After the invasion of Normandy Hitler demanded that every fortresse be defended to the the end, as the case in every theartre of war. In the West one by one were eliminated or isolated, taking with them thousands of troops. Now one can argue that some or of the troops were slavs who would of proved of little value defending Germany, but they also included some of the Reich's best troops including elite paratroopers.

Let's think about this. Cherbourg:
Under General von Schilieben with 47,000.

St. Malo/Dinard
Under Colonel Von Aulock wih over 12,000 men including elements of paratroopers and SS troops

Brest:
Under General Ramecke with over 38,000 men including infranty from the 2nd parachute division.

Lorient:
Under General Junck with 15,000 men including the 265th infrantry

Quiberson Bay/Belle Isle
Gernal Farmbacher and his XXV Army Corps of 25,000

S. Nazaire:
General Junck with 35,000 men including elements of the 275th infranty division

Le Harve:
Colonel Wildermuth and his 14,000 men.

Boulogne:
General Heim with about 10,000 men of the 64th infranty division

Calais:
Lt. Colonel Schroeder with about 9,000 men

Dunkirk:
About 12,000 men from the 18th Luftwaffe Ground division.

So quick math, that means around 180,000 men were tied up in these fortresses and not availble for the defence of Germany.

So my "what if" is...what if Hitler never adapted the "hold till the last man" theory and these men were allowed the chance to retreat and defend Germany.

I believe it would of pro longed the war another 4 months or so maybe.

Something to think about anyway.

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Facta non verba. "Deeds, not words"

The problem for Germany in the West in 1944 isn't need of an orgainzed retreat, but the lack of mobility of virtually all but a handful of their combat units. Whether the "hold at all costs" policy is followed or not, the Germans have really only two other really bad choices:

1. Try to hold until a breakthrough is made and then reseal the line using their limited mobile forces. Failing that, withdraw as best they can. This option means the majority of the non-mobile forces are going to end up pocketed and POWs.

2. Withdraw their non-mobile forces in a timely fashion using their limited mobile forces as a rear guard to allow the withdrawal. The problem here is that the mobile forces will be ground to nothing leaving no means of offensive action for the Germans at a later date. Yes, the non-mobile divisions are intact but their combat value in many cases is very limited so you are really robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Basically, the Germans in 1944 as a complete army were so badly over-matched that they were just buying time until their eventual defeat.

I'm aware of the lack of mobility the Germans had. But that huge number of troops wasted, can't be over looked. They would of made some difference, even with the lack of mobility. NOt saying they would of won the war, but they would of made the campain even more of a attritional war. With those 180.000 men, you are almost doubling the total army (almost).

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Facta non verba. "Deeds, not words"

Take into account that retreating all these garrison troops implies that all their equipment and stoks must be left behind due to lack of transport means, so you are retreating manpower only. Alright, that counts too, but the increase in army firepower would be very limited.

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Everly Brothers - What I Have To Do Is Dream
"Never wrestle with pigs, you both end up getting dirty and the pig likes it."

You could say that those garrisons served some good purpose by at least complicating the allied position enough to provide some respite for the bulk of the retreating German army.

The axis retreat from Normandy, despite their mobility and equipment problems, and all that happened around Falaise, was a surprisingly orderly one, Pallud's recent 'Ruckmarsch' book appears to confirm this, but it balanced on a very fine line at several points. Perhaps if those garrison troops had not been occupying this or that allied unit, air squadron or supply convoy the balance might have tipped even more seriously against the Germans.
In place they were at least fighting units, as part of the rout they'd perhaps just be more of the mass of men with little or no offensive capability while the units that were scrabbling to keep the lines of retreat open found themselves with an even harder job?

Cheers,
Adam.

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"Wars cannot be fought with dream stuff" - Sir Percy Hobart.

Lets take it another step further and also include the men who were trapped in the Falaise pocket, The Seventh Army and the Fifth Pz Army.

A large group of men that were ordered to hold there position and only allowed to retreat when it was to late. Although only about 50,000 men were lost in the pocket they also lossed 500 tanks and 10,000 guns and other vehicles. Pretty much most of what they had in the West.

So, 180,000 would be trapped men with another 150,000 men from the would be Falaise pocket along with the rest of the Germans in the West could in my opinion organise a fighting retreat, Pull back across the Seine and blow all the bridges, It wouldnt stop the allied advance but it would slow them down.

Although not all of them would escape i personnaly believe they could atleast pull out of France and still have 400+ tanks, 8,000+ guns and other vehicles, and 360,000 men give or take. Not the army of 1939-41 but a fighting force that could easily do defensive work and succeed.

Well, thats just my 2cents.

The retreat from Falaise was a fighting one. Otherwise so many would not have escaped.

The Seine bridges were largely destroyed already, one of the greatest German achievements of that period was the crossing of the river by Ferry and improvised bridge.

The forces that crossed the river recovered very quickly indeed and actually did good defensive work almost immediately despite their lack of equipment.

More vehicles and field pieces could not have been rescued, they were destroyed by allied action, ran out of fuel, were adoned in traffic jams or just broke down, nothing can change that, particularly in the pocket.


Cheers,
Adam.

(The word 'adoned' above should read a-b-a-ndoned but the forum seems to be not displaying the word/letters b-a-n at all, presumably auto-edit in action... banner band bank banter...)

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"Wars cannot be fought with dream stuff" - Sir Percy Hobart.

Not saying that the war would have been definitely over by Xmas 1944 if the garrisons had been handed to the allies as the front moved, but certainly the fact that supplies were brought all the way from Normandy for a long time caused problems in the allied fighting capability. Would Patton and Monty have gotten their fuel at the same time if the ports closer to their troops would have been in use, and would that mean that the attack would have continued straight away?

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Za brings up a point. What about the 250,000[?] troops left on their own in the Kurland pocket. On their own til the surrender. Don't think they could've got their equipment back.

The retreat from Falaise was a fighting one yes but it was launched too late, The gap that they could escape through was getting smaller and smaller, only 2 thirds of the German troops got through, There were probaly just enought supplies left to get those Tanks and vehicled back to Germany maybe a little further.

And considering most of the stuff was destroyed by allied action, Wasnt that stuff only destroyed in such large numbers when the gap was so small there were only but a few roads that the stuff could excape on.

The fact is that They would have had a better chance if they were allowed to leave earlier, Not wait until the last possible minute.

And let us not forget the 100,000+ German troops in Norway and Denmark.

Even if the German Army (or more to the point Adolf Hitler) had decided to order an orderly retreat in the west to conserve as many troops and their vital equipment and supplies, that would only extend the war for one or two months at the most, the point is that the German Army was on the road to defeat and at that point in time nothing could prevent that.

Anecdotal account.

In the book I just read, Tigers in the Mud (Carius, Stackpole, 1992) the author spoke of having to leave every remaining Tiger I from his company on the West Bank of the Seine. His account of the withdrawal painted the picture of a very disorganized retreat, at least from his perspective.

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Best Regards,
JW

Personnaly i beleive it could have allowed the war to go on longer than one or two months but that would require one thing, Hitler not trying to control what every single squad of men does.

He was a WW1 soilder who was not familiar with WW2 tactics, Thus he lost men and tanks in hopless battles.

In some cases battles could have been won if Hitler had allowed his Generals to move there men back to more defendable positions.

Hitler was stupid and tryed to hold every bit of ground when they could easily have falled back to defendable terrain.

And considering the amount of men they had on the Western front near the end of 1944 those extra 50,000 men and equiptment from Falaise alone would have made a big difference, Considering they had atleast some training compared to the troops of late 1944. Not mentioning the 180,000 men from the besieged ports.

Not defending the various ports aids the Allied supply effort. Although mines and demolition closed the ports like Cherbourg for a month or two after Allied capture letting them have all the ports means more fuel and ammo in September and October. Ulitmatly a 25% increase in Allied artillery ammunition in October and November means 25% more German casualties.

Just becouse open ports may mean a 25% increase in Allie artillary dosn't mean there would be 25% more German casualties. And also a 25% increase in artillary ammo also means alot more vehicles needed to get them to the front, which means more fuel, which means more problems for the allies.

After the Normandy breakout the German west front was totally open. It can be considered a miracle that von Rundstedt ( back in action ) could create a new front at all. Thus, with earlier supplies the allied attack would have given less time for the Germans to create defensive positions and thus the fighting could have moved perhaps past the West Wall before the Germans could do anything about preparing the West Wall for any major offensives.

Hitler was at the same time facing crises in the west and the east, with operation Bagration smashing through the front in the east.

Hitler was thus forced to send his low numbered reserves to both directions.

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As fare as i can tell all it comes down to is that with Hitler trying to control everything on every front, Germany was doomed.

Yep, in my opinion he was trying to buy time not for Germany but for the final solution. Badly needed rolling stock was being diverted by the SS to insure there dirty deed would carry on right up to the point where even they could do no more.

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Regards, Richard

There back this Xmas 2008