GAL maxime Weygand was formal: impossible to evacuate many men in Africa.

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It would be interesting to find out what his reasons were. I would think it would have been easier than Dunkirk, even with the lack of ships and the Germans masters of the skies.

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I'm fairly certain the Wehrnacht would have occupied all of France before October 1940. The collapse of the remaining army in Central France was too complete and the last army units guarding the Italian frontier or fleeing south could not have held the Germans for more than a few weeks or months.

The question is then would Hitler 1. Turn to attack Britian and fisnish it off, the Sea Lion option? 2. Send his best ground and air forces to aid the Italians in defeating the remaining Franch in Africa? 3. Leave the west and turn all but a occupation group east to prepare in Poland for attacking the USSR?

Of these I'd think the Sea Lion option the most likely. In June 1940 most people would think the Italians capable of occupying the French colonys. So it woud be tempting to try for defeating Britian and have all business settled in the west. So the battle of Britian is likely to play out as it did historically.

In the Med the Italians will fnd themselves in trouble. The combined British French fleets and Allied aircraft in Tunisia will threaten to cut off the sea lanes to Lybia. Hitler will be asked to send some air groups and whatever ground forces that might seem appropriate. So some Germns could be diverted from attacking the USSR, but perhps no more than actually were.

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Cant say at all. Elsewhere someone remarked that the French navy estimated they could evacuate a maximum of 200,000 men. There was no indication of where he got this, or how much time was allowed for this.

From the start of the British embarkation, whch begain nearly a week before operation Dynamo, until the last man was plucked from the docks of the Atlantic ports the British took about 500,000 men from France. That was partially under air attack. Dunkirk area was pounded, the ports further to the west were less so. Aiding a evacuation from the southern ports is that they are out of practical range of the Luftwaffes bombers. To makea large scale attack on Marsallie or Toulon air bases will have to be established south of Paris and the fuel/ground support moved there. So if the French start their embarkation around the 15th of June there will be one to two weeks before the Luftwaffe can seriously interfere with it. I suspose a analysis of the loss rates of men and ships per air sortie at Dunkirk would allow a rough estimate of what might be removed from the southe ports. Information of what ships the allies had in the Mediterrainan are needed too.

The link I posted earlier indicates the evacuation of the air force was well under way. So, I expect the removal of the most skilled portion of the AF personnel was already arraigned. This air evacuation is susposed to have placed priority on the best aircraft, leaving the second raters behind. This suggests and French air defense of the south ports would be less than that of the RAF over Dunkirk, but I may be wrong. After all the French have little to lose in trying for a air battle here.

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Another question which requires knowledge of the politics of the day...

I'd expect there would be a large change in military leadership as France sorted out is military forces in Africa. Who might be the principle leaders emerging, and would change in doctrine or methods happen quickly? Not all French military officers admired the ground and air doctrines in place before the disaster. Would change come quickly, in only a year or less, or would it take several years for adaptation to sink in?

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The Gaulle? Giraud? Who knows this is pure speculation at this point. There would have been no Petain regime and no "Free" Zone.
The resisting option in the Alps is not so plausible, but in the east, there were still units in the Maginot bunkers that could carry on for several weeks/months.

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If the Germans had opted for Sea Lion, they would have been massacred.
This was pointed very clearly in the What If Sea Lion thread. I agree with you though that it would've been a very tempting for Germany to attempt to finish off the UK once and for all.
As an afterthought, I don't think Germany would've mounted its air offensive in the same historical manner against the UK if France had chosen to fight on in North Africa.
Germany would've probably based more squadrons in Italy or the Med area to deal with any potential UK/French move, thus diverting forces from the air offensive against England.

With North Africa in French hands, as well as Corsica and possibly some area in the Alps (don't forget that the Italian offensive of June1940 was a total failure there). It would have been possible for the allies to bring reinforcements to Corsica. There would have been no Afrika Korps in North Africa, Lubia would have been an easier prey and instead of landing at Sicilly the allies could have opted for central Italy or southern France via Corsica.

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Agree there. After the Luftwaffe failed to defeat the RAF the Germans agreed as well. I see the same attempt/cancellation.

Perhaps not right away. The Italians are not very well prepared to directly attack Tunisia or Egypt, theFrench are very disorganized and not at all ready for major ground or air offensive operations. A naval battle may develop around the evacuation, which may draw off a few Luftwaffe units.

Its hard to predict what the German point of view will be during July. A decsion to attack Britian before bad weather must be made fairly quickly. If its is decided the Italians can eventually finish off the weak Allies in the Med then the Luftwaffe might be concentrated against Britian. In that case the minimum would be sent south to harras the evacuation ports and it would be returned north quickly.

It would only be after the Italians got into trouble that the Luftwaffe would be required to send reinforcements to the Med, and that may not be any more than what was sent historically. Conversely if the French mount a effective air defense in the final weeks in the south a larger longer term commintment in July-August and heavy losses by the Luftwaffe of another 300 to 500 aircraft might lead to postponement of a attack on Britian. Or maybe complete cancellation. It is really difficult to say for certain since the German leadership was so unpredictable. Goerings overconfidence, Hitlers erratic thinking over details, lack of a well defined stratigic plan for OKW ect...

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I suspose whoever was currently in charge in Africa wold continue in that position for the near term. Thus having responsibility for the inital fighting with the Italians. I dont recall if Giraud was a POW at this point. He was a minor player in 1940 any way. There were a long list of senior marshalls and generals to choose from. As Reynaud who would you choose as the new military chiefs to evacuate to Africa?

Certainly. I'd suspect the nazis would find some facist minded Frenchmen to orgainzed a collaborationist government, but that certainly would not be the same as the Vichy goverment.

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it seems like for Weygand the honors of the French Army was the most important drive. That's why he opposed bluntly the idea of capitulation , because it would have held the army responsible, and pledged instead for armistice, that involved the politicians. This distinction seems to have played a big role in the Weygand's and perhaps also Petain's position and have caused a lot of friction in the discussion between politicians and and military. Technically, after the experience with two (or more) saccessful evacuations across the channel, Weygands positions seems indeed questinable, esp. with the mediterranean ships still not at all engaged in the battle. Of course many ships that were still engaged around the channel and in the Atlantic would have been deployed around Spain to Southern France, but at the same times the whole of Southern France would still have to be conquered by the Germans.

I don't know about south of France, but Corsica would have been a big stronghold and a valuable asset for the Allies. Sardaigna could be added too because I doubt the Italians would have resisted too long there.

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Corsica is interesting. The bomber types remaining to France, and those on order from the US were the medium high speed types, which could range the industrial north of Italy from Corsica. If the Axis allowed the Allies to retain that island and build airbases there then bomber raids on Italy would become rather anoying in 1941 & 1942. Torpedo boats and small coastal submarines based in Corsica would raise hell with Italian coastal shiping. I'd think the Axis might be forced to do something about this by 1941 before serious damage was done.

If the Italian navy & airforces were wrecked in a fight for the sea lanes to Lybia then a attack on Cosica might not be practical. Sardinia might not be defendable either & lost to the Allys in 1941 or 1942.

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It seems to me that if the British could organize the evacuation of over 400,000 men during four weeks then the French navy could manage 100,000 or even 200,000 in 2-3 weeks. It would depend on how many cargoand passenger ships are available in the Med. The navy combat ships could not help much as the Italian navy would need to be guarded against.

If there is a sucessfull evacuation then Admiral Darlan might come to dominate the French war effor for the enxt couple years. Naval operations would be key in stablizing the Allied position and Darlan seems to have been a capable leader.

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France had a aircraft carrier half built. Is ther eany information available on it? Could it have been taken to a British or US shipyard to be completed?

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That's why I have a certain fascination for good what if scenarios, especially the really plausible ones.

I'll go on a limb here.
At first glance, I personally doubt that such an attempt would be successful. It would be a seating duck for air attack or sub attack and there is no guarantee that it could survive the voyage. Such a voyage would be very slow, perfect for a canny U-boat commander. Logically it would have to be heavily escorted, thus diverting needed naval units for more vital missions.
I don't think it would have been worth the effort or risk to bring it to another shipyard for completion.

Darlan in any case could have been one of the key persons in 1940 to push towards evacuation instead of armistice.
Concerning the availability ships for evacuation, without having any statistics at hand, I would assume with northern Africa being part of the mother country, there was a regular passenger services between all major ports and that the Mediterranean was quite busy with regular cruisers and cargos.
It is not only a question of technical capacities, but also a question of time, though. One of the big points of the Monnet plan, was indeed that by unifying France and Britain, there would have been neither cease fire nor surrender. And it is indeed a difference if you think the scenario for southern France from the the 15th of june or from the 22nd. If there was no armistice, no Petain and no radio proclamation by Petain, but perhaps a different proclamation like Churchill's blood sweat there would have been a perspective for resistance. Somebody mentioned the impressing figures for captured soldiers before and after Petain's speech. Furthermore it is to consider that the Rhone Valley south of Valence is a bottle neck between the Alps and the Massif Central, where all the major infrastructure is concentrated. The occupant could have taken the long way via Bordeaux, Toulouse, Narbonne, but also at Carcassonnne and before Montpellier it would have gotten very tight. the major ports, Marseille and Toulon were quite well situated, much better than the channel ports a couple of weeks before. I still think that with time going by, this part of the campaign would have gotten very close to call even. Italy was not a real threat, no way to deploy its army, the fighting in the Alps and at the Côte d'Azur could have gone on forever and once a supply system had been built up between Algeria and Southern France. No to forget also, that the control of the occupied territory would have been much more complicated. With no national WWI hero backing up the occupant, resistance would have been the only patriotic attitude, right from the beginning.

We all know how minimal a threat Italy really was in World War II because we have the benefit of hindsight. But looking at it from the writings of that period, Italian military strength was viewed differently, at least before the involvement in Greece.

This article appeared on Sept. 30, 1940 in the weekly news magazine Time. I'll put in a few excerpts.

Fighting in Africa's deserts is like playing chess with nothing but rooks and pawns. Water is as vital as ammunition; sand finer than talcum makes its way into the eyes. . . Mirages, blistering wind, sand blizzards, germs, all constitute hazards more dangerous than point blank enemy fire.

From Libya, a fortnight ago, started the Italian spearhead--a long thin line of ight Fiat tanks in Indian file, three infantry regiments, a machinegun battalion, an artiller regiment, sapper companies, communication units, bringing total strength to about 250,000. This well-balanced striking force drove first for Salum, five miles across the border inside Egypt.

The defenders--perhaps 70,000 Britons, Australians, New Zealanders, Rhodesians, Indians--have been braced for the attack for some time. The British defense was apparently to fall back, harassing the invaders and avoiding serious action until the British were in an area with good supply lines and the Italians were far from their base.

The Italian press cried that this was a "war for Egyptian independence"--"liberating Egypt from the oppressing domination of the English." One reason for Italian confidence was apparent superiority in the air. With a pronounced margin in numbers, the Italians also had at least parity in quality, since the British use mostly planes like the Gloster Gladiators in Egypt, where dust and sand jam modern retractacble landing gear. There was no question that these hopeful factors had made the Italians a little giddy. Wrote Benito Mussolini's mouthpiece Virginio Gayda: "Nothing can save Britain now."
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As for establishing a supply line from North Africa to Southern France, it's been pointed out earlier in this thread that Algeria didn't have the industrial base to support a large force, let alone supply those French units that would remain in Southern France.
I think what would have been better was turn this French position into a large logistical base with Allied help but that would take time. Remember that at this stage of the war, only Roosevelt's administration was pushing for US involvement in World War II. There existed a very strong anti-war sentiment among Americans before Japan came into the picture.