Could Singapore have been held similar to say Malta if the British strategy in Malaysia were different? Let's assume the British decide that the entire pennisula cannot be held with the forces at hand. Instead, they place a skeleton force on the pennisula to act as a delaying force and rear guard while the bulk of their forces are entrenched on Singapore Island to defend.
Given this strategy, let's also assume that the British stock supplies and ammunition for a long campaign holding the island, that airfields and other military sites are built for this purpose there too. They bring in some additional antiaircraft units for defense as well.
On the naval front the British plan to try and hold the DEI and Australia with the intention of being able to resupply Singapore periodically using heavily escorted convoys much as was being done with Malta. Ferrying of aircraft via the DEI is envisioned.
Could the British have held Singapore using such a strategy or was that city doomed to fall to the Japanese regardless?

Looking at the map it appears any convoy woud have to run though narrow straits at either end of Sumatra. I dont know about the east strait, but the western could be easily mined. Unlike the italians Japan had a good torpedo bomber air aireal torpedo.

Beyond that what is the stratigic objective of Singapore? If it threatens acess to a critcal portion of Japans oil then maybe it is worth something. But a isolated base is difficult to use.

I'd try to figure out how to defeat the Japanese on Maylaysia to preserve some room for operational manuver.

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Such a strategy would surely upset the Japanese timetable and perhaps divert resources and troops from the Japanese campaign in the Philippines.
Singapore would have lasted longer but I doubt that it could be another Malta. Correct me if I'm wrong but I do recall that Singapore's weak point is the island's water supply. The island just does not have enough local water sources and has to rely on the Malaysian mainland.
Your point on heavily defended convoys getting through to the island has merit, especially if one factors in the ABDA fleet with the PoW and Repulse you mentioned in another thread.

The Japanese, however, could choose to ignore and just isolate the island, much like the US did in its island hopping campaign. The Japanese Navy can mine the straits and local choke points leading to Singapore and that would make running a convoy to the island very dangerous.

Though I still doubt that Singapore could've done a Malta, such a strategy would've given more breathing space for Australia, the US, the UK and other allies to get their acts together. It's also possible that such a stubborn defense in Singapore could lead to a change of attitude in the Japanese Army's penchant for quick campaigns on the cheap. Action, then reaction. Each side learns from each other and according to history, the side that is less adaptable and is the slower learner usually loses.

The US Army held out in the Phillpines for five months and the stratigic effect was small. The first problem was the inability of any reinforcements to reach the besiged. The IJN and IJA airforces were far more effective than the Axis in isolating these pockets. Singapors location made it very diffcicult to approach by sea or air. Keeping a large portion of Maylasia under British control complicates the Japanese advance/interdiction.

If the British can halt the enemy in Maylasia then perhaps a Allied group in Maylasia & Sumatra can create the same sort of long running attritional battle that wrecked the Japanese in the New Guniea/Solomons campaign.

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True, the Allies would have to hold Sumatra. But, if Singapore holds out this would have definitely been well worth it. First, this denies the Indian Ocean to the Japanese to a large degree. Next, it puts the Burma theater in a far weaker position and endangers Japanese efforts there.
The most valuable loss to the Japanese though is Singapore as a naval base. They now have no good naval facility in that region to base their fleet off of. Without it, they also cannot easily transport crude oil or refined oil from the DEI either. With greater dependence on sea lanes for transport and having to sail far further to reach a suitable off load port the Japanese would be more vulnerable to tanker losses.

I am guessing that without control of the strait between Maylaysia & Sumatra a early attack on Burma would beout of the question. The overland route from Thailand was to difficult logistics wise.

I thought the Dutch oil went on to the ships directly from the refinerys.

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for humanity's sake i wouldn't have done it even with a time machine. the malacca strait will become the original guadalcanal slot although on a much bigger scale. the resulting attrition on surface naval forces will probably doom japan's navy much sooner than marianas and leyte gulf.

singpore, on the other hand, will become a tropical stalingrad with both sides fighting savage wars of attrition. the desperation on both sides will be terrific since both are trying to keep their respective supply lines open.

how many civilians do you think will be left alive after it's over?

The USAFFE was crippled from the start when they were unable to move their huge stocks of supplies to Bataan. Had they been able to do so, the US garrison could feasibly last longer into the typhoon season which starts June and ends in November. The very heavy rains and floods would render air ops impossible and ground movement would be almost a standstill. Naval travel would also be very iffy. It would be in this period that both sides would experience a lull and give an opportunity to regroup.

I don't know when the typhoon season starts in Singapore or Malaysia but I would say when the weather is factored in, the key to the defense of the area would be dependent on making it to the rainy season. For the offense, their key would be to round up the campaign before the typhoons arrive.

I guess in a way, it's similar to the eastern front . . . just replace the heavy snowfall with typhoons.

I completely agree with you that had the British held longer, it's conceivable that this would develop into a Guadalcanal type campaign.

I have to add this that any British garrison in Singapore must last into the typhoon season because this would be the best way for them to replenish their water supply. I've read somewhere that water was in short supply in Singapore at that time.

I once worked for a chap who was captured at Singapore, he wished they had fought on. Anything was better than the camps, he still had nightmares up to the day he died and was an alcoholic to boot. The worst thing for him was they walked into the camps like sheep.

I believe the Japanese were over stretched and thought Gen Percival was going to ask for their surrender, maybe it was worth slugging it out, mind you hindsight is a wonderful thing.

from the looks of it, it would have been futile to keep fighting on. you remember the exchange between percival and yamashita? percival simply spoke of the hardships of both british soldiers and civilians, yamashita just kept asking whether or not he'd surrender. with no firm answer, yamashita said that if they did not surrender, they will launch another night attack, to which percival said they could not sustain one such. so again, the japanese asked whether or not he would surrender. finally percival said 'yes.'

but yamashita's own account was he neither threatened percival with a new attack, nor forced percival's hand. he castigated the interpreter, telling him to simply ask percival 'yes' or 'no?'

If the storys of how the Chinese population of Maylasia were brutalized by the Japanese are half true then they probablly wished the fight had continued too.

The opinions of the Jpanese on this ar eoften repeated. I dont know what their actual situation was, but it may have been irrelevant. The belief of the commanders right or wrong is often more important to the outcome of a battle than the actual conditions. Particularly where the commanders view has time to permmeate down to his subordinates, & then to the front ranks. Had the British through luck or the ability of a vigorus commander been able to organize a viable counter attack then Yamashita 'might' have choosen to withdraw the to retreat to shorten his supply route and gain a better tactical positon. Retreats under these conditions have a way of turning into a rout. While the indivdual Japanese soldier and officer always displayed admirable dicipline the infantry officers seldom performed well when withdrawing or retreating under pressure.

If the Brits were then to hold onto the area adjacent to the straits then reinforcements would be viable and accomplish something of stratigic importance. Percival would have to go very soon. Hero or not for his presence at such a upset victory.

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You have a point. Reinforcing the British there is admittedly feasible. However, time would then be of essence for both the Japanese and the British. The weather in Southeast Asia can wreak havoc on sea travel, thus any reinforcements to Singapore would be dictated by weather. The Japanese also would have the same problem but to a lesser degree since they have established outposts in Indo-China by this time.

Another thing, where would the reinforcing troops, equipment and supplies for the UK's Singapore-Malaya garrison come from? It would likely come from Australia. However, and please correct me if I am wrong, I recall reading that Australia didn't have enough troops on the continent and had to withdraw their divisions from North Africa. Since this is so, it would take some time before those Australian troops are available for action in the Singapore-Malaya area. India could be another source of troops.
But then, where would the supplies for these additional troops come from?
Aside from Australia, The largest stack of Allied war supplies nearest to Singapore would be in the Philippines, but these have been mostly lost during the retreat to Bataan. The next source of resupply would be Pearl.
Even though reinforcing the British forces in Singapore looks feasible, time and odds are against the success of such a reinforcement mission.

For most of the war the Japanese shipped oil coming out of the DEI to Singapore and then off-loaded it into tank cars and moved it by rail to Chinese ports reloading it on a ship there and crossing the Sea of Japan with it. This made the sea portion of the route fairly short and as the Sea of Japan was unenterable by submarines due to heavy mining of the narrow straights leading into it also meant that their tankers were less vulnerable to attack.
Some did go straight by sea through about mid-war to Japan when the Japanese realized that the vulnerability of this route was getting too high.
Without Singapore the rail option is out meaning all the oil has to go by sea instead.

First I'd heard of that one. Did not even know there was a functional railroad crossing French Indochina.

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Here's a bit of fill in on the Malay campaign in terms of this what-if:

Given the original TO&E on the ground with the following changes for 7 Dec:

The 8th Austrialian division along with the 2 available Malay Brigades are engaged and have been for over 6 months in building fortifications for a defense of Singapore Island from the land side. The beaches are heavily mined, there is extensive wire obstacles and, there are some boat obstacles in place as well. Of course, there are bunkers, trenches, and other fortifications along the entire roughly 6 mile length of the island too.
The Indian III Corps is tasked with a delaying action on the Malay pennisula itself from Jitra south along the main trunk roads.
The overall command has accepted and received about an extra 50 Hurricanes that are in service (these were originally turned down as the RAF locally felt the Buffaloes in service were sufficent). These are held in the South while some of the Buffaloes have been sent North onto the pennisula for air defense there.
Given even the original reinforcements of one British division and several brigades of Commonwealth troops along with a tired but semi-intact III Corps, Singapore is now held by roughly the equivalent of three complete divisions with good support in heavily fortified positions. Even given the low level of training of many of the troops the change in expectations... that is that now Singapore Island is to be held long term.... keeps morale at a reasonable level.
The Japanese are now faced with making a riverine assault across the equivalent of the Rhine with just 4 divisions without major artillery or air support.

Given these TOE for the defense of Singapore, it would be unlikely that the Japanese would push an offensive with just the four divisions it has available. For the British side, it also does not have enough strength on its own to drive the Japanese out from their positions across the river.

Also since this is the British strength around December 7, I would surmise that there would be changes in the overall deployment of Japanese troops in Southeast Asia to reduce the Singapore garrison. For instance, it would be likely that the some if not all the troops, equipment and supplies earmarked for the invasion of the Philippines could've been diverted and sent to Singapore/Malaya area. This, would in effect, give more breathing room for the US in the Philippines.
Also, while Singapore holds, any Japanese attempt for expansion towards the Australian area would have to be delayed. So troops that would have historically been used for such operations would, I think, be used against the British and Commonwealth troops in Singapore.

I would surmise too that substantial Japanese naval units would be sent to Singapore and the straits leading to it to attempt a blockade. Such an action would undoubtedly be met by a vigorous Allied naval response. Thus the stage is set for several heavy naval engagements.

Of course, the above supposes that the Japanese places priority for taking Singapore. Another choice for the Japanese would be to keep the British bottled in their fortifications in the Singapore area while the Japanese concentrate first on reducing the US garrison in the Philippines.

Looking at the map, it's really a coin toss. The IJA would probably prefer taking the Philippines first but the IJN would push for Singapore.

Additionally, since the UK garrison is now about three divisions in strength, the key to holding Singapore would now rely on keeping these units supplied. The land route is out of the question so it would have to be by air or sea. With this in mind, I have to point out again that the Japanese would most probably attempt some form of a blockade and their would be strong Allied attempts to break it. Could the Japanese attempt to break the British defense with an amphibious landing accompanied by a strong attack on the landside defense? The Japanese might consider it but would that succeed?
I look at the Japanese attempt at Wake Island and it would seem that the Japanese needs a lot of work for amphib ops.

The landing at Khota Baru was nearly a catastrophe. The sea stae was slightly above that permisable for loading the landing craft. The Infantry commander ordered them loaded anyway and it took nearly three times as long as planned to load the first lift. Then the navigation was botched (which happens in all landings no matter how experinced the army ).

As the boats returned to load the second wave a few British Hudsons attacked, casuing the amphibious force commander to order the fleet to stand back out to sea away from the coast. This would have stranded the first wave without naval gunfire support, reinforcement, or ammunition supply. The landing force commander talked him into canceling the order and continuing the landing.

Despite having only a single battalion of half trained soldiers the defenders were able to confine the landing force to a beach enclave with their MG & mortars. However the commader was unable to get his frighted rifemen to make a effective counter attack, or obtain adaquate reinforcements from the brigade commander. Many hours later the ships with the other half of the Japanese divsion appeared and sent their group ashore, breaking the stalemate.

Costellos 'The Pacific War' and Swinsons 'Defeat in Maylasia' both have excellent if brief decriptions of this beach assualt.

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The British during the original campaign were able to substancially reinfo