Should Hitler have resolved the British problem at the beginning ?

.docholliday · #1 (**permalink**) January 14th, 2008, 03:34 AM

What if the Fuhrer completed operation sea lion and eliminated the British capacity to wage war over the channel, this would have negated the Mediterranean, north Africa and Greece campaigns while given the Axis it's much needed secured communications on Malta.

The disposition of the British armed forces may have resulted in more troops being deployed to the eastern front Although, but would securing England be large drain on the wehrmachts manpower coupled with notorious British patriotism ?

On the other hand If Britain was knocked out of the war in 1941, an alliance between Russia and USA would be severely difficult to initiate without the desperate British to form the basis of the alliance. Thus resulting on all attention being directed to obliterate Russia and it's ability to resist giving the Germans their much sought after Living space eastwards.

Kai-Petri · #2 (**permalink**) January 14th, 2008, 08:54 AM

Sea lion would have been a death trap for German soldiers, so no wonder Hitler was not interested in trying it once Luftwaffe could not wipe the RAf out of the sky.

I think the answer in the west can be found in Dunkirk. Dont´stop the tanks, Adolf! With BEF in your hands it could be well different.

.docholliday · #3 (**permalink**) January 14th, 2008, 01:28 PM

Quite true Hitlers first mistake of the war was at Dunkirk, Although he still believed a truce with Britain was possibly at that point in the war. How wrong he turned out to be.

Hitler was winning albeit at a loss to his own Luftwaffe but never the less he had the British on the run until he ordered the bombing of London which resulted in the RAF deploying their northern squadrons to deal with the German bombers. Thus the Germans believed the RAF wasn't actually on the brink of annihilation as it almost was.
Occupation of england would have been a handful and a depletion of capable manpower available for the wehrmacht. The capture of Britain I believe would have been worth the the hassle, as it would eliminate a nuisance in many theaters of war like the Mediterranean and North Africa which would have released a portion of soldiers back into Europe without an enemy in the fields. This would also allow Hitler to consolidate his forces but give the Russians more time to prepare for the impending onslaught.

Kai-Petri · #4 (**permalink**) January 14th, 2008, 02:18 PM

How bad a beating would the Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine etc get by going full steam ahead with Seelöwe and its weaknesses? Even if it ended in success you would have won in the west but what do you have left of your army? Remember, the bear ( =USSR ) is behind your back and ready to strike when you´re weak. And Soviet Army was taught to attack not defend (which was the problem for Red Army during Barbarossa ) . The same thing happened later on for Germans, nobody knew the defensive tactics because they were not taught.

T. A. Gardner · #5 (**permalink**) January 14th, 2008, 06:06 PM

Yes, Hitler should have finished his war with Britain before embarking on any new military project (like Russia). Seelöwe was not necessarily needed to accomplish this either. Instead, the Germans could have reinforced the Italians and finished Britain in the Mediterrainian basin. Taking the entire Middle East wasn't necessary, just driving the British out of Egypt and taking Suez might have been sufficent.
The air war could have been pursued long term at a lower pace than Göring's original blitz strategy. A sustained and sustainable bombing campaign was possible. Germany had the resources for it if they focused on such a strategy.
At sea the Germans could have continued the U-boat campaign but by being more scruplious about US losses kept the US from whipping up support for joining the war at home. It didn't matter if Britain was starving. It mattered that Britain was investing far more capital into fighting U-boats that Germany was in building them.
Combined with a loss or inavailablitiy of Middle East oil the British would be in the same position as Germany with limited fuel resources. With more U-boats operating in the Indian Ocean (control of the Suez Canal would have allowed that) and more operating off Africa in the Atlantic the British could have really suffered shortages of many vital resources.
With the Japanese entering the war at the beginning of 1942 the British would have been in even more trouble. With no German declaration of war on the US Lend-Lease would have dried up as the US politically could not have supported its continuation.
Britain loses in the Far East and potentially even India and Australia are threatened.
With the very real look of losing much of their overseas empire, an unabated bombing war going on at home, their forces unable to match Germany on land, a serious commerce war at sea, and the US not coming to their aid now that they have a war of their own, Britain might just have sued for peace with Germany.
Of course, things didn't work this way historically. But, had Hitler and the OKW been more savvy grand strategists they might have.

Sloniksp · #6 (**permalink**) January 14th, 2008, 06:35 PM

There are those who claim that Stalin knew war was coming, just not until England fell. This would inevitably bring the U.S. to Great Britain aid. Once sides in question wore themselves out, the "hero" Stalin and his men would swarm down upon Europe like locusts and claim all.

Theories unfortunately is all we have.

BTW....

I too think that going to war with Russia before Great Britain was dealt with, was a catastrophic blunder.

.docholliday · #7 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 12:56 AM

From what i understand Stalin had his own designs for western Europe, it just happens that Hitler had a bit less patience. Stalin was undoubtedly was a sly one just like Franco of Spain but Hitler's mien Kampf basically prophesied the plunder and rape of eastern lands explicitly the Slavic people, Hitler's intentions were known but not heeded at any point. Hitler played an excellent game of lulling his opponents into awkward positions and keep them guessing until it's was to late and he was as entrusted the Fuhrer - Hitler was adept at manipulating politically although war strategdy was a slightly different prospect.

Finishing off the British though in the Mediterranean I believe would place german in a worse position for the manpower as, to achieve victory in that theater the Germans would have needed to pump more troops into that arena. Eliminating the British nuisance at the roots could be achieved with much less effort (Britain is an Island thus once supplies are cut off the entire system will be distraught and desperate for an armistice with Germany) Taking Britain would negate extra troops being sent to north africa and Mediterranean and provide a wall for the britons to resist in any capacity. Strategically England was in a much worse position that the Germans who constantly worried about another two front war. The U-boats was exacting a horrifying loss to Allied shipping and if the trend continued all possibilities for the British to wage war would be removed.

Hop · #8 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 03:05 AM

Quote:

What if the Fuhrer completed operation sea lion and eliminated the British capacity to wage war over the channel,

How?

This is of course what the Germans were trying to do. They failed, but not for want of trying.

Quote:

Hitler was winning albeit at a loss to his own Luftwaffe but never the less he had the British on the run until he ordered the bombing of London

No, the Luftwaffe were losing throughout. They just didn't know it because of their inflated kill claims. It's worth pointing out that in the 4 weeks before the switch to London the Luftwaffe had a worse kill/loss ratio against the RAF than they had in the 4 weeks after they began attacking London.

It still wasn't anything like good enough to win the battle, though.

Quote:

Thus the Germans believed the RAF wasn't actually on the brink of annihilation as it almost was.

No, other way around. The Germans believed their own kill claims, believed the RAF was almost destroyed, believed they were winning the battle.

The truth is RAF strength increased for most of the battle. From 1200 Fighter Command aircrew at the end of June to 1,396 on the 10th August to 1,381 on the 7th September to 1,581 at the end of September.

Same for aircraft. On 17th July (earliest date for which I have operational aircraft numbers) Fighter Command had 568 Spits and Hurricanes fit for duty in operational squadrons.

By 13th August, the start of the Luftwaffe's all out offensive, that had risen to 579.

By the 20th August, after a week the Luftwaffe believed would destroy the RAF, they had 636.

By the end of August they had 587, and by the 7th September, when the Luftwaffe switched to London, they had 621.

Look at those figures again. In early July, when the battle was just beginning, the RAF had 568 serviceable single engined fighters. On the 7th September, when the Luftwaffe largely abandoned attacks on airfields and switched to bombing London, they had 621. 2 months of the best the Luftwaffe could do and the RAF had more fighters and more fighter pilots.

Quote:

Seelöwe was not necessarily needed to accomplish this either. Instead, the Germans could have reinforced the Italians and finished Britain in the Mediterrainian basin. Taking the entire Middle East wasn't necessary, just driving the British out of Egypt and taking Suez might have been sufficent.

Why? As soon as the Italians entered the war the British stopped running merchants through the Med. All the trade with the far east went the long way around Africa.

The Germans taking the Med merely reduces British commitments a little.

Quote:

The air war could have been pursued long term at a lower pace than Göring's original blitz strategy. A sustained and sustainable bombing campaign was possible. Germany had the resources for it if they focused on such a strategy.

They did, it was called the Blitz. It was called off for the attack on Russia, but after the early phase it didn't really achieve much.

Quote:

At sea the Germans could have continued the U-boat campaign but by being more scruplious about US losses kept the US from whipping up support for joining the war at home. It didn't matter if Britain was starving. It mattered that Britain was investing far more capital into fighting U-boats that Germany was in building them.

Again, this is what Germany actually did. Again it didn't do them much good.

Britain didn't build more ships than the Germans were sinking, but it benefited from the merchant fleets of neutral countries Germany had invaded, like the Norwegians, Dutch etc.

In 1939 the British merchant fleet amounted to 17.7 million tons. By the end of 1941 it was 20.8 million tons.

As to starving, food stocks in Britain were 10.53 million tons at the start of the war, 7.49 million tons by December 1939, 10.63 million tons in December 1940, 13.39 in December 1941.

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Combined with a loss or inavailablitiy of Middle East oil the British would be in the same position as Germany with limited fuel resources.

Because of the long shipping route, most of Britain's oil came from the western hemisphere, either the US or Caribbean.

The big producers in the Caribbean were Trinidad and the Dutch West Indies, being allied there was little problem in paying for this fuel. Production in 1939 was something over 10 million tons a year, and with the pre war expansion plans would likely have increased as the war went on.

The US was the world's largest oil producer and supplied oil, but in return for dollars or gold only, until Lend Lease cut in in 1941.

Quote:

With the Japanese entering the war at the beginning of 1942 the British would have been in even more trouble. With no German declaration of war on the US Lend-Lease would have dried up as the US politically could not have supported its continuation.

I don't understand this. Once the Japanese declare war on the US, the US sees far more common cause with the UK.

There's no way Japan would declare war on the UK and not the US, because it was the US embargo that drove Japan to war anyway. Their whole strategy in going to war against the US was to secure a free hand for themselves.

john1761 · #9 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 03:55 AM

Kai-Petri, I think Model and Von Manstien would have a thing to say that the Wehrmacht was not trained in defensive warfare.and the soviet's tried their idea of offensive war i.e. preplanned mass infantry attacks in 41-42 and failed miserable.

Martin Bull · #10 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 07:32 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by .docholliday

Hitler was winning albeit at a loss to his own Luftwaffe but never the less he had the British on the run until he ordered the bombing of London which resulted in the RAF deploying their northern squadrons to deal with the German bombers.

This isn't correct. Hop has summed it up fairly well - and as for Northern RAF squadrons engaging Luftwaffe bombers, don't forget the disastrous ( and only ) daylight attack on Northern England by Luftflotte 5. This occurred on Thursday 15th August ( weeks before the attack on London ), and even German figures admit to a 20% loss-rate.

Kai-Petri · #11 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 01:37 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by john1761

Kai-Petri, I think Model and Von Manstien would have a thing to say that the Wehrmacht was not trained in defensive warfare.and the soviet's tried their idea of offensive war i.e. preplanned mass infantry attacks in 41-42 and failed miserable.

Later on yes, they showed how to defend, but I would not call December 1941 " not a step back" method a very developed version of defensive action. Also the Red Army´s attack method was a huge waste of man and material. Walking targets for MG´s and 88´s schrapnels....

Sloniksp · #12 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 03:03 PM

Not One Step Back - Order 227..... Was issued in July 1942.

From my knowledge, the suicidal runs were not pre-planned but were more on the lines of desperation as STAVKA desperately tried to slow the German onlsaught and win enough time to build new defenses, reinforce their lines and call up more men......

An enormous price to pay for Stalin's blunder, but it accomplished the desired effect.

Gregory Zhukov in October of 41' singed a decree which, explicitly forbade frontal attacks on German forces without the support of Artiller and/or Air Support...... While the armor would be concentrated on the German flanks.

Guderian even made a note of this in his diary upon experienceing such a counter attack, at which he stated... "We took more casualties then before and even had to reinforce my flanks, they were learning".

PzJgr · #13 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 03:16 PM

Ok gentlemen, this is a what if, not a "could a". So going on the premise that Hitler did take Britain, a US/Soviet alliance would be difficult if Hitler made sure that his subs did not sink any US ships. The Americans, regardless of Hitler's tramping all over Europe, were not convinced that this was their war. The Brits would have had to move their government either to India or Australia. Egypt really did not have much to offer and would be difficult to hold if Hitler put all his energies towards the fight against the British instead of dividing his forces by attacking the USSR. At this point, Hitler should focus on holding what he had gained. By attacking the USSR, he spread his forces too thin and would not be able to hold onto anything. I believe it was von Clauswitz who said, "he who defends everything, defends nothing".

Hitler's initial success, similar to blitzkrieg, is to focus on one point and throw everthing there. Knock out your enemies one by one. Don't force them to concentrate or put yourself in a position where there are enemy attacks from various directions. In the latter part of his reign, Hitler got over confident and threw everything to the wind. He got greedy and lost. Fortunately for us.

T. A. Gardner · #14 (**permalink**) January 15th, 2008, 04:14 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Hop

Why? As soon as the Italians entered the war the British stopped running merchants through the Med. All the trade with the far east went the long way around Africa.
The Germans taking the Med merely reduces British commitments a little.

Actually, the loss of Alexandria and possibly the loss of Massawa in its wake (eg., the Axis retakes Italian Ethopia) takes away the two major ports of operation the British have in Eastern Africa. The loss of these two along with their use by the Axis as operating bases for U-boats into the Indian Ocean would represent a huge strain on Commonwealth escorting resources. Trade around the Horn would be far more difficult now running a several thousand mile long gauntlet of U-boat "infested" waters.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Hop

They did, it was called the Blitz. It was called off for the attack on Russia, but after the early phase it didn't really achieve much.

What I was suggesting wasn't so much a high intensity Blitz as just a sustained campaign with possibly several raids of maybe just 20 to 50 aircraft per night with nightfighter escorts along with daylight fighter bomber raids, the occasional anti-shipping strike, etc. Enough to keep the pressure on the RAF but not sufficent to draw down Luftwaffe strength. This would make it hard for the British to withdraw RAF units to other theaters while the Germans have sufficent forces uncommitted to action over the UK to operate else where.

In regards to U-boats:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Hop

Again, this is what Germany actually did. Again it didn't do them much good.

Britain didn't build more ships than the Germans were sinking, but it benefited from the merchant fleets of neutral countries Germany had invaded, like the Norwegians, Dutch etc.

In 1939 the British merchant fleet amounted to 17.7 million tons. By the end of 1941 it was 20.8 million tons.

As to starving, food stocks in Britain were 10.53 million tons at the start of the war, 7.49 million tons by December 1939, 10.63 million tons in December 1940, 13.39 in December 1941.

Because of the long shipping route, most of Britain's oil came from the western hemisphere, either the US or Caribbean.

The big producers in the Caribbean were Trinidad and the Dutch West Indies, being allied there was little problem in paying for this fuel. Production in 1939 was something over 10 million tons a year, and with the pre war expansion plans would likely have increased as the war went on.

The US was the world's largest oil producer and supplied oil, but in return for dollars or gold only, until Lend Lease cut in in 1941.

True enough. But, the Allies historically were spending roughly ten times the money Germany was on the U-boat war. The US could afford it. Britain alone could not. If Germany steps up their operations even slightly and adds a larger dedicated force of maritime aircraft into the mix the British are faced with a real problem. Even if they can maintain their merchant tonnage the drain on resources would be unmanagable long term if the US is not helping. British escorts were also of lower quality than US ones. The Flower Class for example was too slow to run down a surfaced U-boat, unable to fight any type surface raider should one appear, as it lacked torpedoes, and basically was a cheap stop-gap that Britain could afford. Note, how the US only used eight of this class and then only temporarily.
But, if the Germans are more scruplious about not attacking US and neutral shipping outside declaired war zones then the US is given little reason to engage in a European war. Where ever the materials are coming from to Britain they go by sea. The Germans need only worry about tonnage sunk not where it is or what it is carrying. Eventually, this will hurt Britain's ability to pursue the war.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Hop

I don't understand this. Once the Japanese declare war on the US, the US sees far more common cause with the UK.

There's no way Japan would declare war on the UK and not the US, because it was the US embargo that drove Japan to war anyway. Their whole strategy in going to war against the US was to secure a free hand for themselves.

I would expect both to be involved in a Pacific war (the US and UK). But, a Pacific War against Japan by the US does not translate automatically into a US declaration of war on Germany or Italy. If the US is reluctant to engage in a European war then Britain is likely to only receive war supplies from the US that go towards winning the Pacific War.
It would be difficult for US politicians to justify giving Britain war material to fight Germany while the US was at war with Japan. This could easily be political suicide in the US.
In fact, I would expect the US to even limit their own shipping in the Atlantic to own needs telling Britain that they have to ship all of their goods in British hulls simply because the US needs their shipping for the war with Japan.
You would have definitely seen a drop in US naval strenght in the Atlantic far greater than was historically done once it became clear Germany was not going to go to war with the US. So long as the US is fighting Japan and Germany will not get involved I cannot see Britain getting any great amount of help from the US to fight Germany.

von Rundstedt · #15 (**permalink**) January 16th, 2008, 01:23 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Hop

How?

This is of course what the Germans were trying to do. They failed, but not for want of trying.

No, the Luftwaffe were losing throughout. They just didn't know it because of their inflated kill claims. It's worth pointing out that in the 4 weeks before the switch to London the Luftwaffe had a worse kill/loss ratio against the RAF than they had in the 4 weeks after they began attacking London.

It still wasn't anything like good enough to win the battle, though.

No, other way around. The Germans believed their own kill claims, believed the RAF was almost destroyed, believed they were winning the battle.

The truth is RAF strength increased for most of the battle. From 1200 Fighter Command aircrew at the end of June to 1,396 on the 10th August to 1,381 on the 7th September to 1,581 at the end of September.

Same for aircraft. On 17th July (earliest date for which I have operational aircraft numbers) Fighter Command had 568 Spits and Hurricanes fit for duty in operational squadrons.

By 13th August, the start of the Luftwaffe's all out offensive, that had risen to 579.

By the 20th August, after a week the Luftwaffe believed would destroy the RAF, they had 636.

By the end of August they had 587, and by the 7th September, when the Luftwaffe switched to London, they had 621.

Look at those figures again. In early July, when the battle was just beginning, the RAF had 568 serviceable single engined fighters. On the 7th September, when the Luftwaffe largely abandoned attacks on airfields and switched to bombing London, they had 621. 2 months of the best the Luftwaffe could do and the RAF had more fighters and more fighter pilots.

Why? As soon as the Italians entered the war the British stopped running merchants through the Med. All the trade with the far east went the long way around Africa.

The Germans taking the Med merely reduces British commitments a little.

They did, it was called the Blitz. It was called off for the attack on Russia, but after the early phase it didn't really achieve much.

Again, this is what Germany actually did. Again it didn't do them much good.

Britain didn't build more ships than the Germans were sinking, but it benefited from the merchant fleets of neutral countries Germany had invaded, like the Norwegians, Dutch etc.

In 1939 the British merchant fleet amounted to 17.7 million tons. By the end of 1941 it was 20.8 million tons.

As to starving, food stocks in Britain were 10.53 million tons at the start of the war, 7.49 million tons by December 1939, 10.63 million tons in December 1940, 13.39 in December 1941.

Because of the long shipping route, most of Britain's oil came from the western hemisphere, either the US or Caribbean.

The big producers in the Caribbean were Trinidad and the Dutch West Indies, being allied there was little problem in paying for this fuel. Production in 1939 was something over 10 million tons a year, and with the pre war expansion plans would likely have increased as the war went on.

The US was the world's largest oil producer and supplied oil, but in return for dollars or gold only, until Lend Lease cut in in 1941.

I don't understand this. Once the Japanese declare war on the US, the US sees far more common cause with the UK.

There's no way Japan would declare war on the UK and not the US, because it was the US embargo that drove Japan to war anyway. Their whole strategy in going to war against the US was to secure a free hand for themselves.

Actually in the regards to fight number claims the RAF were very much guilty of exponentially over inflating victory kills themselves, many pilots claimed shooting down aircraft but could not substantiate if they crashed, but were credited with kills anyway, many of the so called kills managed to limp home, the higher kill claims were of propaganda value.

If the British had lost the Med then the "around the Cape" route is far more dangerous to shipping than you realise, the seas of South Africa are dangerous and unpredictable, plus the convoys would have to run the entire west African coast from constant harrasment from U-Boats that could be deployed along that route, and whats more it add valuable time for the convoys to get to Britain.

Britain build more ships, please help me to understand this, for more merchant ships to be built, some RN naval programs would have to curtailed or cancelled, pray tell which RN ships would suffer to bolster the Merchantile Marine. And you mentioned starving, how much of the food was locally grown and produced and how much came from Commonwealth nations. I am not sure how much an WWII vintage oil carrier carries in weight in oil but i bet if several hundred are sunk through the early phase of the war that would put severe pressure on Britain available fuel stocks.

Falcon Jun · #16 (**permalink**) January 16th, 2008, 06:13 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

Yes, Hitler should have finished his war with Britain before embarking on any new military project (like Russia). Seelöwe was not necessarily needed to accomplish this either. Instead, the Germans could have reinforced the Italians and finished Britain in the Mediterrainian basin. Taking the entire Middle East wasn't necessary, just driving the British out of Egypt and taking Suez might have been sufficent..

Good points posted. These are roughly the same views I have. I completely agree with these points.

Hop · #17 (**permalink**) January 18th, 2008, 09:55 AM

Quote:

Actually in the regards to fight number claims the RAF were very much guilty of exponentially over inflating victory kills themselves, many pilots claimed shooting down aircraft but could not substantiate if they crashed, but were credited with kills anyway, many of the so called kills managed to limp home, the higher