What if Hitler had agreed to his generals and allowed a complete withdraw in the autumn of 1944 of all forces behind the river Rhine. Which would had resulted in a much stronger defencive position.

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Regards, Richard


"Open channel D"

It certainly would have helped the Western Allies. The Rhine was not the barrier the Germans though it was. Britain and the US had developed amphibious and riverine systems that made it largely irrelevant.
Some examples:

The Allies would have brought up landing craft for use in their assaults just as they did originally.
Both could have used DUKW and LVT amphibious vehicles for an assault. DD tanks would also have been used.
Bridging was no major issue. For example, the US 291st Engineer battalion threw three vehicle bridges under fire (the Germans destroyed the first two bridges) across the Rhine in less than 24 hours. Some of the longer bridges Allied engineers put across exceeded 1000 feet in length. This sort of operation was literally beyond German capacity at any point in the war.
Paratroops could be used to support such operations.

Such a withdrawal would just have made the Allies job easier and the war shorter.

agreed. Along with air superiority, the Allies could through out a bridge and cross it with little difficulty. It would have shortened the front for the Germans but not prevented a crossing.

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American by birth, TEXAN by the grace of GOD!

I agree in that the art of rivercrossing was well developed, but from what I read out of Richards post I don't think it would have been a pushover.

A rivercrossing is more difficult than fighting on terra firma. If the Germans had retreated across the Rhine rather than beeing cut to pieces on the west bank, the Allies would have a much harder task.

For one the infrastructure pretty much decide where the Allied armies would cross the Rhine, making it easier to protect with AA guns and arty. Having units intact would have enabled armd counterattacks too.

All of the rivercrossing kit needed would hog roads and slow down the overall progress of the campaign.

As for the paratroops, remember the number of men lost during Plunder.

All in all a rivercrossing is a taxing exercise because you need specialists and equipment, it narrows the axis of attack and it has setbacks on the suppies.

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942

Hitlers interference at that point was disastrous though.
If Kluge, Dietrich et. al. had been allowed to withdraw initially across the Seine as they'd wanted to in July/August 44 they might at least have averted the Falaise incident and saved more armour and men for later use. They'd surely still have lost but may have retained some coherency for a little longer and caused higher loss of life for the Allies.
The tensions between Adolf and his commanders with all the distraction and extra stress it heaped upon the senior officers were certainly no way to run an Army at that time (or any other).
On this occasion I say well done to Mr Hitler for being a boon to his opposition.

Cheers,
Adam.

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"Wars cannot be fought with dream stuff" - Sir Percy Hobart.

Withdrawing to the Rhine in mid 1944 would have placed the westernmost German industrial cities eithr in allied hands, or within very short range. The Rhine and seveal tributarys were (still are) a critical transport conduit. The maps I have here show several important looking railroad trunk lines close to the Rhine (some on the west side).

With the Allied armys non the Rhine, their airfields will very soon be just minutes away from the Ruhr indutrial cities. With the USAAF & RAF medium bombers in close range the weight of bombing is nearly doubled. Historically the Allied medium bombers in January-Febuary 1945 made an attack on the German transportation system similar to that made on France & Belgium in the Spring of 1944. The results were equal if not better. So retreating to the Rhine early alows such a 'transport attack' to be made that much sooner.

A few days of planning is suffcient to get around traffic problems for some 'bridge columns' . The US First Army managed to rush the necessary equipment for two pontoon bridges & a ferry company to Remagen in less than 30 hours. Additional bridge equipment was brought to the Rhine in just another 48 hours by the First Army. That was without any preplanning, but started with tossing away the existing plan for bringing the bridge & ferry equipment forward to other locations and starting with a blank paper shortly after the Ludendorf bridge was captured.

I cant speak for the British.. The US 1st & 3rd Armys got around the channelization problem by crossing at as many points as possible.

Basiclly I see retreating to the Rhine as placing German industry at increased risk. Making the air bombardment equation simpler for the Allies. Intially the Germans get a small break as the Allies still must rebuild their newly accquired tranportation routes & establish forward supply depots. Historically that took a bit less than three months.

An interesting aspect. Bringing the allies to the Rhine would have brought them closer to Berlin and end the war earlier. Above all it would have brought Berlin to the allies before the Russians and it would certainly have changed the world. The allies would have advanced up to Poland, there would have been no Potsdam, no Yalta, no DDR , no zones in Berlin etc..

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I suspose its possible to reach Poland, but it still wnt be a cakewalk. First the Allied logistics support has to catch up. Then the German defense must be beaten down. Even before assualting the Rhine an extensive preparatory campaign would have to be done. Mostly air & long range artillery isolating the Rhine defenses then softening them. Even if the Germans abandon France & Belgium in June it would be September before the Allied supplies are suffcient to start artillery preperation, and the for the air bases were ready for the fighters & medium bombers. By the time prepartory attacks are accomplished it would be October or November.

Then there is a much stronger German military facing the attacker, not the wreck of march 1945. Even with a massive air attack and realatively fresh Allied infantry it will a slow stiff fight. The big advantage of course is the faster collapse of German industry supply to the ground & airforces. Historically this took effect in Febuary of 1945. If the Allies close to the Rhine valley in Sept 1944 this supply transportation collapse could begain in December or even November.

By withdrawing Germany would not have lost the bulk of strength west of the Rhine which could have resulted in a much stronger defencive position which of course they should have prepared no later than early 1944. But of course the Allies would of had greater number as well.

The line up as it was then in March 1945 -

Germany
55 divisions (on paper) as we all know they were not all at full string.
Average infantry division 5,000 men

Allies
3 armies containing 29 divisions, more than a million and quarter men


I suspect in the what if situation the Allied study and planning in 1944 would have needed a bit of a rethink if the Germany army suddenly bolted back over the Rhine.

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Regards, Richard


"Open channel D"

Withdrawing to the Rhine would have been an unmitigated disaster for the Germans and particularly their leader, not the superior defensive position you envision. The retreat would have been harried by the superior Allied air force and the Germans would still have lost a lot of their armor and field pieces. As others have pointed out, the Allies had the ability to cross the Rhine. It wasn't easy but it could be done, even under fire. And by retreating the Germans would have lost the very, very valuable Rhineland.

And then there are the political ramifications that you have to consider. By retreating to the Rhine and taking up a purely defensive position after willingly giving up sovereign German territory Hitler would have lost the confidence of the German people and particularly the German generals. It would be a tacit admission of ultimate defeat and you would have seen mass desertions of German units, disaffection amongst the populace, and likely renewed attempts from General Staffers to oust Hitler. I would not in the slightest bit be surprised in this scenario if the Remagen bridge incident wasn't repeated but with German citizens welcoming in the Allies to avoid having their Rhine town be made into battlefields, especially when it was obvious that even Hitler believed the war was lost.

I think one of the greatest problems people have in understanding Hitler and his military decisions is forgetting that he was also the supreme political leader of Germany. Never forget the political ramifications of military actions if you want to understand why he did what he did.

Yes, but that was often quite fatal for German Army to think that way.

For instance Kursk, Sebastopol 1944, Hungary 1945, Declaration of war to the US 1941, Stalingrad, every lost soldier in surrounded defence positions 1943-45, Keeping the troops in Norway until the end, keeping the troops on Greek islands until they were lost, Bombing England 1944, V-weapons...

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Note that I'm not arguing that Hitler's moves were the best, either politically or militarily. What I am arguing is that in order to understand Hitler's moves you have to understand that he was the supreme leader both militarily and politically. And so I find it hard to buy this what if, given that the premise is that Hitler himself allowed his generals to retreat already in 1944 behind the Rhine, without contesting the loss of the Rhineland. Wouldn't happen. Perhaps with another leader but not with Hitler in power.

Sorry Marienburg for choosing the wrong words here as I was actually agreeing with you and putting more examples on the table...

it should have been:" Yes, that was often quite fatal for German Army ( and Hitler ) to think that way." (That is to put the emphasis on political importance even if the decision would lead to the total destruction of armies and losing of the war altogether.)

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The impression I get from the Generals they knew the game was up and tried to bring about a sort of collapse in the west to bring the war in the west to a stand still or what ever.

The trouble in understanding Hitler is was a politician and a General running the war with his health was against him and of course he was a psychopath.

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Regards, Richard


"Open channel D"

Richard, where did you get these numbers?

Your quote would more accurate to describe troop numbers in late summer 1944.

Would not the number in Mar 1945 be more along the lines of:

3 Army Groups - 21st, 12th and 6th

7 Armies - Canadian 1st, British 2nd, US 9th, 1st, 3rd, 7th (I won't count the 15th as it was forming) and the French 1st.

75 divisions (at least) - The British had at least 14 Infantry and armored divisions, the Canadians at least 5.
The US 15 armored and 36 Infantry (with US infantry divisions each having, on average, more tanks than German Panzer Divs by then).
I don't know how many divisions the French had formed by then, but it was more that 5, I suspect closer to 10.
Adding up Allied divisions on the continent Mar 1945, the number is closer to 75, but this is not counting Commonwealth armored brigades and US cavalry groups and independent regiments and my numbers for divisions are intentionally low.

One and quarter million men would be a good number for a single army group

I have not included forces in Italy in these numbers nor RAF, RCAF or USAAF.

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Best Regards,
JW

The French had 8, two of which are armored. And, the US had sufficent non-divisional resources to count about 4 additional armored divisions, 4 infantry divisions, and an insane amount of artillery, engineers, etc.

Are you considering these as corps assets only, not the ones 'semi-permanently' attached to infantry divisions? Also don't forget about the butt-load of tank destroyer battalions (tracked, not towed), enough for one or two for each ID with I don't know how many held by corps.

What would y'all consider was a good 'tail' for each divisional soldier in the ETO? Don't count CONUS. Three or four non-divisional soldiers for each divisional soldier on the continent?

Does my question make sense?

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Best Regards,
JW