In the fall/winter 1941 the German Army suffered devastating losses in its final push to conquer the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht was overextended and exposed to Red Army counter-attacks in a sub-zereo climate. The Germans would never again be able to mount operations on a scale like that of Barbarossa. What if (lets say sometime in August) Hitler and the High Command realized the dangers ahead, and decided to halt the Wehrmacht's forward movement after the encirclement of Kiev? The Germans could then have used the coming weeks, before the rains, to clean up and straighten out their front lines. The halt would have also enabled them time to construct cold weather shelters and dig in defensive positions for the possibility of a Soviet winter assault. With a front line hundreds of miles closer to Germany, the German Army could have better used the winter of 1941/2 to improve their lines of communication and build supply depots closer to the front. Would these measures have saved the bulk of the Wehrmacht from the wholesale destruction it sustained at the gates of Moscow and elsewhere? Would the use of such a strategy have enabled the Germans to finish off the Russians in 1942? Or at the very least allowed them to fight an elastic defense for years on end while exploiting resources from these captured Soviet territories?

[ 08. June 2003, 11:02 AM: Message edited by: Peiper44 ]

First of all, welcome aborad, Peiper! Hope you enjoy yourself in here and we hope to see many posts from you.

And now, I think that was not a viable solution. First of all, because the real heavy casualties that the Wehrmacht suffered took place in December and January while the Red Army counterattacked and the winter smashed the German forces. Here was when most of the equipment and men were lost. Whole platoons froze in one night with temperatures of -40ºC in some places. But as we have discussed earlier over here, the German advance was halted by the beginning of December, because the over extended supply lines and the weakening of the German divisions (lowered to 50% of their men force). And if there would have been an halt after the huge annihilation battle at Kiev, the Soviets would have had a lot of time to reorganise and bring reinforcements; we are talking about October 1941 until May/June 1942 when the Germans would have been able to launch another offensive. Let's remember that just a few weeks of awkward arguements in the German High Command gave the Soviets time to reorganise, bring reinforcements and fortify cities as Leningrad and Moscow. Exactly after the battle of Smolijensk, the Red Army between that city and Moscow were retreating in disorder, if Hoth and Guderian would have been able to chase them it is rather probable that a victory in November would have occured. But the arguements in the German High Command wheter to take Moscow or Leningrad and the Ukraine took precious time away from the Wejrmacht and gave the Soviets time to strenghten their forces.

__________________
"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

I don't dispute that the Wehrmacht was largely destroyed in December 41/January 42. My suggestion is that they would have stood a much better chance if they were dug in (to withstand attacks) and sheltered (from the cold). Of course troops can't fight from a heated hut or bunker very well, and some would have to venture outside to face any Russian attacks. The core of my theory is that by halting the German Army to allow for winter preparations, the German force that emerged from the winter of 41/42 would have much more closesly resembled the German force that crossed the border on June 22. Infanterie Friedrich H does mention that this pause would give the Reds time to prepare stronger defenses in their cities. True, but I would contend that if the Wehrmacht could have avoided those devestating losses in the winter of 41/42 they would of been in a stronger position to take on these enhanced defenses than was the historical case. Another point is that those soldiers that beat back the Germans at Moscow would have had to travel at least an extra 200 miles westward to meet the enemy, an enemy who was rested and more easily supplied than if they had advanced eastward without reguard to supplies or counter-attack. I guess the whole argument rests on wether the strategic advances made by Germans in October-November of 1941, and the destruction it inflicted on the Soviet forces and economy, were worth the price. In any case I would agree with I. Friedrich H's suggestion that the Wehrmacht should have stuck to the plan of capturing Moscow early on if they planned for a victory in 1941.

Your points are quite good and understandable. A relatively untouched and prepared Wehrmacht would have been an incredible fighting force. But with those months of calm, the demoralised, ill-leaded and ill-equipped Red Army of 1941 would have been reinforced to adquire the force of 1943 Red Army or even that of 1944, which a Wehrmacht of any time could face.

__________________
"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

It is an interesting idea to make Wehrmacht stop at August 1941. Yet they would then leave unused the advantage they had gained with their pincer movements at that moment. Maybe the stopping part should have been taken just before operation Typhoon instead?

We must remember though that Germany was not preparing for longer wars ( production figures ) but had focused on Blitzkrieg victories and thus a longer war in the East was not in the plans. AS well the winter clothing production should have been started.

But a nice what if...

__________________

Stalin's general philosophy was when in doubt, attack! Killl Germans, take back land, and generally cause havoc among high command. Now, in 1941-2, the Soviets were basically in chaos. Sure, they could offer some resistance, but only in cities, and even there they could lose. Stalin would have been in doubt, and thus... and the like. Although the Germans would have had better supplies, the Soviets still had more people to throw at them. Eventually, the Germans would have been pushed back to the Reichstag.

__________________
To the German Commander-- Nuts.

-- The American Commander

Let's say the Germans stopped after the Kiev encirclement, and then spent the remainder of summer/fall consolidating, smoothing out their lines and creating defensive positions. Then the Germans should be able to defeat the Russian winter attacks, since the Germans defeated other attacks in the winter and in the beginning of 1942.

But the Russian army was improving in quantity and quality, and Germany was still embroiled in a multi-front war with inadequate resources.

With the Germans bugging down for the Winter, the SU would recieve the crucial time which she needed to reinforce her lines bring up countless of new epuipement which were more advanced then anything the Germans possessed at this time (the T-34 and the Katyusha) draw up new battle plans and re-supply all of the troops. These 3-4 additional months would not have benefited the Germans. If anything, she would now be facing a much larger, more powerful and a more determined adversary.

__________________
The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

[QUOTE=Peiper44;140486]In the fall/winter 1941 the German Army suffered devastating losses in its final push to conquer the Soviet Union. The Wehrmacht was overextended and exposed to Red Army counter-attacks in a sub-zereo climate. The Germans would never again be able to mount operations on a scale like that of Barbarossa. What if (lets say sometime in August) Hitler and the High Command realized the dangers ahead, and decided to halt the Wehrmacht's forward movement after the encirclement of Kiev? The Germans could then have used the coming weeks, before the rains, to clean up and straighten out their front lines. The halt would have also enabled them time to construct cold weather shelters and dig in defensive positions for the possibility of a Soviet winter assault. With a front line hundreds of miles closer to Germany, the German Army could have better used the winter of 1941/2 to improve their lines of communication and build supply depots closer to the front. Would these measures have saved the bulk of the Wehrmacht from the wholesale destruction it sustained at the gates of Moscow and elsewhere? Would the use of such a strategy have enabled the Germans to finish off the Russians in 1942? Or at the very least allowed them to fight an elastic defense for years on end while exploiting resources from these captured Soviet territories?

[ 08. June 2003, 11:02 AM: Message edited by: Peiper44 ][/QUOTEGod question and some good points;but it would have mean to recognize that Barbarossa was a failure and that there was no chance the war could be finished in 1941 . Concerning the German losses:the Germans did not suffering devastating losses in the fall-winter of 1941 :they did suffering devastating losses in the summer of 1941. CL +NCL :from june to september (10 weeks):51000 a week;from september to december (13 weeks) 42000 a week ;from december to april (17 weeks):42000 a week,of whom 50 % NCL ;in each of the three periods the Russian losses were 2000000 . The Russian winteroffensive did not get its objectives and can be considered as a failure . In 1942 the Germans were not that weakened:from april to january they lost 830000 men(39 weeks) =22000 a week;the Russian lossesonly CL)4.9 =120000 a week .

After reading Pleshakov's documentary book ' Stalin's Folly', in which he stunningly describes the horror and bewilderment the generals and Stalin himself experienced at the swift destruction the German juggernaut delivered, I am rather convinced that a halt would have been a realistic and cunning decision. Russians couldn't have faced another summer of the same kind of attack, what with all the russians joining germans to fight Stalin, and the reinforcements and the supply lines created during winter.
The real enemy was the allied's enormous aid. Tanks, food, ammunition, trucks, everything.
The what-ifs are intriguing, but you always have to look back while daydreaming, to the solid basic idea: Hitler was the greatest, AND luckiest warlord of all time and it was an unbelievable achievement to get as far as to the gates of Moscow, after everything he had already achieved.
F**k the war, though )
TimMadden

Maybe off point ,but Jean Dutourd was born in 1920 thus veteran of WW

The end paragraph is basically the explanation of why few if any Generals argued with Hitler for a halt in August, or even until well into the winter: they didn't, couldn't and wouldn't halt the advance, because there seemed absolutely no reason to. The Russians had done almost nothing since June except retreat, and it looked to everyone like the Germans had pulled off another succesful blitzkrieg. Moreoever, such a halt would have served the russian cause far better than the German: Stalin would have had even more time to mobilize men and resources, to move more factories away from the German advance, to build more "fortress cities", to lay more minefields, to train and develop doctrine (that took them 3 years to come up with ultimately) and possibly even position themselves to seriously threaten the German positions held by Army Group North and on the Baltic.

its not widely discussed but Hitler never planned to occupy the soviet union in its entirety - had Hitler succeeded he intended to occupy the country only to a line running roughly covering everything west of Siberia (which Hitler, with the knowledge of the time, thought of as nothing but an arctic desert and did not think worthy of occupying.). The intent was for German forces to push the remaining Russians all the way east to Siberia then to build a permanent defensive line, an arctic DMZ of sorts, to defend against them while Germany plundered the east and used German farmers to exploit his "lebensraum".

This is why I think the only way for the invasion to have been pulled off would have to have the southern aid route blocked (Persia, Iraq, Levant, India, China, etc) and the East as well. This would mean the Japanese would have to participate and the Garmans to have an extreme bit of forsight and luck in the south. Not happenin' unless Hitler could make it worth Japan's while (not sure how they could do that) and start into Africa and the Mediterranean very quickly after June '40. This would have required planning before hatching the idea of Barbarossa and by then Japan had soured on Hitler's trustworthiness -good call by the Japanese.

We'd have to combine several What Ifs to pull this off. Maybe if Churchill had a grabber in 1939, Hitler had a weak moment of concession with the Japanese and the Germans have some ambitions and a run of luck in the south it would work. Anything else just delays the inevitable.

One thing to keep in mind is that though the Germans were on the defensive and took heavier casualties than they did in the summer and fall, Soviet casualties were still higher, and furthermore, the advance of the German line to that point denied huge numbers of personnel (in the most thickly populated portions of the USSR) and resources to the Soviets. As the Soviets advanced as they historically did, the rate at which they enlisted new soldiers accelerated as they brought more territory back under their control. This helped to allow them to increase their momentum.

In establishing the Rzhev salient, Soviet losses were 500,000 to 1 million while German losses were half that. The Battle of Moscow was even more lopsided, with Soviet casualties at 2.5 times the rate of the Germans. The winter of '41-42 didn't gut the German Army, that would have been 42'-43. If they'd halted on the lines of mid-September, the Soviet Union would have had millions of additional prospective recruits with which to attack the Germans during that winter.

I think whatever advantage there may have been to a German halt would have made for an even greater advantage for the Soviets.

The reason why the Germans kept going and lacked winter preparations is that they expected to be able to, for all practical purposes, knock the Soviets out of the war before the end of the '41 campaigning season. The rationale for a German halt when and where you say would not have come about so that the Germans could better prepare themselves for the long, arduous winter, but would rather have to come from the awareness that they could not conclude major operations against the Soviet Union in 1941.

While we overall agree that halting the German advance would have benefited the Soviet Union, I still must nit pick a little..

The Red Army began to grow from the very beginning of the war. The communist state had established a draft of sorts (similar to what Israel has with her population today) in which roughly 14 million men would have at least basic training (boot camp). There was simply no way for the German intelligence to foresee this. As a result, the Soviet Union had virtually a bottomless pit of volunteers with at least basic training when war broke out.

In the first 6 months while successful, the German war machine suffered 800,000 casualties and was only able to replenish 200,000 of them. The Red Army while taking far greater casualties was actually able to grow in size. This continued to be the case for the duration of the war even before volunteers from liberated countries became available.

__________________
The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

Great info! Really informative. It is helpful for me.

__________________
Taux credit auto simulation pret auto et voiture | Calcul credit auto et pret voiture | Financement auto et voiture

Yes-a halt in SEPT 1941 probably would have at least saved much of the Wehrmacht's strength against the growing Soviet might. The best I can see for Germany in such a scenario is stalemate-with a remote chance of winning. What could have won the war for Germany would be if they used the time to raise anti Soviet forces in the occuppied territories, not used mass terror on civilians, or mass murder on Soviet POWs. But we are asking Hitler not to be Hitler in all the above scenarios.

JeffinMNUSA

__________________

a halt in september would save the Red Army the 1.5 million losses of the 3th quarter of 1941 (remember the battle of Viazma ) and would mean the bulk of the German Army beying in the East for several years;btwn 1 september the battle of Kiew was NOT finished .

LJ; The premise is that the Wehrmacht finishes off the Kiev pocket and goes to the defensive for the Winter. And yes they are in much better position-with better supply and most of their Barbarossa strength-come Spring. The Wehrmacht was a fearsome beast in defense as witnessed by how it stymied a Soviet advance into Romania in Spring of 1944 with practically nothing (Read Glantz's book "Red Storm Over the Balkans.") Is this a good trade off against the growing strength of the RKKA? Maybe some of our wargaming friends could play this scenario; but if the German player takes a page from Marshall Zhukov and lets the opponent batter his forces against the defense before launching a devastating counterattack (and yes Stalin launched MANY ill advised offensives!) then it might have been worth the trade.
This is all pretty academic as in the Fall of 1941 Hitler was a crazed high stakes gambler on a roll, and nothing was going to stop him on the road to Moscow. The absolute dictator had no concept of defensive warfare and any going to that mode in Sept 1941 would have had to have been done over his dead body.

JeffinMNUSA

__________________

Don't put all the blame on Hitler. The main strategy of the German army since 1870 was the "Vernichtungsslacht", which was basically a victory in one campaign. This was to be achieved by a (series of) "Kesselslacht" or cauldron battle, which was an encirclement where the surrounded force would be grinded inward until destruction. Once the army was defeated the enemy country would surrender. A strategic halt would go against this doctrine, while earlier victories in '39 and '40 proved its worth to the German High command.

Lo;
That too-plus the sheer momentum that followed an unbroken string of land victories. It would have been difficult for the Wehrmacht to stop in SEPT '41-politically speaking-regardless of who the leadership might be (and there was NO chance of stopping with Adolf Hitler at the helm of state). A hard look at the depleted German divisions, lack of winter gear; and the increasingly difficult supply situation might have induced some in OKW to advise caution; but would their advice have been heeded?

JeffinMNUSA

__________________

I know i posted on why they didnt do this before but i am reminded of an important reason why they did not and could not halt - the reason is the Crimea. What worried Hitler most, the Soviets in the Crimea were within bomber range of the vital oil fields in Ploesti, Rumania. This was such a concern than Hitler and Manstein devoted much time, men and resources in 1942 in clearing the "aircraft carrier" (as Hitler called the Crimea).

Operation "Bustard Hunt" as Manstein called it, was a bitter, costly campaign for all sides but the army and the luftwaffe performed brilliantly against superior forces in conquering the Crimea. Succesful completion of "Bustard Hunt" was considered as the minimal preliminary for further German operations in the East, namely Operation Blau with the objective being the capture of the Caucases oil fields.

As ultimately happened, after the hard-won, costly, but absolutely necessary success of the Crimean campaign (Hitler ordered a special medal struck for soldiers who fought in it), Hitler became overly impressed with his own Generalship and too contemptuous of the Russians', and proceeded, to make the worst mistake that could have been made: He split his forces by having half driving toward Stalingrad and the other half toward the Caucases, and we all know the name of the German defeat that came only a few months later.

Not a whole truth. During 1941 to 1943 the soviet union lost more men than it could replace and by 1944 they had a severe manpower shortage. Yes, they put more men in the front lines in July 1943 than 2 years before, but their strategic reserve of manpower was running lower.

Note that after July 1943 the number of men that the soviets could put in the front was slowly decreasing, from 7 million that month, to 6.1 million in may 1945. While they didn't lose many men as prisoners, the loss in terms of wounded and killed was so great that they couldn't replace then all (yes, the germans indeed lost even more in proportion, with strength failing from 3.4 million in July 1943 to 1.5 million in May 1945).

Once again your numbers contradict those of Glantz. The Red Army never stopped growing. This is solely due to the 14 million citizens which received at least basic training due to Stalin's new draft. In 1942 the Red Army was larger than what she was in 41'. In 1943 she was larger than in 42' and so on.

THE RED ARMY NEVER SHRANK IN SIZE. Unless you can provide a source which would prove Glantz to be incorrect, I will continue to use him and Erickson as reliable sources.

__________________
The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler