Anyway, I think it is quite interesting to see how much effort was put into trying to solve the Danzig question ( or looked like it...) by the British ( for example ), still feeling a bit guilty about the treaty of Versailles?
I think as well if Mussolini had done the same trick as in Munich he would have been named some kind of peace Nobel winner, which does sound quite funny after all this time, but anyway much trust was laid on his success by the Western politicians, I think.
Interesting info:
Ossietzky, Carl von
18891938, German pacifist. A leader of the peace movement in Germany after World War I, he was editor of the antimilitarist weekly Weltbühne from 1927. Ossietzky was imprisoned (1932) for articles exposing secret rearmament in Germany. After Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Ossietzky was sent to a concentration camp. Suffering from tuberculosis, he was removed (1936) to a prison hospital shortly before the announcement that he had been awarded the 1935 Nobel Peace Prize. The German government protested and barred all Germans from future acceptance of a Nobel Prize. Still imprisoned, Ossietzky died two years later. His collected writings were published in an eight-volume German edition in 1995.
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The British government, in response to appeals from many sources to stop the war, had formulated two preliminary conditions: immediate cessation of hostilities and evacuation of German troops from occupied Polish territories. British conditions did not mention Germans' withdrawal from Danzig. Again the French government clearly procrastinated. Paris had accepted the Italian proposal to organize a conference of European powers to solve existing political problems. To the chief of the French diplomacy, Georges Bonnet, this proposal became a pretext to temporize; he spent more time on attempts to convene the conference than on liabilities originated from the alliance with Poland.
Namely, as early as on 31 August 1939 Mussolini proposed to convene on 5 September in San Remo a conference of European powers, for revision of the clauses of the treaty of Versailles, which were the cause of the present troubles in the life of Europe. Therefore San Remo had to become a second Munich.
Mussolini's proposal was rejected not only by Poland, but first of all by Hitler himself, who was not going to venture into any peace talks before he had taken care of Poland.
Meanwhile the ultimate factor, which torpedoed Italian diplomacy's manoeuvres became Great Britain, which - unlike during the Czechoslovak crisis - was more determined and nolens volens could see no more room to retreat before Hitler.
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Schmidt ( Ribbentropīs secretary ) immediately made for the Reich's Chancellery, to the room where
Hitler was sitting at his desk and Ribbentrop stood by the window. Both looked up expectantly as I came in. I stopped at some distance from Hitler's desk, and then slowly translated the British Government's ultimatum. When I finished, there was complete silence. Hitler sat motionless, gazing before him. He was not at a loss, as was afterwards stated, nor did he rage, as others allege. He sat completely silent and unmoving.
After an interval which seemed an age, he turned to Ribbentrop, who had remained standing by the window. What now? asked Hitler with a savage look, as though implying that his Foreign Minister had misled him about England's probable reaction. Ribbentrop answered quietly: I assume that the French will hand in a similar ultimatum within the hour.
As my duty was now performed, I withdrew. To those in the anteroom pressing round me I said: the English have just handed us an ultimatum. In two hours a state of war will exist between England and Germany. In the anteroom also this news was followed by complete silence. Goering turned to me and said: if we lose this war, God have mercy on us! Goebbels stood in a corner, downcast and self-absorbed. Everywhere in the room I saw looks of grave concern, even amongst the lesser Party people.
At 12:00 the French ambassador to Berlin, Robert Coulondre, presented a similar document. The France's ultimatum originally set the time limit to 4 September at 5:00, but in result of Ambassador Juliusz Łukasiewicz's intervention it was shortened 12 hours.
Simultaneously however lasted a contrary process: more and more countries declared their neutrality. Thus Switzerland, Estonia and Latvia declared their neutrality as soon as on 1 September, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Lithuania, Portugal and Sweden - on 2 September, Belgium, Holland and Norway - on 3 September. Spain and Yugoslavia - on 4 September, Romania on 7 September and Turkey on 11 September. The United States declared their neutrality on 5 September and next day Italy declared her "non-belligerent" status. The Third Reich tried to push Lithuania against Poland and offered Hungary territorial gains in Poland. Both governments categorically refused; moreover the Hungarians rejected demands to let German troops pass through their territory.
On 12 September, during a French-British summit, the supreme commander of the French armed forces, Gen. Maurice Gamelin resolved, that air raids on Germany would cause retaliatory actions, which would bring damages and would complicate concentration of French troops. British politicians and militarymen shared this opinion.
Three days after the signature of the Polish-French political protocol, a trilateral financial agreement was signed in London between Poland, and France and Great Britain. According to the agreement France granted Poland a summary loan of 600 million francs (17 million dollars) and Great Britain - 5 million pounds (24 million dollars). In other words, for Polish war expenses Great Britain lent her 1% of just accepted extraordinary war credits; France - 0.7%. This money was used later, in different circumstances, by Polish authorities in exile.
On 17 September Soviet troops on the Polish border were ordered to enter Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia - which at that time were within Polish borders - as far as to the line, which limited further German advance towards the borders of the USSR. Simultaneously the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Wacław Grzybowski, was summoned to the people's commissar for foreign affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, who presented him with the note of termination of agreements with Poland:
The Polish-German war has revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish state. After ten days of military operations, Poland has lost all its industrial areas and cultural centres. Warsaw, as the capital of Poland, no longer exists. The Polish government has collapsed and shows no sign of life. This indicates that the Polish state and government have, in effect, ceased to exist. In view of this state of affairs, the treaties concluded between Poland and the Soviet Union have no validity. Abandoned to its fate and deserted by its leaders, Poland has become a fertile field for all sorts of acts and surprises which could become a danger to the USSR. This is why, having preserved its neutrality until the present, the Soviet government can no longer remain neutral in the face of these facts.
The British reaction to these developments was somewhat equivocal. Although they condemned the Soviet government, they also affirmed that the full implication of these events is not yet apparent. The British had criticized Poland after the First World War for extending her frontier eastward beyond the areas inhabited by the Poles. Throughout the inter-war period the problem of deterioration of relations between the Poles and ethnic minorities had been very much in the British public eye. Now they even seemed to excuse the Soviet action on the grounds that the Soviet-German demarcation line approximated to the Curzon Line proposed in Versailles as the Poland's eastern frontier. Most notably it was Sir Winston Spencer Churchill, who advocated this policy the most in the British parliament:
Russia has pursued a cold policy of self-interest. [...] I would have preferred that the Russians should be standing on their present line as the friends and allies of Poland instead of invaders. But that the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. [...] I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest. It cannot be in accordance with the interest or safety of Russia that Germany should plant itself upon the shores of the Black Sea, or that it should overrun the Baltic States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of southeastern Europe.
http://2ndww.tripod.com/Poland/politics.htm
