Hello there!

Maverik and myself are embarking on an ambitious plan to re-fight the battle of Arnhem in 20mm. One difference I may add is the ability to have two airlifts on day one.

What do people think would have been the result? Assume that the two lifts landed the troops without major incident and the majority of 1st Airborne is on the ground on Day One allowing the division to act as a complete force.

Would the end result have differed? Would more troops have been able to push to the bridge? Could they have 'held-on' till XXX Corps arrived and what would have been the further reaching outcomes of the operation?

I am sure this has been covered before but I thought it was worth resurrecting given the anniversary!

Oh, and the fact that I am starting draft two of my masters on Airborne Effectiveness...

__________________
"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

A second lift makes less difference than having the Rebecca units on the drop zones up and operating properly. In the 82nd's and 101st's zones their pathfinders got these up and running virtually immediately. Over 90% of their troops dropped within a few hundred yards of their zone as a result. The same went with follow up supply drops.
In Arnheim 3 of the zones suffered failures of their Rebeccas and 2 more were lost when overrun within the first 2 days. This meant that many follow up drops were scattered or fell on zones not properly marked. It makes a big difference in orgainzational effectiveness.

I dont see how having a drop over several days with functioning equipment is better than dropping the entire division in one day?

If the whole division arrived on day one it could have organised itself and then advanced on mass into Arnhem. Surely this would have been better than a dispersed drop that goes against all the rules of airborne operations?

__________________
"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

What about the ill-functional radios and scattered supply drops?

__________________

It wasn't so much a question of dropping over several days as it was the initial drops were more scattered than necessary had the equipment worked right. This delayed the British in forming up and moving on their objectives. Had they not been delayed and landed on their drop zones in tight groups like the two US units did they likely would have taken both ends of the Arnheim bridge and been far better prepared to defend against the German counter attacks that occured.
This would also have negated some of the German counter moves and allowed XXX Corps to advance more rapidly to their objectives.

That's what I was discussing about Rebecca / Eureka. These are the code names for the transmitter and aircraft mounted receiver used by Allied airborne forces throughout the European campaign. They were a major factor in many Allied successes in dropping airborne troops and supplies accurately and account for many of the failures when they didn't perform as advertised.
In their first US use for example (which also rates as the longest flight distance for a airborne drop in Europe at just over 1500 miles) the 509th Parachute Battalion dropped in North Africa during Torch flying from Britain...across Spain at night...to Algeria. Unfortunately, between aircraft navigation errors, missed radio transmissions and, the failure of the agents on the ground to successfully emplace the Rebeccas the drop was disorganized and largely a failure.
The DC 3's were to land on a dry lake after dropping to await the US landing forces to relieve them...that's how they could fly the distance involved.

So, on a slightly related note Red, are you blowing off the WW II campaign for this or are we going to have another go at it?

RB, I assume that you're theorizing two lifts but using the original DZ/LZs ?

Reason for asking is that after walking the ground yet again it really hardened my view that coup-de-main forces should have parachuted onto the polderland south of both Arnhem bridges.

__________________
"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

RB,

It’s a fascinating scenario and the only realistic possibility of success IMHO.

Going out on a limb here, so please be gentle . I’m sure there are a whole feast of factors I’m not taking into account in the following scenario.

I don’t have my books in front of me, but all things being equal, same distant dropping/landing zones accepted, you’ve got an ideal situation where the entire division is advancing on Arnhem with two brigades up and one in reserve. The single most important factor for the failure must be the way that 1st Airborne were forced to assault piece meal and were therefore contained and systematically taken apart piecemeal.

Assuming that the 4th Parachute Brigade still arrives in the afternoon, the main German blocking line effort is still focused on 1st Parachute Brigade. The Recce still fails to reach the bridge i.e. still ambushed on the northern approach. 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions are still held up by Kgr Kraft, enabling Kgr Spindler to establish a stronger blocking line to it’s rear.

However, add 4th Parachute Brigade advancing on the Northern approach in the afternoon and this might have changed the whole sequence of events for the remainder of the day.

Kgr Spindler would likely have been too thinly extended and 4th Para Brigade might have outflanked it with overwhelming force, coming into Arnhem from the North. With Frost bypassing Kraft and Spindler by advancing to the Bridge on the Southern approach, the whole scratch German line is outflanked on both sides. Also 1st Airlanding Brigade either flank south or reinforce by following through in the center. Therefore, both Kraft and Spindler might have been forced to withdraw much earlier or face being completely enveloped and destroyed.

One less advantageous effect of the second drop might have been that: Graebner of 9th SS Reconnaissance Bn might have perceived the airborne threat quite differently and have actually followed his orders by establishing a defensive bridge head on the north side of Arnhem Bridge by the late afternoon of the 17th. Digging out the SS from a defensive position, I hazard to guess, would be as difficult as digging out Frost. The 9th SS by all accounts appeared to be just as hard and tenacious as their airborne foes.

Secondly, 9th SS Rec Bn and at least a larger portion of 10th SS (With the exception of 10th SS recon, most of the 10th SS crossed the Rhine by ferry to the East of the Bridge in order to reinforce Nijmegen) might have been issued quite different orders due to the second lift threat and instead have been forced to establish an extended blocking line north of the railway. The effect of the full weight of 9thSS, 10thSS and Tettau falling on the 1st Airborne, doesn’t bear thinking about.

Still, it all depends on German reaction time. My take would be that two lifts would have established at least the majority of the division at the bridge, central Arnhem and suburbs in depth by the second day; the Airborne anti-tank and infantry defensive capabilities in built up areas would have come into their own as they did in Oosterbeek; 1st Airborne hold on to Arnhem Bridge and are reinforced by the Poles from the South; by drawing forces from 10thSS they relieve pressure on the 82nd AB; 30 Corps reach 1st Airborne by day 7; the War is over by March 1945!

The 10th SS factor surely needs to be considered in your wargame re-enactment, since their orders and objectives might have changed due to the difference in perceived threats. 10th SS by the 17th possessed substantially more armour than 9th SS.

All the best,

Peter

PS: As discussed, German OOB idea is still on, just getting my act together [img]smile.gif[/img]

[ 24. September 2004, 11:07 PM: Message edited by: PeterJ ]

Great posting, Peter.

I've still got my doubts, which centre on British command. Many veterans recall 'hanging around' near Oosterbeek for hours on the first evening. More troops may have meant more confusion ; Urquhart and Lathbury would still have become detached causing the fatal command muddle.

Like you, I reckon Hackett would have pressed on and been across the Dreijenscheweg well before Spindler's forces arrived; but 4 Para's orders were to hold the high ground to the North of Arnhem. They would still have had to turn 90 degrees and fight their way through the suburbs to get to the bridge on day 2.

Many of the British advances of that first day were delayed by tiny groups of Germans ( usually with MG42s ), causing large back-ups of idle men while small numbers tried to suppress opposition.

The railway bridge would still have been blown, the single MG42 on the road bridge would still have delayed the attack there.

They should have dropped on both sides of the river....

__________________
"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

Very interesting stuuf Peter and all!


Just from memory...

I seem to remember Kershaw, in It Never Snows in September, ruling out a drop near the bridge (a Coup de Main) due to the dispositions of the Germans (9th SS). I will check later, but I believe the intended areas (those that could have been used) were 'occupied' by German troops.

T.A.Gardner,

As for the WW2 campaign, its on 'hold' at the mo, due to work and the masters! Once the masters is done I will have a bit more time, I dont want to make a half-arsed effort!

__________________
"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

Just been reading on the Michael Reynolds book Sons of the Reich on II SS panzer corps actions there.

Already mentioned here are many of the things that had a huge effect to the outcome of the battle but I think two major things were as well:

1. The air power did not help enough as the Germans later on mentioned " Our own troops´ movements were practically undisturbed in spite of the good weather."(??)

2. What if Student had not get the complete operation map early in the operation.

[ 24. September 2004, 02:55 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

__________________

The infamous 'plans capture' is not - I believe - thought to have had a major impact on the conduct of the battle.

But the lack of air support by 2 TAF cetainly did. In retrospect, the hurried planning overlooked Tactical Air Support - Broadhurst later claimed that prior to Market-Garden, he was unaware of the airborne element of the operation and was briefed only to support the advance of XXX Corps.

__________________
"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

I thought one stated reason for not having a drop or glider landing near the bridges was the fear of flak over Arnhem. When you read the papers in the National Archives, the RAF seem paranoid about the prospect of even losing one aircraft, let alone a whole squadron of them in an area covered with flak guns... which you will recall fired on troops in Arnhem on both the lower and middle roads later in the battle (2nd South Staffs record taking heavy AAA fire from south of the Lower Rhine, eg)

__________________
Paul Reed
Webmaster - Battlefields of WW2- http://www.ww2battlefields.info
D Day Ancestors: The British Army in Normandy - http://www.ddayancestors.com

There was a lot of 2cm flak in the town area of Arnhem - one Mosquito was lost to this early in the morning of the 17th.

Here's a spoiler question - how about no second lift at all ?

Of the 20 rifle companies who came in on the 17th, 11 remained behind to protect the landing grounds for subsequent drops.

The way things turned out, it may have ben better for the whole lot to have made straight for the bridge.....

__________________
"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

From the same Reynolds book...

Unfortunately don´t have the book with me now so I don´t have the names but it seems that the Irish Guards that led the 30th Corps stopped for the first night to sleep...or was ordered to rest(??). Does not sound like the best thing to do if the chaps are waiting to be released in Arnhem even if the Germans did knock out some tanks. Reynolds says and the sources he has picked tell that they could have continued their attack during the night. One given explanation by the commanders was that the tanks needed repairs and supply but Reynolds says that just after 12 kms that is a weak excuse...

Others read this? Opinions?

__________________

This was definitely not the Guards Armoured Division's finest hour. [img]graemlins/no.gif[/img]

The actual reason for stopping at Valkenswaard ( seven miles from the starting point, six miles short of Eindhoven ) that first night was that news of the blowing of the Son Bridge had reached the Chief of Staff of the Guards Armoured Div'n. Tanks needed to be serviced and the men rested and the opportunity was taken at this point.

Under normal circumstances, this was a correct decision and was loyally defended as such by Horrocks in his memoir, 'Corps Commander' .

But - these were not 'normal circumstances'. Geoffrey Powell in 'The Devil's Birthday' argues convincingly that other units could and should have spearheaded an evening/night push to/through Eindhoven. The Guards could be stereotyped and inflexible in their fighting methods.

'As it was, at the end of Sunday 17 September the battle closed down for 12 hours' ( Powell, p. 88 ).

There was - literally - a distinct lack of drive at this vital point of 'Market-Garden'.

__________________
"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

Absolutely, as it turned out. A two brigade assault would, on paper, have had a better chance of making more headway.

The only problem with the maximised assault force scenario (including may earlier post) is perhaps regardless, the assault forces would all be converging on a single point with very little scope to maneuvre. With single mgs able to hold up entire battalions, the local fire fight superiority goes out the window. There is a finite benefit/constraint as to the forces that can be brought to bear on a narrowing front.

What also needs to be answered is the benefit if any the second lift achieved at all. The 4th Parachute Brigade was virtually annihilated after barely three days (down to 15%?). At most, by breaking itself on the Spindler blocking line, North of the railway, it bought the rest of the division a couple of days to consolidate the cauldron, by preventing the kgrs from enveloping from the north (such a move might even have cut off 1st Border).

I've always wondered what the effect would have been if the 4th Para Brigade had immediately abandoned the Arnhem high ground objective and the withdrawal debacle that followed and instead, with full strength, have crossed south of the railway to reinforce the 1st and 3rd Battalion breakthrough attempts. Such was the lack of command direction due to Urquhart's critical absence.

The remainder of the second lift comprised the remaining light regiment RA battery, 2nd Anti Tank battery, 2(?) companies of South Staffs, 4th RE and remaining divisional elements. In the context of Martin's question, these remaining forces would not have been critical.

So yes, in hindsight no second lift would have freed the 1st Airlanding Brigade for the assault on the first day. Greater success? Who knows?

Peter

PS The above scenario excludes the command dithering factor

Could it be said that the lost possibility of flexible movements of troops due to missing commandment was one of the major factors that the operation went so wrong?? Reynolds seems to be making some notes on the allied side sticking to the made plans while Germans read the situation and used their forces at least more skilfully?

??

__________________