It was a catastophic German failure, yes Germany had captured France and the Low Countries, but it was both a tatical and strategic failure, and it proved for the first time how brittle the chain of command was in the German Army especially to von Rundstedt and how kneejerky Hitler was to less than impressive reports.

Consider not only the loss of the BEF at Dunkerque but what of the 1st French Army (approx 110,000 men) that made it to Britain to become the basis of the Free French.

Why would Hitler just stop?.....well you are partly right in that it was an aspect of honour. In May of 1940 Hitler remarked to Generals Blummentritt, Rundstedt and...and...I can't remember right now. But he said something to the effect that Britain was, like the Catholic Church, an essential element of world stabilty and that he hoped to make peace with Britain on terms that would be honourable to Britain. That would mean that a large portion of the BEF remain intact. Hitler also did not believe that Britain would come back in to the war. (Rundstedt, in an interview with Liddell Hart after the war claimed that Hitler let the BEF escape on purpose so that peace negotiations would be easier and quicker. I'm not sure how true Rundstedt's statement is, that he halted the panzers for that purpose).
I have also read that Goering wanted a piece of the action and asked Hilter to let the Luftwaffe finish off Dunkirk and the BEF. Hitler liked the idea because, if it succeeded, would give the Luftwaffe some prestige over the army and navy.

I agree. I think Hitler saw Dunkirk as an oppurtunity for peace. He knew that If he sent the U-Boats or Luftwaffe in to pick off the retreating BEF, that it would be that much harder for the Reich to propose peace with Britain. Just as Pearl Harbor was a rallying cry for the U.S. a slaughter of the BEF would of been a disaster for Hitler. Lets not forget that Hitler had grand plans for Germany and he was to be the face of the Third Reich. He surely did not want the moniker of tyrant.

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CLIMB MT. NIITAKA!

This is a perfect example how generals try to rewrite history to place themselves in a good light.

It was Rundstedt himself who instructed the Panzers to halt so they could rest and refit, Hitler merely gave his approval to the order.

Any claim that Hitler 'allowed' the BEF to escape, is merely Rundstedt attempting to escape the blame for ordering the Panzers to halt for 3 days to rest and refit.

It should also be noted that the large scale evacuation from Dunkirk didn't start until after the Germans had resumed their attack on the Dunkirk positions.

The halt order was important, not that it allowed the British and French to escape, it was the time it allowed them to organise their defensive positions around Dunkirk, so the Allies could hold out until the evacation was completed.

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if in doubt....Panic!!!!

The US Army at that time was so small and ill equipped ( the US Army didn't have tanks, it had 'Combat Cars )that it was in no condition to fight a major battle against a well equipped modern army like Germany.

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if in doubt....Panic!!!!

At that time the U.S was an Isolationist State. There were talks regarding entering the war and helping Britain and France but most Americans were content to sit it out. At this time, The U.S was struggling with its own problems. The Great Depression as we called It, was devastating this country. Plus, It was only 20 years since the Great War. Many Americans wanted to leave Europe to its own.

The closest we got to the war, pre Pearl Harbor, was the Lend Lease Act. which was a program to help arm France,England and Russia. We shipped almost 700 Billion dollars worth of supplies and arms to them.

The most Important argument against war was our Military. Pre 1941 we were ranked in the bottom third militarily. The Army and Navy had drastically reduced its manpower from the WW1, we had no heavy armor, no airforce. Our cavalry was still based on the Horse. My Uncle, who was wounded in 44' in Huertgen, was in a cavalry unit which trained on Horseback!!

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CLIMB MT. NIITAKA!

Thank God that we were able to catch up and surpass the Germans in such a short time.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman

Aside from groups in the US opposed to involvement in any European war there was the matter of the condition of the US military. The US Army had just started a small expansion and for the first time in a decade muster over 200,000 enlisted men. It was badly equipped, and organized as a training cadre, barely capable of emergency defence of the US. The army reserrves werre largely the National Guards of the individual states. Those were badly trained and poorly equipped.

The US Navy had some expeditionary capability. Two aircraft carriers and a squadron of battleships, a couple squadrons of light and heavy crusiers, and smaller ships were available in the Atlantic Fleet. The USN also had a single brigade of Marines available on the East Coast ready to send overseas.

Even if Roosevelt could obtain persmission to send direct combat aid to Britian it is hard to see how a hastily scratched together and weakly armed corps could help.

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I forgot my password, can I use yours?

Returning to the events at Dunkirk. Perhaps a radically different outcome was possible?

Consider the battle at Gembloux on the 15-17 May. There a French infantry corps had just a few days to entrench itself. The terrain was open fields with hardly a orchard or line of trees for cover. There were no rivers or unfordable streams. No cliffs, hills, or swamps impassable to tanks. It was on the Belgian plain and by every book perfect armor terrain. The French corps had two battalions of light tanks for armored support. A couple squadrons of light 'cooperation' type aircraft were the only air support.

The German corps containing the 3rd and 4th Pz divsions had over 400 tanks available on the 15th of May, and all their infantry & artillery, and Luftwaffe support. this corps orders were to attack and break through the defenses of the French First Army. For three days the Gemans tried to break the enemy infantry defense, and failed. Unlike Rommel at Dinant, or Guderian at Sedan, or the 8th Pz at Givet this Pzcorps made no break through.

The difference was in the quality of the defending infantry. Unlike at Sedan, Givet, or Dinant these were not the recently mobilized and badly trained B class divsions. The two at Gembloux had been mobilized since August 1939, had commanders that used every spare moment to train them, were commanded by the younger classes of officers who's orignal training was more recent and modern. And, discipline was better. In other words they were not much different than the core divsions of the BEF. Well trained, equipped, and disciplined infantry. Also both the French defenders of Gembloux and the BEF were well supplied with artillery.

Arriving on the coast the Pz corps had lost the bulk of their tanks to breakdowns and battle damage. Rommel arrived with just 25 out of his original 21. It was taking days for repaired tanks to catch up. Similarly the supply columns had been outrun. Both the tanks and artillery had less than two days supply of ammunition available. Fuel was questionable as well. There was ammunition enroute, but it trickeld in over several days as the truck columns came across jammed roads and temporary bridges.

If the several pz corps become tangled in a melee with capable and well armed infantry amoung the cannals and streets of the coastal region it might actually go very badly for them. While a British victory is not certain and the final outcome for the BEF less favorable the effect on the German mobile corps would be even less favorable. Historically the Pz divsions were recovered to 50-60% strength when they again attacked the French army on the Somme-Oise line. But their motorized infantry and artillery were intact. In this alternate situation the pz divsions would be badly attritioned, with their tank strength as low as 25%, infantry battlions depleted or destroyed, and artillery missing. In this condition they would be far less capable of making further breakthroughs against the French defense. It would be up to the Wehrmachts infantry corps to finish off the French, and infantry battle was what the French army was designed to fight.

So perhaps the 'panzer halt' decision was the better choicefor the Germans?

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I forgot my password, can I use yours?

Ah yes carl i see. But i still believe that the Germans could have finished off the British Army and French military strength at Dunkirk and surrounding areas. It is Hitler's first major mistake of the war. He knew they wouldn't surrender. The mere fact that they landed troops on mainland europe proved that they were aggressive enough to try to stop him. Also any body in their right mind would know that if you invaded their home land (whosevers) then you would suffer for every inch of it.

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Since no one has paid me to kill you, sleep well.
-Bobba Fett http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/index.html

But thats where politics came into the equation. There was no doubt that Hitler could of crushed the BEF and French forces. He easily could of rolled them all up and continued straight onto the U.K. However the reaction It would of caused politically was something he could'nt afford. At this time Hitler was still thinking with a clear head, He knew the Reich could not support a 2 front war. England was a jewel he wanted to add to his crown but he was set on crushing Russia.

Even though the U.S was not ready to fight another war in Europe, The Invasion of England would most certainly been met with a U.S response.
He may of called Americans "lazy playboys", but he knew that our ability to sustain war was massive. Speer, being Armament Minister, new it better than Hitler. Speer once commented to Hitler that our ability to produce war material was so far beyond what Germany could produce, that a long drawn out war would certainly drain the German resources, long before America. Every possible natural resource needed to conduct war can be found and produced in America or her territories. Steel, Oil, Iron, Coal, Rubber, Hydroelectricity,Thermal Power etc....

The last thing Hitler wanted was the U.S to enter the war.

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CLIMB MT. NIITAKA!

There are quite a few risk to attacking Dunkirk with the force available on May 24 as Carl alluded to. The terrain was difficult and Panzer divisions were dangerous short of supplies, ammunition and tanks. A failed attack with signicant casualities may have allowed the repeive that the French army needed to regroup or maybe even allow the French to launch a major counterattack. Remember German commanders didn't have the benefit of hindsight.

Let's give this a thought what happens when a early attack on Dunkirk fails and with the Panzer divisions badly mauled the French armies to a south launch a massive attack and trap and destroy all 9 Panzer divisions leaving Germany with a single armored division.

Well i read that General Rommel commander in chief of the 7th Panzer Division wanted to attack the Dunkerque Pocket, if my records are correct there were 4 to 5 panzer divisions available to attack the Dunkerque Pocket, i bet that all were'nt all strapped for fuel and the like, no what i have read von Rundstedt paniced as things were going to well for the German forces, this he relayed to Hitler who finally gave the order for the panzers to stop and pull back.

But as i have said previously had von Rundstedt issued the order to proceed for the elimination of the Dunkerque Pocket then the BEF and the 1st French Army would have been captured, Operation Dynamo would have failed. I believe that Churchill would come under severe political pressure to retain his job and on top of that explain the loss of the BEF to the population.

If the Dunkerque Pocket had been captured then without doubt Germany would have commit to an invasion, but when, there have been books written on the subject and i agree with most that Germany had a window of opportunity of 4 weeks after the armistice with France so with that i believe that mid to late July would be the best time for an invasion of Britain, how is for another thread.

So the Germans have less than 4 weeks to plan, organise and launch an invasion Of Great Britain, despite the fact that the RAF still has nearly 600 Spitfires and Hurricanes, and that the Royal Navy is the largest navy in the world.

Not going to happen

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if in doubt....Panic!!!!

Yes the RAF and RN would have to be dealt with but consider the moral blow of losing up to 16 divisions, then on top of that the political fallout, are you saying losing the BEF and the 1st French Army and all the equipment and supplies was nothing.

The RN was the largest in the world at the time i grant you, but how much of that Navy was spread around the world, you forget that you can't just simply recall your fleet and expect it home in one or two days, in some cases it would take weeks to reach home waters.

The Germans were planning the Invasion long before Dunkirk. What happened at Dunkirk just presented the oppurtunity much faster than planned. Almost a stroke of luck for the Germans.

Granted, The R.A.F had control of the skies, but at this time the Luftwaffe was still a match for them. As to the Navy, England had the largest and best Navy in the World. However their strength was in the surface vessels and traditional naval warfare ie; heavy and light cruisers, frigates and battleships but the Kriegsmarine were far from a traditional navy. From 1936-1942' the German "wolfpacks" ruled the Atlantic. It was'nt until mid 41'-42' that the British and U.S Navy, using escort tactics, hunter killer groups and breaking the naval Enigma codes, that we were able to negate the U-Boats.

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CLIMB MT. NIITAKA!

The u-boat overall made little significant effect on Allied shipping, there were simply too much ships avaliable to the allies (the merchant fleets of the occupied nations provided a massive amount of shipping for Britian)and too few u-boats available for a theatre as large as the Atlantic. In addition the British were able to evacuate 200,000 men in Britany including much of their equipment.

Plus the Germans weren't the only ones to have an significant submarine force, the British kept a significant submarine force in the channel and the north sea.

Thats not true! The U-Boats had a HUGE affect on allied shipping early in the war. From 1939-1943 German U-Boats sunk almost 5800 ships at 22,000 Gross tons. For every 1 U-boat sunk the Germans sunk 14 allied ships. The amount of supplies needed by England via the Atlantic shipping routes was massive. Almost 2/3 of the British economy was dependent on the allied shipping lanes. Hitler knew to destroy England he had to control the Atlantic.

The British, being able to evacuate Dunkirk was'nt due to a weakened U-Boat force. The evacuation was due to a catastrophic error by the German High Command. The U-Boats, if ordered would of cut the BEF evacuation to pieces. Also, The British Submarine force was secondary in relation to there Surface Fleet. Which was a complete opposite to the German Navy. The German Navy was more geared to the U-Boats and "wolfpack" tactics.

The British and Americans had to drastically rethink there shipping tactics. It was only from 1943 on, that America was able to triple her ship building afforts. When America started building the Liberty' ships. They built 2800 of these ships in 4 years. The reign of the U-boat as a significant threat was'nt really over until mid 42'. It was only then by lots of luck, ie breaking the Enigma codes, hunter killer groups, Radar and solid convoy tactics that we were able to stop them.

If the Allies were unable to stop the U-Boats when they did, England would of been in serious trouble.

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CLIMB MT. NIITAKA!

This from my good friend Clint on another discussion group talking about U-boats in the Channel.

"Before Hitler turned his attention east toward the USSR, which is 1939 through mid-1941 as the time-frame, the Kriegsmarine of Nazi Germany had 57 U-boats which were CAPABLE of going out to sea. I am not absolutely certain, but I do NOT believe this counts the 50 existing Type II boats (A through D models), since they were small coastal and training boats only. That said, 8 boats of those larger types were lost in 1939, 24 in 1940, and 9 more lost before June of 1941. Some were replaced of course in that time line, but by mid-June the U-boat strength was pretty small.

6 of the 10 type VIIA (Atlantic boats) had been sunk well before June,1941. There were 24 type VIIB boats build, and they were an improvement in range, but by mid-1941 twelve of them had also been sunk or "lost at sea". There were a grand total of 538 type VIIC boats eventually commissioned during the war years, but only a few had been built by late 1940 and mid 1941 since the very first was only commissioned by Nov. 1940. 5 of the 8 type IX (A) boats built had been sunk by early 1941, and of the 14 IX(B) improved version boats built, 6 had been sunk or "lost at sea" by early 1941. The IX(C) class only showed up in Jan. of 1941, so they really can’t be counted in my estimation of U-boat strength. There were eventually 54 of them produced but not before the time period we are speaking of.

Most of the other classes of U-boats built, by that time, were NOT terribly threatening types. So no matter their numbers, they could NOT have influenced the Channel usage in any significant fashion in the early stages of the Second World War (pre-Barbarrosa). This is why I stand by the "less than 30 combat ready, sea-worthy" U-boats still existed before Operation Barbarrosa, and at the time of Operation Sealion being considered.

I can recommend Richard Worth's ("Tiornu") Fleets of World War II; and on the net a site called:

http://uboat.net/types/

If you go there (and are patient) you can discover the fates of ALL the "Undersea Boats" built after WW1 until the end of WW2. Pay particular attention to the time-frame of 1939-1941. Does any of this help understand my position on the U-boat weakness of that period? With that limited a supply of ready boats it is no wonder Doenitz was reluctant to allow them to venture into the Channel. With those losses in mind it would appear that the Kriegsmarine DID NOT have even thirty seaworthy "combat" ready U-boats left in early 1940 to the middle of 1941 which is the only period being discussed. Later they did, but when the Operation Seelowe was being discussed, before Barbarrosa, they just flat did NOT have enough of them to risk in the shallow waters of the Channel."

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman