Exactly. The Maginot Line was primarily designed to provide a series of interlocking fire zones along its length that would pin an attacker and blunt breakthroughs. It was not primarily intended for offensive fire. That was to be provided by supporting field units.

Here is a description of one of the German attacks on the main fortified zone. While I dont like using internet sources it seems reasonable match with the books and should illustrate some of the details. Note that most of this description covers the time after the field divsions comprising the Interval Forces were withdrawn to cover the Somme/Oise sectors. Most of the units identified are the fortress garrisons and the 'Infantry Regiments Fortress' that occupied the forward zone of MG & AT positions that covered the border and approches to the main fortress zone.

http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewto...p?f=45&t=29084

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sorry, but numerous german mercinaries(ex SS troops now fighting in Indo-China) employed by France still wondered why France would not send out scouts..and scoffed at France and their forts....while tracking and attacking General Giaps forces...i stand corrected at being an airstrip....but in the artillery barrage from the hills around the valley French where hunkered down in trenches, barb wire defenses, so might not have been a fort but an air-strip,,the fire-support for this base was not mobile or was it????

During the initial days the French sent patrols out to the hills. They were driven back into the valley. After first week the Viet Minh had the valley encircled with infantry positions. Subsequent French ventures out were raids on the VM positions.

The French artillery was initially twentyfour 105mm & four 155mm howitzers. There were also three "companys" of 120mm mortars. Dug into pits open topped pits the cannon & mortars were exposed to plunging fire from the cannon and mortars of the VM positioned in the surrounding hills. Overall the French artillery was out numbered by 3-1.

Dien Bien Phu was not fought in isolation. Several French offensives into the same area from Laos and the Red River Valley were also defeated that spring. That is the entire French stratigic offensive for the year was defeated in several battles. Dien Bien Phu was the one battle that recived all the publicity.

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It was the main French garrison, and when defeated, basically defeated the French's claim on Indo-China as a colony...little is printed in works on diem bien phu, unless books on actual fighting, or works about General Giap having to fight former SS mercenaries brought their seeking employment after the collapse of Germany for want of jobs...
i will try and find the book among my stuff which reveals or states scouts. early LRRP units where ex SS troops now employed in Viet Nam (Indo-China) and their words during this battle

Not exactly the same type of terrain nor fortifications isn't it?

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Main garrison? The group trapped in Dien Bein Phu represented just a small percentage of the French field forces. The eight Groupes Mobiles, and the amphbious force (that conducted the Atlante operation the same time as the Castor operation), were all busy either attacking in the northern highlands in support of operation Castor, or in subsidiary operations elsewhere. Overall these operations failed to achieve Navarre's goals. Even had the Dien Ben Phu garrison survived, or Operations Castor not been executed the French would still have been in a losing stratigic position in the summer of 1954.

The parachute force used in Operation Castor was not to be a static garrison but rather a mobile raiding force cutting the Viet Minh supply route through that area. That it was trapped by a enemy with a better strategy and operational plan is not the result of a 'fortress mentality'. Trying to bend this battle around to illustrate a point about the Maginot fortifications and fortress mentality is a weak proposition.

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If you were a German commander of Army Group C, ordered to make a stratigic breakthrough of the fortified zone, and given the mechanized corps and air support, I wonder where the best area to attack would be?

There are two considerations I see. One is obviously that of terrain and the fortificatons in the various areas. Where would be the most favorable or esaiest? The other is where the attack will hurt the French the worst. Since you cant count on reaching Paris or encircling entire army groups, tho those are admirable goals, that leaves the industrial cities just behind the frontier. What breakthrough location would allow the capture of the largest or most critical ammount of coal mines, steel foundrys, and factorys?

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Good question, Carl!
I'd give you a rep point but the system says I have to spread it around a little more.

Dien Bein Phu much more resembles a medival seige or WW 1 "Lost battalion" battle where the French are surrounded in a fortified position (actually, two seperate ones) defending their sole means of supply the airfields within their perimeter. The Vietnamese held all the high ground and basically proceeded to use centuries old seige tactics to reduce the French "castle."
That is, they brought in massive amounts of artillery to shell the French virtually continiously. They then built saps (trenches) up to the outlying positions and assaulted and overran them. As the positions fell, the perimeter shrank and the airfields became untenable.
Eventually the French lost the position.

Had this battle taken place in winter it could have been Veiliki Luyki, 6th Army at Stalingrad, Cholm, or any one of several other German WW 2 pocket battles.