US on the left and Brits on the right

Slipdigit · #1 (**permalink**) September 29th, 2007, 01:15 AM

The US Army in the Second World War was the most mobile army in existence up until that time. There were more wheeled vehicles in use by the US Army than any other army of the day. It seems a bit odd to me that this army faced some of the worst terrain for mobile warefare, Central France, the Ardenne, The Vosage Mtns, The Palatinate, etc while the Brits were on the North German Plain with a less wheeled (but certainly far from leg dependent) army. With the US 7th Army set to come up the Loire Valley in late Summer, it would have made for some problems with the two US Army Groups (12th & 6th) seperated by the British 21st AG.

My question is: What would be the differences in the breakout and chase phases of the Northwest European campaign had the US landed on the left and the Brits on the right at Normandy? The question is not about the lodgement phase of the Normandy Campaign and assumes a roughly similar timeline up until 25 July 1944, only with each nations positions reversed.

Kai-Petri · #2 (**permalink**) September 29th, 2007, 12:17 PM

Personally I can only see any difference if the harbours had been taken and got in use in short time period ( Dieppe, Calais, Antwerp etc ) because during the real WW2 the speed element was enough to get the forces to the German border/ river Rhine but then they had to stop by autumn 1944 simply because the troops could not be supplied. So changing the troops without changing the supply element would not change much in my opinion.

T. A. Gardner · #3 (**permalink**) September 29th, 2007, 05:59 PM

I can see several major and positive differences:

The US would have moved more quickly to open various ports and ease their supply situation than Monty and the British did. One good reason for this is the US has far more engineering capacity to perform this work than the British army did. This would likely have made the fall supply crisis a non starter and both armies could have maintained their advance longer.

A second difference has to do with how certain units were used in the two armies. The US allowed its mechanized cavalry a far more free wheeling degree of operational latitude than the British had with any of their units. Most British armored car regiments were tied to specific divisions and could not go off on a "romp" across the countryside. The result of this is that often in the period where the Germans were in full retreat the US was actually ahead of many units or at least knew well in advance alternate routes and where things like bridges were still standing.
This would make the frequent German "last stand" by some small unit along the route of advance more difficult to pull off.

Getting back to engineering: This is one area the US would have had a huge advantage in. They could throw a bridge across any river in as little as half a day....including the Rhine (the 291st Engineers threw three roadway pontoon bridges across in less than 48 hours under fire. That is why they had to do three. The Germans kept hitting them with artillery fire).

Another aspect was that the British, for whatever reason, had far less confidence in and trust of local resistance groups than the US did. If you remember during Market-Garden the Dutch resistance had near complete control of the telephone system. The US made excellent use of this resource and quickly knew what was going on all the way to Arnheim. The British basically threw the Dutch out of their headquarters and ignored them. Turns out their intelligence was right on and better than that the British or Americans could have produced themselves.

Slipdigit · #4 (**permalink**) September 29th, 2007, 08:58 PM

One of the men at my church was in a recon company with the 30ID. He said that during the race across France, they several times ran off the maps. The first time it happened, they stopped. The Div CO chewed on them and told them to keep going. They kept going the next times it happened.

Jaeger · #5 (**permalink**) September 30th, 2007, 10:25 AM

I don't think there would have been 'radical' differences if the US and Brits/Canadians/Poles were on the other side.

The great swan from Normandy saw the 21st AG race like a bat out of hell to the Low countries.

As for the number of vehicles that is of less importance. During the 'swan' the recce and Armd brigades led the way. The British drew upon lessons from the MEF/8th Army lessons in 1940-42. Immobilising some units to give 'fresh' units right of way.

As an example my pet div (51st Highland) stopped at St. Valery where the original Highland Div had been shot to bits by Rommel in 1940, whilst other divisions took the van northwards.

A serious problem in the campaign was to get enough rescources to the fighting men. Even with the PLUTO in operation convoys needed to travel across France to supply the front.

Monty wanted the Narrow front to ease the supply situation, but we don't need to go down that lane do we?

To sum up. No I don't think that the reversal of forces would have done much difference.

In 1944 the British army was finally coming to terms with fighting efficently. However most revisionists give a similar description of the Brits in '44 as they would in '41. This is unfair as the Army did no less than 3 doctrinal revisions in that space of time.

tikilal · #6 (**permalink**) October 1st, 2007, 09:59 PM

Here are my two cents. Had the American landings been switched with the British, the Americans would have been the ones facing the German Armored divisions in Caen, The British would have lacked the resources to break out to the south. (IMO) You would have seen and increased need for up-gunned and up-armored tanks. Then a breakout to the north resulting in a right hook to trap the German Armies to the south. It would have been different but that is about all.

Carl W Schwamberger · #7 (**permalink**) October 1st, 2007, 10:53 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by tikilal

Here are my two cents. Had the American landings been switched with the British, the Americans would have been the ones facing the German Armored divisions in Caen, The British would have lacked the resources to break out to the south. (IMO) You would have seen and increased need for up-gunned and up-armored tanks. Then a breakout to the north resulting in a right hook to trap the German Armies to the south. It would have been different but that is about all.

That assumes the Germans would have deployed their corps the same way. They may have, but many German commanders still dismissed the US Army as inferior to the British and they would have been inclined to send more of the 'good' units towards the Briths sector, thinking that must be the more important area.

Anyone recall why the Allied armys were deployed as they were?

Slipdigit · #8 (**permalink**) October 2nd, 2007, 02:21 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger

That assumes the Germans would have deployed their corps the same way. They may have, but many German commanders still dismissed the US Army as inferior to the British and they would have been inclined to send more of the 'good' units towards the Briths sector, thinking that must be the more important area.

Anyone recall why the Allied armys were deployed as they were?

The source I found (after looking for many years), gave the reason that the US troops were billeted in the South and the Brits to the North. To have each army assault opposite beaches would have required them to cross each other in transit. It further postulated that the decision was probably made early in the American build-up phase by some non-descript middle-level British billeting officer when the US numbers were low and he unknowingly had a major part in Allied stategy because of it.

tikilal · #9 (**permalink**) October 2nd, 2007, 02:24 PM

As weird as it sounds it could be true. I do find it hard to believe that the billet locations in England determined assault beaches in France.

Had the Germans tried to move their armored forces past the Americans to the South to face the British they would have been exposed on the roads to fighter/bomber attacks for longer periods and arrived in less strength then they did in and around Caen. I also don’t know that I agree that most German generals thought more of the British than the Americans.

Kai-Petri · #10 (**permalink**) October 2nd, 2007, 04:09 PM

Well, at least it is known bocage was heavy in the US sector, so I don´t think the Germans would be very interested in putting lots of tanks there, really. Don´t recall the same problem being much mentioned in the Caen sector (??!) but i could be wrong.

T. A. Gardner · #11 (**permalink**) October 2nd, 2007, 04:28 PM

On the initial fighting:

With the US facing most of the German armor instead of Britain I would have expected the US Army to much more quickly start moving towards upgunning their AFV with first the 90mm and second, the 17pdr. Additionally, the M4A3E2 Jumbo would have proven more valuable than it originally did. It would certainly have been a bit interesting to see the US dumping the Sherman in favor of the M 26 and possibly other even heavier tanks like the T 29 - 34 series.
As the US has far more resources to produce new AFV and already had designs moving towards production I would think the M 26 and M 36 would have been pushed into service alot earlier than they were.
I would also expect that the US would not have tried a Hill 112 or Goodwood type of set piece head on attack style of warfare. They likely would still have carpet bombed the Germans more than once but it is very unlikely that any US Army general would have tried a set piece attack more than once and likely would have been replaced if his first try was costly. It is not the US style of war to commit to the sort of attack Monty prefered.

tikilal · #12 (**permalink**) October 2nd, 2007, 06:30 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

I would also expect that the US would not have tried a Hill 112 or Goodwood type of set piece head on attack style of warfare. They likely would still have carpet bombed the Germans more than once but it is very unlikely that any US Army general would have tried a set piece attack more than once and likely would have been replaced if his first try was costly. It is not the US style of war to commit to the sort of attack Monty prefered.

I dont follow your thinking here, how do you see the Americans fighting ? You think that Bradley would have been fired? Why do you think the AMericans would have carpet bombed so much?

redcoat · #13 (**permalink**) October 3rd, 2007, 09:10 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

I would also expect that the US would not have tried a Hill 112 or Goodwood type of set piece head on attack style of warfare. They likely would still have carpet bombed the Germans more than once but it is very unlikely that any US Army general would have tried a set piece attack more than once and likely would have been replaced if his first try was costly..

The USA lost 5 men to every 3 the British Commonwealth forces lost in Normandy, even though the British faced a large majority of the German Panzers, and slight majority of German infantry forces. Up until the attack on St Lo, Badley kept attacking on a broad front, which normally resulted in a large number of casulties for little gain.

Quote:

It is not the US style of war to commit to the sort of attack Monty prefered

Seeing there was no way around the German defensive lines, there was no other option than a set piece head on attack. Monty's method while costly in armour, was less costly in human terms.

Emperor · #14 (**permalink**) October 4th, 2007, 01:35 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by tikilal

Here are my two cents. Had the American landings been switched with the British, the Americans would have been the ones facing the German Armored divisions in Caen, The British would have lacked the resources to break out to the south. (IMO) You would have seen and increased need for up-gunned and up-armored tanks. Then a breakout to the north resulting in a right hook to trap the German Armies to the south. It would have been different but that is about all.

Doesn't this scenario have the potential to trap more Germans in a pocket?

Kai-Petri · #15 (**permalink**) October 4th, 2007, 05:51 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by redcoat

The USA lost 5 men to every 3 the British Commonwealth forces lost in Normandy, even though the British faced a large majority of the German Panzers, and slight majority of German infantry forces. Up until the attack on St Lo, Badley kept attacking on a broad front, which normally resulted in a large number of casulties for little gain.

Seeing there was no way around the German defensive lines, there was no other option than a set piece head on attack. Monty's method while costly in armour, was less costly in human terms.

Wasn´t Monty warned that the men losses should be kept to minimum or the morale among the civilians ( back in the UK ) would go low or something like that, especially because the war was expected to be short-lasting.

The problem is also that if you don´t have infantry to protect the tanks you definitely are gonna lose the bl***** tanks.

redcoat · #16 (**permalink**) October 4th, 2007, 08:35 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Kai-Petri

Wasn´t Monty warned that the men losses should be kept to minimum or the morale among the civilians ( back in the UK ) would go low or something like that, especially because the war was expected to be short-lasting.

Nothing to do with civilian morale, the problem was a shortage of infantry. During late 44-5 certain units within 21 st Army had to be disbanded to maintain the numbers in other units

Carl W Schwamberger · #17 (**permalink**) October 5th, 2007, 02:51 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by redcoat

The USA lost 5 men to every 3 the British Commonwealth forces lost in Normandy, even though the British faced a large majority of the German Panzers, and slight majority of German infantry forces. Up until the attack on St Lo, Badley kept attacking on a broad front, which normally resulted in a large number of casulties for little gain.

Seeing there was no way around the German defensive lines, there was no other option than a set piece head on attack. Monty's method while costly in armour, was less costly in human terms.

Bradley seems to have kept at the various attacks longer than the Brits. He appears to have had a prefrence to chewing steadily away, rather than the "Colossal Cracks" Montgomery prefered. I wonder if any historians have analyised this aspect? In the Tunisian campaign he had observed various British corps commanders attempt narrow front 'punch through' attacks, and fail. Patton during his brief tenure as II Corps commander had tried the same and not achived the results he hoped for. When Bradley had his chance as II Corps commander he gave mutiple attacks on several axis a try, and had better results. Perhaps he was trying to reproduce the same in Normandy?

Jaeger · #18 (**permalink**) October 5th, 2007, 10:54 AM

The colossal crack worked beautifully didn't it? Using the concept of 'balance' Monty pinned down german armour in the north (through a series of set-piece battles that might be a draw tactically, but served their strategic purpose) and with the german reserves comitted to battle, the US Armies could break out. This tore the defensive structure of the german front wide open, and enabeled the Great Swan.

tikilal · #19 (**permalink**) October 5th, 2007, 05:23 PM

I dont know that Monty "pined" anything down, The Germans chose to engadge the enemy on Montys sector, perhaps with the idead that their forces could swing north if Patton did land around Calis. Had they moved south to fight the Americans Monty would have been able to advance faster no doubt. The whole set of events shows that the German Army was beaten.