This is a two part "what-if."

Part one is could the Germans have made Operation Typhoon succeed to the point where Moscow is either under siege or largely cut off from the country as a whole, and in doing so could the Germans have forstalled the first winter offensive by the Soviets?

Part two is could Army Group Center have been in a position to not only forestall the winter offensive but blunt it far more badly than they did surviving the first winter largely intact?

The more I look in detail at the German and Soviet material positions, the logistical situation, and the tactics and leadership of the forces involved I'm becoming more convienced that the Germans threw away their best opportunity to achieve at least a stalemate on the Eastern Front if not possibly even victory.

1 question : does your what-if allow for a different time frame, or is Typhoon is supposed to start like it did ?

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Good question

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Same initial timeline. You can back up several weeks logistically if you like prior to the same start date and change things though.

W/out the thought of this war being more than a 4-6 month campaign, I don't see much different. Soviets still had the troops coming from Siberia.
Now Germany would have two cities under seige.With that same long supply line. In hindsight, the seige of Leningrad accomplished nothing.
My 2cents.

Framer has a point, the siege of Moscow would mean that now close to 2 million men would be held up trying to get control of 2 cities.

I would imagine that this would be catastrophic for the Germans as they would be trapped themselves in between the city's defenders and the relief force. The battle of Alesia rings a bell here, with a different ending.

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The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

Framer, unfortunatly I haven't got supporting sources handy so feel free to dispute this, but the idea of Moscow being saved by regiments of Siberians who were immune to the cold is largely an invention of German propaganda (along with the Russian soldier being closer to nature), supported by the testimony of disgruntled German officers. The most damning evidence against the 'Siberians' thesis was that Soviet divisions were not organised along regional lines but instead troops from all over were grouped together at depots and sent to the front. Regiments did often recieve honourific titles (such as the 2nd Guards 'Taman' rifle division) named after sites of their victories but there were rarely regional distinctions. The exception of course is the locally raised 'volunteer' regiments, effectively units of men and women of service age drafted in 1941, given uniforms and the minimum of training before being sent to support more seasoned units. Thus in your average soviet division you might see ukranians, latvians, uzbeks, siberians and so on.

Not really important to the 'what if' but something worth remembering about the makeup of the Soviet military.

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As some starter food for thought:

The condition of AGC in the weeks preceeding Typhoon was only fair. But, this did not have to be. The Germans could have done the following with their available resources if a decision was made to put top priority on this operation:
1. Fully replace casualties in the group's divisions. AGC was down about 55,000 men due to casualties. The replacement army was generating about 130,000 men per month. But, Hitler ordered the majority to be used in filling out new units in France giving AGC only about 25,000 replacements. This changes to a full 55,000 to 60,000 men being pushed into AGC bringing it to full strength.
2. The Eisenbahnbautruppen are increased by two additional regiments. This will aleviate most of the rail construction problems in about a month or so. While the rail system will still be inadequite it will not be critically so. This means that sufficent supplies and materials are on hand at between 75 and 90% of requirements, and that winter clothing will be available when needed for the most part.
3. Panzer production is directed to AGC making up for losses almost entirely. Production was about 320 vehicles and would have brough the AGC panzer divisions up to full strength or nearly so.

This means instead of AGC starting Typhoon at an average of 60 to 70% divisional strength with panzer divisions operating at 50 to 60% strength and the associated truck strenght (particularly in the Grossraumtruppen they are closer to 80 or 90%. Instead of having only about 50% to 70% of the necessary supplies, and in particular a shortage of artillery ammunition, the group would again be at about 75% strength and in better shape with reserve supplies.

These changes alone make a huge difference in the starting position of AGC. The Soviets facing them at this point are in really bad shape at this point. Many of their divisions are at or below 50% strength. Many are badly disorganized and lack much of their heavy equipment and weapons. Most of the Soviet tanks are the pathetic T50 /60 /70 lights that are all but worthless as battle vehicles (about 60% of those available). The T34 and KV 1 still represent only about 30% of available AFV and are still being committed piecemeal.
Many of the Soviet replacement divisions and ones from the interior are of poor quality and lack training. The only really bright spot is that a number of cavalry divisions of good quality are available.

I believe that speed was the objective for capturing Moscow... In this "what if", if reserves are brought to reinforce the German side, how much time would that take?

And during this time, ( at which the Germans are waiting for the reinforcements if at all) Do the Russians get their reinforcements?

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The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

I have thought about this a few time and i believe as follows

1, German panzer forces are not diverted towards Leningrad and Kiev and are used to punch through with both artillery and air bombardment of Moscows outer defenses allowing the mobile and infantry support this assault would come after the surrender of the Vyazma pocket on the 19th October, giving plenty of time before the harsh winter came calling on the 5th December that is some five weeks to inact Operation Typhoon, as it so happened the German forces devoid of panzer support came within 13 miles of Moscow on the 5th December and planned to attack moscow proper the following day.

2, If the Germans had indeed with panzer support and gone after Moscow several weeks before they did then i can see that they could carry off the capture of Moscow although it would take a high attritian in men and equipment, but after capturing Moscow this would have the knock on effect with a total breakdown of communications between Soviet forces i can see that the German forces would advance to almost occupy most of the territory west of the River Volga. And securing the River Volga as a line of defense in the summer campaigns of 1942.

I think we can all estimate how many men the Germans lost in NOT capturing Moscow.... How many men would the Germans have lost if they did in deed capture Moscow? and how long would they have been able to hold the city?

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The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

personally I believe the Germans could have taken or put Moscow under siege by the troops they had originally in 1941, by

a. taking better care not to let the Red Army troops slip out of the envelopments once Typhoon started ( this especially true of the cavalry divisions )

b. Concentrating all operations towards Moscow ( there were also operations of AGC eastwards which did not help the troops going to Moscow )

c. Getting the winter clothing to the forward troops

It is a different matter whether they could have held on, but then again if Stalin decides to stay he would be captured in Moscow.....if Stalin decides to leave the defence of Moscow collapses probably....

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Sorry. I'll try to clarify what I meant. The Soviets had all those troops that were guarding against a Japanese invasion available now. I'll have to look up on the figures. Look at all those troops available taking part at the Stalingrad encirclement.

I don't see how this would change. The Soviets retreating faster than Germany can advance.............on horseback and foot.
Maybe if somehow they were more mechanized.

For the most part the Soviets weren't retreating. Their unit commanders were generally being ordered to hold at all costs and the units were being destroyed in situ. Where retreats were occuring they were generally planned but irrelevant as the units involved were often already pretty much combat ineffective due to losses.

Oh so true, Stalin refused to allow many of the larger cities to be evacuated by delcaring them fortresses and because of this many commanders were unwilling to countermand Stalins orders and in doing so many of the Soviet Armies were surrounded and destroyed.

According to Moscow 1941 by Forczyk the cavalry divisions were the breaktrough troops of the Soviet counterattack´s first wave. There were only light tanks available for the Red Army during the initial phase and the cavalry , considering the weather, was fast and struck hard.

Actually in the book Guderian is blamed for letting so many men and equipment out of the envelopment to fight another day.

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If we keep the same time frame, it leaves only about 5/6 weeks for the Germans to reach their objectives.

Large scale combined arms maneuver was very much slowed down from (approx.) 20 of october until 8 of november because of the heavy rains/mud, and then almost stopped from 30 of november on, because of cold, before the Soviet counter offensive backlash.

About weather, it's not about Russian soldiers being more resilient to cold or mud, it's just that it put more strain on Germans because of much longer supply lines, lack of training and operate machines under such conditions (for example the German airforce had only very few concrete layered airbases near frontline, which made it very difficult to operate planes because of the mud, and also very few equipments and methods to prevent planes from "freezing" in the cold), and lack of winter equipment (even if, contrary to some beliefs, some Soviet units had to wait until february 1942 to get winter gear).

Maybe, if AGC had been reinforced like TAG says, it would have been able to cut its way fast through Soviet very strong defenses, like it did before in Brest or Smolensk for example, but it would have been very hard in such a limited time frame.

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That's contrary to what Alan Clark says in his Barbarossa. Basically what he says is that every locality was to be defended by "Worker's battalions" with orders to stay put and die in place, while the regular army formed composite units, brigade-size, with orders to operate in the middle and retreat when things weren't going too well.

As a consequence, the regular army units would survive to fight another day, while the units that would be cut off and shot to pieces were the improvised ones that weren't really important anyway.

I'm re-reading Guderian's "Panzer Leader", and the picture he paints about this period is completely dismal. No supplies, no roads, no fuel, no anti-freeze, not even anti-icing paste for the optics therefore guns not firing, 16 hours of darkness per day. Above all troops still in summer clothing at -40º Celsius. And for shooting his mouth of too often he was dismissed for his pains and put on the shelf for two years! Quite frankly, I don't see how they could ever pull it off.

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