Hitler sacks Goring

Richard · #1 (**permalink**) September 24th, 2007, 09:48 AM

Hitler has to eat humble pie after his defeat at the B.O.B. and with Sea Lion now on hold Hitler decides Herman Goring must be sacked from his post as head of the Luftwaffe. Who do you think would take over and how would the Goring fan club react this this blow?

Za Rodinu · #2 (**permalink**) September 24th, 2007, 11:21 AM

Some of the other Luftwaffe marshals would be able to step into his boots, Kesselring, Milch, Sperrle...

Though not impossible it would raise some waves as Goering was such a big wig in the Party with a lot of other past and present responsibilities, not the least of which would be Jaegermeister of the Reich :P

The fact is Goering despite his obvious faults remaind head of the LW until his fatidic telegramm offereing to replace the Fuhrer. The question we should ask is what did keep him up there.

Richard · #3 (**permalink**) September 24th, 2007, 11:56 AM

Let me flesh this out a bit, Hitler really is angry with Goring and takes no stick from anyone who supports Goring. Would this caused some problems in the long term or not. And with this vacancy open to the Generals who would have the guts to step in and even reorganize the Luftwaffe?

Za, in the real events Hitler was loyal to his followers and stuck with them like Mussolini when he got him out to safety. I think it's more like Hitler believed they would never go against him but as we all know from the last days of the war Goring and Himmler did. Result of this must have shattered Hitler's possible belief they would all go down with him and not stab him in the back.

PzJgr · #4 (**permalink**) September 24th, 2007, 12:36 PM

Milch would be the obvious replacement for Goring. He reminds me of Heydrich who also had visions of himself replacing Himmler.

Erhard Milch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

At the outbreak of World War II Milch, now with the rank of general, commanded a Luftwaffe wing during the Norwegian campaign. Following the defeat of France, Milch was promoted to field-marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) and given the title Air Inspector General. Milch was put in charge of the production of planes during this time, and his many mistakes were key to the loss of German air superiority as the war progressed. Due to changing the designs and aircraft requirements frequently, manufacturers like Messerschmitt were unable to focus on aircraft output. Germany produced fewer than 5,000 planes during 1942, whereas Russia increased its aircraft production to over 40,000, leading to a change of superiority on the Eastern Front. Interestingly, during 1944, when Allied bombers were razing German factories and cities, aircraft production moved up to over 40,000, comparable with the Soviets, but too late. In 1944 Milch sided with Joseph Goebbels and Heinrich Himmler in attempting to convince Hitler to remove Göring from command of the Luftwaffe following the failed invasion of the Soviet Union. When Hitler refused, Göring retaliated by forcing Milch out of his position. For the rest of the war, he worked under Albert Speer.
Following Hitler’s suicide, Milch attempted to flee Germany, but was captured by Allied forces on the Baltic coast on May 4, 1945. On surrendering he presented his baton to the Commando-Brigadier Derek Mills-Roberts who was so disgusted by what he had seen when liberating Belsen, broke the baton over Milch's head. [1] Milch was subsequently tried as a war criminal at Nuremberg. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment at Landsberg prison, although he was released in June 1954. He lived out the remainder of his life at Düsseldorf, where he died in 1972.

~~Roddoss72~~ · #5 (**permalink**) September 25th, 2007, 12:58 AM

I concur with most, but after getting rid of Goring Hitler had to move quickly to blood let Goring's supporter base, Gorings replacement would have to go to Erhard Milch as Luftwaffe Head and begin to promote Generals to head the respective Luftwafe departments on merit, a novel approach, but one thing has me stumped and that Herman Gorings influence within the Gestapo and the SS, this could be a problem.

But if the Luftwaffe had leaders of merit things may have turned out differently.

TA152 · #6 (**permalink**) September 25th, 2007, 04:30 AM

If Hitler had Goring die in an aircraft accident then it would take the politics out of it and the German Air Force might or might not get a more useful commander, however over all it would not change the outcome of the war.

It is an interesting question on how he managed to stay in power for so long, looking at him in film and in pictures does not inspire much confidence in me as a leader.

Za Rodinu · #7 (**permalink**) September 25th, 2007, 08:31 AM

Goering was never a non-entity, a buffoon just fit for the photo-ops. From Hermann Goering

(my underscores)

Quote:

Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, President of the Reichstag, Prime Minister of Prussia and, as Hitler's designated successor, the second man in the Third Reich, Hermann Goering was born in Rosenheim on January 12, 1893.

The son of a judge who had been sent by Bismarck to South-West Africa as the first Resident Minister Plenipotentiary, Goering entered the army in 1914 as an Infantry Lieutenant, before being transferred to the air force as a combat pilot. The last Commander in 1918 of the Richthofen Fighter Squadron, Goering distinguished himself as an air ace, credited with shooting down twenty-two Allied aircraft. Awarded the Pour le Merite and the Iron Cross (First Class), he ended the war with the romantic aura of a much decorated pilot and war hero. After World War I he was employed as a showflier and pilot in Denmark and Sweden, where he met his first wife, Baroness Karin von Fock-Kantzow, whom he married in Munich in February 1922.

Goering's aristocratic background and his prestige as a war hero made him a prize recruit to the infant Nazi Party and Hitler appointed him to command the SA Brownshirts in December 1922. Nazism offered the swashbuckling Goering the promise of action, adventure, comradeship and an outlet for his unreflective, elemental hunger for power.

In 1923 he took part in the Munich Beer-Hall putsch, in which he was seriously wounded and forced to flee from Germany for four years until a general amnesty was declared. He escaped to Austria, Italy and then Sweden, was admitted to a mental hospital and, in September 1925, to an asylum for dangerous inmates, becoming a morphine addict in the course of his extended recovery.

Returning to Germany in 1927, he rejoined the NSDAP and was elected as one of its first deputies to the Reichstag a year later. During the next five years Goering played a major part in smoothing Hitler's road to power, using his contacts with conservative circles, big business and army officers to reconcile them to the Nazi Party and orchestrating the electoral triumph of 31 July 1932 which brought him the Presidency of the Reichstag.

Following Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 January 1933, Goering was made Prussian Minister of the Interior, Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Police and Gestapo and Commissioner for Aviation. As the creator of the secret police, Goering, together with Himmler (q.v.) and Heydrich (q.v.), set up the early concentration camps for political opponents, showing formidable energy in terrorizing and crushing all resistance.

Under the pretext of a threatened communist coup, Prussia was “cleansed” and hundreds of officers and thousands of ordinary policemen were purged, being replaced from the great reservoir of SA and SS men who took over the policing of Berlin. Goering exploited the Reichstag fire — which many suspected that he had engineered — to implement a series of emergency decrees that destroyed the last remnants of civil rights in Germany, to imprison communists and Social Democrats and ban the left-wing press. He directed operations during the Blood Purge, which eliminated his rival Ernst Rohm and other SA leaders on 30 June 1934.

On 1 March 1935 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force and, with Udet and Milch, was responsible for organizing the rapid build-up of the aircraft industry and training of pilots. In 1936 his powers were further extended by his appointment as Plenipotentiary for the implementation of the Four Year Plan, which gave him virtually dictatorial controls to direct the German economy. The creation of the state-owned Hermann Goering Works in 1937, a gigantic industrial nexus which employed 700,000 workers and amassed a capital of 400 million marks, enabled him to accumulate a huge fortune.

Goering used his position to indulge in ostentatious luxury, living in a palace in Berlin and building a hunting mansion named after his first wife Karin (she had died of tuberculosis in 1931) where he organized feasts, state hunts, showed off his stolen art treasures and uninhibitedly pursued his extravagant tastes. Changing uniforms and suits five times a day, affecting an archaic Germanic style of hunting dress (replete with green leather jackets, medieval peasant hats and boar spears), flaunting his medals and jewelry, Goering's transparent enjoyment of the trappings of power, his debauches and bribe-taking, gradually corrupted his judgment. The "Iron Knight," a curious mixture of condottiere and sybarite, "the last Renaissance man" as he liked to style himself with characteristic egomania, increasingly confused theatrical effect with real power. Nevertheless, he remained genuinely popular with the German masses who regarded him as manly, honest and more accessible than the Fuhrer, mistaking his extrovert bluster and vitality for human warmth.

Goering's cunning, brutality and ambition were displayed in the cabal he engineered against the two leading army Generals, von Fritsch and von Blomberg, whom he helped to bring down in February 1938, in the misplaced hope that he would step into their shoes. Following the Crystal Night [Kristallnacht] pogrom of 9 November 1938, it was Goering who fined the German Jewish community a billion marks and ordered the elimination of Jews from the German economy, the "Aryanization" of their property and businesses, and their exclusion from schools, resorts, parks, forests, etc. On 12 November 1938 he warned of a "final reckoning with the Jews" should Germany come into conflict with a foreign power. It was also Goering who instructed Heydrich on 31 July 1941 to "carry out all preparations with regard to . . . a general solution [Gesamtlosung] of the Jewish question in those territories of Europe which are under German influence.. . ."

Goering identified with Hitler's territorial aspirations, playing a key role in bringing about the Anschluss in 1938 and the bludgeoning of the Czechs into submission, though he preferred to dictate a new order in Europe by "diplomatic" means rather than through a general European war. Appointed Reich Council Chairman for National Defence on 30 August 1939 and officially designated as Hitler's successor on 1 September, Goering directed the Luftwaffe campaigns against Poland and France, and on 19 June 1940 was promoted to Reich Marshal.

In August 1940 he confidently threw himself into the great offensive against Great Britain, Operation Eagle, convinced that he would drive the RAF from the skies and secure the surrender of the British by means of the Luftwaffe alone. Goering, however, lost control of the Battle of Britain and made a fatal, tactical error when he switched to massive night bombings of London on 7 September 1940 just when British fighter defences were reeling from losses in the air and on the ground. This move saved the RAF sector control stations from destruction and gave the British fighter defences precious time to recover. The failure of the Luftwaffe (which Hitler never forgave) caused the abandonment of Operation Sea Lion, the planned invasion of England, and began the political eclipse of Goering. Further failures of the Luftwaffe on the Russian front and its inability to defend Germany itself from Allied bombing attacks underlined Goering's incompetence as its supreme commander. Technical research was run down completely, not surprisingly with a Commander-in-Chief who prized personal heroism above scientific know-how and whose idea of dignified combat was ramming enemy aircraft.

Goering rapidly sank into lethargy and a world of illusions, expressly forbidding General Galland to report that enemy fighters were accompanying bomber squadrons deeper and deeper into German territory in 1943. By this time Goering had become a bloated shadow of his former self, discredited, isolated and increasingly despised by Hitler who blamed him for Germany's defeats. Undermined by Bormann's intrigues, overtaken in influence by Himmler, Goebbels and Speer, mentally humiliated by his servile dependence on the Fuhrer, Goering's personality began to disintegrate. When Hitler declared that he would remain in the Berlin bunker to the end, Goering, who had already left for Bavaria, misinterpreted this as an abdication and requested that he be allowed to take over at once; he was ignominiously dismissed from all his posts, expelled from the Party and arrested. Shortly afterwards, on 9 May 1945, Goering was captured by forces of the American Seventh Army and, to his great surprise, put on trial at Nuremberg in 1946.

During his trial Goering, who had slimmed in captivity and had been taken off drugs, defended himself with aggressive vigour and skill, frequently outwitting the prosecuting counsel. With Hitler dead, he stood out among the defendants as the dominating personality, dictating attitudes to other prisoners in the dock and adopting a pose of self-conscious heroism motivated by the belief that he would be immortalized as a German martyr. Nevertheless, Goering failed to convince the judges, who found him guilty on all four counts: of conspiracy to wage war, crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. No mitigating circumstances were found and Goering was sentenced to death by hanging. On 15 October 1946, two hours before his execution was due to take place, Goering committed suicide in his Nuremberg cell, taking a capsule of poison that he had succeeded in hiding from his guards during his captivity.

So you can see Goering was an individual totally immersed in the Nazi taking over of the entire nation, in economical, industrial, political and security terms. It's quite natural that Hitler owed a great debt to this man.

PzJgr · #8 (**permalink**) September 25th, 2007, 01:04 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Za Rodinu

So you can see Goering was an individual totally immersed in the Nazi taking over of the entire nation, in economical, industrial, political and security terms. It's quite natural that Hitler owed a great debt to this man.

I would agree that he owes Goring but Hitler also owed the SA alot and did you notice their reward?

~~Roddoss72~~ · #9 (**permalink**) September 27th, 2007, 12:59 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by PzJgr

I would agree that he owes Goring but Hitler also owed the SA alot and did you notice their reward?

Yeah a Versaille style "stab in the back".

redcoat · #10 (**permalink**) September 27th, 2007, 10:56 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Roddoss72

But if the Luftwaffe had leaders of merit things may have turned out differently.

No. They still would have lost.

~~Roddoss72~~ · #11 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 12:58 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by redcoat

No. They still would have lost.

Like what, say i throw a spanner into the mix and say we have, Milch in charge and decides as early as 1941 to reorganize the Luftwaffe into a Heavy Bomber Strategic Air Force instead of a Medium Bomber Tatical Air Force, but we still have medium bombers to support the troops, but we also have four engined heavies like the Messerschmitt Me-264 which flew in 1942, we also ramp up the He-277 production (The mated twin engines are seperated into four seperate engine as Heinkel wanted to do but was forbiddin by Goring), the four engine heavies would then launch large scale raids against British and Soviet industries.

redcoat · #12 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 01:11 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Roddoss72

Like what, say i throw a spanner into the mix and say we have, Milch in charge and decides as early as 1941 to reorganize the Luftwaffe into a Heavy Bomber Strategic Air Force instead of a Medium Bomber Tatical Air Force, but we still have medium bombers to support the troops, but we also have four engined heavies like the Messerschmitt Me-264 which flew in 1942, we also ramp up the He-277 production (The mated twin engines are seperated into four seperate engine as Heinkel wanted to do but was forbiddin by Goring), the four engine heavies would then launch large scale raids against British and Soviet industries.

Can't be done. the German aircraft industry cannot produce enough for both a tactical and strategic bomber force of the size needed.
Remember one of the main reasons the Germans were able to produce so many aircraft in 44, was the fact they concentrated on fighters which are simpler to produce than multi engined bombers

Za Rodinu · #13 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 02:34 AM

Old English proverb: "Thou cans't have thy cake and eat it too"

~~Roddoss72~~ · #14 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 04:50 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by redcoat

Can't be done. the German aircraft industry cannot produce enough for both a tactical and strategic bomber force of the size needed.
Remember one of the main reasons the Germans were able to produce so many aircraft in 44, was the fact they concentrated on fighters which are simpler to produce than multi engined bombers

No the main problem was that the Germans refused to give up on obsolete designs, they tried to wring everything out of those designs instead of allowing the manufacturers design and build new aircraft, also political interference was crippling the RLM, as mentioned as an example Heinkel wanted to decouple the engines of the He-177 Greif and redesign it back to a four nascelled heavy bomber but Goring forbade it, ironically Heinkel did produce a four nascelled He-277 and its performance was extraordinary, the Messrschmitt Me-264 "Amerika Bomber" which flew in mid 1942 could in theory fly up to five tonnes of ordnance from Poland into the industrial heartland of the Soviet Union east of the Urals, Messerscmitt had planned to build up to 2000 a year, this how ever meant scrapping the Me-109 again Goring forbade this.

Za Rodinu · #15 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 07:41 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Roddoss72

No the main problem was that the Germans refused to give up on obsolete designs, they tried to wring everything out of those designs instead of allowing the manufacturers design and build new aircraft,

The problem here is that as any production guy you'll tell you you can't very easily set up new or convert old production lines. It forces you to entirely stop production at that plant for months. The best you can do is do incremential changes to existing models. That's why the me-109 was in production from what, 1936 through 1945, even if the 45 model had little to do with the 36 model, bar the name.

If you look at a list of German planes you see an incredible amount of types in service or others in low-production/prototypes only. This was a madness that Germany economy could not afford at all and tried to stop.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Roddoss72

also political interference was crippling the RLM, as mentioned as an example Heinkel wanted to decouple the engines of the He-177 Greif and redesign it back to a four nascelled heavy bomber but Goring forbade it, ironically Heinkel did produce a four nascelled He-277 and its performance was extraordinary,

This was a good idea but then again the economy was in such a bad position that it could't afford. Besides swithching production again would entirely stop production of the only half-decent heavy bomber for months.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Roddoss72

the Messrschmitt Me-264 "Amerika Bomber" which flew in mid 1942 could in theory fly up to five tonnes of ordnance from Poland into the industrial heartland of the Soviet Union east of the Urals, Messerscmitt had planned to build up to 2000 a year, this how ever meant scrapping the Me-109 again Goring forbade this.

Your last paragraph responds to this: priority given to Reich Defence against the Allied Bombers.

But even so, you have no idea how dispersed and how far Soviet industry was in Siberia, 20% of oil coming in from the Sakahlin Islands close to Japan! All the rest was imensely dispersed at locations that became know only postwar when the Americans started their U-2 overflights. Again, remember that even under heavy bombing Germany managed to increase production, so why would things work different for the Germans with a very much weaker program and no P-51s to escort them?

redcoat · #16 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 10:24 AM

The Germans did conduct a bomber offensive against Britain from January to May 1944, which the British called the 'Baby Blitz'.
It achieved nothing, and cost the Luftwaffe over half of the 550+ bombers committed to the operation

Carl W Schwamberger · #17 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 02:18 PM

Any war changing alternatives for the Luftwaffe must go back to 1938 or earlier. Different development and production policys must be in place that early to alter any major outcomes. Perhaps if General Werner (Wever?) had not died in a aircrash in the middle 1930s better production policys would have been followed.

PzJgr · #18 (**permalink**) September 28th, 2007, 04:45 PM

I see a lot of excellent points here. Once the war began, it was too late to make any major changes for Germany. After 42', the production seemed to focus on fighters, which it should have. The aim would be to have air superiority over the Fatherland first and then the battlefields. But here, Hitler had become a nuisance with his demand for bombers or converting fighters over to fighter-bomber roles such as using the ME 262 as a bomber as well. Such idiocy cost Germany the war. After 42', Germany could not carry the war past it's borders so investing in bomber fleets would be a waste. It would take too long as Za has pointed out and short change the fighter fleet which was needed against the enemy bombers. As Carl pointed out, any plans for a strategic fleet should have been implemented in the 30's prior to going to war. Even if Germany had the 'Amerika' Bomber, it would do no good bombing targets hundreds of miles away. Not while Germany was on the defensive.