As a side subject, The US did have an exellent side plan strategy sort of pyramid command structure. If plan A went wrong, then medium grade officers were assigned to prepare alternative plans & so on. Very elaborate. The Japanese certainly did not. The Germans somewhere inbetween. It is true they didn't have good Iceland or Crosschannel contingency plans put together. Norway was however an exception, it was thrown together quick & came off well.

& lets toss in the S-boats. How many existed in spring 1940? Could they tow craft? carry cargo?

German S-boats - S-boat is short for Schnellboot (fast boat). It was also nicknamed E-boat by the western allies during the war (E for Enemy). The German S-boats had a formidable image in the Royal Navy, especially in the first years of the war, and for several good reasons. While all other torpedo boats had gasoline engines, the German S-boats were powered by Diesel engines, which are much less flammable, a major advantage in gun fights. Their unique structural design, with the torpedo tubes just below deck, was a perfect combination of very low profile, and a higher ability to maintain very high speed in rough sea. Add to that a German force-preserving operating strategy which dictated avoiding unnecessary combat with allied torpedo boats, and the sum result is an elusive, stealthy, hard to catch and hard to sink enemy which British sailors could only vaguely and briefly see during short night encounters. The S-boat was also a formidable enemy since in addition to two torpedo tubes with four torpedoes (or 6-8 sea mines), it also was armed, initially with two 20mm guns, and later also with a 30mm or 40mm gun, and up to five 20mm guns. It also had a larger crew of 21-23 sailors, compared to about a dozen in allied boats, which meant more gunners. Their top speed rose during the war from 40 knots to 45 knots. Eventually the S-boats were outnumbered and defeated by the increasing numbers of allied boats, but it was a long battle, and until the end the S-boats were a capable enemy.

Over 100 "S" boats survived the war and were surrendered.
either S-80
82 tons
36 knots
2-21in torps
2 single 20mm AA
crew 16
range 800 mi.

S-100
100 tons
42 knots
2-21in torps
same as above...later
4 21in torps
1 40mm, 3 single 20mm, or
1 37mm, 5 single 20mm, or
3 double 20mm.
crew 23
range 700 mi.
usually 8 mines, either BMC, EMF, or FMC

End of 1939...
tonnage sunk-----Who Dun It
421,156 tons-----U-Boats
262,697 tons-----Mines
61,337 tons-----Surface Ships
2,949 tons-----Aircraft

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Sealion was a lost cause.
As they say in the "Sopranos"
Fo Gedda Bow Dit

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My understanding of the historical plan of Sealion is that it was flawed in every possible way,
and these flaws came from 3 basic problems :
1) Lack of element of surprise.

2) Inability to quickly deliver the first wave of the invasion with tanks and heavy equipment.
3) Inability to support the invasion on the face of the royal navy.

On my humble opinion all of those could be easily remedied by:
1) No mine laying of the channel - the mine laying operation was to start a week before the invasion and would be sure indication that something is comming. Instead the mining should start wiht the invasion start and
should be done by planes.

2) Using planes to lay mines at the entrance of all south england ports holding military ships and u-boats to ambush them, when they try to exit in order to intercept the invasion.

3) Using the KM's radars and LW to engage the RN forces patrolling the channel at the moment of the invasion start.

4) Returning some part of the accumulated 1900 barges back to the Rheine couple of days before the invasion - a sign, which could be interpreted as 'no invasion' by the British

5) Sacrificing 100 merchants out of the 170 available by driving them on british beaches
during high spring tide - basically those ships would carry most of the the invasion force
Each ship would carry 4x 300 ton empty barges and 5 stormboats , 1500 troops+ 10 tanks +10 halftraks+10 trucks+50 horses.
In addition each ship would have a concrete enforced compartment which will hold 1000 tons of supplies.

6) After the initial beachhold is taken and enlargened the resupply will be done by the Ju52 planes + part of the LW bombers
Those need not land on english soil - they'll fly cargo in water resistant cylinders and
drop it at low speed in the coast water or in some of the lakes/channels /rivers in south england.
Those would be then retrieved by the troops. The latter requires huge number of air stripes to be prepared in the immediate vicinity of the channel on the French side, each stripe with it's own bunker hangar for transport protection.
In my opinion during the 2 months of preparation those could be setup.

7) Some underwater barge towing u-boats could be added to assist the supplying the invasion force.

That would be my Sealion plan.

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Leopold, first, a welcome to this board. From your latest reply I suspect you are also the one who posted this thread on the Axis History forum:

Sealion alternative

In any case, it was gone over fairly thoroughly there but did end a bit badly.

The major objection to any potential Seelöwe plan is simply the very narrow window of opportunity the Germans have following the British defeat at Dunkirk. After as little as 4 to 6 weeks the British had sufficently recovered to make any German invasion attempt a debacle in the making.
In strategic terms, Germany is a land power. Britain a seapower. Performing an amphibious assault requires seapower normally. But since the Germans lack seapower, they must be able to make their assault without allowing the British to bring to bear their more limited landpower.
The reason Britain can defeat German land power in this case is that the Germans lack the means to deploy and sustain a major invasion force in the face of British seapower that can overwhelm what land power the British have.
In the immediate weeks following Dunkirk the British essentially have no viable land power to speak of. This window allows the Germans an opportunity to make a Coup de Main with what limited seapower they have. Getting even a limited amount of orgainized land power ashore in this situation allows them to make and sustain a bridgehead the British have no means of dislodging.
It is this initial lodgement that will allow the Germans with their liimited seapower to grab the initiative from the British at sea and sustain and reinforce their landings. Any German plan that involves a substancial build up and a conventional amphibious assault over the beaches where their naval forces must remain off shore for any period is doomed to defeat simply through lack of sea power.
Basically, the Germans must land before the British can regain an army capable of stalemating or defeating the initial landings. This occurs no more than 6 weeks after Dunkirk. Thus, by the end of July the Germans would be fools to make an attempted invasion.
Do note, I did not forget about air power in this equation. Air power is an extension of either land or sea power and does not have a strategic purpose or utility of its own. Therefore, the Luftwaffe can influence the battle but in and of itself cannot be decisive.

Many ships means many men to "sail" them, and I'm not sure if the Wermacht had enough qualified personel to man many boats, and it requires sea-skill to assembly and synchronize an armada made of many boats of different types.

But even if I doubt such a mongrel mob of an armada could efficiently cross the channel, I see no better plan than TAG's plan.

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Some additional information.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British...f_World_War_II


Perhaps a new what if could be posted, once sufficient details are known, detailing what changes would need to have been made [Like planning AND practicing], for the operation before the war.

1st things first: Needed information should include re-supply tonnage, how it is organized [and where], how it is to be shipped, and how it is to be distributed to the troops once it gets to British shores.

2nd What the state of the Brit defenders were [numbers/deployments, transportation, weapons & ammo, etc].

Shadow Master

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''If'' Germany had a ''Navy''

[ 10. January 2007, 11:16 PM: Message edited by: ANZAC ]

The KM had a problem with finding personal for the 1900 barges. However eventually they did find crews (if undermanned).
In my proposition there are 100 ships + 100 big barges instead of the original Sealion 1900 barges.
Even if each barge was supposed to have 3 guys crew (I think the number was more like 5-10 guys) that's still ~57 crew per ship.

TAG plan is interesting. I also recall Manstein mentioning something toward such idea in 'Lost Victories' , however there are numerous problems with that plan, which I simply don't understand how are to be dealt with.
I'll respond to his post..

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Thanx!

Yep, that's me.
The thread rised fair amount of attention and the discussion became quite interesting (at least to me). However the moderators there decided that if they cannot prove me wrong by arguments they can do it by simply disallowing me to post... kind of dissapointing considering my initial impressions of that site.
In any case, the discussion helped me a lot to polish my scenario idea.
So if anyone is interested to discuss it - please, fire away.

I have several questions about your idea:
1) What chain of events could realistically lead to german high command decision to strike so fast and without much time for preparation?
6 weeks after dunkirk - that's only 2 weeks after the fall of France!
There's hardly any time for any preparation at all... Why would the Germans decide to do such a bold unprepared action ?

2) You suggest the initial group to be landed by paradrops. But during their operation in lower counttries and in Battle of France the German paratroopers sustained significant losses and needed time to restore their battle strength. Many of the gliders and transports were also damaged and needed repairing. How are they to do that in such miniscule time table (2-3 weeks)

2) Supposing the german invasion groups captures a harbour. (by surprise) How are the germans to stop the RN from blocking the hell out of that harbour? (by sinking ships in it's entrance or mining it or bombarding it with capital ships.)
Mind you that it took more than a month of LW attacks to force RN dispersment in bases away from the channel.

3) How is a single german division holding a harbour supposed to stop a several million people from rearming and building defences?

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The British author C. S. Forester proposed something along the lines of your scenario in a short story he wrote decades ago. Unfortuntely, I can't remember the name of it or where it was published (it was in a book of short stories of science fiction / alternate history type nature).

It would have taken a very shrarp OKW staff to spot and then execute such a plan. I would suggest the following is at least possible as a scenario:
The Germans decide to press their operations at Dunkirk but the British still are able to withdraw (a likely outcome). Hitler, takes Churchill at his word and decides that Britain will not sue for peace. He therefore immediately directs the OKW and OKM to come up with an invasion plan. The OKM pretty much immediately rules out a conventional amphibious assault for at least 2 or 3 months minimum and says that 6 months to a year is a more realistic time frame.
Göring of course brags that the Luftwaffe alone can bomb Britain into submission. More realistic officers argue that this will take months or years before it can be accomplished given the greater strength of the RAF. Hitler concurs and wants a quicker timetable.
Someone on the staff suggests a joint parachute and amphibious landing based on using available small craft and battalion sized Kampfgruppen.
France it is agreed is on the ropes and that such an operation would not require more than a few infantry divisions and what paratroops are available to carry out. Planning is ordered started with an invasion date set for 21 days from about mid-June. This puts the invasion ashore in early July.


What the Germans do to meet this is immediately withdraw all available fallschirmjäger to a embarkation area somewhere in northern France or Southern Belgium. There they reorgainze as best they can for a drop in a few weeks. The available 350 or so Ju 52 are readied for the operation as well.
Three infantry divisions that are already in France and have not seen heavy fighting are selected for the operation. They are directed to orgainze 6 to 9 battalion sized units with some mobility like a company on bicycles or motorcycles and limited support (say a section of AT guns, a section of infantry guns, some mortars, a section of pioneere etc. and very limited motor transport).
These divisions are directed along with other commands to immediately round up sufficent small shipping (fishing boats, motorboats, launches, yachts, etc) locally and make immediate estimates after a quick inventory of additional needs they have in this area to give them sufficent lift to move their KG to England in one trip. Given the limited amount of heavy equipment this should be relatively easy to accomplish with a total lift of say between 20 and 30,000 men (1000 to 1500 men per KG).
The KM and Luftwaffe is directed to have a plan in place to secure the Channel for 48 hours and then be able to provide sufficent escort capacity for daylight convoys every few days for a extended period thereafter.
Merchant shipping is to be rounded up for lifting the second wave and supplies to support the invasion. Three additional divisions are tapped for the second wave to go over within 3 to 5 days after the first arrives. Within less than 48 hours after the initial landings a convoy will be arranged to land the remainder of the 3 divisions ashore. In whatever ports are captured.
The 22nd Luftlande division is prepared to be air transported over in Ju 52 and Ju 86 aircraft as soon as the fallschirmjäger secure a landing site. Air transport of supplies is considered a secondary means of supporting the invasion with ammunition being a primary load.
The immediate objectives of the invasion are to secure several ports on the coast, preferably close enough together that they can support each other. Each port is targetted by a parachute group and 3 or 4 KG that will land at the port or on beaches nearby. All transport is considered expendable.
The crossing is to take place in daylight with the KM and Luftwaffe providing maximum cover. The follow on convoys will also cross in daylight. If the British try blocking a harbor entrance, the Germans can simply use the expedient of blowing the ship up, a common salvage method used by the Allies to clear some particularly stubborn obstacles later in the war. Mines can be dealt with using motor minesweepers that are small enough they should be able to remain on the English side of the Channel in port in relative safety.
Alot depends on the British. The rapidity of their response will determine much of the success or failure of such an operation. Given the sorry state of the British Army in late June early July 1940 the British might have to settle for containment initially. They have virtually no tanks, little artillery, few AT guns (yes, the Germans initially have no tanks ashore but those can come over on a second wave in freighters) so they have relatively little means orgainzed or otherwise at this point to stop an invasion. Little will have been done to prepare harbors for demolition. There will be few, if any, beach defenses or obstacles in place.
The Germans are masters of improvisation in such situations. Two or three thousand men ashore with limited artillery support but good organization should be able to hold a port for a few days until reinforced. Crossing in daylight takes away a good portion of the Royal Navy's ability to put forces in the Channel. Their casualties would be fairly heavy and as they would be the only ones with larger vessels for the most part easy to pick out from the German craft. This also allows the KM to ride herd on the invasion fleet much better than they could ever do at night. This means most of the fleet arrives more or less in the right place or close by in a group.
It is not a great plan but a workable one that might achieve success.

Block ships can be dealt with using explosives to cut them up and pound them out of the way. Mines can be swept. The Germans have the capacity to do either. Of course, it also depends on how the harbor is situated.
The RN forces in the Channel will have to abandon any port that looks likely to fall. That's only sensible. A destroyer that is damaged is only a prize if it stays put. And, it is of little use in the fight if the damage is serious.
But,the RN will remain a very dangerous opponet.

They aren't. They are to hold sufficent ground to allow more stuff to come across later. Having a port makes using merchant ships easily possible for the Germans. Whether the convoys sail by day or night a 3 or 4 ship convoy with several destroyers and S Boats in escort will be a tough target for the few hours it is in the Channel. Once in harbor it will be largely immune to naval attack. Air attack can be met by flak and possibly even local fighter cover if an airfield is avaiable.
Taking and holding a couple of ports in a Coup de Main (surpise attack) executed quickly and violently is a distinct possiblity. It also deprives the British of some forces that were sent to France post-Dunkirk like the 1st Armored Division and that are still on the continent.
The Germans initially can content themselves with getting enough troops and equipment ashore and expanding their bridgehead sufficently to make a good sized pocket in Southern England. At this point if the Germans could negotiate a peace they might actually get a favorable response. If not, they have the real possibility of actually defeating the British militarily in a land campaign.

Couple questions: The British forces evacuated from Dunkirk [I know many 'went right back' across till the final pullout], when was the final pullout [I have not found out yet], and where did they go from there?

If the Brits & then the Germans can grab 'everything that floats' to support their amphibious operations, my guess is that Churchill will soon order 'everything that rolls' be commandeered to mass RA and Home Guard troops to the invasion points.

The RAF, RA, and last but not least the RN are going to go all-out to crush the invasion as soon as possible. In such a situation, I would suspect that the British government would direct their armed forces to annihilate any port captured by the Germans.

If the German naval forces were not safe from naval attack in the fjords of Norway [where allot of their losses occurred], why would they be safe in a captured English port?

As for the limited artillery support; how are 6 battalions going to hold a port [let alone several] in the face of capitol ship naval bombardment? Assuming the Germans have 88mm guns (3.6"), how is this going to deter the 14", 15" and 16" guns of the RN? Or even the 6" and 8" guns of the cruisers?

I agree that in the face of no pre-war plan having been developed Germany has to try something like this or not invade at all.

However what exactly is going to stop the RN? The LW is going toe-to-toe with the RAF 11th fighter group [and 10th and 12th fighter groups as well, no doubt], trying to support the ground troops, port facilities, and invasion shipping. At the same time, the LW bombers are going to be trying to whittle down the home fleet before it arrives, but RAF fighters acting as CAP for the home fleet sailing down the British coast will make this very expensive. If KM attempts an intercept [in daylight] the day after the troops go ashore, this will have too take place under Brit land based air cover.

Also: On 14 May 1940, Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, announced the creation of the Local Defense Volunteers (LDV) — later to become known as the Home Guard. The announcement was met with enthusiasm and far more men volunteered than the government expected; by the end of June there were nearly 1.5 million volunteers. By July 1940, the situation had improved somewhat with uniforms, a modicum of training and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition from the USA


Any thoughts?

[ 12. January 2007, 05:05 AM: Message edited by: Shadow Master ]

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One more sideline idea I wandered about for a while.
What if the Germans filled a big merchant(or several) with 10000 ton of TNT and sunk it in the Dover straits at the beginning of the invasion.
Then if the RN starts to cross the channel ship by ship, those could be picked out by the KM.
If they cross as a flotilia they would probably do it close to the british shore. Then the sunked ship's explosion would equal a nuclear weapon and could potentialy sunk/ disable the whole flotilia.

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There are a lot of unknowns. The British had secret teams of individuals trained in subversive tactics. Hidden caches of supplies and weapons would allow them to create chaos for the Germans. Since this was not factor at the time of Dunkirk, it may not be a big thing, but it leads one to think that the Brits could do a good job at preventing full German control.

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No one doubts that the Germans could gave gotten ashore during the Sealion operations. The greatest hinderance for them remains in the much understated field of logistics and the Royal Navy's ability to insure that little to no German resupply gets to where it is most badly needed. That is where all of the Sandhurst wargames played over the years have always fallen apart for the Germans.

There is an additional possible strategy for Sealion - instead of trying immediately to conquer the whole island, the invasion troops could occupy a defendable perimeter in the immediate area of the channel and dug in.
The advantage is treefold:
a) The supplies needed for defence would be significantly smaller and would not have to be transported far inland.

b) The RN would be forced to patrol the channel for a fear of the germans enhancing their bridgehead. It would be getting heavy punishment from the LW - rendering it eventualy powerless.

c) A rude refuelling airfields could be set up on the occupied land allowing LW fighters longer flight time above britain.

With such bridgehead on the island the war of attrition against the Britain would be a much more realistic option (together with u-boats in the atlantic)

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I see every single piece of artillery extant in Great Brtitain including every Napoleonic piece from the Imperial War Museum being used