US and finding a place to fight. What Did

tikilal · #1 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 03:36 PM

This is not a What if but a What did.

What led to the first US action in Europe being in Africa. Feel free to contribute facts, with references. Dates, names, and documents. No discussion of correctness or could have unless it was discussion that took place pre 1943.

Here we go.

bigfun · #2 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 04:37 PM

it's funny you brought this up as i just started to read a book by Ernie Pyle where he talks about fighting the French in North Africa? i'm noew to this but that really confuses me? so anyway i will be reading this with much anticipation!!!

Sloniksp · #3 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 04:42 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by tikilal

This is not a What if but a What did.

What led to the first US action in Europe being in Africa. Feel free to contribute facts, with references. Dates, names, and documents. No discussion of correctness or could have unless it was discussion that took place pre 1943.

Here we go.

Perhaps the "Under belly" of the 3rd Reich was its most vulnerable?

T. A. Gardner · #4 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 05:09 PM

The answer lies in the politics of coallition. The US Army and Roosevelt wanted to invade Europe directly almost from their entry into the war. Coded Roundup, there were plans for such an invasion from 1942 on.
The British and Churchill pretty much steadfastly refused to go along with such plans, instead offering alternatives that "sniped at the edges" of the German army. Churchill's Greek campaign, the North Africa campaign, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica are all examples of this thinking.
I think that North Africa was a good idea in hindsight. It allowed the US Army to get its act together without the pain of a major defeat (Kasserine Pass was a operational one that was recoverable as opposed to a Dieppe type disaster that would have been an outright repulse with no recovery possible). Beyond that the US was probably right in that the next invasion should have been a cross-channel one. But, this wasn't in the cards because of the British and even the actual D-Day in 1944 was a hard fought political win for the US as the British still were resisting the idea and only came on board because of the pressure Stalin added to that of the US.

tikilal · #5 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 08:14 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by bigfun

it's funny you brought this up as i just started to read a book by Ernie Pyle where he talks about fighting the French in North Africa? i'm noew to this but that really confuses me? so anyway i will be reading this with much anticipation!!!

Please contribute what you are reading about.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Sloniksp

Perhaps the "Under belly" of the 3rd Reich was its most vulnerable?

Could you be refering to Churchills infamous crocidle? Only problem is that Italy or Greece for that matter did not contribute much to the war power of Germany and those areas could be defended with 10-20 divisions maybe 30. Not so soft.

Quote:

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

The answer lies in the politics of coallition. The US Army and Roosevelt wanted to invade Europe directly almost from their entry into the war. Coded Roundup, there were plans for such an invasion from 1942 on.

True. Sledgehammer was planned for '42, it was a Dieppe type raid. Roundup was intended to invade France in '43. Stalin kept requesting a front in 42, Roosevelt wanted to keep the Russians in the war and needed action for the 42 elections. American planners new that to beat Germany they needed to fight in France.

Quote:

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

The British and Churchill pretty much steadfastly refused to go along with such plans, instead offering alternatives that "sniped at the edges" of the German army. Churchill's Greek campaign, the North Africa campaign, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica are all examples of this thinking.

Also true. Churchill didn't like the idea of getting into a war of attrition on the Continent. He gave the reason that there were not enough men and landing craft in the UK to launch Roundup or Sledgehammer. There were aroudn 30 divisions in the UK for defense.

Emperor · #6 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 08:19 PM

Churchill explains his reasoning pretty well in History of the Second World War. Landing craft were always a big factor, from North Africa all the way through Italy, France, Burma, and landings that never happened near Trieste and Rhodes.

I think he was also a little gunshy about amphibious landings after what happened at Gallipoli. But that was also part of his overall philosophy of not wasting lives and trying to find imaginitive ways to bring down Germany from the edges. Example: had an invasion of Rhodes happened, he thought he could get Turkey to join the Allies much sooner. Then a secure, warm-water route to the Soviet Union would have opened.

Another option was Norway and the rest of Scandinavia. This had the potential to cut the Germans off from their source of iron ore in Sweden, and would have solved some of the convoy problems in the Arctic. I'm not sure why this didn't happen. Again, probably landing craft.

tikilal · #7 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 08:57 PM

It is true that landing craft are important to amphibious operations. But what was planned in north africa was an amphibious operation. IE what was used there could have been used in France. Had the French fought the allies on the landing beaches it would have been similar to Normandy.

But then again if you invade Germany all of the German armies everywhere get cut off from supply. The only route to Germany for the US and Uk was through France.

Chuchill invisioned a large mobile tank army taht would invade Europe at the right moment and get infantry from the liberated nations.

bigfun · #8 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 09:21 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by tikilal

Please contribute what you are reading about.

okely dokely!

Ernie Pyle was a reporter attached to the American army heading into combat in North Africa.
They are in Oran fighting with the British forces there, here is one of the lines I am questioning, "...The French put up a terrific resistance, and in fact stopped us cold for a while." The context of this passage is of 2 Army photographers who were so caught up in their duties to record the war, they did not realize the battle going on around them.
Another one is "...A friend of mine, Lieutenant Colonel Ken Campbell, captured eight French soldiers......."
I don't know anything about this campaign, but the French? I'm confused!!

Wessex Wyvern · #9 (**permalink**) November 14th, 2007, 09:38 PM

Bigfun, The French soldiers they were fighting were Vichy French.
Have a look here.
Vichy France - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

North Africa had to be cleared of Germans as well as the rest of the Med as it would then free up shipping.
The quickest way from the UK to India , Burma and down to Australia is through the Med & down the Suez Canal on onwards.
Until the Med was clear of Axis Forces supply convoys had to take the long way round via South Africa .
Once the Med was free the shipping saved could then be used to get supplies across the Atlantic quicker.
Well that's how I see it.

tikilal · #10 (**permalink**) November 15th, 2007, 12:45 AM

Excellent input BigFun. Post all the quotes you want.

About shipping here is a quote from Winston Churchill and the Second Front

Quote:

In justifying Gymnast on the basis of saving a million deadweight tons in shipping, Sir Alan Brooke ignores the fact that in the long run the loss in shipping incurred as a result of sustaining his new Mediterranean campaigns must have greatly outweighed what was gained in opening up the sea. Furthermore, with the Mediterranean once open there was no longer nearly so serious a need for it as a route, because the Middle East theater, the principal front which the Mediterranean passage could supply, and at the greatest economy in shipping would necessarily be wound up though a victorious campaign to open the inland sea. In short, as General Marshall would become well aware, in spite of what Brooke has liked to consider the American Chief's ignorance of logistics, an operation to clear the Mediterranean was self-defeating so fas as a net profit in shipping was concerned. pg 135 (Reference to House of Commons Debates, 5th series vol 381, 237-576; cf. John Wheeler-Bennett)

von Rundstedt · #11 (**permalink**) November 15th, 2007, 05:04 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

The answer lies in the politics of coallition. The US Army and Roosevelt wanted to invade Europe directly almost from their entry into the war. Coded Roundup, there were plans for such an invasion from 1942 on.
The British and Churchill pretty much steadfastly refused to go along with such plans, instead offering alternatives that "sniped at the edges" of the German army. Churchill's Greek campaign, the North Africa campaign, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica are all examples of this thinking.
I think that North Africa was a good idea in hindsight. It allowed the US Army to get its act together without the pain of a major defeat (Kasserine Pass was a operational one that was recoverable as opposed to a Dieppe type disaster that would have been an outright repulse with no recovery possible). Beyond that the US was probably right in that the next invasion should have been a cross-channel one. But, this wasn't in the cards because of the British and even the actual D-Day in 1944 was a hard fought political win for the US as the British still were resisting the idea and only came on board because of the pressure Stalin added to that of the US.

Could not agree more, the western allies were in no shape to invade Europe directly, as you indicate but they were being pressured by Stalin to get into the picture, so America and Britain knew that they could invade Europe through Italy via North Africa, plus this was to the allies advantage, as it turned out it led to the destruction of many Axis divisions, and it knocked Italy out of the war in 1943, again this proved strategically important as it diverted many German division from the Eastern Front and the Atlantic Wall.

By mid 1944 the Americans and British were in position to invade contintental Europe directly, by this stage the much vaunted Atlantic Wall was defended by third and fourth rate (mostly recovering wounded) troops. Also the location of the invasion was a brilliant piece of planning as the Germans never expected the invasion to take place in the Normandie area, Germany had planned a Calais landing and had the bulk of its forces their.

tikilal · #12 (**permalink**) November 15th, 2007, 03:20 PM

First Rundstedt please understand that my comments are not personal.

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