 vs. 1941 is in my opinion two-part.
For one, by 1944 germany was able to make use of the resources gained from occupied territory. The resources from france, poland, and central europea countries like rumania were not available right away; it would often take many months for the german to actually acquire the resources they had captured- machinery must be put in place, transport for resources must be planned fro, etc. So by 1944, germany was finally beginning to make use of all the new sources of materials that had been captured. Not sure if this is clear- Andreas brought this up earlier. He used the example of oil from the caucasus, which works well. Let's say the germans had held the caucasus and so gained access to the oil there- first, they needed to set up the oil wells and processing facilities. Then, they needed labor to begin extracting and processing the oil. Finally, the oil had to be transported back to germany. A long process like this existed for any sort fo captured resource, so they would not be available immediatley. But by 1944, most of these new resources were available.

OK, so I said two main issues- the second issue would be Speer! By 1944, Speer had taken over the military production. For one thing, he was finally able to convince Hitler that a major shift towards military production was needed- this increased production. Further, we both know Speer was an organizational genius- he restructured and reorganized germany's military production, which resulted in further increases in production.

Your point on the bombing and damage to infrastructure is well taken- that kind of goes back to the "what if?" on the bomber offensive. Also, this shows how impressive Speer was- he was able to make use of the newly available resources and increase production despite the damage germany was recieving...

Germany likely could have secured significant new sources of materials in 1941, as you suggest. But then we get back to the Hitler issue- Hitler did not authorise increased military production until 1942.

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

Very well, carzy. But we had already behaved mischievously and agreed to change the topic a bit...

What if Herr Speer was appointed minister of weaponry with the power to use 100% of Germany and its territories to make war in 1939?

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Well, the one exception would be that Germany had no conquered anyone in 1939 (I'm assuming we are speaking of before the war started), so there would still be some significat resource shortages. And this again goes back to Hitler and the german planners- they did not see any need for increased production. Until the war in russia, germany had no need for extra resources and an increase in production.
But if they had foreseen this in 39, and increased production, I'm not sure. that makes a good what if. Hitler (We'll have to disagree on him- I don't think he was any good as a strategist) may not have been so fixated on resources, which could have altered some of the decisions he made. With more equipment and transportation available, the first year of the war in russia could have turned out differently...

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

That would have meant that the U-boats would have been built in enough quantities by 1940-1941. Bye, bye Britain!

And a motorised and adequatelly equipped Wehrmacht in Russia, bye, bye USSR!

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

It definetely gets more interesting with this theory...
As far as the U-Boat war, I'd ahve to basically agree. The U-boats as it was did a serious number on England. There would have certainly been more U-boats, and don't forget potentially more of a surface fleet. And also, german torpedoes as far as I understand were relatively unrealiable, especially early in the war. With Speer influencing production then, the torpedoe defects may have been addressed earlier. It would essentially become a fight as to wether or not the US could produce Liberty ships and escorts faster than the germans could sink them.

AS far as Russia goes, not so fast. Fuel- sorry to come back to that, but fuel was a finite resource- there was only so much of it. And even at the height of fuel production in germany, late 1943, there was still often not enough to go around. This would have been the only serious probelm for german mechanization on the eastern front. The vast distances in russia were the problem. More tanks and trucks would have definetely have had a huge effect on barbarossa- more tanks means more encirclements, and fuel could have been stockpiled. But as soon as the stockpiles ran out, the germans would run into the same problem they had by 1942 anyway... not enough fuel to mechanise all forces in the east.

But let's say you are correct... and Britian and Russia both fell. Then it would be the US, Canada, Australia and others against The Nazis, Japan, and the rest of the axis.
Well then...

[ 16 August 2002, 10:59 PM: Message edited by: CrazyD88 ]

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

By giving Speer full authority in 1939 the war probably would have gone like Friedrich said. At least he would have been that intelligent to see that a long war is coming and equipment needed. Hitler was surrounded by fools who made him feel unbeatable and that no war would last longer than a couple of weeks.

I for myself am satisfied with the fact that for the Barbarossa, as more panzer divisions were needed, the tanks were spread among these divisions and the number of tanks never grew very much, now with Speer they would have enough tanks, and no need to move Guderian and tanks to the south in august 1941, and Moscow would have been captured. End of war!

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Just discovered this bit of writing that I created a few years ago. It's on topic but neatly misses the resource issue. But for what it's worth, here goes:

Production for War Reaches Top Priority a Lot Earlier

Another what-if. It struck me, while discussing the topic with my grandfather, that Germany was actually only playing at war until 1943. In fact, some people were still treating the war like a stupid game in 1945. This is quite understandable when you come to think about the fact that on January 1st 1945, the front lines were roughly the border lines of the Reich.



My grandfather, you must know, was managing director (or roughly that) of a factory in Sielsia from 1940 onwards IIRC. Until 1943, guess what they were making - the incredibly strategically important war good of fountain pens. Then he got a call from the local chief of the Nazi party, with whom he was on quite good terms, who warned him that unless he changed production to something more suitable for attacking the enemy his factory would be closed and his workers, staff and his boss (and he himself) be made soldiers. After a few adventures too numerous and too long to tell, he ended up building vital high-precision parts for the V weapons, presumably for the navigation equipment.



So, in 1943, production was finally changed for war. Isn't this a bit late? What if it had already been changed over in 1939? The situation as far as material supplies went was a lot better back then - there was still all that stuff flowing in from the Soviet Union and the Balkans were co-operative and nobody was bombing any factories yet.



There was one thing missing, though, and this was labour. With every able-bodied man on the front, industry was desperately short-handed. This is the reason why millions upon millions of foreigners were deported to Germany to work in the factories under conditions too disastrous to describe. By 1944, the deportation was at its boom and so was - surprise, surprise - the production level of tanks, guns etc etc.



On the one hand it therefor seems unlikely that a very high level of production could be achieved in 1939 or 1940 since there is a lack of labour force. On the other hand you must remember that the Wehrmacht in 1939 and 1940 is nowhere near what it was in 1944. It is still a relatively small force. In 1944 about 10 million people were German soldiers, in 1939 there were 2-3 million (I have the figures somewhere but can't be bothered to look it up). So, IMHO, from the labour point of view this could easily have been achieved.



Some people will now probably think that the conversion from peace-time industry to war-time industry would take years, probably thinking of the USA, which took ages to get into gear (though once it did it was unbeatable!). Well, I can tell you exactly how long it took to convert my grandfather's factory. The first of the machines was converted from fountain pen parts to V-weapon parts in one night by one man. In one week, the entire factory was converted. The trick is to pick the right factories to do the right work. It would have been quite impossible - to take just an example - to convert a fountain pen factory to make Tiger tanks even within a few months.



Thus, to sum it all up, it is my opinion that had the German industry been put on a war footing at once in 1939, Germany would undoubtedly have won the war. Far more tanks, more guns, more planes, more submarines.... losses suffered in 1940 and 1941 would easily have been replaced - maybe Russia would have fallen in 1941. Who knows? The possibilities are limitless.

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„Solange man nicht mit dem Kopf unterm Arm rumläuft geht es doch noch!" Erwin Rommel