Well, on paper the Yamato was the best battleship ever. But, its fire controls was quite bad, while I remember that I heard that Bismark had overall the better firepower than any other battleship in history (i may be wrong, since the Iowa is though to be the best battleship in every category "evar").

I think training would be a big deal just because you have a better weapon doesn't mean much. I think the Bismark would win its faster, and still packs a punch. The Yamato has a better range but could they really hit something that far out? I'm not sure just food for thought. Even though I bet the Bismark.

There isn't a whole lot of evidence that Yamato's fire control was "quite bad"
It's quite likely that you did indead hear or read this. The claim however is very dubious. For instance if you define single salvo throw weight as the defintion of firepower quality the only modern BBs that are worse than Bismarck are the Scharnhort and Dunkirk classes and some of the WWI designs have more as well.

The Japanese apparently thought so. Training also becomes a matter of when you choose them. Initially the Yamato's were training pretty hard but as the fule crunch really hit they tended not to go to sea very often. Still not sure that their level of training wouldn't be in the same ball park as say that of the Tirpitz late in the war. Note that the Yamato has 9 guns throwing hells that weigh in at over 1,400 KG while Bismarck has 8 firing shells that weigh in at 800 KG.

There are a number of things to keep in mind when talking of the Yamato Class ships the first is that you cannot simply look at the "numbers" and compare and contrast them with other fleet’s numbers. First off the Japanese were decades behind the western powers in armor quality, so they needed more weight and thickness to equal the protection of others. So while they had almost 35% of their displacement weight in armor, it was inferior. A comparable ship made with western style armor would weigh about 4-5000 tons less.

The Yamato design had a shortened armored citadel due to its triple turrets and compact superstructure, and while this actually saved a bit of weight it left great distances of its overall length, bow and stern, unprotected. It turned out that 46.5% of its total length is an Achilles’ heel.

The Yamato Class turrets traversed at the same speed as the WW1 Anglo-American types, whereas the new Iowa Class traversed at twice their rate, and were coupled to excellent radar fire control. Not so the Japanese, they lagged behind in radar in all fields, especially in fire control. The great inefficiency of their power plants limited their range to only 7,200 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 16 knots on "full tanks" (source; Fleets of World War Two by Richard Worth).

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.

That isn't what I get out of:
Ballistic Tests on IJN SHINANO's Turret Face Armor

Quote:

...The Yamato Class turrets traversed at the same speed as the WW1 Anglo-American types, whereas the new Iowa Class traversed at twice their rate,

At the ranges these were likely to engage turret travers speed would have been of little or no significance.

Quote:

and were coupled to excellent radar fire control. Not so the Japanese, they lagged behind in radar in all fields, especially in fire control....

On the otherhand the Yamato may have had the best optical fire control of all time.

Neither is there any evidence that it was any good. And if you use the term "Fire Control" in the broadest sense to include the proficiency of the crew, then there is ample evidence that it was "quite bad".

Do you have any documentary evidence for making this claim?

The USN technical Mission report on Japanese surface fire control generally rated it somewhat behind that of the RN and USN and said in particular that, "Japanese stable verticals and gyro work for fire control seem to be vastly inferior".

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/prima...ort%20O-31.pdf

The Japanese apparently never expended much effort on gunnery training for Yamato. When the Yamato was first commissioned, it became the flagship of the Combined Fleet under Admiral Yamamoto. But after observing Yamato's gunnery exercises a few weeks later, Yamamoto is so disgusted with Yamato's gunnery that he transfers the flag back to Nagato and orders additional training for Yamato.

Just what was the level of Tirpitz's gunnery training late in the war? If it was comparable to the Yamato's gunnery crew in late 1944 or early 1945, it would have been pretty bad.

The armor on the turret faces isn't what was being described by Richard Worth in his book Fleets of World War Two, on page 181 he states;

"Protection constituted and adequate 35% of displacement, with armor concentrated in lavish thickness; the 25.6-inch turret faces rate as the toughtest protection ever mounted afloat. However, Japanese armor was decades behind foreign standards, and other problems lay in the details of protection and weaponry."

Now, I may have mis-read that portion or something. But what I took away from that was the turret face armor was excellent, but the rest of the armor was sub-standard. Perhaps I mis-interpreted his meaning, I read the section you provided, and that too references turret face armor specifically as well. Not the overall armor quality, but only a single sub-set/portion of the armor scheme.

If I am in error, I apologize to all.

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.

Well I'd consider the first salvo stradle off Samar as evidence of a pretty decent fire control.
The length of her baseline and qualitiy and size of her optics. Certainly there were problems. I believe for instance that the Japanese had at least one more set of people in the chain than the US did. Not familiar enough with the German or British practice to compare them.
My understanding is that everyone esle's stable verticals were significantly inferior to the US ones if they had them.
Certainly they didn't expend very many rounds. However that's not quite the same as training. It's not clear to me how much of the latter they did.
I don't think I've ever heard that Tirptiz fired in practice rounds once she was sent to Norway. Doesn't mean she didn't but later on when she was damaged and just sitting in the fjord I seriosly doubt her crew did much training except perhaps for AA work.

My reading of that sentence would be more where and how the armor was apportioned rather than the quality of the armor. For instance Japanese cruisers tended to have very little armor on their turrets.

I would qualify that with the statement, "IF it happened." Also good FC isn't characterized by the ability to get a single straddle; it is, by definition, the ability to consistently produce straddles and hits.

An FC system is like the proverbial chain; a weak link anywhere can, and does, negate the value of all the strong links. The Japanese did exhibit some good naval gunnery, especially early in the war. But in every navy, there are good gunnery ships and poor ones; the Yamato, according to all the evidence we have, cannot be said to be ranked among the former category.

That's my impression, as well. However, the Yamato's stable vertical's, according to the Technical Mission report, seem to have been one of the weak links in her FC system

That's true. However, dry firing drills do not instill the same level of confidence nor produce the same level of skill that actually firing a round and hitting a target does. And we have no record, that I'm aware of, of how frequently the Yamato's gunnery crew were drilled. Sometime, in the latter half of 1944, gunnery radar was installed on the Yamato. The Fleet gunnery Staff officer stated that at Samar, the gunnery crew was not really proficient in it's use and had very little confidence in the radar. That would seem to indicate a lack of practice with it.

That seems to have held for the Yamato as well. The Japanese, however, considered the Yamato an active fleet unit and the indications are her crew did practice various gunnery evolutions while she was at Singapore in 1944. But by that time in the war, the IJN did not have the superbly trained crewmen that they started the war with. They were receiving replacements from the reserves that had little practical experience in their rates.

True but given that the Japanese observer and US observers on the CVE's both reported the salvo landing close there's a pretty good case for it. As for consistency how many times did Yamato fire and how good a fire control solution did she have given the range, smoke, squals, and maneuvering? I submit there is little evidence that she was a bad shooter after she finished working up (ie after the additional training Yamamoto required).

Simply put we don't have much evidence either way.

From my reading the big point of stable verticles is they allow you to maintain a fire control solution even with quite radical maneuvers. If we are comparing Yamato to any but US battleships the same critisim would likely apply to them. In any case it's more likely to come into play in a multi ship engagement particularly one where torpedos are fired. (Sounds like they could really have used it off Samar now that I think of it).

Indeed but can't much the same be said of Tirpitz. Both the Germans and the Japanese were reluctant to use radar because they didn't want to give away their positions. The US and British chose otherwise. Perhaps part of it was since by the end of the war even PT boats had radar it's use didn't really compromise things much where any axis ship at sea was going to atract a lot of attention.

The US observers, as I recall, reported a salvo of BB-sized shells landing close, but that doesn't mean it was a straddle (Yamato reported a "hit", not a straddle), and with three other BB's present, it doesn't mean the salvo was fired by Yamato. In my opinion, your "pretty good case" is pretty weak.

We have plenty of evidence that Yamato was a poor gunnery ship earlier in the war. We have plenty of evidence the Yamato's gunnery crew didn't get many practice shoots. We have the testimony of the Japanese Fleet gunnery staff officer that Yamato's crew wasn't proficient with her gunnery radar and had no confidence in it. And finally, we have the evidence that Yamato's crew, shortly after the opening salvo's at Samar, lost sight of the targets and had no idea of where either the American ships, nor the Japanese cruisers were in relation to herself or each other. Given that we have no conclusive evidence that Yamato hit anything at Samar with her main batteries, I'd say that all the evidence we do have supports the idea that she was a poor gunnery ship and her FC system was deficient compared to other Japanese ships and US ships.

I'd sure be willing to entertain any evidence that you have that Yamato was a better than average gunnery ship.


I think that's a bit of an over simplification of their role, but it is true of the WW II American stable verticals as far as it goes. However, it is not true that RN, or for that matter, German stable verticals were as deficient as Japanese examples. And the advantage is not only in play when torpedoes are present. Clearly, a BB which has the ability to maintain it's own firing solution while maneuvering radically, has a tremendous advantage over an enemy BB which must steam on a more or less stable course in order to maintain it's firing solution. The radically maneuvering BB will easily throw the enemy aim off, while continuing to hit it's own target; this should be obvious.

That argument doesn't hold much water; in a gun battle both sides are aware of the presence of the other, so there is no advantage to shutting down one's gunnery radar. The Yamato apparently failed to use her gunnery radar because her gunnery crew had no confidence in it, or perhaps it wasn't working. Either way, it seems the addition of radar did little to enhance the Yamato's FC system at Samar.

Given the pilots report in combination with the report from the US ships it looks pretty strong to me. I'll try and remeber to look up some more info later today.
We do? What? Looking at the TROM at: Imperial Battleships
8 August Yamato launched
16 Dec commissioned
30 March 42 deficiencies noted in gun crew and additional training required
May she's Yamamoto's flagship.
Now if we compare this to Bismarck from: Bismarck Operational History
24 Aug (40) commisioned
May (41) completes trials and training

IE work up times are pretty much the same. Is there any record of her shooting poorly after this?

Agreed, but this doesn't in and of itself mean she couldn't shoot well. Especially if we are looking at the equipment rather than the crew which is where we started out.
But I was talking about optical fire control. They obviously had more experiance and trust in it.
Which is not really a problem with her fire control.
How many rounds did she fire and under what circumstances? While this provides little evidence that she was a good gunnery ship it also at least with what has been presented to date provides little evidence she was a poor gunnery ship. Indeed other than possible splinter damage two US BBs fired quite a few rounds at Nowaki and didn't hit her. I would argue however that that engagement actually speeks rather well of their gunnery.
I have not maintained that there is strong evidence that she was a better than average ship. The action of Samar does provide some very limited evidence of that as well as possible evidence to the contrary. My postion is that there is equally very little evidence that (at least after she was fully worked up) that she was a poor gunnery ship.
What's the source on this? I haven't read much about it other than an article pointing out the superiority of the US design.
Radical maneuvers still effect gunnery just not to the same extent. There's also the question of if this feature would really be used. The test which demonstrated just how well this functioned were post war from what I've read.
But they had no confidence in it because they hadn't trained much with it. One of the reasons they hadn't trained much with it is that the Japanese tried to limit transmissions. Certainly once you are in battle trying to hide your radar emmisions doesn't make much sense but if you don't use your radar until your in battle it's a little late to start. In Tully's new book on Surigao Strait there are some acounts of the southern forces use of radar while transiting the straits. My impression is that they had made little use of it up until that time.

If you are speaking of Yamato's spotter plane, it must have reported a hit, otherwise why would Yamato have claimed a hit on the first salvo? Clearly the spotter plane's pilot was in error, so I discount any observations from that source. The case for Yamato's first salvo accuracy is very weak since we don't even know if the shells observed by US sources were from the Yamato, and Yamato's spotter plane reported something that never happened.

Yes we do. Yamato first became Yamamato's flagship in February, but he was so disgusted with her gunnery that he ordered more training for her gunnery crew, and went back to the Nagato for a flagship. It wasn't until May, 3 months later, that Yamamoto considered Yamato fit for service as his flagship. Obviously, Yamato's initial gunnery exercises were a failure and it took 3 months to rectify them.

Bismarck spent the winter after she was launched in the Baltic doing her workup. Her initial gunnery trials were satisfactory and she shot pretty well in her first battle against Hood and PoW. And yes, there is a record of Yamato shooting poorly later in the war; Samar.

That's true, but how can you divorce crew training from the performance of the FC system itself?. If the crew can't use the system effectively, it doesn't matter if the FC is the finest in the world, the ship won't be able to consistently hit anything.

They may have, but all the observers on both sides at Samar agree that visibility was poor to begin with and rapidly got worse due to stack, gun, and chemical smoke, haze, and rain squalls. The fact that Yamato's crew probably relied on optics and that conditions for optics were very poor, supports the idea that Yamato probably wasn't able to hit anything at Samar.

Well, if you're relying on optical devices it is. If you can't see anything how can you fire your guns and expect to hit something?

I don't know the exact number of rounds, but I know it was low compared to the number fired by Kongo, for example. The fact that she didn't fire nearly as many rounds as fired by Kongo and the Japanese heavy cruisers tends to indicate YAmato didn't have a firing solution much of the time, which, in turn, may indicate her FC wasn't as effective as other Japanese ships engaged.

Well, what is your position then? I see no evidence from Samar, or anywhere else, that Yamato was a better than average, or even an average, gunnery ship. I agree there's not much evidence about the Yamato's gunnery, but what little there is, is almost uniformly negative. A battle ship engages an enemy fleet for more than an hour and produces not one conclusive hit on a single target, while her consorts (Kongo and the heavy cruisers) produce hit after hit, sink four enemy ships, and damage several more.

I'll have to do some research, I can't remember the source on the German information, but the data on the RN is in one of Friedman's books.

Yes, it was postwar, but the US ships and the FC systems that were tested were war time developments. And if a ship can hold a firing solution while maneuvering radically, as the US ships proved able to do, it will still be able to hit it's target; that's what a "firing solution" means. Therefore, any ship with that capability has a tremendous advantage over a ship with a lesser FC system.

I don't think so. Gunnery control radar had a limited range and if you are in a training area you are out of range of any enemy receivers. If you install gunnery radar on ship it means you expect to be able to turn it on when in contact with an enemy. I believe the reason the Japanese didn't allow the Yamato to participate in gunnery exercises was because the very limited barrel life of her tubes and the fact that there were insufficient spares to replace them.

That's rather a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater isn't it?
Not quite. There was a problem with the fire control crew in the trials that Yamamoto observed and additional training was required. It's not at all clear it took 3 months to rectify them. In any case if you add in those three months Yamato took just about as long to work up as Bismarck. IE the Japanese may have tried to push the Yamato's operational status too much.
I have seen no good evidence provided that Yamato's main battery shot poorly off Samar. How many rounds did she fire? How many stradles did she get? How many of the salvo's were essentially opening salvos due to loosing targets in smoke and squals. What was the impact of maneuver forced by torpedos and arial attacks? If you can't quantify these you can't make hard statements eitehr way.


And implies that using Samar as an argument that her optical fire control was poor is off base.
Not really. From what I've read Yamato turned away from a spread of torpedoes and that turn away took her out of the action. Not a problem with fire control quality.
That hardware wise Yamato had at least some advantges over all other BBs as far as optical fire control goes. That operationally there simply isn't enough of a track record to say she was either a good shooter or a poor one.

Not at all. A spotter which is either too far away or simply incapable of discerning between a direct hit and a straddle, isn't a reliable source of information.

Well, Japan had just launched a war, so it's unlikely Yamato's crew spent a significant amount of time learning how to anchor. It's reasonable to assume the three months was spent working mostly on the problem that had caused so much embarrassment for her skipper.

As for the Bismarck, it's my understanding that the winter of 1940-41 was particularly severe in the Baltic and the Bismarck was able to spend only October/November, 1940, and about six weeks in March/April, 1941, actually on trials there. Her actual gunnery exercises were even shorter. So no, the Yamato had much longer for her intial gunnery exercises overall.

As I indicated, I don't know the exact number of rounds the Yamato fired at Samar, but I believe it was far fewer than Kongo. At Samar, Yamato achieved zero hits and zero straddles, that can be established with conclusive evidence. As far as I know, there was only one "opening" salvo, just like in any other gunnery battle. The impact of maneuvering to avoid air and torpedo attacks was negative the same as it was for the other Japanese ships, which nevertheless achieved numerous proven hits and straddles. Now that we've quantified those issues we can say that Yamato's performance was far below that of the other Japanese ships which had the same conditions to contend with.

Unfortunately, Samar is the only instance in which Yamato ever fired her main battery at other than practice surface targets, And we know she had problems in her initial gunnery trials. I guess if you want to claim that, theoretically, Yamato would have done well under perfect conditions for her type of FC, I'm not prepared to dispute that. What I am claiming is that under real life battle conditions, Yamato was less than impressive as a gunnery ship.

That's not really relevant; Yamato was STILL within main battery range of the American carriers when she turned back after avoiding the torpedoes. Her FC was apparently unable to recover a firing solution, even though the Kongo and other Japanese ships were still in contact with the American carriers, and were still firing at, and hitting, their targets. That does indicate some problem with either her crew or her FC, or more likely both. Even with gunnery radar, Yamato was unable to re-establish a firing solution; that is NOT indicative of a good FC system.

But when Yamato had an opportunity to demonstrate those advantages in a real battle she failed to do so, while another BB in that battle did perform creditably. I'd say that throws justifiable doubt on Yamato's gunnery ability.

Perhaps. But especially given the timeing (ie the US ships were starting to produce smoke, the squals, the fact that thre were a lot of US planes in the air (I think I read that the opservation aircraft was shot down later) it seems quite reasonable that he might mistake close stradle for a hit.
And is it unreasonable to assume they became more efficient in that regards? Certainly there is no proof either way.
Only relevant if it's clear why they did so and that why was a fire control problem.

At this point it is supposition on your part and what evidence there is indicates she may have got a straddle and I've seen nothing to indicate she didn't get additional ones. On the flip side I haven't seen evidence she did either.

Depending on what you mean by the term it could be used to describe every time one fires on a different target or there is a substantial break in time between firings.

Only those that were being so atttacked. Yamato saw tracks headed for her and turned away this kept her running away until it was clear that the torpedoes had either passed her or run out of range. Did any of the other Japanese BBs face this situration?

Could she see them?

Or simply that her postion especially in regards to the smoke and squals and the distance to the US ships was such that she couldn't see them.
It's been stated that they didn't trust and at least implied that they didn't use the gunnery radar so it's presence was irrelevant. It's also not all that clear to me how good their gunnery radar was. If as is possible it gave a good range but had a poor asmuthal resolution then it wouldnt help much if they couldn't see their targets.

I did find some more info at:
Battles of the supership Yamato
In particular
Now there are obviously a couple problems with the above. The non existant hit and the US "cruiser" to start with. It does however suggest she fire 4 salvoes at the US CVEs.
More information may be available soon as the post at:
Tullys Port • View topic - YAMATO
states
and

Regardless of the reason, and regardless of whether it was understandable or not, the pilot/observer of Yamato's spotter plane was obviously reporting false information. It is therefore NOT a reliable source.

Whether or not the additional training made them more efficient is not the relevant point. The pertinent point is that Yamato clearly had more difficulty in achieving acceptable gunnery expertise than was normal for Japanese naval units.

They had targets in gunnery range, no technical problems were reported with the turrets or guns, other Japanese ships in near proximity were firing on those same targets. What possible other problems could there have been? The most logical problem seems to be Yamato's FC could not produce a firing solution under the prevailing conditions.

Other Japanese ships certainly got hits. I believe it was the Johnston that reported being hit by 14" shells. Yamatro of the other hand, expended fewer shells than other Japanese units, and no American ships reported being hit by 18" shells; that, in itself, is evidence though not conclusive, that Yamato's FC did not have a firing solution during much of the battle.

Well, you broached the question about Yamato's "opening salvo" without specifying any definition of the term. So if you don't like the definition I used, specify one that you do like.

That's kind of splitting hairs in my view. Every account of the battle I have read indicates that most of the larger Japanese ships were under almost constant air attack which included runs, either real or simulated, by torpedo bombers. In addition, the Nagato and Kongo both reported at various times seeing torpedo tracks near their positions. One of the Japanese heavy cruisers actually had it's bow blown off by a torpedo. So implying that Yamato was prevented from firing at the American carriers because it was busy avoiding torpedoes for the entire battle is rather grasping at straws.

That's the question; Japanese officers on Yamato's bridge testified that throughout most of the battle the positions of the American carriers and the other Japanese ships were confused and unclear, and that visibility was poor.

However, it should be pointed out that one of the purposes of an FC system is to sort out the tactical situation and produce data that tells the guns where to point in order to hit their targets. Obviously, the Kongo's FC system was able to do this. for some reason, apparently Yamato's was not.

I have made no implication, one way or the other, that the Yamato's crew did, or did not, employ her gunnery radar. It's presence was certainly NOT irrelevant in any appraisal of Yamato's FC system. If the crew did try to gain a firing solution using the gunnery radar, and that attempt failed, it is a negative reflection on the overall performance of the FC system.

You seem to be saying that poor visibility is an excuse for failure of the FC system produce a firing solution and the fact that radar was available but failed is irrelevant to whether the FC system was adequate or poor. I can't see how you can have it both ways. In any case, the particular conditions at Samar did not seem to make it impossible for the other Japanese ships to register hits; the obvious conclusion is that Yamato's FC was sub-par when compared to other BB's present.

The info you present in this last post really doesn't clarify the issues. I happen to have been a participant in the discussion thread on the Navweaps board, and despite a lengthy debate, no conclusive evidence was ever developed that pointed to the conclusion that Yamato ever hit anything.

I suspect the question will never be settled to everyone's satisfaction. I suppose if the wreck of the Gambier Bay is ever located and an unexploded 18 " shell found lodged in her hull, that would settle the debate, but barring that, there is no conclusive proof. My position is that the circumstantial evidence we have tends to point to the fact that either her gunnery crew or her FC system or both were deficient. It is certainly suspect to me, that a powerful ship like Yamato should participate in a gunnery battle for over an hour and no one seems to have noticed her shells impacting any enemy targets. Of course, it's possible that some of Yamato's AP shells hit and passed through the unarmored vessels on the American side, but again, there seems to be no evidence of this.

I am currently re-writing my notes on the subject, but would like to comment on just a few things.

First is the straddles of and hits on the Gambier Bay. If you look at the formation of the CVE's and course, 090T, you will notice Gambier bay is at the southern lead part of the formation. So, we can say, even if it was a straddle, that 1. Japanese sailors have incredible eyes to pick out, fire on, and observe splashes on a ship obscured by the trailing part of the US formation, or 2. Whoever wrote that web-site was informed incorrectly who the Target of Yamato's opening salvo was, the White Plains before she shifted fire toward the St Lo.

Either way I would not trust the information listed within that site.

As for a radar directed FC, Fading Victory: The Dairy of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941-1945 mentions that several times through the course of the battle the Yamato was able to track the US task force on radar and that the ship was prepared to fire once the American ships cleared the smoke screen. He also mentions that the Yamato commenced radar fire "from about 0822"

The only mention of hits scored by Yamato in this source is a short couple of sentences claiming "Anyhow, at 0658 the First Battleship Division commenced firing with the fore turrets at a range of thirty-one kilometers. Destroying a ship with two or three salvos, the target was changed to another one"

We know without a doubt that no ships were hit at this point, though several near-misses from multiple ships (yellow, blue, red, and green dye marked splashes) knocked out the steering control and electrical power for several minutes.

I have recently purchased a few more books on the battle and have a bit of a way to go before I can come to my own conclusions, which I hope to achieve within a month or so.

PS. Anyone have an source stating when the first float plane was launched. Fading Victory claims two were launched but both were at about the halfway mark of the battle to locate the position of the US fleet through the smokescreen.

__________________
"Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes! Powder is scarce and must not be wasted. Fire low! You are all marksmen and could kill a squirrel at a hundred yards. Reserve your fire and the enemy will all be destroyed! - Israel Putnam, at the Battle of Bunker Hill, 1775
"War is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others." - Karl von Clausewitz

Mike,

I agree, these are interesting remarks. If the Yamato's initial target was the White Plains, and her first salvo straddled a carrier, on the other side of the American formation, what does that say for Yamato's gunnery?

I wonder why, If they were tracking the targets on radar, it was necessary to wait for them to clear the smoke screen? Perhaps Yamato's gunnery radar was a "range only" set?

That's not an unequivocal claim of hits by Yamato; the "First Battleship Division" included both the Yamato and Nagato (with 16" guns).

The four different colors of dye would indicate that at least four different ships were shooting at the target. There were four Japanese BB's present; Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna

I'll have to do some research because I don't remember the source, but I clearly remember reading somewhere that a Pete was launched soon after the battle began and was shot down shortly after making it's first and only report, presumably about the "hit" on the American carrier. If I can find the reference I'll post it. It's odd the Yamato would launch a spotter plane(s) into such a hostile air environment to "locate the American feet", if they were periodically tracking them on radar.

Bruce,
Just wanted to say I remember that great debate on warships1.com especially you & Creeping Death. Tiornu says a new article is supposed to come out soon about this issue. it's written by Rob Lungdren.

Yeah, It would be nice if there were some new data, but from what I've heard Lundgren just rehashes the same old data and concludes with his opinion.

I'd like to see something concrete one way or the other, but I doubt we ever will. It's nearly impossible to prove a negative like the Yamato didn't hit a thing at Samar, but personally, I think that's what happened. On the other hand, I'd be just as happy if someone like Ballard found an 18" dud embedded in the wreck of the Gambier Bay and settled the mattered once and for all.