The south coast of Iceland is nearly all sandbars, making Reykjavik the only attack point, & Reykjavik harbor is designed to only allow one ship at a time to get through. Germans could drop a block ship in when they approached which would mean lifeboats as the only viable attack method for troops. Which would be cutdown by machine guns. Royal navy was pretty shy about going near any coastline dominated by Luftwaffe, ( Norway, France, Denmark, Holland etc ). Iceland would be no different. Extra paved strips could be built along south & east shores.

The Royal 'Uber" navy concept needs to be put to bed. They would 'not' put several cruisers & a carrier on permanent station 800-1000 miles north of home islands between Norway & Iceland to intercept German shipping for a few reasons, # 1, they have to be refueled for one, meaning they have to go home at some point. # 2, They wouldn't place them between Trondheim & Iceland to be subjected to incessant German bombing. # 3, & these ships were needed elsewhere anyways, BOB anyone??

besides, as I ponted out, many German ships slipped right through the Royal Uber navy into atlantic in the real war. & Narvik would be another debarkation point. British ships can't cover that much ocean, just isn't feasible or real.

Uber Royal navy is myth.

Well, at the risk of repetition,

First, the RN would not be landing from "lifeboats." There were, among other things 6 flotillas of LCA (Landing Craft Assault a 41' 6" boat carrying 36 troops) available in 1940. These were used, among other places, at Dunkirk.
As for landing points, given the length of coastline on Iceland there are certainly more than a few points that are suitable for such an operation. I doubt that a mostly volcanic island standing alone is so inaccessable as suggested.
I also doubt that the Luftwaffe could have maintained any significant presence on Iceland for several reasons:
First, fuel. DFM or bunker fuel for ships will not work for aircraft (the aforementioned trawler fuel), not to mention that trawlers of the period take a mere fraction of the tonnage of fuel that even a single destroyer uses. Importing fuel means building a suitable storage facility. But, let's assume one is there.
Next comes getting the fuel there. A single U-boat cannot carry fuel for more than a few sorties by a squadron at most and likely less.
Without suitable pumping and other facilities available a tanker would be slow to unload and the alternative of shipping in drums is highly inefficent.
A cubic meter of avgas weighs a metric ton. A single Ju 88 consumes over 2 tons per flight. If regular flights are to be made one can see that even a squadron of aircraft consumes a massive quantity of fuel in a relatively short time. With daily patrolling, training flights, and such what fuel is available to the Germans is quickly consumed.
In any case, moving shipping regularly by sea is an impossibility for the Germans. Yes, up through late 1941 the Germans did manage to slip single warships, single merchants, and the occasional battlegroup out to sea. But, they could not manage this with any regularity and many operations either ended in failure or had to retire to safe ports to avoid interception.
For example, as previously pointed out a relatively fast transport at 15 knots requires over two days at sea to reach Iceland.
It certainly is possible, even likely, that a maritime patrol aircraft might spot it. Even U-boats had to worry about such a possibility.
The RN does not have to have standing patrols at sea to intercept shipping just good maritime patrol aircraft coverage.

"The RN does not have to have standing patrols at sea to intercept shipping just good maritime patrol aircraft coverage."

Yes it does, aircraft spots transport ship, Royal navy ships have to be sent to intercept 800 miles north, which by the time they arrive, ships have arrived in Iceland. Unless you have a standing patrol. & good maritime patrol coverage did "not" occur in 1940 & 1941 in north sea. As evidenced by the many German ships that passed through the more dangerous waters around southern Norway, ( even harder to patrol way up north around Trondheim ). British anti U-boat measures were not too successful in 1940 either, only in 41 did they achieve any notable measure of success.

& aircraft fuel at the airport would work for German aircraft, & ship fuel from Icelandic ships would work for ships. & destroyers would be fueled from Norway. Smaller supply ships from Iceland, & if need be from Norway on return trip.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narvik_class_destroyer "Range: 2,240 miles at 19 knots "



"Without suitable pumping and other facilities available"
Which they naturally "would" have to accomodate both aircraft fuel & their sizable fishing fleets needs.

A standing patrol to be successful has to be placed near Reykjavik harbor since supply ships can go either north of Iceland or south of it, the "only" way British ships can intercept with certitude is to station ships there, which makes them vulnerable to Luftwaffe attack.


& if British send carrier, they have Albacores & Swordfish to use which are no match for ME 110's, they would be shot down like a flock of geese, then the helpless carrier mauled by JU 88's.

"Swordfish were considered backward plane at the beginning of the war, incapable to defend themselves against ground-based planes. This is usually credited to the lack of policy and structure in favour of a strong naval airforce until 1938. And this may explain why Great Britain lost the largest part of her carriers during the first phase of the war."


"Fliegerkorps X, had been especially trained to attack shipping with its Junkers Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers. They attacked the HMS Illustrious on January 10, 1941, causing such extensive damage to the carrier, that she had to be withdrawn to the United States for repairs."

The problem with Lca's is that there weren't enough of them around in May 1940. Only 9 were used at Dunkirk. & they couldn't carry anything heavy.

http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/medi...=Landing_Craft

the British ordered construction of 64 LCAs, 4 LCMs, and 6 Landing Craft, Support (LCS) at the end of Sep 1940, and a second order for 104 more LCAs followed.

The LCM, was problematic in that it was not considered seaworthy enough to cross the channel, and could not be carried by an LSI with a tank aboard. The first Landing Craft, Tank (LCT) was trialled in Nov 1940, but eventually supplanted by the Landing Ship, Tank (LST) which was large enough to be seaworthy yet still capable of unloading directly onto a beach. The first LST, a converted tanker named Bachaquero, conducted a successful tank landing on an undefended beach on 5 May 1942.

9 times 36 is 234. so, 2-300 at most troops would attempt to land in the teeth of German machine guns, mortars & the odd mine. Sounds like a party. If they attempted a night landing, Luftwaffe would strafe the remainders in the morning.

[ 01. November 2006, 01:17 AM: Message edited by: chromeboomerang ]

& Condors roamed with near impunity 1940. Maritime patrol aircraft coverage would be superior on the German side in the far northern waters as they would have both sides covered between Iceland & Norways northern half. British ships patrolling in the area would be very vulnerable in the German air dominated space, 6-700 miles separating the 2 locales. Would be like 2 jaws of a shark.

"Fortunately, while the weak early Condors were almost unopposed, the improved models had a very hard time, from ship AA guns, from Grumman Martlets (Wildcats) based on escort carriers and, not least, from the CAM Hawker Hurricanes, which scored their first kill on 8/3/41."

Ok, so just 9 were used at Dunkirk. There was still 6 flotillas in existance so there were definitely more than 9 LCA in existance. Aside from that, given that there are plenty of landing locations in Iceland including:

Sites between Olafsvik and Borgarnes on the coast
Between Sandgerhi and Halla on the south coast
At Höfn
At Eskifjördhur
At Vonpnafjördhur
Around the penisula Raufarhöfn is on
The fjord btween Dalvik and Akureyri
Saudharkrour
Even the much larger US and British garrisons would have had difficultly covering every location thoroughly.

As for Condors: I/KG 40 had exactly 6 Fw 200 C-0 available for service in April 1940. By the end of the month only 2 were still servicable. In the limited number of sorties made the aircraft were flying from Denmark. At the end of June 1940 the unit was withdrawn from operational service to re-equip with the C-1 model. So, the "jaws of a shark" would be largely toothless.
Also, the effectiveness of the Condor is more myth than truth. Between July 1940 and October 1940 KG 40 with a service strength of about 15 aircraft sank 90,000 tons of shipping flying from Bordeaux-Merignac to Trondheim-Värnes up the coast of Ireland. Of note is that 42,348 tons of that shipping was the sinking of the liner Empress of Britain Northwest of Donegal Bay on October 26th.
At least two Condors were intercepted by land based aircraft on these flights and shot down (July 13 and 20th).
A Condor also consumes between 8 and 9 metric tons of fuel per sortie. Also given the early model's structurial problems flying from an unimproved airfield would present problems.
Part of the problem here is that the Luftwaffe started WW 2 without any maritime patrol aircraft in service. It was not a mission that was considered; and even after it became a necessity it remained a very low priority.
So, during the period under consideration the maritime patrol capacity of the Luftwaffe is effectively nil.
The day of the Condor (no pun intended) was well after the period in question. From October 1940 through February 41 British shipping losses to these aircraft rose to 263,000 tons. The number of Condors in service roughly doubled as well. Servicability though remained low with only about 25% operational at any time. Also, the Condors operated largely independent of the U-boats during this period.
With the increase in Allied air defenses on merchant ships and increasing numbers of catapult and shipboard fighters becoming available Condor crews by mid 1941 finally began to perform maritime reconnissance shadowing convoys and such.

the "jaws of a shark" would be largely toothless

Not when one considers all the other aircraft available at the time, & other Condors were just around the corner.The first missions by 1/KG 40 were flown on 4/8/40 against British ships. That's April 1940. & 263,000 tons is myth??!

"and the first operational sorties followed in April 1940 during the invasion of Norway."


"unimproved airfield would present problems."

So they would fly from improved airfields in Norway & Reykjavik, Condors that is.

"The Ju 88 A-1 series first flew anti-shipping sorties close to Norway", that's early 1940, before BoB.

"So, during the period under consideration the maritime patrol capacity of the Luftwaffe is effectively nil."

Unless of course it was made priority, which it undoubtedely would. & d'ya suppose the bombing missions were also considered "maritime patrol" Kinda obvious I would should say. & the word "reccon" does appear with frequency below.

http://www.nuav.net/ooblw.html

ng the attack on Norway the 9th of April 1940, these A/C were used:


Unit Type Airfield Time Number
of A/C Mission
1./506 He 115 List auf Sylt 0630 6 Reccon
2./506 He 115 List auf Sylt 0630 10 Reccon
1./106 He 115 List auf Sylt 0700 10 Reccon
1.(F)122 He 111/Do 17 Hamburg 0830 3 Reccon
1.(F) 120 Do 17 Lubeck 1350 1 Reccon
Stab/K.G.4 He 111 Fassberg 1445 1 Reccon
III/KG 26 He 111 Schwerin 0245 25 Bomb missions
7./KG 4 He 111 Delmenhorst 0522 8 Bomb missions
8/KG 4 He 111/Ju 88 Delmenhorst 0712 11 Bomb missions
9/KG 4 He 111 Delmenhorst 0430 6 Bomb missions
K.Gr 100 He 111 Nordholz 0615 15 Bomb missions
I./KG 26 He 111 Marx-Oldenburg 0935 8 Bomb missions
II/KG 4 He 111 Fassberg 1043 9 Bomb missions
III/KG 4 He 111 Delmenhorst 1335 17 Bombing of Oscarsborg
II/KG 4 He 111 Fassberg 1400 4 Bombing of Oscarsborg
I/KG 4 He 111 Perleberg 1454 19 Bombing of Oscarsborg
I/St.G.1 Ju 87 Kiel-Holtenau 1100 6 Bombing of Oscarsborg
1/ZG 76 Me 110 Westerland ukn 8 support for para units
3/ZG 76 Me 110 Westerland ukn 8 support for para units

The North Sea was heavily patroled by bombers, most from KG 30 and KG 26

So much for the toothless idea.

"There was still 6 flotillas in existance" Not exactly. The ones that operated in Norway were volunteer infantry. Training for such an exercise takes time, coordination, how to handle the boats etc. Which boat carries the radio, which ones will go exactly where, study of the landing beaches, study of tidal patterns, weather data & naturally aireal photo recon would be done to study German gun emplacement & harbor defences. The allies were known for serious, often pedantic preparation, Plans would be concieved & forwarded to the traditionally slow British military high command.


http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/hts.../20060419.aspx

The original commandoes were formed after France fell in mid 1940


So with that in mind, perhaps they would attempt a landing late summer 1940, ( or perhaps not, they had their hands full with France & BoB ), which gives Germans time to build extra fields, repair & send to Iceland heavy units, Hipper etc & most importantly equipment for German infantry. Landing takes place,no heavy equipment for British, ( no motorized transport ), & wholesale slaughter ensues. Germans dominate the air as allies did late in war, which gives them insurmountable advantage. British troops captured, many ships sunk or damaged, Swordfish decimated, carrier sunk & rest scatter & head home followed by German bombers & U-boats most of the way back. they try again in 41 when Americans get involved.

[ 01. November 2006, 10:37 PM: Message edited by: chromeboomerang ]

Considering the amount of troops and planes etc invested to the Iceland project once Hitler starts to think about Barbarossa I do think the possible operation to Iceland would be removed from the table. He needs all the planes and men he can have for the BIG operation.

Besides all the U-boat pens and air fields in France and Norway , I´d think, should be enough for the strategic needs to cover the Atlantic as far as Germany needs really. Just spreading the forces around Europe does not seem good especially on the Luftwaffe´s part.

So sending troops to Iceland might mean the U-boat pens and air fields at least in France would stay empty?? As Hitler et co were actually downgrading production because the war was won several operations probably could not be achieved.

__________________

"Considering the amount of troops and planes etc invested to the Iceland project once Hitler starts to think about Barbarossa I do think the possible operation to Iceland would be removed from the table. He needs all the planes and men he can have for the BIG operation."


That's about right.

He has to choose a direction. Portugal, Spain, Morocco, Africa & no Barbarossa, then Iceland op more feasible.

U-boats got around, even had em in Indian ocean & Penang. A few could be easily sent to Iceland without depleting French pens.

"I´d think, should be enough for the strategic needs to cover the Atlantic as far as Germany needs really."

Don't agree here. Iceland bases offer huge advantage over French ones as coastal command played hell with French pens, & distance is greatly increased from Norwegian bases. Remember distance from Norway to Reykjavik 978 miles. Germans could easliy defend airspace over Icelandic pens, but not French ones, too close to England. It also gives Germans 2 angles of attack on convoys & splits British defense in two.

" The aeroplane can no more eliminate the submarine than a crow can fight a mole!"

Admiral Dönitz in Aug 1942 after the failed bombings of the U-boat pens

----------

This was changed once the Tallboy entered the scene in 1944. By then the Germans had lost the war.

__________________

Well, repeating myself again, in May 1940 (and prior thereto) the Luftwaffe's maritime patrol (and naval strike) capability was virtually nil. This, not withstanding the above (and highly inaccurate list) showing operations on the opening day of the Norway campaign.

In May 1940 the Luftwaffe's primary maritime operations component comprised 7 Küstenfleigergruppen, 106, 406, 506, 706, 806, 906 and KGzbv 108. In addition, there were several Seenotstaffeln operating Do 24 and He 59 aircraft for air-sea rescue.
The various KüFlGr were equipped as follows:

106 6 Do 18, 8 He 115
406 5 Do 26, 3 Ha 139, 29 Do 18
506 18 He 115
706 10 Ar 96, 6 He 115
806 Do 18
906 10 Do 18
108 He 59

During the Norway campaign all of the above were primarily operated as transports; flying troops into various locations. KüFlGr 506 for example flew in troops to the Trondheim - Jonsvatnevt area losing two shot down by fighters.
Post Norway these groups operated along the European and Norwegian coasts as patrol aircraft. Some, like KüFlGr 506, also flew anti-shipping strikes and mining operations off northern Britain.
As for KG 26 and 40, neither operated as an anti-shipping strike unit on a regular basis. Instead, during periods of lulls in land warfare they sporatically conducted strikes against naval targets. During the Norway campaign both did attack naval targets on a few occasions but, both were far more regularly employed in supporting land operations.
While both of these groups did remain in Norway with a combined strength of about 200 aircraft, they lack the range to support operations in Iceland from there. And, I cannot imagine the Luftwaffe wanting to base either unit in Iceland were maintenance, supply, and operational utility of these units would be incredibly difficult to maintain for very little in return.
Do note that neither at that time was engaged in maritime patrol activities. Also of note was that these aircraft did not coordinate their activities with the Kriegsmarine at the time. Basically, the OKL had little interest in and very little invested in supporting KM operations, U-boat or otherwise in 1940.
It was not until the formation of the FleigerführerAtlantik command (formed March 1941) that the Luftwaffe took any official interest in maritime patrol in support of the KM.
So, the shark really is toothless and maritime patrol is a non-mission for the Luftwaffe in May 1940.

"in May 1940 (and prior thereto) the Luftwaffe's maritime patrol (and naval strike) capability was virtually nil."

& after they got there & finished transport duties, patrol duties would naturally commence.


"they lack the range to support operations in Iceland"

Incorrect. BV 138, Condors, even HE 111 had range enough to cross distance between east coast of Iceland & Trondheim. & other flying boats also had the range. As did JU 88's & ME 110's. Iceland currently has 94 airports/landing strips. One might imagine the Germans could scrath out 8-10 of em on south & east coasts. Pave a few as well.


Getting back to shipping, one thing that's been overlooked is British submarines, 'they' would likely represent the bigger danger to shipping traffic to Iceland. They can hide from German a/c & wait patiently for their quarry. Bad weather could cause some probs up north, but mainly in wintertime.

The landing sites below are of negligable value,unless near Reykjavik,( ones on south coast of near no value ), as the objective remains the same, namely Reykjavik harbor & airport. & 30 miles up Hafnarfjordur harbor. Which simplifies German defense.


"given that there are plenty of landing locations in Iceland including:

Sites between Olafsvik and Borgarnes on the coast
Between Sandgerhi and Halla on the south coast
At Höfn
At Eskifjördhur
At Vonpnafjördhur
Around the penisula Raufarhöfn is on
The fjord btween Dalvik and Akureyri
Saudharkrour"

Many of the listed landing sites are near Reykjavik. The Germans would have to defend many miles of coast to either side of that city to prevent an unopposed landing.

While, as you point out and I was well aware of, many of the aircraft I previously listed could fly one way to Iceland, they could not fly there and return without refueling. By the by, the Bv 138 did not become available until June 1940 when the first one was made operational. The Fw 200, likewise, was in minimal operational service until later in 1940 than the period under discussion as previously noted.

Repeating earlier stuff on airfields:

There is no petroleum or cement industry on Iceland in 1940. Therefore, the Germans would have to import materials for any permanent airfields. But, the problem there is that the German construction industry as a whole, along with construction troops and engineers in the military in general, is almost completely non-mechanized. Orgainzation Todt was largely dependent on manual labor to complete virtually any project, including the West Wall, the later Atlantic Wall, the Autobahn system, etc. Typically cement mixers and cranes / gantries were the only available mechanized equipment. If you look at the TO&E of Wehrmacht engineering units the only regular motorized construction item listed is one and two man chainsaws.
A single paved runway would require thousands of tons cement along with hundreds of kilometers of rebar, wire mesh, thousands of tons of sand and gravel all having to be shipped there. Asphalt is out of the question as there is already a shortage of this material in Germany. Aside from that an asphalt plant would be required to mix and heat the material as well as a considerable amount of mechanized equipment to move, spread, and set it.
Thus, as previously noted, it is extremely unlikely that the Germans could build any kind of airfield except a grass or dirt strip without hardstands, hangers, buildings or other infrastructure. They simply lack the equipment and means to make it happen.
Therefore, aside from the fuel issue, there is absolutely no way, short of the Germans dropping everything else going on, to turn Iceland into any sort of major basing location. And, in the face of superior British sea power, they could not do it except at very high cost in losses.
The bottom line remains Iceland is nothing but a certain loss of uncertain size to the Germans as an operation.

A bit of additional information:

Iceland had a population of 120, 264 in 1939 with about 25,000 of that living abroad mostly in Canada. Their trawler fleet consisted of 38 vessels totalling 12,715 grt with another 3,575 grt in other fisheries vessels including several fisheries protection boats. There were 222 other small vessels totalling 6,225 grt serving various purposes in Iceland.
There are about 3000 miles of mostly unpaved road on the island and much of the island is still served by pack horse or small horsedrawn cart. There were about 2000 private or commercial motor vehicles on the island.
How much of these totals would become useable to the Germans is very problematic and cannot be estimated.

Right, they fly one way, refuel at Iceland airport, then fly back. Or in the case of aircraft with smaller ranges, refuel in east fiords. Do 24's still fly today.
For news regarding the worldtrip of the Do-24ATT please check the official website:
http://www.do-24.com

& the fiords of east Iceland make ideal flyingboat bases. 8 are deep water year round ice free harbors.These flying boats are perfect for maritime sea patrol. Small fuel carrying ships could operate in these fiords to handle fuel issues. U-boats would co-operate in these fiords as well.

http://www.east-iceland.is/access/index.html

Here's a map.

http://www.east-iceland.is/map.html

Creative use of available resources is all that's needed here. Iceland currently has 80.000 horses, dunno how many it had in 1940, but it was in the tens of thousands, these would be used as patrol all along the south & east coasts with radio outposts all along the route. Heavy patrol of north coast not neccessary. Iceland is 305 miles wide, the south & east coasts could be well patrolled by infantry on horseback.


Fuel situation was favorable in 1940 for these type operations.

"At the outbreak of the war, Germany’s stockpiles of fuel consisted of a total of 15 million barrels. The campaigns in Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France added another 5 million barrels in booty, and imports from the Soviet Union accounted for 4 million barrels in 1940 and 1.6 million barrels in the first half of 1941. "

Submarines & small ships & sailing boats...

At the request of the German command, Italian submarines were used as early as April 1941 to transport fuel for the most advanced elements of the Africa Corps. They discharged their cargo at Derna. Coastal shipping along the African coast was organized with small ships and sailing boats with auxiliary motors.


& Aircraft..


c. January-June 1942

During this period, transportation was favored by German superiority in the air, which was gained by the German Second Air Force under Kesselring and also by the fact that Malta was suppressed. The transportation of troops and supplies functioned smoothly and with few losses. Enough supplies were moved forward to enable the German-Italian Army to launch an offensive with limited objectives that advanced as far as the borders of Egypt in May-June. In addition, adequate supplies were stockpiled for a period of six to eight weeks against the eventuality of the air forces and naval vessels being employed in an operation to capture Malta.

That's how it was done, & if they could supply Kola penninsula, they could as well supply east Iceland. With 240 Icelandic ships of various size, plus whatever Norwegian ships were captured, the issue of supply presents no major problems.

The BV 138 was first flown in 1937 and was used by the Luftwaffe all over Europe, the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia - often flying for hours far out over the sea in search of allied convoys. This long-range maritime reconnaissance flying boat was utilized until the end of the war not only for anti-shipping but also for personnel transports whereby ten fully equipped infantry troops could be carried which actually required no modification of the plane. The Luftwaffe's famous special-operations unit, KG 200, used one for this purpose. Fully loaded it could fly over 4000 kilometers and stay up for 16 hours. This range could be increased even further when using RATO packs (Rocket Assisted Take-offs) or when launched from catapults on board seaplane tenders.

http://home.swipnet.se/our_stuff/Pla...enderships.htm

Although the BV 138 was able to carry small loads of bombs and depth-charges and thereby do attack missions such as sub-hunting, most operations were pure reconnaissance and surveillance,

Some BV 138 A's were used as transporters for the norwegian campaign in 1940,