Best case scenerio. Had MacArthur not tried to be a modern day Caesar, but instead heeded to the dictates of War Plan Orange III and immediately withdrawn his forces into Bataan along with all of his Quartermaster Stores, ammunition, weapons, medicine, fuel and other logistical necessaries with him, how long could he have held out against the Japanese and how long before the profound embarrassment of the US not going to the USAFFE Forces relief would begin to sink in to the American public? I wonder if, had the Philippines Islands held out well into 1942, would the US War strategy have been changed, with a much more aggressive war policy towards the seizure of Japanese bases leading up towards the PI, using Army Divisions originally slated for North Africa?

I read that millions of pounds of harvested rice were sitting idly in railroad cars throughout Luzon, but were prevented from moving into Bataan because of Philippine Governmental restrictions prohibitting the shipment of rice from one provence to another. Had they been sent into Bataan, those rations could have kept the USAFFE troops there much more well fed, battle fit and for a much longer period of time.

There is an excellent read in Chapter III: The Reinforcement of the Philippines from United States Army in World War II The War in the Pacific The Fall of the Philippines by Louis Morton. If the reinforcements had arrived how much longer could they have held out?

"In a letter prepared on 5 December 1941 but never sent, General Marshall outlined for General MacArthur what had been and was being done to strengthen USAFFE. "Reinforcements and equipment already approved," he said, "require over 1,000,000 ship tons." Fifty-five ships had already been obtained and approximately 100,000 ship tons of supplies were en route, with twice this amount ready for immediate shipment to ports of embarkation. Requests for equipment for the Philippine Army, except those for the M1 rifle, had been approved, and uncontrolled items of supply were being shipped as rapidly as they could be assembled and loaded on ships. "Not only will you receive soon all your supporting light artillery (130 75-mm. guns]," Marshall told MacArthur, "but 48 155-mm. howitzers and 24 155-mm. guns for corps and army artillery." Except for certain types of ammunition, the defense reserve for the U.S. Army by July of that year. Three semimobile antiaircraft artillery regiments were scheduled to leave the United States soon, but the 90--mm. antiaircraft gun could not be sent since it had not yet been fully tested. A sum of $269,000,000 had been requested from Congress for the support of the Philippine Army, and early passage of such legislation was expected. "I assure you," Marshall closed, "of my purpose to meet to the fullest extent possible your recommendations for personnel and equipment necessary to defend the Philippines."[65]
The last vessels carrying supplies to the Philippines were assembled in convoy in Hawaii and on 7 December were still on the high seas. In the convoy were the 52 dive bombers of the 27th Bombardment Group, 18 P-40s, 340 motor vehicles, 48 75-mm. guns, 3,500,00 rounds of .30- and .50-caliber ammunition, 600 tons of bombs, 9,000 drums of aviation fuel, and other heavy equipment and supplies. Also aboard were the two light field artillery battalions and the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H)."



HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Fall of the Philippines [Chapter 3]

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Wasn't this you, Mr Jack (SouthWestPacficVet) and your guns?

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Best Regards,
JW

I wonder though what might have happened had MacArthur had a Quartermaster General imbued with the powers to overcome Philippine Governmental restrictions, to seize and commandeer all wheeled transport and supply ships in the same fashion that a Canadian Transport full of Bren Gun Carriers meant for Hong Kong was taken and its cargo made part of MacArthur's mobile force TOE. A Vichy French freighter that was loaded to the gunwhales with wheat flour and bound for French Indo China was sunk by Japanese aircraft while fleeing Manila Bay. All of these lost and wasted opportunities meant empty bellies for the USAFFE Forces on Bataan.

This discussion reminds me of what happened when we were told to war game the defense of the Philippines during one of our advance classes. One of my classmates had split the US and Philippine units into two. He sent what was essentially a bared down Northern Luzon Force to hold the mountains in the north to act as an organized stay behind force to constantly harass Japanese units that were coming down from the north. The other half he sent immediately to Bataan according to the war plan.

The northen unit was able to impede Japanese progress enough and was able to live off the land by having a friendly population to operate from. With that force acting as a speed bump, units in Bataan were given more time to consolidate their defenses and be better prepared. Even with the isolation of the Philippines from US mainland supply, by organizing irregular units to constantly harass Japanese units rear areas, he managed to prevent the Japanese from concentrating enough forces to make a heavy push into Bataan. And with conventional units still existing to support the irregulars, it was the invading Japanese who found themselves surrounded, their mobility severely restricted. He didn't repulse the Japanese but he was able to contain them, thus giving time for whatever reinforcements from the US mainland to organize properly and get through. This, he explained to our somewhat amused tactical officer/instructor, was the essence of the War Plan. This guy's moves and canny planning extended the time line of the defense of the PI and Bataan by at least five months after the historical April surrender until our TACO called it a day.

He essentially combined irregular and conventional tactics. All of us (including me) who used only conventional tactics for the period lost. That very wily guy is now working as a geologist for Shell.

If for a moment we assume that MacAuthur had a far better grasp of mechanized warfare than he actually did one might postulate that he could have taken the two M3 light tank battalions combined them with the Philippine Scout Regiment (mounted), added say, a battalion of motorized infantry and engineers and then backed these with the 2 battalions of M3 75mm GMC half tracks available. What you get is an 'instant' armored division.
Adding the Bren carriers that showed up as a scouting and security force at a later point to strengthen the unit MacAuthur had the potential to field a powerful mechanized unit the Japanese would have been largely powerless to defend against.
In this case it might have been possible to stall the Japanese advances long enough for their invasion to fail on lack of supplies alone. Historically, the Japanese were at the end of their tether as it was.
A large armored / mechanized force could have simply been thrown in against one or another Japanese advance crushing it forcing the Japanese into desperation tactics commonly seen when their initial planning failed. Dealing the Japanese a severe setback or two would have far more effect than a harrassing rear guard as most of the Japanese troops were already familiar with and could deal with such tactics from China.

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Truth is stranger than bullshit!

Quite feasible and this was what I attempted during our wargames several years ago. It would have worked except that in the central plains of Luzon, they were sitting ducks for Japanese strafing runs. That pocket armored division wouldn't be able to function as effectively in the northern part of Luzon because of the mountain range of the Cordilleras. Beyond that is more plains which would render that pocket division vulnerable.

They would function well closer to Bataan peninsula I think because they would at least have some friendly air cover from the remaining fighters.

The problem for the Japanese Falcon is exactly where are they getting their air support from? They have no carriers in the area. Their nearest airfields are on Formosa and at the edge of the range of their aircraft. They have no ability to real time coordinate air strikes on tactical ground targets. And, lastly, have little ability to carry out such strikes. Note that throughout the war both the IJN and IJA air forces pretty much never put in any sort of close air support operations anywhere. So, I doubt that air attack would be much of a problem.

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Truth is stranger than bullshit!

Sorry I'm late on this,

"The last vessels carrying supplies to the Philippines were assembled in convoy in Hawaii and on 7 December were still on the high seas."

Yes Jeff, that was us.

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All the Best
Jack

How do you feel about that Jack? What were your thoughts?

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Hello Robert,

I'm not quite certain if I understand the question.

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All the Best
Jack

Sorry Jack LOL. I meant after all that had happened how did you feel about not being able to get to the Phillipines? Especially after the surrender?

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

The one major problem found out during the actual campaign, was that the poor condition of the roads and bridges on Luzon, combined with the high water table, endemic to the season and region, caused more US tank losses than actual battle with the Japanese. Oftentimes, after a Stuart left the road to fire and manuever against the Japanese, the tank would bog down or throw its track in the mud and mire. This was common to the early M-3's and their inexperienced crews. Added to this mix, was the lack of US tank retrieval vehicles and repair facilities that could have saved countless tanks, bogged down or needing repair, to fight another day. This leads me to believe that the addition of an additional two battalions of much heavier Grant/Lee tanks originally earmarked for the PI would not have improved the offensive status of the Filippino-American Forces by that much, except as self propelled artillery guns.

Robert,

Our convoy would have had little effect on the outcome, other than changing the number of final causalities. I think I can say I'm glad they didn't land us there. If I had been in my Grandfather's generation, one more man at the little bighorn would have made very little difference.

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All the Best
Jack

I hear ya there Jack LOL. Im glad that you didn't have to experience that certain hell.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

While looking at further material for this thread again, I came across information that corroborates the posts revealing that further reinforcements were indeed on the way to Macarthur via Hawaii.
What really attracted my attention was that there were four more heavy bombing squadrons that had just arrived in Hawaii around Dec. 7, 1941 but were withdrawn to the US and later sent to Australia.
It seems to me that if these squadrons could still make it to Australia, why then at that point in time were they not sent instead to their original destination? For me, this indicates the thinking that the Philippine garrison was already viewed as a lost cause as early as Dec. 1941.
The US forces in the PHilippines certainly had a need to refurbish its air strength after the devastating air raids of Dec. 8 and 10. I understand the sentiment that one more soldier wouldn't have made a difference in the campaign but I just can't help but think that these squadrons could indeed have helped Macarthur hold out longer, possibly to the point when the local typhoon season starts.

Part of those heavy bombers were the B17s that arrived over Oahu during the Japanse attack. They suffered a fair ammount of damage, delaying them as the maintiance support on Oahu for B17s was inadaquate.

More important was that their refuel stops were also under Japanese attack during the following week. Wake and Guam were both air raided and assualted by amphibious forces. Sending the bombers on to PI under those circumstances was judged a extreme risk. And, of course the news from Manila was bad, with repeated Japanese air raids rapidly destroying the airfields. Last, the essential support echelon of the bombers was sent by ship. With the fleet severely damaged sending cargo ships to Manila was judged a extreme risk.

Later those B17s flew from bases on Java in the 19th Heavy Bombardment Group. The effectiveness of these heavy bombers was 'disapointing'. The high altitude bombing techniques there were trained in proved nearly useless, and there were major problems in combined arms coordination in the Dutch and ABDA command.

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There were other routes for ferrying long range bombers to Australia. One of them was the South America Route. The biggest problem, besides the lack of repair facilities and spare parts for the Filippino-American Forces in the Philippines, was that the only airfield large enough to accomodate them was at Del Monte on Mindanao and that island too had already been invaded by the Japanese. Still though, the Americans were able to mount the "Royce Mission" a few days after the surrender of Bataan, out of Del Monte that caused considerable damage to Japanese shipping and infrastructure.

homma already had his hands full with the existing bataan defense. he had to pull back and wait for reinforcements. there followed a 45-day lull in the fighting. after that, it was the beginning of the end for bataan.

so the question is, would additional preparation and war material for doug have reversed the outcome, given homma's luxury of calling for reinforcements?