What if Rommel received what he wanted as commander of Hitler's Atlantic Wall?

I hope I am allowed to revive this old thread because I think the matter was not discussed as fully as it should have been after the posts in the original digressed to a discussion of the Me-262. There were 58 posts on the old thread, many of them very insightful posts about famed "Sturm Vogel."

I have my own definite idea of what the Allied action would be but it would be a lot more interesting to get a wider perspective from different people. As I always say, "A person learns something new from someone everyday."

I would agree. I do think that had the allies been cut off at the beaches with panzer units in reserve and located closer than they were, the invasion cold have been stopped. The allies almost came close to pulling out of Omaha beach. Yes, the navy could have caused considerable damage but all the Germans had to do is keep the allies pinned down on the beaches for that first day.

But as von Rundstedt noted, this would require Hitler loosening his grip on operations. That would never have happened

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American by birth, TEXAN by the grace of GOD!

The question is how would Rommel be able to get what he needed?

Germany simply had nothing. The reason why the Allies launched D-Day is because the garrison at the wall was nothing short of a skeleton force... 67,000 men?

In the East, the only army which was virtually unscathed compared to the rest was Army Groupe Centre. And we all know what happend there on 22 June 1944

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The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

I definitely see the points of view presented and I tend to agree with them.
However, there is one factor that could have aided Rommel and the Germans on Normandy that is often overlooked. If only the Germans had reacted properly to the intelligence they received on the D-Day attack, it would have been entirely plausible ground for the early release of the panzer reserves. Acting promptly would have allowed the reserves to move with the cover of night, thus they wouldn't be bled dry before reaching the fighting front.
This arrival could have tipped the scales for the Germans because the airborne would have to face tanks. We all know what happened during Market Garden. Without the chokepoints provided by the airborne, the Germans could move far more readily and thus meet the landings at the beaches more agressively.

Don´t forget the 15th Army at Calais...

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Yes forgot all about it......

Any info on the strength of this force at this time? Didnt this Army also suffer 2 defeats in the hands of the British and the Canadians?

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The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

I don't understand some What-Ifs, especially those implicating on the Operational-Low Strategical levels

What-If some of you guys bought some wargames and played them (try the Europa Series), and work out alternative scenarios, troop deployments, supply situations, etc?

It's much more fun, you roll lotsa dice, drink lotsa beer, find lotsa friends, stay up late, and gain some indirect experience.

A lot of questions asked in these sacred hallows can easily be replied to by this method.

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My guess is, nothing. Rommel simply couldn't get around the vastly overwhelming naval gunfire and tactical air superiority that the Allies enjoyed during those crucial first few days. He could have lined the invasion beaches with panzer divisions and the Allies would simply have shot them to pieces, just like they had done in a number of earlier campaigns.

I really don't see how Rommel could have gotten what his planning called for in any case. For instance, OT workers historically ran about 40% of requested building the Atlantic Wall. Finding several hundred thousand more to fill the requested number would have been impossible. Concrete deliveries ran 10 to 50% of requested amounts. High months typically saw about 500,000 to 750,000 cubic meters delivered. Diverting that much from elsewhere would have severly impacted other projects and even economic development. The same can be said for steel. Rebar, steel trusses, and general steel for fabrication was also in short supply.
Because of the labor shortage many units spent much of their time building field fortifications rather than training tactically.
Other items in short supply included ammunition, particularly for many of the captured weapons being used in the Atlantic Wall. Mines were also not available in the quantity requested. Taking literally the entire supply being produced might have satisfied requirements but this is hardly realistic either.

And, as John Dudek points out Rommel wasn't going to get any useful naval support. Without this nothing could be done to stop the invasion fleet. I would put up Okinawa as the example of that. Air power alone, particularly in the face of equal or superior air power will not be able to stop a naval amphibious invasion on its own. The Japanese threw over 5,000 Kamikaze (not to mention hundreds of regular sorties) at the US Navy off Okinawa to no avail. The Germans using conventional tactics with aircraft could not hope to do better.

Too bad you are in Portugal Miguel, otherwise I'd invite you over for a game or three (seeing as how I have the whole GDW Europa series among several hundred other titles).

That's a nice idea. Makes me recall my old wargames on World War II made by TSR, like Operation Cobra.
Happy New Year, guys.

I don't want to get into this too deeply as 'What Ifs' really aren't my thing.

But the more I read about it, the more I come to believe that D-Day was actually quite a close-run thing. It certainly wasn't taken as a foregone conclusion by many Allied commanders ( viz Eisenhower's famous, un-used communique to be used in the event of failure ). If the Allies hadn't gained a firm foothold by the end of that first day, there would at the very least been a severe crisis of confidence among the commanders.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

I really don't think Normandy was much of a "close-run thing." The closest any beach got to that was Ohama where there was sufficent doubt that consideration was made to pulling off the beach. There just about everything that could go wrong did. But, in most sections of even that beach the Allies were firmly established by the afternoon of the first day.
If anything, Salerno was more close-run than Normandy. There, there was no preliminary bombardment. A panzer division was literally camped on the landing beaches. The Germans threw in a half dozen more panzer and panzergrenadier divisions within a day or two of the landings and actually almost reached the British beaches in armored counterattacks. Yet, even there where the Germans had much better odds and faced less air and naval opposition they lost.
Basically, the only sure way to defeat an amphibious landing is by naval operations. Send a fleet to dispatch the attacking fleet.

Like the Kriegsmarine did at Dieppe...?

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

or the Marines at Wake Island.

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Best Regards,
JW

What if the Omaha beach had failed, then there would be no firm line facing the Germans and one landing zone on its own?

Omaha beach failed?

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Sure way to stop an amphibious assault. I didn't say it couldn't be done. Dieppe is a poor example as it was intended as a "raid." With the intent of withdrawing the Canadian / British forces and not making a permanent lodgement. On the whole, it was a bad idea.
Wake failed the first time due to what is best characterized as the defeat of the weak Japanese naval forces supporting the operation. So, that follows the rule given. Defeat the naval forces stop the invasion.

Now, as to Ohama.....That could have had serious implications and have forced a prolonged build up and breakout phase that lasted as much as two or three months longer than historically happened. But, the British were in a reasonable position and Utah was not going to be overly threatened in the initial German response as they were likely to still put the bulk of their arriving reinforcements in front of the British whose positions represented more of an immediate threat.

Omaha is an interesting point ; that a strong amphibious assault, preceded by aerial and naval bombardment, under conditions of total air supremacy, supported by amphibious armour, could run into such difficulty from well-emplaced mortars and machine-guns ( and no Panzer divisions at all ) , makes you think that if Rommel had indeed 'got what he wanted' - D-Day may have been a much closer-run thing indeed.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

Even though I don't want to start the usual national rant. Omaha was largely a close run thing out of a few poor choices and bad luck.

Not using Hobart funnies, and the deploying the DD Shermans too far out is not good enough on the commanders part. The air strikes not 100% and the fog of war acting up.

There were 5 beaches and only 1 had significant difficuleties, yet the 1 with problems have been given the headlines. Sometimes I get the idea that some thinks that if you were on either of the other 4 beaches then you didn't really take part of D-Day.

As for Rommel getting his way, we would have been in Germany a lot sooner.

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'We march. The enemy is retreating in transport. We follow on foot.' Lt.Neil McCallum 5/7 Gordons 19th November 1942