Patton was certainly one of the most gung ho members of the Allied command during the invasion of Europe. There were times when he had to take a back seat to other operations due to the logistical realities of the campaign.

What If... Patton had been given logistical priority? Would he have accomplished more than any of the other army commanders in Europe? Given the supplies what do you believe Patton's forces would have accomplished? Given the same type of free hand with support which army group commander do you believe would have done the most?

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PEOPLE SLEEP PEACEABLY IN THEIR BEDS AT NIGHT ONLY BECAUSE ROUGH MEN STAND READY TO DO VIOLENCE ON THEIR BEHALF. GEORGE ORWELL

What would Patton have accomplised?

More dead GIs...

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

There is indeed a risk of over-glorifying Patton. If he'd been given 'free rein', I think it most likely he would still have outrun his lines of supply. Quite possibly he would have left his own forces vulnerable to counter-attack.

As the Hammelberg fiasco showed, Patton's judgement could be seriously lacking at times.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

I feel that Patton was better suited to command smaller units like an army corps. He was too willing to gamble, and like Rommel naive about the troubles of logistics. 'Lightning' Collins was another Gung-ho Corps commander that did well. The problem as I see it is outrunning supplies and taking too big risks. Patton needed somebody to slow him down to avoid the scenario Martin Bull decribes.

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942

We have discussed this matter recently. See here:

http://www.ww2forums.com/cgi-bin/ubb...c;f=3;t=000230

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Everly Brothers - What I Have To Do Is Dream
"Never wrestle with pigs, you both end up getting dirty and the pig likes it."

Wow, that was quite a discussion about a post-WWII conflict between Russia and the Allies.

I am not talking about that. I am talking about the forces in the Allied armies fighting from Normandy onward. All of the Allied generals had to deal with limited logistical capability and the realities of the broad-front stategy of Eisenhower. If Ike had decided to give one of them logistical priority what difference would it have made. I chose Patton not because he was the most brilliant tactition, but because I have heard the most stories about him briddling under the restrictions imposed on him by the rationing of the supplies.

Is there someone else who would have done better in your opinions? I don't want to move the whole strategy of the war away from the broad-front to a narrow-front. I just want to imagine what difference any one corp commander whould have made with more priority. Faster closure of the Falaise Gap maybe? Quicker break out from Normandy? Faster liberation of Caen? Success in Operation Market-Garden? Let's hear it.

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PEOPLE SLEEP PEACEABLY IN THEIR BEDS AT NIGHT ONLY BECAUSE ROUGH MEN STAND READY TO DO VIOLENCE ON THEIR BEHALF. GEORGE ORWELL

I hate 'what ifs' because so many factors are involved - things are never - ever - as simple as they appear.

But I'll throw in a little 'Market Garden' thought. Patton's forces were in the wrong place for this operation anyway. But if - if - Patton's 3rd Army had driven up 'Hell's Highway', they'd have faced the same obstacles, taken heavy losses...but I'm convinced that they'd have reached the Arnhem bridge. Horrocks, fine General though he undoubtedly was, didn't drive hard enough - Patton would have done, regardless of the consequences.

However, I don't believe that even Patton could have adhered to the timetable, and Market Garden would still not have ultimately succeeded. Would have been a good fight, though....

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

Following the disasterous conclusion of Operation "Marketgarden" Lt. Col. John Frost spent several months in a German POW cage before being liberated by Patton's 3rd Army.

He was temporarily attached to Patton's Army and spent several weeks observing how the American 3rd Army fought against the Germans with a tenacity of un-orthodox methods and "Can-Do" warrior spirit that was lacking in Montgomery's 21st Army Group. It was quite an eye opening expeience for him.

His conclusion. Had Patton been given overall command of Operation "MarketGarden," it would have undoubtedly succeeded.

You're absolutely right, John - Frost confirmed it in later editions of his book, 'A Drop Too Many'.

But I think Frost had an ( understandable ) axe to grind - I'm sure that Patton could have relieved the Airborne Division, but I remain unconvinced that the overall objectives of 'Market Garden' could have been attained. The plan was too flawed, and too many obstacles had not been foreseen.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

I have a Picture of Patton with his finger up his nose to the second knuckle. A family treasure.
Other than that I agree with Red Baron.

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"Danger Will Robinson!"

Found in www.strategypage.com ... the archetypal son of a gun

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Gen. George S. Patton Helps "Repair" a Tank

One afternoon in early 1945, as his glorious Third Army was driving across the Rhineland under rainy skies, Gen. George S. Patton spotted a number of troops gathered around a tank parked a rod or so off the road. Driving up in his jeep, Patton jumped out, and asked what was up. He was told that the men were trying to repair the tank, which was suffering from some malfunction. At that, the general – natty uniform and all – promptly crawled beneath the vehicle to join the two surprised mechanics who were actually working on the problem. After nearly a half hour under the tank, Patton crawled out, his normally splendid uniform torn and covered with mud and grease. Climbing back into his jeep, Patton ordered his driver to press on.

As they drove off, the general’s driver asked “What was wrong, General?”

To this, Patton replied, “I don’t know, but I’m sure that the word will spread throughout the division that I was on my belly in the mud repairing a tank.”

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Everly Brothers - What I Have To Do Is Dream
"Never wrestle with pigs, you both end up getting dirty and the pig likes it."

Re Patton, it’s always appeared to me his talents lay in what he was, a cavalry officer, and fighting in that way. He had poor grasp of a number of scenarios, such as assaulting a fortification (e.g. Metz), and was very detrimental to the cause of presenting a unified Allied command. Accepted some Allied commanders were (and are) the best of enemies and many carry personal empire agendas, however, the official and professional opinion is surely one of ”my fellow officer is very good, but I am better”, and not ”my fellow officer is a useless, ignorant pratt” – or words to that effect. It also remains a point that if Patton was an ‘achieve anything’ commander, why didn't he resolve Hurtgenwald?

Regarding the historians what-if ‘gravy train’ of Market-Garden, like that of Dieppe, one thing that stands out for me is a reason Monty stated in his memoir, being the men were dropped too far from the bridge.

I don’t as much see this as an ‘obvious’ fault, rather as an either/or option with enormous risk. There were the examples of the successful German drop on the Maginot Line and the British drop on Pegasus. Given that neither were of the magnitude of Arnhem, a major factor was that the drops were both made directly on the target. Then consider the targets of the airfield on Crete and the Merville Batteries at Normandy. In both cases there were not direct drops on the targets and the troops had to form-up on the ground then execute their assaults. In both cases, things that could go wrong did go wrong, and Crete was narrowly achieved at huge cost while Merville only in part, equally with great loss.

Per the book, to capture a bridge requires taking and holding both ends. I would not advocate dropping everyone directly on the Arnhem bridge, but I think it was a consideration to make some direct drop there. That said, I would also expect 70%-80% casualties as a likely minimum, because, other than the known defences and defenders, you are going to lose men landing in built-up areas and not least landing in the river. Who’s going to ask that of their forces?

No.9

Maj.Gen 'Windy' Gale commented once that an assault force landing with gliders should have been employed closer to the bridge.

We will never know...

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942

The tragic thing turned out to be that they ended up with 80-90% casualties and they never controlled both ends of the bridge. It is one thing to watch 9 out of 10 of your mates killed or wounded in a successful mission. It is another to retreat away leaving your dead and most of your wounded in the hands of the enemy and still have the same casualty rate.

On the recommendation of forum members here I have read both The Battle of the Falaise Gap and The Devil's Birthday. The former about the fighting in France after the breakout from the beaches and the latter about Operation Market-Garden. They were both illuminating. The conclusions about the drops on Arnhem make me agree with the author that both sides of every objective should have been landed or dropped upon and that the element of suprise was lost by dropping/landing so far away. This was especially true based upon the comments from the defenders.

The drive by the ground forces to reach Arnhem would have benefitted from a harder charging force. The British forces were excellent troops but did not have that as an in-grained part of their unit history. The Third Army knew what was expected and that was movement along the axis of advance!

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PEOPLE SLEEP PEACEABLY IN THEIR BEDS AT NIGHT ONLY BECAUSE ROUGH MEN STAND READY TO DO VIOLENCE ON THEIR BEHALF. GEORGE ORWELL