imho the ultimate what if?
they choose not to use the atomic bomb on japan?
we now know that the japanese civilian government, through u.s. diplomatic sources, was seeking to surrender to the allies through the soviet govt. how do we see it playing out. do the allies except surrender or they choose to invade? something which the soviet were planning to do after their drive through manchuria. do we end up with to divided countries after WWII?

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Thoughts on Military History
Cornish Scale Modellers
Ross' Military Modelling and Art

If the atomic bombs hadn't been dropped I believe that there would have been no surrender (i've never heard of that before, the Japanese wanted to surrender), that is why the bombs were dropped in the first place.
This would have forced the Americans to launch an invasion which would of resulted in thousands of lives lost (possibly millions) before the Americans could get to Tokyo.
Chances are that Japan would have been divided.

Jet

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And when he gets to heaven
To Saint Peter he will tell
One more soldier reporting sir
I have served my time in hell

If I remember right the final reason why the Japanese did not accept the surrender terms before the bombs were dropped was the fact that the terms included that the emperor would leave his position..?

So that would make it quite close to reaching peace I think.

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Actually on the History Channel WWII boards we are currently on a reading group using Richard Frank's "Downfall" about the end of the Imperial Japanese Empire. Its a great read and dispells many of the myths about Japan wanting to surrender.

The Japanese cabinet which mostly consisted of Military Commanders from the Army and Navy couldn't even agree on what to do. They wanted to have Russia negotiate for peace with the Allies but they couldn't agree on what to trade or offer the Soviets.

In fact the United States offered to Japan under the Potsdam Declaration that Japan would surrender unconditionally and the U.S. WOULD allow the emperor to remain but only as a figurehead.

The Japanese wanted four conditions:

1. They retain the emperor.
2. Disarm themselves
3. No occupation of the Home Islands
4. Withdraw from China and the rest of Asia at their leisure.

It was Japan's intention to end the war so that they could claim that they did not meet total defeat and basically do what the Germans did after WWI. Rise up again.

Again I'd highly suggest reading "Downfall" because Frank's has researched alot of the Magic and Ultra codes that were broken, much of which were ignored up until this book.

Greg

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"There are times when a Corps Commander's life does not count"
-General Winfield Scott Hancock at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863

Thanx Greg,

though I am not too familiar with the Pacific Ocean war I´ll keep this book in mind when visiting the book shop next time!

[img]smile.gif[/img]

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ok. imagine that the terms of surrender are modified to include the respecting of the position of the emperor, something which at least Macarthur was willing to allow to happen. then what do you believe the U.S. would accept the surrender of the japanese. I think they would have as it would have brought about the 2 main aims of using the bomb, firstly the saving of U.S. lives, remember the U.S. expected incurring 500000 causualties in the invasion of Japan, secondly, it would forestall the Soviet expansion in the FE.
The japanese did attempt surrender to the point that the imperial household sent one of the princes to negotiate with Stalin at the time of Potsdam. Stalin refused to see him as he believd he should only see someone of a similar position i.e. the emporer or prime minister. Truman was advised of this and keep it quiet. Possible so he could use the bomb?
If you are interested about the decision to use the atomic bomb you should read Gar Alperovitz - Atomic Diplomacy : Hiroshima and Potsdam.

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Cornish Scale Modellers
Ross' Military Modelling and Art

Well, I believe the Japanese tried to negotiate peace through Russia but I would not trust Stalin here. That´s just an excuse that Stalin would not see the prince (?) because he was not negotiating peace as Russia and Japan had a non-aggression pact. Stalin already by then had his eye on the attack on Japanese forces, and he was negotiating with FDR and Churchill on that!

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ah you are going on the opinion that stalin was attempting to gain advantage over america and that stalin was the singular cause of the cold war. i think that the fact that truman decided to hide the fact that the japanese had attempted negitiation is more interesting as he was going out to try and use the bomb as a show of power over the soviets. this leads to an interesting debate, one which i'm actually about to write a paper for at university, and i'll post for opinions in the free fire zone.

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Ross' Military Modelling and Art

Hmmm. The situation has many sides like we´ve seen.

To put it shortly ( my view ):

1. Churchill and FDR probably did not care if the Russians took Manchuria etc etc. Maybe they thought that would even help the situation in Europe as Stalin was getting half of Europe for himself since 1944.

2. FDR was busy with the presidential elections 1944. He could not get his hands dirty "politically". I guess Churchill understood that..as he did in 1940-41 as the US did not enter the war even how Churchill tried

3. I am not saying Stalin started the cold war by himself. If Truman dropped the bomb to show the Russians how powerful he was then the US were at least not against the cold war by forcing the Russians equip themselves...IF he dropped the bomb to get peace then that´s different.

4. It is hard to say as well, I think, whether the peace negotiations would have been fruitful in the end. Japan might have been buying time even though they knew time was not on their side. Guess they did not believe in the A-bomb as they did not react to the first drop??
I am not saying that Truman did the right thing but I am glad I was not the one the decide..

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it has been argued that the reason the japanese did not react to the first bomb wasn't because the did not believe in its power it was very little news was coming out of hiroshima. this was due in course by the US strategic bombing offensive which essentially crippled japans road and rail network. therefore, communication was very hard.

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Thoughts on Military History
Cornish Scale Modellers
Ross' Military Modelling and Art

Truman telling to Stalin on the BOMB

President Truman's version:
On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make "good use of it against the Japanese."

Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1955) p. 416.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's version:
I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do. What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted. A new bomb! Of extraordinary power! Probably decisive on the whole Japanese war! What a bit of luck! This was my impression at the moment, and I was sure that he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told. Evidently in his immense toils and stresses the atomic bomb had played no part. If he had the slightest idea of the revolution in world affairs which was in progress his reactions would have been obvious. Nothing would have been easier than for him to say, "Thank you so much for telling me about your new bomb. I of course have no technical knowledge. May I send my expert in these nuclear sciences to see your expert tomorrow morning?" But his face remained gay and genial and the talk between these two potentates soon came to an end. As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. "How did it go?" I asked. "He never asked a question," he replied. I was certain therefore that at that date Stalin had no special knowledge of the vast process of research upon which the United States and Britain had been engaged for so long...

Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1953) pp 669-70.
Secretary of State James Byrnes' version I:
At the close of the meeting of the Big Three on the afternoon of July 24, the President walked around the large circular table to talk to Stalin. After a brief conversation the President rejoined me and we rode back to the "Little White House" together. He said he had told Stalin that, after long experimentation, we had developed a new bomb far more destructive than any other known bomb, and that we planned to use it very soon unless Japan surrendered. Stalin's only reply was to say that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it. I was surprised at Stalin's lack of interest. I concluded that he had not grasped the importance of the discovery. I thought that the following day he would ask for more information. He did not. Later I concluded that, because the Russians kept secret their developments in military weapons, they thought it improper to ask us about ours.

James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) p. 263.
Secretary of State James Byrnes' version II:
I am just as convinced now as I was when I wrote that first book, "Speaking Frankly," in 1947, that Stalin did not appreciate the significance of the statement. I have read stories by so-called historians who assert that he must have known, but they were not present. I was. I watched Stalin's face. He smiled and said only a few words, and Mr. Truman shook hands with him, left, coming back to where I was seated and the two of us went to our automobile.

I recall telling the President at the time, as we were driving back to our headquarters, that, after Stalin left the room and got back to his own headquarters, it would dawn on him, and the following day the President would have a lot of questions to answer. President Truman thought that most probable. He devoted some time in talking to me that evening as to how far he could go -- or should go.

Stalin never asked him a question about it. I am satisfied that Stalin did not appreciate the significance of President Truman's statement. I'm pretty certain that they knew we were working on the bomb, but we had kept secret how far that development had gone.

James Byrnes, interview in U.S. News and World Report, August 15, 1960 pp 67-68.
Truman's Interpreter Charles Bohlen's version:
Three days after the successful test blast, after consulting his advisers and Churchill (the British had cooperated in the project), Truman decided it would be wise to tell Stalin the news. Explaining that he wanted to be as informal and casual as possible, Truman said during a break in the proceedings that he would stroll over to Stalin and nonchalantly inform him. He instructed me not to accompany him, as I ordinarily did, because he did not want to indicate that there was anyting particularly momentous about the development. So it was Pavlov, the Russian interpreter, who translated Truman's words to Stalin. I did not hear the conversation, although Truman and Byrnes both reported that I was there.

In his memoirs, Truman wrote that he told Stalin that the United States had "a new weapon of unusual destructive force." Apparently, the President did not tell Stalin the new weapon was an atomic bomb, and the Soviet leader did not ask or show any special interest. He merely nodded and said something. "All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make good use of it against the Japanese," Truman wrote. Across the room, I watched Stalin's face carefully as the President broke the news. So offhand was Stalin's response that there was some question in my mind whether the President's message had got through. I should have known better than to underrate the dictator. Years later, Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, in his memoirs, disclosed that that night Stalin ordered a telegram sent to those working on the atomic bomb in Russia to hurry with the job.

Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973) pp. 247-248.
British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden's version:
Mr. Churchill and I had previously discussed together the problem of telling Stalin and, if so, whether before the explosion of the bomb or after. If we did tell him would he ask for the know-how at once? A refusal would be awkward, but inescapable.

There were embarrassments every way, but on balance I was in favour of telling Stalin. My chief argument was that the United States and Britain would have to refuse the secret information. They would be better placed to to this if Stalin had already been told that we possessed this weapon and meant to use it. There was not much to this, but the Prime Minister thought it the better way.

On the question of when Stalin was to be told, it was agreed that President Truman should do this after the conclusion of one of our meetings. He did so on July 24th, so briefly that Mr. Churchill and I, who were covertly watching, had some doubts whether Stalin had taken it in. His response was a nod of the head and a brief "thank you." No comment.

Anthony Eden, The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) p. 635.
Soviet Marshal Georgii Zhukov's version:
I do not recall the exact date, but after the close of one of the formal meetings Truman informed Stalin that the United States now possessed a bomb of exceptional power, without, however, naming it the atomic bomb.

As was later written abroad, at that moment Churchill fixed his gaze on Stalin's face, closely observing his reaction. However, Stalin did not betray his feelings and pretended that he saw nothing special in what Truman had imparted to him. Both Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors subsequently assumed that Stalin had really failed to fathom the significance of what he had heard.

In actual fact, on returning to his quarters after this meeting Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted amost immediately. "Let them. We'll have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up."

I realized that they were talking about research on the atomic bomb.

It was clear already then that the US Government intended to use the atomic weapon for the purpose of achieving its Imperialist goals from a position of strength in "the cold war." This was amply corroborated on August 6 and 8. Without any military need whatsoever, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on the peaceful and densely-populated Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971) pp. 674-675.

http://www.dannen.com/decision/potsdam.html

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Harry S. Truman, Diary, July 25, 1945

President Truman told his diary on July 25, 1945, that he had ordered the bomb used.
Emphasis has been added to highlight Truman's apparent belief that he had ordered the bomb dropped on a "purely military" target, so that "military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children."

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We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.

Anyway we "think" we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexico desert was startling - to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and 1,200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower 1/2 mile away and knocked men down 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more.

This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.

He and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful...

Truman quoted in Robert H. Ferrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) pp. 55-56. Truman's writings are in the public domain.

http://www.dannen.com/decision/hst-jl25.html

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some interesting points to think, discuss maybe?

The bombing order issued to General Spaatz made no mention of targetting military objectives or sparing civilians. The cities themselves were the targets.

http://www.dannen.com/decision/handy.html

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In his radio speech to the nation on August 9, President Truman called Hiroshima "a military base."

In the bottom of the site

http://www.dannen.com/decision/

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Dr. Leo Szilard, 62, is a Hungarian-born physicist who helped persuade President Roosevelt to launch the A-bomb project and who had a major share in it. In 1945, however, he was a key figure among the scientists opposing use of the bomb.

Q Do you feel that President Truman and those immediately below him gave full and conscientious study to all the alternatives to use of the atomic bomb?

A I do not think they did. They thought only in terms of our having to end the war by military means.

I don't think Japan would have surrendered unconditionally without the use of force. But there was no need to demand the unconditional surrender of Japan. If we had offered Japan the kind of peace treaty which we actually gave her, we could have had a negotiated peace.


Q In retrospect, do you think your views got a full hearing?

A Let me answer this by describing in detail just what kind of hearing my views got.

In March, 1945, I prepared a memorandum which was meant to be presented to President Roosevelt. This memorandum warned that the use of the bomb against the cities of Japan would start an atomic-arms race with Russia, and it raised the question whether avoiding such an arms race might not be more important than the short-term goal of knocking Japan out of the war. I was not certain that this memorandum would reach the President if I sent it "through channels." Therefore, I asked to see Mrs. Roosevelt, and I intended to transmit my memorandum through her - in a sealed envelope - to the President.

When Mrs. Roosevelt set the date for the interview which I had requested, I went to see Arthur H. Compton, who was in charge of the Chicago project. I rather expected him to object to the contents of my memorandum, and I was therefore much relieved when he told me that he hoped I would get the memorandum into the hands of the President and that it would receive the attention of the President. I then went back to my own office, and I hadn't been there for more than five minutes when there was a knock at the door and there stood Dr. Norman Hilberry. "We have just heard over the radio that President Roosevelt died," he said.

For a while I was at a loss to know how to bring my memorandum to President Truman's attention. I knew many people who knew Roosevelt, but President Truman didn't seem to move in the same circles. Then it occurred to me that we must have several men from Kansas City in the project and that some of these might know how to reach Truman.

When I was asked to go to the White House and see Matt Connelly, Truman's Appointments Secretary, I suggested to Walter Bartky, associate director of our project, that he accompany me. Mr. Connelly read my memorandum with attention. "I can see that this is serious business," he said. "Frankly, at first I was a little suspicious because this appointment came through Kansas City." He told us that the President had an inkling of what our business might be and that he wanted us to go to Spartanburg and see James Byrnes. We didn't know why we were sent to see Byrnes, since at that point Byrnes held no Government position. We were quite willing to go, of course, and we asked for permission to take [atomic scientist] H. C. Urey along. On May 27 we took the night train to Spartanburg.

Q What happened then?

A Having read the memorandum, the first thing that Byrnes told us was that General Groves [head of the Manhattan District, which developed the A-bomb] had informed him that Russia had no uranium. Of course, if Russia did not have any uranium then she would not be able to participate in an atomic-arms race, but to me this seemed to be an exceedingly unlikely assumption. It was conceivable that Russia might have no high-grade uranium-ore deposits - deposits of pitchblende. The only known pitchblende deposit within the control of Russia was the deposit in Czechoslovakia, and this was not believed to be very extensive. But I found it difficult to believe that within the vast expanse of Russia there should be no low-grade uranium-ore deposits which could be used to obtain uranium for the production of bombs.

When I saw Mr. Byrnes I was very much concerned about the fact that no governmental policy had been developed on the issue of how to cope with the problem that the bomb would pose to the world. I raised the question of whether it might be wise to gain time for developing such a governmental policy by postponing the testing of the bomb. It seemed to me that once the bomb had been tested its existence could not be kept secret for long. Byrnes did not think that postponing the test was a good idea, and, in retrospect, I am inclined to agree with him. In retrospect, I don't think that postponing the test would have solved our problem.

Byrnes was concerned about Russia's having taken over Poland, Rumania and Hungary, and so was I. Byrnes thought that the possession of the bomb by America would render the Russians more manageable in Europe. I failed to see how sitting on a stockpile of bombs, which in the circumstances we could not possibly use, would have this effect, and I thought it even conceivable that it would have just the opposite effect.

When I returned to Chicago and learned that Byrnes had been appointed Secretary of State, I concluded that the arguments that I regarded as important would receive no consideration. I didn't realize at that time that Secretary Stimson would play a major role in the final decision and that he might be able to understand my point of view better than Mr. Byrnes had done.

In Chicago I collaborated in the writing of the so-called Franck Report. This report was addressed to Secretary Stimson, but none of those who participated in the writing of the report, including Prof. James Franck, had an opportunity to see Mr. Stimson.

In the meantime I drafted a petition to the President which did not go into any considerations of expediency but opposed, on purely moral grounds, the use of atomic bombs against the cities of Japan. This petition was signed by about 60 members of the Chicago project. Some of those who signed insisted that the petition be transmitted to the President through "official channels." To this I reluctantly agreed. I was, at this point, mainly concerned that the members of the project had an opportunity to go on record on this issue, and I didn't think that the petition would be likely to have an effect on the course of events. The petition was sent to the President through official channels, and I should not be too surprised if it were discovered one of these days that it hadn't ever reached him.

Q Did you think then that the Russians probably were working on the bomb?

A I had no idea of this. The question before us was: Should we think in terms of America's having a long-term monopoly of the bomb after the war, or will Russia have the bomb before long also? I had no doubt that we would start an atomic-arms race if we used the bomb.

Q Would the Russians have developed the atomic and hydrogen bombs as quickly if we had not dropped the bomb? Do you think they hurried up their espionage and research after Hiroshima?

A They had no choice but to hurry up with developing their own bomb, since they would not want us to have the monopoly of the bomb.

Q Would a United States Government today, confronted with the same set of choices and approximately the same degree of military intelligence, reach a different decision as to using the first A-bomb?

A I think it depends on the person of the President. Truman did not understand what was involved. You can see that from the language he used. Truman announced the bombing of Hiroshima while he was at sea coming back from Potsdam, and his announcement contained the phrase - I quote from the New York "Times" of August 7, 1945: "We have spent 2 billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history - and won."

To put the atomic bomb in terms of having gambled 2 billion dollars and having "won" offended my sense of proportions, and I concluded at that time that Truman did not understand at all what was involved.

[ 26. February 2003, 03:51 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

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stalins reaction is interesting. and for many years not understood until the americans realised that the NKVD had agents working at los alamos. therefore, stalin was probably aware of its destructive ability, but possible, my opinion, unsure of its use and whether the americans would use it.

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Cornish Scale Modellers
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Yeah, and the Americans all bought it...Stalin knew how to play his cards! He probably knew more than Truman about the bomb ?!

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Hmmmm...

Truman Presidential Museum and Library

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistle...rrell_book.htm

Truman and the Bomb, a Documentary History
Chapter 7: The Potsdam Declaration, July 26

On July 26 a declaration was issued, signed by the president and Prime Minister Churchill and with the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China, that in its result was as fateful, if not more so, than the instruction of General Handy to General Spaatz. If the recipient of the Potsdam Declaration, the government of Japan, had responded with the surrender that the president and prime minister asked for, the instruction of the day before would not have been carried out.

Unfortunately the declaration was not an explicit warning that the United States possessed nuclear weapons and would use them. Truman was unwilling to be explicit, for Congress had tolerated an unknown project costing nearly $2 billion and might object to an explanation offered an enemy government without informing the legislative body that paid the bill.

Perhaps because the warning was only a general statement, the Japanese govrnment responded with something approaching contempt. The prime minister chose to ignore it, employing the ambiguous word mokusatsu, which means literally "to kill with silence," although it carries a nuance of uncertainty. Tokyo radio used the word, saying the government would mokusatsu the declaration and fight on. The English translation became "reject," and the president took it as a rebuff. Years later he remembered, "When we asked them to surrender at Potsdam, they gave us a very snotty answer. That is what I got. . . . They told me to go to hell, words to that effect."

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i think the japnese government was divided whether to surrender or not and atom bomb compelled them to vote in favour of surrenderif atom bomb hadnt been used may be japnese might have continued to fight but they could not continue fight more than a month against infinte might of usa and had to surrender after a whilebut the bomb commpleed them to surrender immediately