This is a very interesting and potentially likely what if from the opening days of the Pacific War. What if instead of the Prince of Wales and Repulse being sent to attempt to intercept the Japanese landings in Malaysia they, along with their four escort destroyers are diverted to Java / the DEI to link up with the various naval forces already there.
The reasoning might be that without air cover the Malaysia operation was too risky and covering Australia and the DEI where there is a better chance of success due to other Allied naval forces in the area.
This would have given the ABDA fleet a battleship, a battlecruiser, 2 heavy cruisers, 5 or 6 light cruisers, and as many as 20 + destroyers. Against this the largest Japanese combatant in the area is a heavy cruiser. The Japanese also lack easy access to air power unlike they have in Malaysia and would have made it possible for the British capital ships to operate at sea without undue concern for being successfully attacked by aircraft.
Given the occasionally successful operations of the ABDA fleet it is entirely possible that this addition might have stopped one or more Japanese amphibious assaults through the annihiliation of the ships involved. In at least a couple of cases, ABDA ships...primarily destroyers... put severe hurt on Japanese landings. A thouough pasting of one or two by two battleships could have wiped out an entire transport group ending the landing and any possibility of immediate success.

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The Battle of the Java Sea would have ended differently, but without good air cover would the outcome been markedly different for Doorman in the end?

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Wow very impressive.

This may be crazy but it may have worked, indeed had this senario had worked then the Japanese drive into SE Asia and South Pacific may have hit a halt, giving time for places like Malaya/Singapore and other areas to re-enforce themselves, it may have gone asforas to delay the Japanese, buying time for the allies, which if indeed the Japanese had failed then time is critical, due in no small part the expenditure of valuable fuel oil and the loss of entire IJN taskforce. Also imagine that the Dutch East Indies had not fallen and the the ABDA were able to use the DEI as forward bases of operations, this could have lead to an earlier defeat of Japan.

What makes this more interesting is that Admiral Philips and Admiral Hart (commander of the US Asiatic Fleet) had discussed on the 5th and 6th of December 1941 first an agreement to move Prince of Wales and Repulse with their escort to Manila with both agreeing that Singapore was not highly defensible and that these ships would be better placed to counter Japanese moves from the Philippines. Lack of air cover was an issue in the move.
Admiral Hart also agreed to send Desron 57 (4 four piper DD's the Whipple, Alden, John D. Edwards, andEdsall) then at Balikpapan via Batavia to Singapore to reinforce the British destroyers available to escort the two battleships while Admiral Philips agreed in return to send three British destroyers at Hong Kong to Manila to replace them.
Of course, the next day things changed and soon thereafter Admiral Philips and his ships ceased to exist as fighting vessels.

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From my thread on the possible US escorts for the Prince of Wales and Repulse.

*Since there was no military alliance with Britain at the time,it was a difficult decision for Admiral Hart to make,but by coincidence four of our destroyers were refueling at Balikpapan (Borneo). Hart decided that there was nothing in international law that would prevent U.S. ships from making a indoctrinational cruise with ships of a friendly power. Before Phillips left he ordered the destroyers to Batavia for supplies and recreation. They should have reached Singapore in 48 hours. Unfortunately the Dutch port authorities refused to open the antisubmarine booms at Balikpapan before sunrise, and by the time the destroyers reached Singapore, the two battleships,unescorted,had long since left on thier missions up the Malay coast.6

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However just prior to the pivital battle of the java sea Vice Admiral Kondo had detached the Battleship Kongo and Haruna, two heavy cruisers and two destroyer from the main body to hunt shipping escaping from the region. If the Japanese were aware of the presence of battleship we can safetly assume that this detachment would remain with the main body.

As I understand the optics on IJN ship were excellent but only managed to develop shipbourne radar during the very late stages of the war. The Prince of Wales had blindfire capacity for it's main armament and limited fire control for it's secondary and anti-air batteries and a surface scanning radar(which unfortunately was not operable when it was sunk). Had they had the Prince of Wales ABDA would have had a tremendous range advantage but would it been enough to withstanded a much stronger fleet?

Yes, I think in these what if scenarios it's important to speculate that the other side would have reacted differently to the different scenario. Had the British capital ships and their escorts been added to the ABDA force the Japanese would surely have changed their tactics.

I would agree. But, a surface action with the two British capital ships present would have changed the dynamic of the battle greatly. First, the Japanese torpedo advantage would be largely negated. They would have to launch at extreme ranges where chances of a hit would decrease substancially.
The inclusion of two Kongo class battlecruisers might have some effect but if the British are able to score using radar at 15,000 to 20,000 yards even just a few hits on these ships they would have been out of the action quickly. Their armor was grossly inferior to that of the PoW in particular and the Repulse had already proved her gunnery efficency earlier in the war. The British 15"/42 was a particularly reliable gun with good accuracy and would have performed without problem.
Another possibility is a scenario where the Repulse is detached to accompany US Desron 57 to Balikpapan to attack the Japanese landing there. Historically, the four US DD sank 4 out of 12 transports and shot up several more along with some of the escort vessels. The presence of Repulse might have resulted in a total destruction of the Japanese landing and its failure.

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Let me understand this. You want to send the the Prince of Wales and Repulse to Dale Earnhart Industries?

Actually, it would have been a better use of the force. However, sometimes the lessons best learned are the ones won from the hardest loses. Who is to say that the lessons lost by the their sinking, would not be the cause of a worse loss.

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radar, shmadar. down at the slot, it was 50:50. at night, other than radar, you need sharp lookouts, diligent search planes, a well-drilled crew.

Radar usage off Guadalcanal had a hit and miss record at first. However by late 1942 the US usage greatly improved. Radar was also insturmental in the air campaign over Guadalcanal. The SCR 286 sets proved their worth in detecting and estimating altitude of incoming raids even when coastwatchers or other methods failed. This gave the US time to put aircraft up and at altitude to ensure a successful intercept of raids.
Most of the initial US radar problems at sea had to do with unfamiliarity with the equipment, poor doctrine, and using the wrong type of sets for a particular purpose. Once SG and and sets like Mk 3 and Mk 8 radars were available naval battles became far more one-sided in favor of the US.

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perhaps but as in all wars, there's never a conclusive pattern. the only guadalcanal battles i remember that were decisively won by radar were cape esperance and the second major battle wherein the kirishima was sunk. before and after those, battles like savo, the first major battle, and tassafaronga, were won by discipline and lots of cojones.

after guadalcanal, the only other successful american surface actions were the battles of surigao straight and the battle of samar. the first was won by good coordination and lots of moxy in the part of the PT boats and destroyers who harassed the japanese battleships, giving the US battleships time to line up. the second was won by sheer bravery, if there was ever such.

Logically, ships bearing better technology would have the edge. However, as T.A. Gardner points out, the crews of the ships have to know how to use the new technology properly.
As for radar battles off Guadalcanal, a good book (IMO) is the old Bantam Book's Battle for Guadalcanal.

T.A., good what if, especially when you pointed out that the PoW and Repulse could have headed to Manila Bay.
However, even if I admit that the presence of the PoW and Repulse would have strengthened the ABDA fleet, the important factor would be when the hypothetical engagement with the Japanese would take place.
I say this because at this point of the war, the Japanese had the edge in night fighting doctrine at sea with the Allies a poor second.
If it's daylight, then the Allies have the edge. Of course in any naval fleet battles, the first one to score a good hit on the other's capital ship generally enjoys the tactical advantage.