A small point in the overall context of this thread, but another myth is appearing with those 'wrong radio crystals' - a myth largely created by the film, ' A Bridge Too Far'.

The high-command planners paid insufficient attention to the radio capabilities of Airborne Forces in 1944.Airborne carried smaller radios than those of normal Army Divisions for reasons of mobility and lightness.

As Tony Deane-Drummond wrote in 'Return Ticket' :

'..we were repeatedly assured that the Airborne Division would never be employed on a wide front, but would be landed and would fight within a small perimeter, perhaps as much as three miles in diameter'.

The problem was exacerbated by the sandy soil around Arnhem, wooded terrain and buildings. These problems could only be overcome by high-powered radios which in 1944 were large, heavy, difficult to power, and needed to be vehicle-mounted.

To quote from the definitive book about signals at Arnhem, 'Echoes From Arnhem' by Lewis Golden OBE, :

'..it cannot be validly argued that that the effect of any remaining signals failures on the outcome of the battle was all-important.'

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

I'm not convinced that Patton would have cleared the job. Maybe he could have done it, but I'm not sure.

As for Monty, I still think he was a good commander. Especially at D-Day where he plaaned everything very good.

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Martin--I stand corrected but, I only meant the chrystals bit as an example to use. [img]smile.gif[/img]

Erwin--Patton had a much better chance of success than Monty did. Reasons being--he had more roads in which to rely on, he had shorter supply lines, and he had no need to rely on air-dropped supplies. Monty on the otherhand, had those problems of one road--and not a great road at that, and having to have all supplies airdropped and with fewer and fewer planes due to combat and losses and other attritions--plus having the weather as a major factor. Patton on the otherhand--didnt have any of that to worry about--all he wanted to do was to move forward and to kill Germans.

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Lost are only those, who abandon themselves) Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

'Market Garden' was an excellent plan, in strategic level. Point for Monty. But an intrepid commander, such as Patton was needed to make it work in the tactical level.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

No-one seems to have mentioned Brereton's role in all this ?

Don't forget that Urquhart and Hollinghurst were both united in asking for two lifts on the first day and were opposed by Brereton.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

[quote]Originally posted by General der Infanterie Friedrich H:
'Market Garden' was an excellent plan, in strategic level. Point for Monty. But an intrepid commander, such as Patton was needed to make it work in the tactical level.

Valid point, but would have the end result been any different with Patton? I'm not sure. Admittedly, Patton would have approached the task with a bit more dash and conviction. But Patton wasn't Superman. He was still having to operate within the framework of a plan that was deeply flawed.
In any case, the blame game for Arnhem doesn't begin and end with Montgomery. Lt.Gen Brian Horrocks [Commanding XXX Corps] might have served Monty well in the desert but at Arnhem Horrocks didn't really have a proper 'grip' on the mission. Maybe Horrocks' indifferent health was a factor, who can say.
But for all the weaknesses in the planning of Market Garden, the fact is that despite everything Montgomery did come close to achieving his objectives.
Given his time over again, if Montgomery was permitted to change just ONE thing about Market Garden he would have demanded that 1st Airborne Division was landed and dropped close to its objectives. For Market Garden that was the hinge of fate.

You're maybe right, Leo. As I said, there were other problems there such as bad weather, bad intelligence informs and an over-extended supply lines. Not even whoever SUPER general could deal with that.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Monty came close but no cigar.

Too many what ifs involved here. A few examples.

What if the weather had been clearer?

What if the Polish Paras had jumped days earlier?

What if the Brit Paras had been able to keep control of the fields used for their resupply?

What if the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divs and Colonel Joe Vandeleurs Armor--had pushed on past Nijmegen?
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Here is my simple theory on what might had happened IF Patton had been in command.

Very simple--Patton would have never gone for such a plan because of the uncertainties involved and lack of resources needed to make this successful. I.e. the one road keeps coming to mind.

ALso the concept of taking a few villages and cities but none of the countryside to him would mean that each and every village and city taken would be encircled and would have to have enough soldiers to permanently hold these places thus leaving him fewer and fewer men left to carry on the attack and main goal--the capture of Arnhem.

Now if Patton had actually had the job of commanding this operation--(to which I can see never happening even in a what if?)

Patton would have had the brains enough to keep all the men under his command moving and gaining ground, instead of not letting them become stationary for long periods of time.

Patton would also not have put up with not having his supplies dropped even if his men had lost control of the dropping zones--he would have made sure that these were changed and had the cannisters dropped in the cities.

Instead of it all stopping at Nijmegen, why not all try to push on to Arnhem? If that had happened soon enough in Montys plan--it would have successful-- or more successful. They had an Armored Brigade, and two Airborne Divisions in that area to use.

Now with these forces at hand--I also think it plausible that they would also rush in reinforcements in the name of other Armored Divisions, Infantry Divisions and more Air cover.

In the least, I think they would have also had a Feint attack launched to keep the Germans guessing and busy. This attack could have been like operation Little Saturn on the Eastern Front. Not too bold and ambitious but yet--you would keep attacking to keep the enemy off balance.

But then again--that too becomes a what if? If they had had enough supplies.

No matter which way I look at it, nor from which point of view--this Operation was doomed to failure.

Even more optimistically--trying to give Monty his due justice as a commander, I flat out cannot see this as being a winning situation for the allies--unless all those other units had managed to keep moving as I believe they could have and, IF they had all the necessary supplies and replacements continously fed into the battle, and also a possible large-scale attack by other allied forces on a narrowed broad front, which could be used as a Feint to draw away some of the attention from Arnhem.

What do you think on these possibilities?

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Lost are only those, who abandon themselves) Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

wonder if the Luftwaffe would have been in control of the air ?
wonder if the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions would have had a full compliment of armor ?
wonder if the SS Schwere Panzer Abteilung 102 would of been on hand ?

on it goes.....

~E

And another what if in the old what if section..

Brereton, I'll mention him...What if the capacity used to carry in his hq would have been used instead with ist airborne. Maybe not a winning force, but maybe enough to help with push for bridge.

I'll agree with Friedrich...the plan was bold, I'll agree with Carl, needed someone to motivate and move on...

I'll agree with Martin..comms...A look at first airbornes comms at coy level, to battalion, to brigade to div, to 30 corps etc...they were considered adequate for the plan and would have been if the advance of the troops to their positions had gone according to plan and on time..There were risks taken sure, but the plan envisiaged everyone being where they should be, then the radios ranges etc would have no critisism...then though what always happens when plan meets action??

And what of the Jedbergh teams etc with their enviable comms equipment.

The movie Bridge too far as Martin would suggest..good movie, but every word uttered shouldnt be taken as fact.

Breretton..Sorry...At end of day he was the commander litterelly on the ground...Nice polished belt though.

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

Originally posted by General der Infanterie Friedrich H:
You're maybe right, Leo. As I said, there were other problems there such as bad weather, bad intelligence informs and an over-extended supply lines. Not even whoever SUPER general could deal with that.

That's exactly my point. Any commander who managed to make a success of Market Garden with all its internal and external shortcomings would have to be a cross between Alexander the Great, Napoleon and U.S. Grant all rolled into one!
Montgomery made a fair stab at it, no more and no less.

See--thats what I mean? too many variables even in real life.

Also--just in case--no im not making fun of Monty in any way, shape or form by saying what I did.

Not because I am an American--do I feel that Patton was a better General but, Monty did prove he was capable but, I just dont feel he was capable enough to pull this job off--unless everything went according to plan and he had had all the necessary supplies.

Also--to be fair--I think Patton would have had a rough time at this too. Seeing that Patton and Monty never really saw anything eye-to-eye, I think even Patton would have called this off earlier than Monty--or changed the plans earlier in the fighting when the Brit Paras still had a good chance to breakout with most of their men and make it back to Nijmegen. As much as Patton would have hated to call off any attack--I think he would have done so on this one sooner than it really was called off--unless those other what ifs? came to play--such as a major feint attack--things like that.

like I said--meaning no disrespect for Monty. [img]smile.gif[/img]

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Lost are only those, who abandon themselves) Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

Totally agree with Carl and Leo.

But I'd bet that ALEXANDER (and I don't mean sir Harold Alexander) would have achieved it for sure! If he beated hundreds of elephants in the Indo river... he surely could have taken a couple bridges... [img]smile.gif[/img]

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Just to show how complex market-Garden can become ; urqh, I think you're confusing Browning with Brereton.

You're right, Browning's decision to use 38 gliders to transport his HQ was foolish and ill-considered. But Brereton had the final 'say' in the use of US transport aircraft.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

No Martin think I was confusing Whiskey with Beer..never mix em especially at early hours of morning...Yep I was talking of old Daphne De Mauriers hubby...

But now while we are on old Breretton and Im sober....Did anyone actually even show him the plans...

No faith in either of em.

Who could have commanded such an operation? Sorry Friederich....the elephants when hit by 88s would have blocked the road...ever seen how long an elephant bulldozer takes to clear a one land highway of dead elephants??

No, I go for Catcheweyo...sp...Zulu chief....

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

What IS he on???

The fact that so many areas can be examined and criticised is one of the things that makes 'Arnhem' such a fascinating subject for research.

But - to go waaaay back to Leo's original question, I really don't think that the war could have been won in NW Europe in September '44, whatever plan was adopted or whoever was chosen to lead it.

Again, the context is so important - in this case, it was the 'Germany's finished' context. For a moment there , after the German army's headlong retreat through Flanders , SHAEF genuinely felt that Germany was finished. As we know with our wonderful 20/20 hindsight, this was far from the case.

Sure, things could have been done differently/better ( taking - er, was it Rotterdam or Antwerp ?, for instance ) and the shape of the war would have changed.

But Germany still had a few shots left in the locker ......

[ 23. April 2003, 06:06 AM: Message edited by: Martin Bull ]

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

I also think that Alexander The Great could have done it. If you can defeat a whole Persian army, you can defeat a few doze tanks and troops of the Waffen-SS.

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Having started this thread on Arnhem I'd like to add some footnotes to this discussion:

As for MARKET GARDEN it sometimes seems that almost everything that could go wrong, did go wrong.
BUT, as I remarked before, despite everything, it was in the end a pretty fine line separating success from failure.

Considering that the plan for MARKET GARDEN was cobbled together in just SEVEN DAYS I suppose in one sense it was remarkable that so much did go right, allowing for the lack of flexibility in such a plan.

After all, eight out of nine crossings were achieved. The tragedy of MARKET GARDEN is that the ninth crossing, the bridge at Arnhem, had to be the failure that ruptured the entire operation.

MARKET GARDEN was a daring plan that deserved to succeed. As we know, the faults of the plan were plentiful, but strategically it wasn't over-ambitious and all the objectives were achievable.
You could argue all day and night whether MARKET GARDEN had the right generals or the wrong generals. Personally, I think the Allies would have settled for a lucky general.

In the original thread I asked if the Allies could have ended the war in 1944.
Well I've seen it wargamed to a successful conclusion ... if only it had been a war game!
To use a phrase beloved by the Pentagon I guess the 'balance of probability' is that MARKET GARDEN would not have ended hostilities by the end of 1944.

Well. I mostly agree with the points of Martin, Urgh and Leo. It was a matter of Murphy's law. Whatever could have been wrong, went wrong. It was not a matter of the general, you're right (except if he'd have been Alexander)

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Martin, just come across a Market Garden operation box folder type magazine in the BATTLEFRONT series...

Doesnt go into the battle in any great detail, but full of photocopies of orders, Jedburgh ops battalion after battle report photocoopies....Bit like the old Jackdaw series on history folders if you ever saw them in 70's 80's..

SS account of the battle..photocopy

1 Para war diary typed up report photocopy

Map with plan of advance...bit like o/s

Grenadier Guards war diary photocopy

US 82nd Nijmegen map..pointing out times of individual unit attacks together with Guards attack on bridge.

Dutch reisistancce instructions photocopy of typed up British instructions to.

Glossy photo of famous recce flight photo of bridge wreckage.

Typed up photocopy of German intel summary..ex Ultra decrypt of Geman report.

3 para war diary photocopy of type up.

Letter form Colonel Cassidy us 101 to Irish Guards commmending leadership of Sgt Mcrory in support of US forces. Photocopy.

Jedburgh radio logs and info.

Ultra decrypt German Army Gruppe West message photocopy.

Not normal magazine stuff. So quite interesting.

All info from Public Record Office of National Archives..Came across it in flea market sale...

Released in 1999 So must be still available I suppose.

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.