I tread warily here as I freely admit to very limited reading of this campaign ( my interests are more 1944 ).

But the comments about French industrial output are interesting. I recall reading about the array of French aircraft available in 1940, ranging from the very good ( Dewoitine D250 ) to the chronically outdated ( Bloch 210 ). The author described various 'cozy relationships' between manufacturers and government purchasing departments which resulted in a hopelessly unco-ordinated and cumbersome procurement programme.

France's problems in 1940 seem to me not have been so much at the tactical or field level - as so often, individual units and men fought superbly - but at the command/political level.

I am quite sure that no-one would argue that Germany was superior to any other European power at that time in this area - that of 'political will' and military single-mindedness.

Maybe they should have minded Clausewitz' comment that no-one should think badly of a man who desires and strives for peace - but he should not have to defend himself with a dress rapier when attacked by a sharp sword.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

[quote]Originally posted by Vermillion:
[QB] This is such a common misconception, it makes myblood boil when I see it stated. (no offense intended by the way) The French did not think the Ardennes was impassable, neither did the Germans. In spring of 1938, the Fremch military conducted an excersis which simulated a German attack through the Ardennes forest. They predicted that the Germans could cross the Ardennes in 60 hours, which is not that much longer than it actually took them in 1940.

Howeverm Gamelin summed up the French position in 1936 when he stated that the Ardennes "would not support large operations, and would be a secondary front of any assault into France". The road structure, narrow, winding and few, convinced everyone in France that if an offensive were launched through the Ardennes, there would be plenty of time to react, and stop them at the Meuse, kep in mind that the Meuse is at its most difficult to cross in fron of the Ardennes sector. People concentrate too much on the Ardennes ofensive, yes it was an impressive logistical demonstration, but the real achievement was not the offensive, but the nearly inhuman effort the Germans put up in crossing the meusa first at Houx, then at Sedan. That was the impossible feat.

More importantly, the French applied their standards of orgainzation and command control, along with their doctrine on what the Germans would do when they reached the Meuse. The French assumed the Germans would have to stop, bring up infantry and artillery units and then make a forced river crossing several days after they reached the river. Of course, the Germans had other ideas.

France was the first nation in the world to have an actual mechanised division, and their DLMs (Divisions Legeres Mechanisees) equipped with the SOMUA were excellent, and caused som serious damage to the Germans. However they were all deployed into belgium,a nd so irrelevant for the first weeks of the war.

Also, the DLM's were trained for and used almost exclusively for reconnissance. As such they were scattered across Belgium in small groups to scout for the rest of the army as it approached its war positions in Belgium. Many of these small groups were overrun or forced back by the advancing Germans.

The 3 DCR (Divisions Cuirasees Reserves) or heavy tank divisions were badly used, badly led, and poorly equipped, the BIBis tank was powerful and difficult to destroy, but used an enormous amount of fuel, were slow and unwieldly, and were dispersed rather than being concentrated.

The main problem with the DCR was it was more a collection of tank battalions without any real support than a true division. The tanks (both the Char B-1 bis and the R-39) were slow and clumsy in mobile operations. They also lacked support equipment resulting in large losses through breakdowns and lack of fuel (these tanks also had short operational ranges).

You might want to edit your "quote" elements, it is near impossible to distinguish my original post from your responses to it...

However, indeed you are correct, the DCRs were never really structured or trained as actual armoured divisions, and asthey were strictly under the Infantry commanders, they did not have the operational flexibility of the Panzer Divisions. Further, they were lacking much of the critical support equipment of panzer divisions, such as AT guns and AA guns.

The DLM divisions were excellent, and the SOMUA was essentially custom built for the role, but their actual operational role in a conflict was never defined, and though they did have actual training (unlike the DCRs) they were a bit of a runt in the litter, in that nobody was quite sure what to do with them.

The Somua S-35 was the world's first tank to be manufactured from a cast steel. In Service with the French army in 1936. Many experts regarded the SOMUA S-35, in 1940, as the best medium tank in the world. The vehicle was designed and manufactured by Société d'Outillage Mécanique et d'Usinage d'Artillerie (SOMUA) and comes from a requirement from the French High Command in 1931.

A prototype was produced during the Fall of 1934 and trials began in Spring, 1935. Successful testing lead to an order for 50 vehicles in the Spring of 1936. By May of 1940, the French army had over 400 in service which equipped the Régiments de Cuirassiers and Régiments de Dragons in the Division Légère Méchanique (DLM). Equipped with excellent cast and sloped armor, the tank was considered hard to kill by German anti-tank squads equipped with the 37mm AT Gun. A major drawback was lack of a two-way radio and a one-man turret.

http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/f...ce-Medium.html

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Sorry for the quote problem. Still getting used to using it.

Anyway, the problem with the DLM still lay in its doctrine and TO&E. It was intended as a battlefield reconnissance unit, hence the large armored component. The S35 was designed primarily to fill this role. For this reason a dedicated radio operator was included in the crew of 3.
At the same time, the DLM lacked heavy artillery firepower (2 battalions of 75mm guns, one of 10.5mm howitzers) and infantry. The Brigade Legere Mecanique really only had 3 small companies of infantry and 3 machine gun companies in it. The two motorcycle companies in the in the Regiment d'Autos-Mitrailleuses (armored car regiment...really a small battalion sized formation) were also roughly capable of acting as small infantry companies as well.
This overall only gave the DLM, realistically, the equivalent of maybe a large battalion of infantry with everything counted in. This hardly constitutes sufficent support for it to act in the role of an armored division in the sense that the Germans used their panzer divisions.
That the infantry component would be scattered to support the various division elements in small groups would only dissipate what little was available to the point of worthlessness.
The DLC (Division Legeres de Cavalerie)was just as bad. All four of these fought in the Ardennes against the panzer advance there. These units were really more like a reinforced regiment in size and, like the DLM, lacked staying power (2 cavalry battalions and one small battalion of mechanized infantry supported by small armored elements).

It makes me look silly and I sincerely apologise for my comment. I may not be the most pacient person or the most polite. But even if I see you back your statements with facts ( I really thank you for that) and I do see you are not an amateur I still cannot accept many of the things you state. I am no amateur either and I have read a lot on the subject too. My most important source is precisely "To lose a battle" by Alistair Horne, which is the most important work ever written about the battle of France.

First, I understand by your posts that you think that the unimaginative and awkward 'Gelb' would have worked? If Von Bock would have had his 45 divisions and pushing along the Channel in a Schlieffen way? Von Manstein, Guderian, Rommel and many others thought it couldn't work. And I believe that myself. Why? Because a German victory recquired speed above all, which is what the 'Sichelschnitt' provided since Germany could not fight a long attrition war. I agree that Great Britain and France were not in the position to fight a long one too, but had many more resources to do so. Because in 1940 Germany didn't have the Balcans, Italy, Norway nor Eastern Europe to get resources from. Even when she had them she couldn't fight that attrition war. And a frontal confrontation with France and Great Britain in Belgium and Holland would have brought a WWI scenario in which the only way to fight the enemy was in a frontal way and where there was no way to outflank and destroy the enemy. With units of approximately the same strenght and size it would have been incredibly difficult to get through the Allkied lines. Von Bock only advanced when the Allies pulled back, not because he overran them.

Now, France was not running her economy in a full war scale (neither was Germany) and France could not provide enough aircraft (above all) to face the mighty German Luftwaffe. When France entered the war she was all but ready, but all her armed forces deteriorated during la drôle guerre. Gamelin thought that if they didn't attack, the Germans wouldn't have attacked. (What France needed here was an agressive Foch or Joeffre-like leader).

You can say the same about German production in 1940. It was not until late 1942 when these lessons were learned.

Same here. The Panzer divisions 'should' have been equipped with Panzers III and IV for the Western offensive. And we know the reality was diferent. They were equipped with light and obsolete light tanks which were originally designed for training. The French and British tanks could easily outmatch the German ones.

I completely agree with you, Vermillion that the Allies' Achilles ankle were tactics.

They were indeed, but TOO late and TOO bad performed counterattacks. Tactics again. And they were supossed to be performed along the British ones. They weren't. Again, incompetence and fake pride by the French commanders.

Yes, you are right. Neither British nor French had flexible command structures and complete battle groups as the Germans had. But this happened because the victoriuos Allies didn't learn from WWI (perfectly explained by Horne in his book's first chapters).

According to generals Halder and Von Bock Army Group B was not making much progress. The French, British and the Belgians were fighting quite well. Why did they pull back? Because their rear was collapsing, nor because their vanguard was being beaten.

Not really. The Allies withdrew from the North AFTER the Meuse crossing. But suposse the Allies were being kicked by Von Bock (mostly because overextended supply lines, not because of German military supperiority), they could have withdrawn from the north of Belgium but they could easily have formed a new defensive line in their old WWI positions, were the 'Hindenburg Line' was. And of course, it was not a disordered and caothic retreat. Then I do not see why they could have been beaten by Von Bock's divisions (which were still managing with the Dutch and Belgians).

There's NO way you can compare the battles in the Ukraine in 1941 with those of France in 1940. The troops and commanders there were far more experienced, units were larger, were facing a disorganised enemy (with no experienced officers and ill-supplied) and most important of all, the German High Command were extremely confident with their tactics and strategy. The latter one was absolutely ABSENT in 1940. This is the point that Mr Horne states over and over again in his book: the disthrust the General Staff had on the plan and the new tactics.

Yes, it would have been disastrous. Dunkirk was a disaster for Germany. 350.000 men were not annihilated and came back to fight another day. And why? Just because ill-leaded and ill-performed counterattacks in Arras and Sedan made Hitler and the General Staff shiver of fear. Well-performed counterattacks would have: 1) stopped and damaged severely the armoured units; 2) prevented infantry reinforcements - far behind at the time - and supplies to reach the front, 3) the most important of all, would have brought the whole 'Sichelschnitt' strategy down. All the German generals opposed to that would have said: "I told you! An overextended left flank! Too risky!" And they weren't few generals. Hitler would have had a nervous attack and then the whole leadership (the senior one) would have had a crisis in the worst moment as the French High Command had. It wouldn't have mattered then that commanders like Rommel, Veiel, Kirchner or Guderian would have tactically held the attack because of their flexible junior and tactical command because the senior high command would have changed the strategy in a crucial moment. Look at the German High Command in WWI and the French High Command in WWII, which because hesitations changed the strategy or didn't react and wasted all the tactical successes of their capable subordinates. There's where the whole point of German weakness is. That minor detail which is the scepticism of the High Command in their own plans and men that would have led to DISASTER like the Marne in 1914. It can't be in any way overrated since it is a STRATEGICAL matter and automatically, makes worthless all the tactical ones.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Without major doctrinal and tactical changes in 1940 the French were done. It really doesn't matter what the German plan was. The French were hit.
First, as I have previously alluded to, none of the French Mechanized formations were really useful in the sense the Panzer Division was. The DLM was trained for and had a doctrine for use as a tactical battlefield reconnissance force. It was not trained or intended for use as a enmass armored formation using combined arms tactics. The DLC, likewise, but with the added problem of really being a large regiment sized unit. The DCR was nothing but a collection of tank battalions brought together as a sort of GHQ reserve of armor for distribution to infantry divisions as needed. It was not intended to operate as a seperate formation. Hence the designation as a "Reserve Armored Division."
Other problems the French had were a lack of coordination between arms. The artillery placed their observers not with the units supported but in the "best" location for observing the fall of shot in the intended battle area. This made artillery support slow, unresponsive and, ineffective to the needs of the infantry in many cases. Then there was a general lack of radio and telephone communications. Most units still relied heavily on messengers on horse or motorcycle to deliver information and orders. The typical cycle time for order issue for even battalion sized units could be measured in hours. For a regiment or division the time often was measured in days. In any situation other than a purely static front the French units were in absolutely no state to respond efficently or effectively to German initiatives.
Their air force was no better. Planning was almost wholly seperate from the army below army group level. With the exception of tactical cooperation aircraft (which suffered heavily from fighter attacks and flak) the French Air Force did virtually nothing to support the army in the field tactically, operationally or, strategically. Even reconnissance missions were often made against the wrong targets because of lack of intra-service communications leaving the army with little or no idea what the Germans were doing behind the immediate front lines.
Horne is a bit dated and, really does not discuss any of this in any detail. I would suggest the more recent and far better Strange Victory by Ernest May or even Len Deighton's Blitzkrieg as more informative.

I mostly agree with your post; herb about tactical deficiencies of the French.

But Alistair horne's book is quite detailed about French aircraft production and its performance during the battle. The book provides a very wide view of the Luftwaffe, RAF and L'Armée de l'Air perfomances.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun