D-Day 1943 - Page 2

Hands · #26 (**permalink**) April 21st, 2006, 08:56 AM

Quote:

Originally posted by Jaeger:
Hands

Nicking Norway would not take the iron away from Hitler completely. The iron was from Sweden, they shipped it through Norway when Bottenviken was frozen up during the winter.

Hitlers theory of Norway as a destiny area came from the raids by commandoes and sabotage made by the Linge groups early in the war.

Hitler ended up garrisoning Norway with some 380000 men at the most. Surely a waste but U-boat bases and Luftwaffe bases made the convois to Russia more costly.

If Norway was invaded, the allies could simply just forced Sweden to stop selling iron ore to Hitler.

Za Rodinu · #27 (**permalink**) April 21st, 2006, 10:51 AM

All right, Hands, sorry for my misunderstanding, but in amy case you gave me the chance to add another post on war economy [img]smile.gif[/img]

Kai-Petri · #28 (**permalink**) April 22nd, 2006, 11:54 AM

US CHUTE'S DEADLY DELAY

The 957 men of the US 82nd Airborne Division suffered a 16% casualty rate on landing among the Normandy hedgerows. Twenty five men were killed, fourteen missing and 118 wounded. Everything depended on a quick dispersal after landing and to get to the nearest cover. The delay caused by the difficulty of getting out of their chute harness proved fatal to many.

In later drops, the buckles were dispensed with and the British quick-release mechanism was adopted.

http://members.iinet.net.au/~gduncan/1944.html

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Operation Husky and gliders/paratroopers

The British 1st Airlanding Brigade mounted in 137 gliders, were the first to land. They were to seize the Ponte Grande Bridge south of Syracuse. These landings were, on the whole, unsuccessful. Of the 137 gliders, 69 came down in the sea, drowning some 200 men. A further 56 landed in the wrong area of Sicily and just 12 reached the target area and managed to take the bridge. The US paratroopers had difficulties too, the pilots were inexperienced and dust and anti-aircraft fire resulted in the 2,781 paratroopers being scattered over an area 80km radius.

http://www.war-experience.org/histor...943/index.html

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Even with some practice quite unexpected problems which could lead to fatal losses! Thinking about Overlord 1943.

Ali Morshead · #29 (**permalink**) April 27th, 2006, 11:34 AM

Kai,

the losses on the Sicily landings were jointly caused by poor weather and by the RN & USN taking the undertrained C-47 pilots under fire.

This also caused the scattering of those who made landfall.

In April 1943, the Wermacht in the West included 7 Pz & 43 Infantry Divs (Some were in transit to the East)

On 15 April, the Panzers were equipped with
46 Pz II, 61 Pz IIIf, 14 Pz IIIm, 111 Pz IIIj, 18 Pz IIIn, 31 Pz Ivf, 152 Pz Ivh, 298 Captured, 17 Command Tanks for a total of 748 AFV.

By June 20 1943, this had increased to
107 Pz II & Pz IIIf, 351 Pz IIIIm,j,n & Pz Ivf & h, 400 Captured, 17 Command Total 868

From Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wermacht vol 3 pp265-335
Das Heer (Mueller-Hildebrandt) vol 3 pp 125-125

The British Army in June 43 had the following
BRITISH TANK STRENGTH June 1943
United Kingdom
28 Arm Bde / 9 Arm Div 394 Cromwell/Centaur
29 Arm Bde/11 Arm Div 304 Sherman/Centaur
30 Arm Bde/42 Arm Div 303 Cromwell/Centaur
5 Gds Arm Bde/ Gds Arm Div 435 Sherman/Centaur
27 Arm Bde/79 Arm Div 247 Spec Duty, Churchill,Grant, ValentineDD
10 Polis Bde/Polish Arm Div 402 Crusader
4 Can Arm Div 248 Ram/Sherman
5 Cdn Arm Bde/5 Can Arm Div 279 Ram/Sherman
137 Arm Bde 114 ?
31 Tk Bde/53 Inf Div 246 Churchill
33 Tk Bde/3 Inf Div 98 Churchill
34 Tk Bde/43 Inf Div 205 Churchill
35 Tk Bde 280 Matilda II/ Churchill
36 Tk Bde 61 ?
10 Tk Bde 141 ?
11 Tk Bde/77 Inf Div 113 Churchill
1 Cdn Tk Bde 253 Sherman
6 Gds Tk Bde/15 Inf Div 252 Churchill
3 Cdn Tk Bde? 129 Ram/Sherman
Total 4,556
From Tank return United Kingdom June 3 1943 PREM 3/425 & WO 199/587

As an Armoured Bde had a TOE of around 160 AFV, these include training machines , local reserves and obsolete types kept on strenghth.

In addition there were 1925 fit for duty, 1553 in repair & 758 in transit to North Africa.

I have no info on US AFV holdings at the time.

The British Army in the UK at this time included 5 Arm Divs plus 79 Arm Div & 8 Armoured/Tank Bdes.
There 14 British Inf Divs (some reserve) 2 Airborne Divs (6 Div was nearly ready), 2 Cdo (SS)Bdes, Canada had 4 Inf & 1 Armd Divs plus a Tank Bde and Poland an Armd Div.

These numbers leave the Units based in the Meditteranean out though if the landing craft were committed to the French assault I assume many could have been shifted to NW Europe. Surely the NZ & Polish Divs plus 2 British Armd & about 6 Br Infantry . This would have left the Indians & Sth Africans to garrison NW Africa.

The USA had 8 Infantry, 2 (Hvy)Armd & 2 Airborne Divs in Europe by April 43.

Would the 30ish Divisions in place plus about a Div per month from the USA been enough??

Ali Morshead · #30 (**permalink**) April 27th, 2006, 11:36 AM

I also doubt Normandy as the target, Aircover was not strong enough at the time.

More likely on the Coast between Boulogne and the Somme.

Machine Gun Nest 1985. · #31 (**permalink**) April 27th, 2006, 12:38 PM

If dday did happen in 43 its likely that it would of cost alot of deaths on bothsides possible in the milions.

Richard · #32 (**permalink**) April 28th, 2006, 12:35 PM

I have been looking into this what if situation and there is something interesting here. A spot of digging showed up some information.

Quote:

The Grand Strategic Vision
"We came, we listened and we were conquered."
General A C Wedemeyer, US Army (12)
The JCS considered that they 'lost' at Casablanca, that they were talked into a strategy to which they had no intention of subscribing at the start of the conference, despite the fact that the British circulated an agenda weeks before the conference.(13) Murphy talked of the Americans as a 'reluctant tail to the British kite,' while Marshall was well aware that the British had outplanned and outmanoeuvred their American counterparts.(14) As we shall see, the British did indeed gain agreement for their strategic agenda, against the better judgement of the Americans, and with the able assistance of Churchill. Roosevelt offered no comparable support to the JCS.
It is possible to consider some elements of Grand Strategy for 1943 discretely; for example the Combined Bomber Offensive and the Battle of the Atlantic. But when it comes to operations on land, or amphibious operations requiring landing craft, naval and air support and logistics, it is not so easy to consider each theatre of operations in isolation, largely because operations in one were likely to be at the expense of the others. At the beginning of 1943, Anglo-US forces were disposed in two theatres against the Germans, and in one against the Japanese. A number of divisions, both British (in which we include Commonwealth and Dominion troops) and American, were held in the UK, partly for home defence and partly as part of BOLERO, which was envisaged as eventually leading to the invasion of North-West Europe. American and British troops were also engaged in ongoing operations in North Africa, where they were following up the successful TORCH landings with the conquest of Tunisia. The troops in the Pacific were largely American, although there was a significant British presence in India and South East Asia, hence the feasibility of undertaking operations in support of the Chinese in 1943. When the CCS met at the start of the Casablanca conference, they were faced with a number of dilemmas and decisions on the broad outline of Grand Strategy, before they decided on the actual operations to be undertaken. These were as follows:
• What splitting of resources and effort to effect between the European / North African theatre and the Pacific / Far Eastern Theatre;
• Whether or not to undertake an invasion of north-west Europe in 1943;
• What operations to undertake in the Mediterranean in 1943, if any;
• Whether or not to open a full-scale Second Front in 1943, and if so, where.
The details of the strategic arguments, which raged among the CCS (not necessarily along national lines) and their planners, are too intricate to go into here. A number of writers have summarised them, and particular attention should be drawn to Michael Howard's Grand Strategy, where chapters XIII and XIV deal with future strategy and future operations respectively. The 'broker', Field Marshall Dill, was vital to the resolution of a number of thorny issues, and the CCS met numerous times to thrash out a way of taking the fight to the Axis.(15) Our concern, though, is with the war leaders - what did they think of the issues, and to what extent did this opinion shape the position of their country at the negotiating table? More importantly, how did their opinions affect the way they treated each other?
Churchill, as had been apparent since the Great War, considered himself to be a keen strategic thinker - he is famous during that conflict for having masterminded the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign while First Lord of the Admiralty. A preoccupation with peripheral strategies and attacking the 'soft underbelly' of the Axis marked out his thinking during the WW2 as well, and he and the COS were very much in tune in wanting to avoid major cross-Channel operations in 1943. However, Churchill was prepared to countenance some form of SLEDGEHAMMER in 1943, that is a limited operation against France, with the objective of provoking air and naval battles with the Germans, as well as of forcing the Wehrmacht to divert more troops from the Russian front. The minutes record that:
Mr. Churchill then discussed operation SLEDGEHAMMER. He thought … that plans should be made to undertake it, including the appointment of a Commander and the fixing of a target date. He had not been in favour of such an operation in 1942 but felt that it was our duty to engage the enemy on as wide a front as possible. (16)
He did not favour ROUNDUP, that is a major return to the Continent in force, for 1943. One senses with Churchill's advocacy of SLEDGEHAMMER, though, that the politician in him was talking, rather than the strategist - he did not wish to contradict the desire of the Americans to make some impact on the continent. Churchill was a persistent advocate of caution in planning cross-Channel operations, remembering clearly the disastrous 1942 Dieppe raid. Given his preoccupation with the Mediterranean, this policy points to an awareness of the danger of being out of step with American opinion too badly, especially with the opinion of Marshall, a persistent advocate of SLEDGEHAMMER and critic of Mediterranean operations. Churchill probably knew that by supporting the invasion of Sicily he made ROUNDUP impossible and SLEDGEHAMMER unlikely, without alienating Marshall or the JCS.
Churchill was all in favour of the operation in Burma proposed by the Americans (ANAKIM), especially as it enhanced the safety of his beloved India, and as it reassured the Americans that he was serious about the British commitment to war in the Pacific. Churchill made it plain that 'not only are British interests involved, her honour is engaged' in the Pacific, demonstrating the political and diplomatic value he invested in military policy. (17)
It almost goes without saying that Churchill was enthusiastic for operations in the Mediterranean: he wanted to see the invasion of Sicily as soon as possible (preferably by May 1943), wanted to retake the Dardanelles from the Germans, and bring Turkey into the conflict as soon as possible. Always his own man strategically, Churchill was, as we shall see, fundamentally different in his approach to matters of strategy to FDR.

It seems the British were doing a spot of ear bending, by getting the attention of the Americans. Or so did the disaster at Dieppe 1942, influence the American thinking.

Quote:

Operation Sledgehammer
During World War II, Operation Sledgehammer was an Allied contingency plan for a limited-objective cross-channel invasion of Europe in response to a German or Soviet collapse in 1942. It was to be used to reduce pressure on the Russians.
The main objective of the operation was to capture Cherbourg or Brest in northern France in order to establish a defensible foothold in mainland Europe, which would provide a staging area for a larger invasion force.
The United States argued for the operation, but the United Kingdom was against it. The Allies eventually agreed that they did not have enough landing craft at the time and abandoned the plan in favor of Operation Gymnast (later renamed Operation Torch), the invasion of Northern Africa. The costly raid on Dieppe later demonstrated the difficulty of capturing a major port in the face of determined enemy opposition, and the D-Day invasion of Normandy avoided ports altogether.

Operation Roundup
Military history records two operations called 'Operation Roundup:
1. The first was a 1942 plan for an invasion of northern France in the spring of 1943.
This plan, drawn up by then-Brigadier General Eisenhower reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe. Given the shortage of landing craft and other resources, this plan was unrealistic. Briefings concerning this plan brought Eisenhower’s organizational and diplomatic skills to the attention of senior civil and military leaders in the United States and Europe, launching his meteoric rise to Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Although it was never executed, parts of it were incorporated into Operation Overlord. Operation Roundup included Operation Sledgehammer and the later variant Operation Roundhammer.

Or so was the Allied casualty figures higher in Italy than Normandy?

Ali Morshead · #33 (**permalink**) April 28th, 2006, 02:08 PM

Richard,
I have "Wedemeyer Reports"

The Brits were lucky to get Ike, Bradley & Patton because Wedemeyer seemed like one SOB.

His way was THE way.

Strangely, I have yet to see any US plans for a 1943 invasion yet they complain the British didnt want to land.

As noted above, the vast majority of the landing force would have been British. IFF it is assumed that the losses suffered in Italy didnt occur, the Brits might have kept those Divisions in the field.

The german defenses wouldnt have been all that formidable, while many of the heavy positions were in place, Rommel found massive gaps where nothing had been done and his impetus got a lot done in the last months before DDay.

Another question is whether "FORTITUDE" would have been effective.

IMHO, the whole scenario has to go back to before "TORCH" to plot strategic moves and decisions.

Richard · #34 (**permalink**) May 4th, 2006, 03:04 PM

I found a book on Amazon on this very what if subject.

Quote:

1943 THE VICTORY THAT NEVER WAS' by John Grigg

I found a book review on Amazon from a person who had read this book; here are some of his comments.

This part the book the reviewer gives an outline of the book.

Quote:

The basic premise is that Churchill, too keen for a second front pulling America into the war after Pearl and in order to ease the pressure on the red army argued for landings along the north of the Med. at the cost of putting off D-Day until 1944. Roosevelt meantime wasn't wilful enough to stop his force commanders concentrating on the Japanese menace and the Pacific war leaving a European liberation unachievable until 1944 due to lack of resources.

And here's a snippet of what he thought about the book.

Quote:

Broadly I agree with the idea that an invasion of mainland Europe in 1943 would have been successful and brought about the end of the war earlier and saved lives in nearly every nation in the war - with the notable exception of the armies of GB and her Empire, the US and Canada who would surely have suffered more at the hands of a less defeatist and better equipped Nazi forces. I also absolutely agree that it was vital to defeat Germany earlier as we were lucky / My issue with this book is not that the information presented is in anyway floored, nor, necessarily the conclusions arrived at are wrong - it is rather that when you collect quotes to argue you point it is rather like choosing which chess pieces your opponent can start the game with and here is where I feel that Grigg's comments whereby some allied commander or other let the Germans get away with something he has failed to either consider or let the reader consider what the Nazi forces were attempting to win too.

I decided not to buy this book.

Kai-Petri · #35 (**permalink**) May 14th, 2006, 04:08 PM

If they wanted to make an ivasion on the European continent in 1943 why not the Vichy France part? Of course the Vichy government could have made the men fight back but definitely they would have been less dangerous than Germans for the operation. And getting German troops to south France would have taken awhile.

And maybe then Spain could have been "forced" to help in supplying the troops.

Hands · #36 (**permalink**) May 21st, 2006, 06:45 AM

Perhaps lack of proper facilities for a invasion force in North Africa? And the longer distance for the invasion force to move towards Germany ? And the distance the invasion force has to travel exposed in the mediterranean sea to reach the coast in France. Lack of air cover another hinderance?

Actually I think it would be a good idea. The seas in the mediterranean sea is much calmer than in the english channel. And the coast will certainly be less defended than the "atlantic wall".

Kai-Petri · #37 (**permalink**) May 21st, 2006, 11:19 AM

Definitely the Allied wanted to make operations that minimized the possibility of failure. However if they wanted in 1943 to open a new front that Germans considered a real threat on the continent turning the Torch forces here would have opened that possibility. Of course problems with supply would have been bigger but you cannot make an omelette...etc etc.

Ali Morshead · #38 (**permalink**) May 21st, 2006, 11:32 AM

Kai,

They opened a new front, in Italy.

What date do you suggest for an Invasion.

Sicily was attacked 10 July, Italy on 3 Sept. Until Italy surrendered Sarinia & Corsica were occupied by Axis troops so you dont have a firm base to work from until these Islands are occupied and built up.

Also, the French south coast is pretty rugged, and the German & Italian forces which moved in after the TORCH landings would have not been under the air assault that the Normandy landings had plus one year less drain on their numbers.

To be possible, TORCH would have had to work better than in real life. If Tunis fell around January 43 and the Allies gone Sardinia-Corsica rather than Sicily-Italy, they might have been in better position to land .

IMHO, Sardinia-Corsica was the better attack line and a landing in the south more of a threat/follow-up to a landing somewhere in Northern France.

Kai-Petri · #39 (**permalink**) May 21st, 2006, 12:08 PM

Yes, Ali thanx for the comments!

Actually I was thinking of a possible change of object for the Torch landings in Nov 1942. (Later in 1943 also might be considered.) I know this involves alot of risks but definitely would bring the war several times closer to Germany than starting from Southern Italy. At the time there were no Germans around so the landing would be easier to create if the Vichy troops could be handled beforehand. Also this might cause Italy to get out of war earlier and would threaten the supply shippings to DAK. The Germans would not give up easily ( just how they reacted with Anzio ) so would require alot of troops landed in short time as well as the Air force support. It might be wise to get Sardinia-Corsica axis safe first but I´d think of getting Spain letting the some forces through and maybe air fields as well there(?!) Don´t know if Spain would be ready to that because Germany was not that weak yet.

Ali Morshead · #40 (**permalink**) May 22nd, 2006, 10:54 AM

IMHO opinion, TORCH had to happen first.

The supply line to Malta wasnt secure and the 8th Army was back at Alamein. The risks were tooo high for the Allies to attempt.

But if TORCH worked better, 2-3 mths rather than 6 mths, the Allies could have been better placed at the start of the 1943 campaign season to try Sardinia/Corsica/Sthn France.

Sardinia/Corsica in Axis hands would have been a continual threat to shipping lanes into Southern France.

I dont believe Franco would have joined the Allies, at best after they had secured the Pyrennes frontier. But Marseille, Toulon et al were still better Ports than most Spanish Ports.

It would be interesting to coincide an Allied Landing with Zitadelle!

Kai-Petri · #41 (**permalink**) May 22nd, 2006, 12:35 PM

Yes, the operation would be full of risks, no doubt about that. However once the TORCH took place the Germans occupied the Vichy France so Southern France turned alot more dangerous for a possible invasion.

Greek · #42 (**permalink**) June 9th, 2006, 12:30 AM

They might have been less casualties in 1943 if the allies did invade france but also the allies would still just be getting started in italy and it would have tooken longer to invade from the south probably.

Machine Gun Nest 1985. · #43 (**permalink**) June 9th, 2006, 01:06 PM

I think DDay was mainly designed to A: cut the loses.B:shorten the war by months and C:to take control over france and west Germany before the Soviets did.

Its true DDay played a major part in ww2,but even if it didnt happen the Germans wouldnt stand much of a chance against the Soviets in 44.The Germans could move everything from the west to the east to try and hold back the Soviets it would still fail if they couldnt attack.They could of used the extra numbers from the west to form a defence line around Warshaw to try and give some time for the Germans to reorganize.The only way they could win would be to attack the Soviets and inflict large loses to them forcing them to declare peace.