What would of happened if the Panzer force decided upon to make a single, effective thrust right into the pocket as soon as it was created, would it of effected Britain's fighting ability?

Would the panzers even of broken through and captured the pocket, or would the tanks suffer a humanilating defeat trapped in the rocky terrain?

And lastly, why did Hitler stop the effect, some say he lost his nerve, worrying abot over-stretching his forces. Others say the terrain would of made it impossible, over-stratching the forces, and some even state that destorying trapped british soldiers would of made any peace-treatment with the British impossible.

Whats your opinion? I personnely believe the tanks stopped for the sake of later diplomancy, yet the panzers could of stalled on the attack.

Well, this is a good threads and you beat me to create it, because I think it will make a very interesting discussion. Why? Because it was actually a WISE decision at the moment, it turned not to be the right one in the end, but I can understand the German High Command's reasons to halt the advance.

First, it was not only Hitler who thought about the halt. The main authors of this were colonel generals Gerd von Runstedt, commander of Army Group 'A', Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group 'B', Walther von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the Army, generals Franz Halder, chief of staff of the Army and Ewald von Kleist, commander of Panzer Group 'Klesit'. They thought (and they were right) that the armoured troops needed a rest. They had been fighting without a rest for the last two weeks, the majority of the Panzers were damaged or had broken down. The terrain was not suitable for their use and certainly, the infantry is the adequate weapon to clean a pocket. The Panzers had made their surrounding, which was their job. However, they had advanced so rapidly that the infantry divisions were far behind them. It would take days for enough infantry forces to get to Dunkirk and sweep the British. General Heinz Guderian almost went mad when he knew about the halt, but he, better than anyone else knew the situation of his Panzers. maybe the pocket had been destroyed, but with big losses and colonel general Von Runstedt in his experienced and complete view of the situation ordered the halt of the Panzers, so they could rest and refit. Why? Because Von Runstedt clearly saw that France was all but defeated. He was going to need as many Panzers as he could get to break through the Somme, destroy the remaining French Forces (still a lot) and take paris so the war could be won. Our dear Heinz Guderian didn't see this. The German High Command did and they told Hitler about it, who obviously agreed. The only problem was that the infantry divisions needed were far from Dunkirk. And that was the main flaw of the 'Blitzkrieg', which couldn't be solved by Guderian nor anyone else. And now we can turn to field marshal Hermann Göring's suggestion that the Luftwaffe could hold the Allies enough time for the infantry to get there if not destriying the pocket itself. And he was right to say that because if you watch at facts, the first two days of the evacuation in which there was good weather, the Luftwaffe smashed the beachhead, prevented the evacuation and caused severe casualties to the British. The Stukas were making six or seven missions a day and Göring's suggestion became truth. He didn't count on the weather. The following days it prevented the Luftwaffe of attaking the beachhead, so the German infantry divisions arrived there too late. It was not Hitler's mistake. It was everyone's mistake. And the decision of halting the Panzers had the right causes. And I, in Hitler's shoes, would have taken the decision of halting the Panzers.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

The Stukas were making six or seven missions a day and Göring's suggestion became truth. He didn't count on the weather. The following days it prevented the Luftwaffe of attaking the beachhead, so the German infantry divisions arrived there too late. It was not Hitler's mistake. It was everyone's mistake. And the decision of halting the Panzers had the right causes. And I, in Hitler's shoes, would have taken the decision of halting the Panzers. [/QB][/quote]


------------Freidrich,

You point out some interesting angles I hadn't explored. However, as I understand it, Guderian was beside himself because he had just cleared a magor canal at great expence and was ready crash the party in the pocket. Now, as the BEF had lost a great deal of it's heavy equipment, and were no doubt demoralized as any force with it's back to the sea would be (Also they were trapped there with the French! Yike!), so success does not seem all that far-fetched.
To extend this thread a bit, I was wondering what the disposition of the Kriegsmarine was at this time? Could the U-boats have had a field day in the channel during the evacuations? Could they have made the Luftwaffe attacks more effective by delaying the process? Was it Goering's bad relations with the Navy, and all others seeking favor with the Fuhrer, that kept him from succeeding?

The Blue Max

[ 09. June 2003, 12:37 AM: Message edited by: Blue Max ]

If the Panzer didn't had to stop a few kilometers from Dunkirk the bulk of the BEF would have been captured.

The Brittish soldiers didn't have a lot of heavy equipment like tanks, also their moral was not high and they were an easy target for the Luftwaffe and the tanks could have done the encirclement.

About the order to halt the Panzers for their fight in the rest of France, it seems to me that those Panzerdivisions were not all necesarry for that attack.

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If the Germans had captured BEF about 400,000 men in Dunkerque (?), then the British might have been more interested in peace talks with Hitler? Losing the BEF troops would have been a huge blow!

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Well, this is true. But it would have been an urban-fight like and wouldn't have been easy for the Panzers to move in there. But I must remark that according to the 'Blitzkrieg' tactics "the Panzers were there to encircle the enemy forces and then the infantry, air force and artillery were supossed to sweep the pocket". If you compare that with the situation at Dunkirk, it's the same, the Panzers had done their job.

The Navy was in very bad shape by then, the few U-boats available in spring 1940 were scattered all over the Atlantic and the remaining surface ships were still involved in the Norwegian campaign. Remember that in April 1940, the Kriegsmarine lost nearly a third of its surface fleet. It was still licking its wounds to face the might of the Royal Navy.

I do not think so. Marshal Göring and his Luftwaffe performed incredibly well at Dunkirk, whether we speak of the days with good or bad weather. The RAF, although weakened, gave a fierce resistance and the Luftwaffe managed to cause severe losses to the RAF and the RN, and of course, the ground forces. If the weather had been on the German's side, it is almost sure that the Luftwaffe would have finished the job by itself.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Id put another slant on this one. Does anyone want to look at what happened to a defended port at the same time, when a small force of commited units were told to hold to the end, which they did, and how difficult it was for the enemy to take this port. Multiply it to Dunkirk and although we could guess the outcome, Dunkirk was not just a few beaches of demorilesed frightened soldiers.

Look to Calais and its short and overlooked defence.

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

Are you saying that if the BEF and the other Allied Forces would have been ordered to hold ground in an Stalingrad-like order instead of being evacuated they would have held out? Of course they would have had! All the men trapped there were very professional and very brave. But I don't think Churchill would have doomed them like that. Astonishing defeat for the Allies at the end: 450.000 killed, wounded and captured and how many Germans? Maybe 200, 300 thousand maximum?

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Non mon General, but we are more in agreement than you think.

What I am saying is what your are saying, casualties would have been horrendous, a fight to the finish for the British if Calais is anything to go by. And yes a loss of the army that we were in so much need of to train and prepare for future years.

Self defeating.

What I am saying is that the halt order by the Germans considereing the casualties they would most likely take and not a 100 percent certainty of victory and with ok a weakened but still numerous French army round the Somme, a frightening prospect for Hitler if as you say the casualties would be so high against the BEF and Attached French units around Dunkirk, especially if he then has to face the French down south, ok we know in hindsight the Frecnch were both materialistically and morraly defeated, but was that Hitlers thoughts at the time too, especially if he had same thoughts as you and me of the prospective casualties of the finest army in the world at that time.

Maybe the halt order was as good for them in their thinking process as it was for us in the reality?

Getting into what if though now..

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

I agree with you, Urqh. And read my posts above and you'll find my reasons and the facts to belived that the decision to halt the tanks was a very wise one. It was only a matter of luck that the weather was in favour of the British. That's all. And the casualties would have been horrendous, many more than the actual 110.000 of the whole campaign in the West.

I only disagree on the British Army being the best in 1940... I completely agree that the BEF of 1914 had the BEST men in the world, but in 1940...?

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Aha, but Friedriche, its probably my Englsih grammar construction, but I was referring to the German army as being the best at that time and Hitler and his generals not wanting to see extensive casualties of the sort we are talking at that stage of the war?

The British? Certainly determined but far from being the best, and certainly far from being the best equipped...

But I still love a line uttered in Zulu the movie, probably not actually said at Rourkes Drift, but along the lines of yes sir a bayonet but with a lot of guts behind it.

Or as 9 would say, and you will probably wander what Im on about...they dont like it up em Mr. Mainwearing...

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

Bloody English grammar! [img]tongue.gif[/img]

Don't you feel nostalgia bout the old British Army, the feared redcoats? In 1940 they were a bunch of young guys ill-equiped, not perfectly leaded or trained fighting Stukas and Panzers...

You know, Urqh? The German Army was never good-equipped. In 1940 their equipment quality in almost every aspect was not particulary good.

So, this leads us to a question: Wasn't any Army in WWII adequately equipped?

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Yep your right Fried, as stated before on here, the German army had more horses than tanks etc, and actually yes the BEF was quite well on the way to a good if though small, mechinised force, I say good as to its mechinisation rather than the equipment itself..

I actually think the BEF gave quite a good account of themselves, but strategially never stood a chance.

Imagine laying in a corn field....Stukas paving the way around you for a panzer even if an early model, to come out of that hedge in front and your laying there prepared and ready for anything with that great masterful invention for its time, the envy of the world because you are armed with the.......BOYES anti tank rifle....Now should I risk firing the thing at that tank, or pick it up and smash it against the tank, both equally effective.....Englander for you the var ist overt.

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

Other things that makes one wonder how it would have gone in Dunkerque if...

1.the area was flooded to protect Dunkerque named "mesure W".

The flooded area according to a book I have would have been from Bray-Dunes to Bergues and Bergues to Watten.

The only problem was that it woulde take 6 days to finalize the flood.

2. The communications between the French and British were better. It seems that both acted quite on their own in many things...

3. Possible break through attack to west? wasn´t Rommel in quite distress in Arras...

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1. I seem to remember seeing pics of some flooding in Belgium with Allied forces struggling thru, but obviously not on the scale you refer to Kai, yep, looking at this site, between Bray and Nieuport, could have been very intersteing...

http://www.gamber.net/cyclebel/westhoek.htm

2. Nothing changes there then Kai, but on the physical communication side ie radio etc, French and Brits still depended on land lines for most comms, losing land, getting bombed and even flooding etc soon saw the end of most of this, but I get your point the communications between the two could be woeful....Consider Gort off to meeting with Weygand and Weygand not waiting for him, leaving orders behind for him to follow without substantiating the capablities with all..

Blimey commmunications between the BEF and its political masters at home in England were pretty damn poor to.

3. Indeed Rommel was taken aback, but not for long when he realised the attack didnt have any teeth but he duly noted the lost chances by allied forces.

The attack was a paper tiger, basically a few infantry companies from 2 British battalions, from a start line that the French forces supposedly allocated failed to reach, apart from a few. And the British armour did what British calvalry have done for years, charged gallantly for all to see and caused initial mayham but had no support to hold any ground.

The French attack from the south failed to Materialise, forces that either didnt exist or where miles away. Goes back to communicatons you mentioned earlier....Orders handed down without any idea of the facts on the ground...

Friedrich will be along in a mo to add to this... [img]smile.gif[/img]

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

Actually I am beginning to believe that the French defeat was mainly due to their leadership, I mean you have General Georges having a nervous breakdown, Weynard or whatever his name was was looking for people to blame it on and certain French Mayors were threatening to line the townsfolk up in front of the French forces. Oh, that and the fact that they were expecting their forces (which for the most part were peeved because their Comrades had just gone home on leave) to act as full size units etc.

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There's no honorable way to kill, no gentle way to destroy. There is nothing good in war. Except its ending.

AS well the whole strategy seems to have been all wrong for the allied.

More of the things that surprise me is that the French changed the commanders in the middle of crisis-as they did not have the time for that. The French troops were without High Command orders for three days waiting for Weygand to take his place...( according to a book I read on Dunkerque )

[img]graemlins/no.gif[/img]

http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/france_40.htm

"The World War I hero General Weygand replaced Gamelin. Attempting to pull together his forces, Weygand flew to the front, but was forced down and lost contact with his high command. Another French General, Billote, was killed...."

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Ah! Nice to be back discussing this! [img]smile.gif[/img]

1. The Belgians tried to flood the area as they did in 1914 that it proved very successful. However, they didn't flood the terrain completely and the German advance in 1940 was much faster. You didn't see hundreds of German soldiers drowning like in 1914...

2. This is truth. The British and the French were resented by the Great War (why? I don't know) and the French actually made one or two strategical reunions in French and didn't even bother themselves to bring an English translator. Why France and Great Britain could hold the Germans in 1914? Because they worked together very well. In 1940 it was not the situation. And as Urqh says, the British government and the French one didn't do much to help their Armies. In the other hand, you had Hitler fully supporting his Armed Forces.

3. The British counterattack at Arras, is "the perfect example of how NOT to counterattack" said once Sir Basil Liddel-Hart. There was no coordination between armoured, artillery and infantry units. They did not know the attack route. They didn't take advantages of their successes and they had bad luck: they found themselves fighting against a much better equipped, supplied, trained and leaded enemy. The most important consequence of the attack in favour of the Allies was that it made the whole German High Command to fear for the over-extended flank. This made them halt the tanks at Dunkirk.

There are thousands of reasons why the French lost the war in 1940. But one of them is indeed leadership. However, not at all what you say, Stefan. Général Maxim Weygand was a very capable man, but the situation was so caothic when he was made generalissimo that nearly anyone could deal with the situation. Général Georges did not have a break down. He got killed in a car crash in the very crucial moment of the battle and he was the only man more accurately aware of the whole situation. The blame is mostly général Maurice Gamelin's. He never reacted nor did anything to counterattack along the Meuse. He stopped being blind when it was too late...

This is true and very important. Leave alone the fact of changing the commander in chief (it was necessary since Gamelin was indeed, very incompetent). But they also changed Armies and Corps commanders in the crucial moments in the battles. Example, général Giraud replacing général Corap when the French IX Army was collapsing. Even if Corap was not competent enough, he at least knew the situation and the terrain. Giraud wasted precious hours getting aware of the tactical situations.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

*bumped* for KnightMove!

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Thank you so much, but this was in fact not really necessary.

This happened because the British were too lucky. The Luftwaffe faced very bad weather and they couldn't smash the beachhead. (There's a very good Dunkirk thread over there... I'll bump it for you).
</font>[/quote]This is true for Rundstedt, wrong for Halder and Brauchitsch (I don't know about the others). They disagreed and DID foresee th