If hitler began operation Barbarossa at his initial proposed date - Page 2

Sloniksp · #26 (**permalink**) January 16th, 2008, 08:17 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger

Rereading this thread I see one assumption is the onset of winter stopped the German advance. This was a secondary reason and the cold weather did aggravate the primary problem, but it was not the critical factor. The fundamental problem was the inability of the supply transport to keep up with the advance.

I agree with most of what you have said.

Though I must say that the #1 problem which the Germans faced was the Russian soldier. Never before had the Germans faced such an adversary. The "Ivan" was willing to sacrifice much more then the Germans, while having less and was also a better shot then the Germans had hoped. Weather and supply lines were more of an inconvenience.

von Rundstedt · #27 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 12:52 AM

In any way you look at it the one main factor of the loss of direction and the eventual failure of Barbarossa was Hitler continual meddling and shifting the focus of the invasion, diversion of troops here and there and poor allies.

Sloniksp · #28 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 01:10 AM

General Gotthard Heinrici, the commander of the Germans Fourth Army's XXXXIII Army Corps at Moscow and by war's end, the Wehrmacht's premier defensive specialist, congently assessed the reasons for the Germans failure.

Hitler's meddling in military affairs was not on the list of the top 7 reasons.

Politically, Hitler underestimated the inner stability of the Bolshevik system was his first reason. Followed by, Militarily, the Russian armed forces were suprisingly capable.

von Rundstedt · #29 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 02:40 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Sloniksp

General Gotthard Heinrici, the commander of the Germans Fourth Army's XXXXIII Army Corps at Moscow and by war's end, the Wehrmacht's premier defensive specialist, congently assessed the reasons for the Germans failure.

Hitler's meddling in military affairs was not on the list of the top 7 reasons.

Politically, Hitler underestimated the inner stability of the Bolshevik system was his first reason. Followed by, Militarily, the Russian armed forces were suprisingly capable.

Hey Sloniksp

Thank you for the insight of General Gotthard Heinrici, i would be very interested in knowing his top 7, where can i get such information.

Thank you.

Sloniksp · #30 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 03:44 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by von Rundstedt

Hey Sloniksp

Thank you for the insight of General Gotthard Heinrici, i would be very interested in knowing his top 7, where can i get such information.

Thank you.

Here you go, I actually posted them here in here before so I just copy and paste

Oh and I believe #4 was what you might have been referring too

From "Before Stalingrad" - David Glantz

General Gotthard Heinrici, commander of the German Fourth Army's XXXXII Arrmy Corps at Moscow and by wars end the Wehrmacht's premier defensive specialist, congently assessed the reason for the German failure even before the Red Army's Moscow counteroffensive began, stating:

The goal set for the Eastern Campaing was not achieved. The enemy's armed forces were defeated, but the Russian state structure did not collapse. The threat of a two front war stood at the door. The attack on Russia did not prevent this from happening; on the contrary, it conjured up its possibility.

The basis for this failure rested on the following:

1. Politically, Hitler underestimated the inner stability or the Bolshevik system. It proved to be tenacious and consolidated. The spirit within the Russians to defend 'Mother Russia' was stronger than their rejection of the Communist dictatorship.

2. Economically, Russia was also better established than Hitler was willing to admit.

3. Militarily, the Russian armed forces were surprisingly capable. They often defended with a stubborn tenacity and they had an astounding ability to improvise, even in the technical arena. These qualities consistently made up for the inability of the senior Russian leadership.

4. Most decisive was the operational decision of August 1941, which shifted the main emphasis of the operation from Army Groupe Centre to Army Group South and in part, to the north. This forfeited the best chance to conduct a decisive battle with the enemy during the direct attack on Moscow. I stress 'best chance ,' because there has been no evidence to the contrary.

5. The motorized problem must also be considered. The German Army did not have the necessary motorized units and air transport formations or the required fuel reserves for a campaign in an area with the depth of Russia.

6. The width and depth of Russia had a decisive significance.

7. The Russian climate and terrain also complicated matters. The effect of the mud period was surprising in its significance. The coming of the Russian winter did not correspond with German expectations. And the difficulty of the terrain, with its wide marshes and impasssible regions, the great primeval-like forests complexes, the few good roads and the wide, unregulated river courses may not have stopped the offensive, but they did cause considerable delays.

~~PactOfSteel~~ · #31 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 03:55 AM

it was the damn cold, if Hitler would have done it in the summer or at least the battle for Stalingrad was during the summer they would have won. Stalin had already signed a peace pact with Hitler, they were so close...

Troglodyte · #32 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 04:39 AM

Offcouse it was the COLD!!!

Everybody knows that russkie has antifreeze instead of the blood. Therefor not affected by cold.

While German Übermensch took heavy casualties from cold.

Suggestion - look into Winter War of 1939!

~~PactOfSteel~~ · #33 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 06:28 AM

Hitler should have learned from Napoleon. I give the Soviets credit for the scorched earth policy, that was bad as*.

Kai-Petri · #34 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 06:50 AM

...and Napoleon conquered Moscow and did not win....Oops!

Sloniksp · #35 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 05:29 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by PactOfSteel

it was the damn cold, if Hitler would have done it in the summer or at least the battle for Stalingrad was during the summer they would have won. Stalin had already signed a peace pact with Hitler, they were so close...

Please read the post above yours

Carl W Schwamberger · #36 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 07:47 PM

Yes I've seen Heinricis opinions. When I read the specifics given by the local commanders at the divsion (Raus) or battery (Sigfried Knappe or Werner Adamczyk) and others one universal thread runs through their accounts. Supplies were short or nonexistant. At the battery level both Adamczyk & Knappe describe firing missions from ammo directly off the supply trucks or wagons and inconsequential ammounts in the battery load from early November. Knappe remarked on the good fortune of his divsion (87th Infantry) to be operating close to the main railroad servicing Army Group Center. Unlike the infantry further away his divsion recived partial rations from the railhead and did little foraging for food.

Raus in his account ascribes the inability of his Pz Divsion to make the final advance to Lenningrad directly to a lack of (in no particularl order) fuel, spare parts, ammuniiton, tank losses and infantry casualties in the motorized rifle battalions. These crippling shortages begain occuring in October and November, before the cold weather started.

Sloniksp · #37 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 08:34 PM

please deplete this post, mods....

Sloniksp · #38 (**permalink**) January 17th, 2008, 08:39 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Carl W Schwamberger

Raus in his account ascribes the inability of his Pz Divsion to make the final advance to Lenningrad directly to a lack of (in no particularl order) fuel, spare parts, ammuniiton, tank losses and infantry casualties in the motorized rifle battalions. These crippling shortages begain occuring in October and November, before the cold weather started.

Von Leeb, wrote to Hitler after taking Pushkin, that he could no longer advance as he had taken 60,000 casualties while receiving no reinforcements and at the same time coming head to head with the most fortified positions at the outskirts of the city.

The catch is, that while the Red Army suffered way more casualties, the 60,000 German casualties was simply unheard off as the Germans never enticipated on loosing this much.
These looses were atributed to the Russians not the weather or supply lines.

In the first 6 months of the war, Germany suffered 1 million casualties on the Easter Front. A staggering number for a war machine which has just walked through Europe at the same time only receiving about 200,000 replacements.

von Rundstedt · #39 (**permalink**) January 18th, 2008, 01:17 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Sloniksp

Here you go, I actually posted them here in here before so I just copy and paste

Oh and I believe #4 was what you might have been referring too

From "Before Stalingrad" - David Glantz

General Gotthard Heinrici, commander of the German Fourth Army's XXXXII Arrmy Corps at Moscow and by wars end the Wehrmacht's premier defensive specialist, congently assessed the reason for the German failure even before the Red Army's Moscow counteroffensive began, stating:

The goal set for the Eastern Campaing was not achieved. The enemy's armed forces were defeated, but the Russian state structure did not collapse. The threat of a two front war stood at the door. The attack on Russia did not prevent this from happening; on the contrary, it conjured up its possibility.

The basis for this failure rested on the following:

1. Politically, Hitler underestimated the inner stability or the Bolshevik system. It proved to be tenacious and consolidated. The spirit within the Russians to defend 'Mother Russia' was stronger than their rejection of the Communist dictatorship.

2. Economically, Russia was also better established than Hitler was willing to admit.

3. Militarily, the Russian armed forces were surprisingly capable. They often defended with a stubborn tenacity and they had an astounding ability to improvise, even in the technical arena. These qualities consistently made up for the inability of the senior Russian leadership.

4. Most decisive was the operational decision of August 1941, which shifted the main emphasis of the operation from Army Groupe Centre to Army Group South and in part, to the north. This forfeited the best chance to conduct a decisive battle with the enemy during the direct attack on Moscow. I stress 'best chance ,' because there has been no evidence to the contrary.

5. The motorized problem must also be considered. The German Army did not have the necessary motorized units and air transport formations or the required fuel reserves for a campaign in an area with the depth of Russia.

6. The width and depth of Russia had a decisive significance.

7. The Russian climate and terrain also complicated matters. The effect of the mud period was surprising in its significance. The coming of the Russian winter did not correspond with German expectations. And the difficulty of the terrain, with its wide marshes and impasssible regions, the great primeval-like forests complexes, the few good roads and the wide, unregulated river courses may not have stopped the offensive, but they did cause considerable delays.

Thank You Sloniksp

Good insight to the failure of Barbarossa, i'll look at these and have some responses to these.

You are a God.

~~PactOfSteel~~ · #40 (**permalink**) January 18th, 2008, 02:34 AM

this answer starts at the beginning, Hitler should have built up his military might more before going to war with Poland/Europe. Defeating the Bolsheviks/Communism were the Nazis highest priorities but they had to ally with them at beginning or else they could have faced a two-front war, Hitler knew this and in the back of his head he was waiting for the perfect opportunity to strike. Saying this it confuses me still why he decided to forsake England a enemy that was no where near being defeated and were allied with us a sleeping giant, didn't he know that sooner or later they were going to invade France with superior forces? yes he had the beaches mined and built the bunkers ect... for a invasion but why not just finish off England? Yes it was a stalemate military wise, England was ready for a invasion from the Germans and they had a good navy. But Hitler wasn't counting on Englands harassment, they wouldn't leave him alone, he thought he could ally with them thats why Rudolf Hess flew over to negotiate, he realized they posed a grave threat to the Third Reich. Operation Sealion shouldn't have been post-poned, it should have been either re-planned or executed not delayed. Once England was removed then regather strength, build-up and finally invade the Soviets knowing you won't be fighting a two-front war. And yes Barbarossa should have began at that date, then the winter wouldn't have been has bad. Napoleon made the same mistake.

Slipdigit · #41 (**permalink**) January 18th, 2008, 02:46 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Sloniksp

The "Ivan" was willing to sacrifice much more then the Germans,

Or perhaps they had not met an adversary that was willing to sacrifice as much and that had the men and territory with which to do it.

German border 1940 to Paris - about 200 miles
German border 1940 Warsaw - about the same.
German border Oct 1939 to Kiev - over 500 miles.
German border to Moscow - over 600 miles.
Kiev is over 500 miles southwest of Moscow and Leningrad is about 400 miles northwest, with Kiev and Leningrad being close to 800 miles apart.

Great distances and divergent axes* faced the Germans.

The Soviets had the room to spare and apparently were willing spare the men.

*Plural of axis

Slipdigit · #42 (**permalink**) January 18th, 2008, 03:13 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by PactOfSteel

this answer starts at the beginning, Hitler should have built up his military might more before going to war with Poland/Europe.

But he did. The Werhmacht went from 100,000 men in 1934 to 4,722,000 by Aug 1939 and 8,154,000 by 1941. That is quite a buildup in a very short amount of time.

Quote:

Defeating the Bolsheviks/Communism were the Nazis highest priorities but they had to ally with them at beginning or else they could have faced a two-front war, Hitler knew this and in the back of his head he was waiting for the perfect opportunity to strike. Saying this it confuses me still why he decided to forsake England a enemy that was no where near being defeated

Because he knew that the German forces could not defeat the UK without a significant addition the DKM and he apparently was too impatient to wait on that improbable eventuality.

Quote:

and were allied with us a sleeping giant, didn't he know that sooner or later they were going to invade France with superior forces? yes he had the beaches mined and built the bunkers ect... for a invasion but why not just finish off England? Yes it was a stalemate military wise, England was ready for a invasion from the Germans and they had a good navy.

He apparently didn't think the US was capable or willing to get elbow deep in war or would not be much of an adversary, why I do not know. Looking at situation years removed and with post-incident knowledge of what happened, it is easy to see that he "should have known." Very likely, he considered a cross-channel invasion as impractical for the Brits as it was for him. I don't think the thought of American involvement in it even would have crossed his mind in the Spring of 1941.

Quote:

Operation Sealion shouldn't have been post-poned, it should have been either re-planned or executed not delayed. Once England was removed then regather strength, build-up and finally invade the Soviets knowing you won't be fighting a two-front war. And yes Barbarossa should have began at that date, then the winter wouldn't have been has bad. Napoleon made the same mistake.

As Terry Gardner said in another thread, Sealion would have been an unmitigated disaster for the Germans on so many levels. On June 6, 1944, the Western Allies totally controlled the seas and the air over and around the landing grounds and had to fight over only the landing grounds themselves. Sealion as planned in 1940 would have required the Wehrmacht to fight over the air and sea around the landing grounds, as well as the landing grounds themselves. We are very aware of what happened over Great Britain the Summer of 1940 and we are also aware of the unreplaceable losses of naval assets the Norway expedition cost the DKM. How were the Germans going to change the outcome? If the Wehrmacht had persisted in a cross-channel invasion, we would probably now be spending our forum time arguing why he couldn't see that it was bound to fail, as it would be so plain to us now.

Sloniksp · #43 (**permalink**) January 18th, 2008, 04:41 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Slipdigit

Or perhaps they had not met an adversary that was willing to sacrifice as much and that had the men and territory with which to do it.

German border 1940 to Paris - about 200 miles
German border 1940 Warsaw - about the same.
German border Oct 1939 to Kiev - over 500 miles.
German border to Moscow - over 600 miles.
Kiev is over 500 miles southwest of Moscow and Leningrad is about 400 miles northwest, with Kiev and Leningrad being close to 800 miles apart.

Great distances and divergent axes* faced the Germans.

The Soviets had the room to spare and apparently were willing spare the men.

*Plural of axis

Yes you are correct. The size of the Soviet Union was without a doubt an ally of itself. We can also say that the Soviet people had more to fight for.