Indeed,

I think as well Malta would have been the key, but even more I think of Gibraltar. With Gibraltar no convoys to Malta, no nothing, end of their story. But this is interesting to see that the tactics can change a lot...

" On 14 July 1942 a Sunderland flying boat arrived over malta. It broght Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park to replace Lloyd. Lloyd told Park that like London , Malta could take it! Park thought he was dumb. "Why don´t you stop the bombing?" he asked.It was not a joke. Within three weeks, Park had done just that.

lloyd had led Malta´s air defences with great courage and tenacity throughout the worst year in its history, but he was a bomber man.

Fliegerkorps II´s attacks on Malta had peaked in April. The 8,788 sorties they flew in that month fell to 2,476 in May, and dropped again to 956 in June because of the needs of the desert itself.But in July, bombers from France and fighters from Russia arrived in Sicily.That month, with 150 aircraft, Fliegerkorps II flew 1,819 sorties against the island.They were given a beating.

Park:" I changed the tactics to what I called forward interception plan. I sent the fighter squadrons forward, climbing to meet the enemy bombers head on, and to intercept well before they reached Malta, when the bombers were in tight formation,heavily laden and unable to take evading action.

Squadrons were from now on to follow instructions from the controllers, who were to put one squadron up-sun to attack the German top cover, one to attack the close escorts and a third to deliver a head-on attack on the heavily laden bombers.
Park suggested that past tactics had been forced on the defenders by lack of fighters, but that they now had sufficient numbers to stop daylight bombing.

The effect was immediate.During the first half of July, 34 British aircraft had been destroyed or damaged. In the latter half the number was four.Whilst 380 tons of bombs had fallen on Malta during the first two weeks, after Park took over the figure dropped to 160 tons.During July Luftwaffe suffered the loss of rate 5.8%, even higher than the 5.1% rate suffered by the US in the disastrous Schweinfurt raid of August 1943 which almost persuaded them to abandon bombing Germany.
Unlike the Americans, the Luftwaffe was truly persuaded. Having flown 1,819 sorties in AUgust and reduced it further to a mere 391 in September.

On 11 October Kesselring launched a last, forlorn attempt to neutralize Malta. the Luftwaffe flew 2,842 sorties.He kept on going until 16 Ocotber, then called it off.His bombers had suffered a loss rate of 7.5%.It was all over.
Over two years it cost Luftwaffe 357 aircraft, over three quarters of them in 1942.In Russia that year, it lost about the same number of aircraft every month."

From "Alamein" by Stephen Bungay (2002)

__________________

No, Rommel's little adventures in the N.African desert were never going to change the outcome of WW2 .
That was decided on the Eastern Front

__________________
if in doubt....Panic!!!!

Redcoat,

I think Churchill was "a bit" interested in the North Africa situation all the while and Hitler was not until 1943. I hope I don´t sound rude but the Brits did lose quite a lot of tanks and equipment ( Crusader etc ) for Rommel´s little adeventures. Then again if you compare what Rommel had for troops it was a little adventure for the Germans...

But think of this, not only the eastern front like Hitler....

"In London emotions ran high as the British faced the prospect of the loss of Egypt and the vital oil supplies of the Middle East. An even greater nightmare for the Allies was that the Axis forces might link up with the Germans from across the Caucasus Mountains in Russia and possibly even the Japanese fleet in the Indian Ocean."

After Alexandria what could stop Rommel anyway??

__________________

"After Alexandria what could stop Rommel anyway??"

Simple Logistics
His army would have been brought to a halt by the fact that Axis did not have the logistical backup to exploit any breakout beyond El Alemein. At El Alemein, Rommel was only getting 30% of the fuel he needed due to logistical problems, it would have gotten worse the further he travelled.

__________________
if in doubt....Panic!!!!

With Alexandria the Axis troops would have gotten another place to land supplies, which was rather impossible except for Beghazi, Tripol and Tobruk.
Alexandria would have given a huge moral blow to the allied ( once more ) and possibly helped their "friends" in the Middle east and Iraq etc to fight the British troops.Not a bad idea I think.

__________________

Unfortunately it would have a lot further for the Italian navy to escort the convoys there, and a lot closer to the British Submarine bases in the middle east.
and what happens when the Allies land in French N.Africa with Operation Torch ?

__________________
if in doubt....Panic!!!!

Well, Redcoat, I admit you have a point there but as long as it did not happen, Rommel taking Egypt, ( I think not even close to happening as Hitler was not interested in Africa except for keeping Italy in the war ) we´ll never know. I appreciate your view but I think more would have been on its way than just armies against each other if Mussolini had rode on his white horse to Alexandria...

If Germany had taken Alexandria and Egypt the whole Near East would have been in flames and The British would have been in huge trouble even without the Germans to keep it theirs. I don´t think the Germans would have been better but some locals hated The British and wanter them out for any price, I think.
As well it would have meant bye bye for Winston Churchill as his politics in North Africa would have been a total disaster. I don´t think there would have been a better man for PM in England but with Egypt lost it would have been the end of his career. And that would have meant a huge political chaos in England for a while. Germany could have taken quite a profit on this.

Churchill was the man to think that instead of attacking France they should hit the soft belly-Italy.And thus operation "Torch" was on its way. Without Churchill, they might have aimed for France first.
I think Churchill was right and at the time attacking France ( Overlord ) without much combat experience for the US troops it might have been a huge mistake. Then again France was quite empty of German troops, if I remember right, at the time of Stalingrad so it might have succeeded well..??

Anyway,in real life with Alamein England boosted their morale, and got their new hero, Monty. Germany got kicked really hard in Africa and Russia at the same time.

[ 01. December 2002, 09:35 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

__________________

Interesting info on Gibraltar:

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWtorch.htm

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, message to General George Marshall (1st September, 1942)

The following are the particular factors that bear directly upon the degree of hazard inherent in this operation:

(a) The sufficiency of carrier-borne air support during initial stages. The operational strength of the French Air Force in Africa is about 500 planes. Neither the bombers nor the fighters are of the most modern type, but the fighters are superior in performance to the naval types on carriers. Consequently, if the French make determined and unified resistance to the initial landing, particularly by concentrating the bulk of their air against either of the major ports, they can seriously interfere with, if not prevent, a landing at that point. The total carrier-borne fighter strength (counting on 100 U.S. fighters on Ranger and auxiliary) will apparently be about 166 planes in actual support of the landings. Only twenty to thirty will be with the naval covering forces to the eastward. These fighters will be under the usual handicaps of carrier-based aircraft when operating against land-based planes.

(b) Efficiency of Gibraltar as an erection point for fighter aircraft to be used after landing fields have been secured. Since Gibraltar is the only port available to Allies in that region, the rapid transfer of fighter craft to captured airdromes will be largely dependent upon our ability to set up at Gibraltar a reasonable number for immediate operations and a flow thereafter of at least thirty planes per day. The vulnerability of Gibraltar, especially to interference by Spanish forces, is obvious. If the Spaniards should take hostile action against us immediately upon the beginning of landing operations, it would be practically impossible to secure any land-based fighter craft for use in northern Africa for a period of some days.

(c) Another critical factor affecting the air will be the state of the weather. It is planned to transfer by flying to captured airdromes in North Africa the American units now in Great Britain except the Spitfire groups. These last will necessarily be shipped and set up at Gibraltar or captured airdromes. A spell of bad weather would so weaken the anticipated air support in the early stages of the operation as to constitute another definite hazard to success.

(d) The character of resistance of the French Army. In the region now are some fourteen French divisions rather poorly equipped but presumably with a fair degree of training and with the benefit of professional leadership. If this Army should act as a unit in contesting the invasion, it could, in view of the slowness with which Allied forces can be accumulated at the two main ports, so delay and hamper operations that the real object of the expedition could not be achieved, namely, the seizing control of the north shore of Africa before it can be substantially reinforced by the Axis.

(e) The attitude of the Spanish Army. While there have been no indications to date that the Spaniards would take sides in the war as a result of this particular operation, this contingency must be looked on as a possibility, particularly if Germany should make a definite move toward entering Spain. In any event, Spain's entry would instantly entail the loss of Gibraltar as a landing field and would prevent our use of the Strait of Gibraltar until effective action could be taken by the Allies. In view of available resources, it would appear doubtful that such effective action is within our capabilities.

(f) The possibility that the German air forces now in western Europe may rapidly enter Spain and operate against our line of communications. This would not be an easy operation for the Germans except with the full acquiescence and support of Spain. Gasoline, bombs, and lubricants do not exist at the Spanish airfields and the transfer to the country of ground and maintenance crews and supplies would require considerable time. Certain facts that bear upon the likelihood of such enemy action are, first, that Germany already has excellent landing fields in Sicily, from which their long-range aircraft can operate without going to the trouble of establishing new bases. Secondly, the advantages to Germany of occupying the Iberian Peninsula in force have always existed. The fact that Germany has made no noticeable move in this direction, even under the conditions lately existing when substantial parts of the British naval strength have been inside the Mediterranean, is at least some evidence that the enemy does not consider this an easy operation.

__________________