But regained it later.

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Initiative.
I propose that what little initiative the Germans had on Dec 16 was mostly gone by the the 19th or 20th, when Allied ground commanders met in Verdun and decided to fight the Germans on the ground of their own choosing.

The German 6th Panzer Army (PA) had been stopped cold in the North, the German 7th Army was making little progress in the south, mostly on the heels of the 5th PA's tail. Only in the center (German 5th PA) were Germans making any headway, essentially against no forces, since the US 106th Infantry Division (ID) had lost two of it's regiments and most of it's artillery.

The US 422nd and 423rd Infantry Regiments of the 106th ID were unable to manuever as the result of being on the wrong side of a river with insufficient bridging to connect them to the rear. They simply ran out of supplies and unlike locations to the rear, they were so far forward that significant supply depots did not exist where they were. The other divisions in the center (US28th ID, US 7th Armored Division) and the various cavalry groups were able to retire in good order because they were not positioned so that their ability to maneuver was handicapped like the US 106th ID.

The decisions to fight at Elsenborn Ridge, St Vith and Bastogne, certainly born of desperation, served their purpose of denying the Germans the initiative, slowing their advance and allow other Allied forces to prepare to fight in other locations. The forces in these area were helped by a better supply situation than was the 106th. The Allied decision not to go on the offensive along the length of the bulge until all forces were in place was a sound one. There were no large scale counter-attacks early on by the Allies. This allowed the Allies to fight using their strengths and capitalize on German weaknesses, when the weather cleared and the German attack was weakening.

From the 19th on, the Allies held the initiative, even though they were falling back in the center. It was an action akin to allowing a cow to through a chute at a slaughterhouse. The cow thinks is going somewhere safe, but we know better. Eisenhower's early efforts were to hold the shoulders of the bulge strongly and allow the Germans movement in the center, until forces could be marshalled to slow the entire German offensive.

That is pretty much what happened. Look at maps of the battle. The shoulders held and Germans went blithely toward their defeat at Celles on the 24th. It was there that Allies fought German armor on the ground of their own choosing and defeated them.

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Best Regards,
JW

For the Germans it seems the attack went wrong from the beginning. The tanks were meant to be used ONLY once the breakthrough was created by the attack of their infantry. This did not manage to make it and the tanks were used for getting through the front and the Germans lost tanks and time which both they could not afford to lose.

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I did not mean to change the subject to the Battle of the Bulge.

What I was trying to show was the difference between Reaction and Initiative. Now we can talk about local initative all the way up to the stratigic level (where I thought we were at) but we need to make sure that we are not mixing them up.

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"Well, I don't believe that climate change is just an issue that's convenient to bring up during a campaign. I believe it's one of the greatest moral challenges of our generation."
http://www.barackobama.com/issues/energy/
Barack Obama

Fine with me. When I posed the initial question, I wasn't really wanting to talk about the Lodgement phase of the campaign anyway. I was more interested in how the drive across France would differ.

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Best Regards,
JW

My only thought is if the US Leaders would have priority on taking Antwerp as they rush across Belgium in late August/early Spetember. Or, would they have also become enamoured with the idea of breaching the Rhine instead.

Carl,
What precedents in the actual timeline do you base this on? In your opinion, would the US 12th Army Group have been more aggressive taking Walcheren Island and the Antwerp approaches and what you base this on? I'm not trying to be cantankerous or difficult, just wanting to explore this further.

As far as Patton's drive across Brittany and from Avranches to the Seine and on to just beyond the Meuse, this was more a pursuit of an almost non-existant enemy. This is not to detract from the accomplishment, the 3rd Army stayed in the saddle and drove hard nipping at German heels when some armies would very well have stopped. And this was in territory mostly not as conducisive to mobile warfare as existed on the North German Plain. It also didn't help the German cause that Herr Schinkelgruber insisted that the 5th Panzer Army put it's own head in the noose trying to pinch off the US 3rd Army and showed Bradley's faith in the US 30thID holding at Mortain.

So I guess the questions (for all of you) are, would US doctrine and practice, coupled with more wheeled vehicles, and resulted in a quicker run to the Lower Rhine for the 12th AG than did the 21st AG ? Would US Engineering assets be adequate to bridge the Lower Rhine branches before Oct 1944? Would the US 82nd, 101st and British 6th Airborne Division been utilized in a similar manner or would the 12th AG gotten close enough Arnhem to have resulted in more drops across the river?

I know, I know, I hate what ifs. Just bear with me.

edit I just noticed that this post 888 for me. If 666 is the Sign of the Beast, what is 888, the Sign of the Breasts?

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Best Regards,
JW

No...

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942

"From 1 Aug, when Patton's Third Army was activated at Avranches, to 26 Aug, when it's lead elements reached the Seine near Troyes, the army had advanced approximately 260 miles an average of 10 miles a day. Meanwhile, 21st Army Group was still facing the bulk of the German panzer divisions and facing an enemy fighting for it's life while attempting to escape the Falaise pocket. Patton was advancing against negligible opposition. But from 26 August on, when the bulk of the Allied forces had closed to and crossed the Seine, 21st Army Group reached Antwerp on 4 Sep, a distance of approx 200 miles in nine days an average of 22 miles a day, and Maastricht on 14 Sept, a distance of 250 miles from the Seine. Meanwhile, in that same period, Patton advanced 100-150 miles"

As you can see, when Montys 21st Army broke out, it travelled at a faster rate than Pattons 3rd Army

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if in doubt....Panic!!!!

The operation that Redcoat referrs to is called 'the great swan'
(mentioned in my earlier posts)

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942

I read that Patton had alot of rivers to cross. Was Monty also facing the problem of rivers with no bridges? ( just asking...)

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Sirs, I know this thread is basically about the breakout phase of D-Day but after reading all your very informative posts, I just can't help but wonder how a British division would've handled Omaha's defenses. The British had Hobart's Funnies, which the US refused to use when the British offered the equipment to them.
Since you guys really know about this stuff, how would a British division fare against Omaha's defenses.

P.S. I checked the what if's to find out if this was asked before. I found none. I thought about starting a new thread but the title would've been very similar to the title of this thread. I hope I didn't go off topic. If I did, I apologize in advance. I am just really curious how the British would've handled Omaha.

The British and Canadian beaches all had a longer bombardment from naval units on D-day, (IIRC 1.5 hours against 45 minutes) and did use a greater variety of specialised armour, but I've no doubt the outcome would have been the same, a successful landing. Casualties may have been a little lower, but that's the only difference I can see.

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if in doubt....Panic!!!!

Get a map.

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if in doubt....Panic!!!!

Perhaps you can direct me to the direction of a map with intact bridges then....

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For a current detailed description of Omaha Beach read Balkowskis book 'Omaha Beach' . I'd also recomend Ellsbergs book 'The Far Shore'.

There were several reasons the British naval attack lasted longer. One was a preference for naval gunfire. Bradley thought air attack more effective and placed greater reliance on the heavy bomber attack made just before the first wave landed. His corps commanders disagreed (both had served in the Pacific) but Bradley overruled them. As we have often read the heavy bomber attack failed on Omaha Beach.

A second factor were the tides. At O beach the low tide median coincided with the edge of the German obstacles, and with the best approach for the landing craft. The British beaches were fronted by wide shoals of mud sand & silted rock. The tide had to rise enough for the landing craft to float over the shoals. The German obstacle belt started well above this shoal or mud flat. Landing the Brits at the lowest water would have caused them to wade across 800 or more meters of muck, tidal pools, and loose rocks. Then they would have reached the first obstacles. It varied from one beach to another but the water was deep enough to carry the small craft across the shoal 60 to 90 minutes after H hour, or the O & U beach landings. The Brits took advantage of this for some extra naval gunfire on the beaches.

Exactly how the Brits & the US would have handled the different circumstance I cant say. The only clue I have is in Bradleys attitude towards naval fire support.

Apropos the original question, I though that the US dealt with the west end because this would allow supply direct from the USA to French ports (eventually) rather than having to move up the Channel across the path of shipping from England.

As for dictating to the enemy, several of Monty's colossal cracks were timed to prevent German attempts to deploy the Panzer units for various counter-strokes against either end of the bridgehead. Ultra allowed him to forestall these and force the Germans to use them to prevent the eastern defence from collapsing. They succeeded but only at the cost of using their best forces and having them seriously depleted. When the Germans had to risk collapse in the East to redeem that in the west, the latent danger of which they were well aware, the eastenders' advance accellerated. The forces that the Germans could commit to Luttich were a motley nowhere near adequate for the task.

All in all, I favour the view that Normandy was a battle of attrition where Monty made it work for the Allies. Sadly the yah boo mudslinging of the Allied commanders in the 60's and 70's has been a historiographical dead end which has only recently been rectified by the likes of Buckley, Hart, French, Reid et al who have gone back to primary sources like proper historians.

As for 'doctrine' (a euphemism for 'theory'?) Buckley claims that the lack of theory or at least a mechanism for enforcement served the British-Canadian forces well since the unexpected length of time the Allies spent in the Norman hinterland required much of it to be changed anyway, which began within a fortnight of D-Day. It has occurred to me that much of the fighting in Normandy could be considered to have been in a 'temperate jungle' what with the foliage and terrain reducing visibility.

Good Heavens, would never happen...Us Brits like to be close to the sea dont you know?
The French would think it a miracle if their British allies were ever to venture too far away from the water....

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Prepare to repel borders.
William L. McGonagle, MOH, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer, USS LIBERTY 1967.

I'd be inclined to deride that comment except it occurs that I've lived on the coast ever since I got away from home.

One reason for the assignment of the beaches was the location of the various armys in Britian. The US ground units were posted mostly close to the western ports like Liverpool. Many were in Ireland. The Brits tended to be towards the eastern side of the isle. With those locations reversing the beaches to be attacked would have required making the movement to the embarkation ports and subsequent sea transit even more complex. In war anything one can do to simplify is a good thing.

see post 8 above