From what I’ve read, the generals did not want the battle of kursk. They wanted to retreat, counterattack when the Russian line is well stretched then encircle the Russians, and therefore do the maximum damage and take the minimum casualty. But of course, Hitler turned it down because it involves giving up ground.

hitler was a good leader minus that.....he was afraid to take to many risks...

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"Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning." -Winston Churchill

I wouldn't say he was a good general, maybe a good politician

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Facta non verba. "Deeds, not words"

I can't see any What-If question or hypothesis here. For a fuller discussion of the battle of Kursk please see a long thread in Russia at War / Kursk (by popular demand). If you have anything to add to the discussion please feel free to go there.

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Even some months before battle of Kursk started the Germans were in deep trouble.They were already heavily outnumbered as the full weight of the SU slammed against them.The Germans had at best a very slim chance of winning the battle of Kursk even if they did what next.After a victory at Kursk for the Germans they would be too weak to even drive towards Moscow I think they would be cut to bits by the Russians 150miles west of Moscow.

Or this thread, including a partial OOB that shows just how massive the Soviet numbers there were:

Kursk OOB

Hitler simply believed that even if he could not win the battle the losses on both sides would be of that calibre that it would take until spring 1944 before the Red Army could launch another attack. How wrong he was!

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Very true Kai,that must have upset old AH.

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Regards, Richard

Well, you're wrong. The main advocate for the Kursk attack was the head of the Army High Command (OKH), colonel general Kurt Zeitzler. I have no doubts that there were many other senior staff at the OKH and OKW, even field commanders (such as Manstein, who insisted in keeping up with the attack, even after the northern thrust had lost all steam and force), who were quite optimistic about the attack at Kursk. Only, of course, those generals don't mention that in their memoirs...

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Didn’t Manstein wanted to snip out the salient corners months before the July attack? This looked possible but was over ruled by the high command.

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Regards, Richard

OKH (Zeitzler) was already issuing an operations order in mid-March 1943 defining operation Zitadelle.

In 15 April OKH issues another order signed by AH as well notifying the participants to be ready after 28 April on 6 days notice, earliest possible date being 3 May and further defining AG Centre and South lines of operation.

Manstein at the time was commander AGSouth, so he hadn't much to say on a planning level above his head, he might be consulted, but that was it.

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