Hello Devilsadvocate,

Again too many time lines are colliding in this what “if”, B-24 in 1940? and 200 of them?
Taking a start of the war in spring of 1940 would have ended in the occupation of Western Europe just as in real-time history. Hitler knowing about the resource situation would have taken Norway as he did in history, Sweden and Finland would have supplied just as in history.
And just to mention, with 150 U-boots around there wouldn’t have been a Narvik operation by the Allies, and as such the Germans could have taken any trawler in order to occupy Norway.
And a reciprocal 400% means 4 times more U-boots and four times more of everything and not more U-boots = less ships or what ever.
There would have been no gap in regards to minerals, ores etc. etc. Russia would have fallen by the end of 1941 – summer 1942 just due to the masses of weaponry of the axis forces.
Even with the limited number of U-boots England in history was almost done with. I do not hold it for likely that they could they have survived with 3 times that number against them.

Again in regards to Kennedy; a totally bombed out Germany was able to increase its output by 400% in 1944, imagine the output of a non-bombed Germany in 1944 that had already increased its output by 400% from 1936 to 1940.

With Russia fallen or armistice, I could even imagine that the US might have reconsidered their approach in regards to Germany, since Hitler would not have declared war against the US due to him not needing to set up a second front via Japan against the US.

If it makes sense to follow this thread, then let’s assume that the general picture of Western Europe would have stayed the same, exception being England – either starved to death or negotiating a peace treaty with Hitler – or staying in the war just as they did.
The Wehrmachts potential against Russia would have been 400% higher in regards to weaponry and Stalin would have been forced to relocate his HQ behind the Ural, which he had already prepared in 1941.

Hitler did not attack Moscow but chose to go south, in view of the industrial Donez area – which would not have sprung into his mind if the German industry had been prepared for the material losses that occurred in Russia. - Germany would have been able to source its minerals from Russia and other countries before getting into a war. Therefore IMO, the chance to take Moscow in 1941 would have been a very realistic one and as such would have sealed Stalin’s fate.

We should/could discuss this “if” possibility from 1940 to 1941/42 first, taking Stalin’s defeat into account and then continue with the factor USA. If we would come to the conclusion that Stalin would not have been defeated, well then history would prevail.

Regards
Kruska

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The world is grey - not black and white

As I said, they lose virtually every way look look at it

__________________
They shall grow not old as we that are left grow old Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We shall remember them. Lest We Forget

It is possibly your mindset, which simply doesn't wan't Hitler to win, so everthing is brushed asside (BTW I also do not want Hitler to win) - but I would still be interested to see "if" he could have.

Right now I do not look upon this thread as deciding whether Hitler would have won the war or not, but "if" he could have beaten Russia taking the above possibility of changing the industrial planing into account.

I think yes he could have, and then it could be discussed how the situation would have further developed. As I said, who knows the US might not have even gotten into this war due to a change in regards to Russia.

Regards
Kruska

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The world is grey - not black and white

The question was
"What if Hitler following the fall of France decides that finishing Britain needs to be done before proceeding in the East against Russia? Now, this means either conquest or getting a negotiated surrender / peace"
This means that in 1940 there are no extra U-boats, only the ones that existed in reality.
Hitler did order an increase in U-boat production in the summer of 1940, but it took time for these boats and crews to become operational.
So even if Hitler doesn't order an attack on the Soviet Union the level of operational U-boats is not going to increase at a much greater rate than in did in reality

__________________
if in doubt....Panic!!!!

Hello redcoat,

Sorry, the topic Hitler decides to fin...... was already outruled by me, because this "if' would mean to change Hitlers political/racial viewpoint, which as such could never happen or would change anything we know about ww2.

Therfore I suggested the following:

Originally Posted by Kruska
Alright what about the following “if”

"IF” Hitler would have ordered full scale military production in 1936 (instead of 1944), placed Krupp instead of Goering in charge for industrial planning and opened up the war against Poland and the Western allies in Spring 1940 (having his Hitler-Stalin Pact in his pocket) who could have stopped the madmen and his war machine?

Regards
Kruska

__________________

The world is grey - not black and white

Why Not? The XB-24 first flew in 1939 and both Britain and France had orders for large numbers of B-24's on the books before France fell. When France fell in June, 1940, the French order was diverted to Britain. British Coastal Command begged to be allocated some of the B-24's for ASW patrol duties, but the RAF refused claiming they could win the war by strategic bombing alone. However, if the Germans had suddenly conjured up 150 U-boats, the decision might have been different.



No, historically, the KM damn near failed to take Norway against minimal resistence and lost a significant number of their larger warships in the bargain. If they had built 150 subs instead of those cruisers and destroyers they're not even going to attempt the Norway operation because they can't lift the troops. If they do try, they get squashed. Subs, BTW, make lousy troop transports. The KM was operating on a razor thin margin as it was; by the end of 1940 they didn't have a single fleet destroyer in commission.



The stuff dreams are made of. Germany didn't increase it's war-making potential by a single percentage point during WW II; it went down instead of up. Germany might have produced more of some weapons, but they were useless because Germany didn't have the men, fuel or logistics to get them where they made a difference.



Historically, there was a "gap" (shortage) in almost every kind of strategic material Germany used by 1940. Hitler deciding to deal with Britain before invading the USSR isn't going to change that. and 150 more U-boats means 150 more trained U-boat crews which Donitz didn't have. Britain wasn't that close to losing the Battle of the Atlantic at any time. Check out Clay Blair's "The U-Boat War". It would have taken a lot of time for Hitler to find out he couldn't beat Britain no matter what he did; By the end of 1941, he would still be embrolied in the war with the British and the Soviet Union would still be waiting (maybe) for Germany to make it's move.

You may not hold it likely that Britain could survive 150 extra U-boats, but recent scholarship shows that the U-boats were not effective enough in the face of British ASW tactics and that additional airborne ASW assets would have defeated almost any number of U-boats.



Your numbers mean nothing. Germany had a finite war-making potential that amounted to about 14.4% of the total world war-making potential. Increasing production means nothing unless the output can be utilized effectively. The "what-if" does not include any economic enhancement, just a different strategic decision which Germany would be no more capable of carrying out than it was historically. You are ascribing to Germany and the Axis far more in terms of war-fighting capability than it ever accomplished. If you want to pretend there is some sort of magic through which this might have been accomplished, fine, but it has no place on a serious discussion board.



Ok, let's cut to the chase on this. Let's assume that Hitler does decide to "finish with Britain" before attacking the Soviet Union. What happens is that Hitler finds he has no way to force Britain out of the war, either by military defeat or by enticing Britain into a peace treaty. We know this happened in 1940-41. By the summer of 1941, Hitler is getting tired of waiting for something that just isn't going to happen. What can he do? The actual answer is, not a damned thing, he just doesn't have the military or economic power to make things happen the way he wants. He might realize at that point that he is being outproduced where it counts by Britain, and might even try to increase Germany's war production by cutting civilian goods, but that takes time and it's certainly not going to increase German production across the board by any 400%. What Hitler ends up doing is deciding he can't "finish" Britain, especially with a country like the US backing it, and attacks the USSR anyway. Germany still gets it's ass kicked in the end.

What I don't understand is why so many what-if'ers think the Axis can be made to win by simply changing one small decision or event; The Axis lost because it was in the numbers that it lose, and those numbers had been in the making for over a century. As one of my college professors once said, "History happens the way it does for damn good reasons."

Hello Devilsadvocate,

For some reason you prefer to ignore facts or you simply don’t bother to look it up.

Your statement that Germany didn't increase its war-making potential by a single percentage point during WW II; it went down instead of up is absolutely absurd.
Also Germany had no problems in supplying manpower and oil till 1944.

Germany started the war under the concept of Blitzkrieg. It did not accept that it was in a total war until Joseph Goebbels' Sportpalast speech of 18 February 1943. For example, women were not conscripted into the armed forces or allowed to work in factories. The Nazi party adhered to the policy that a woman's place was in the home, and did not change this even as its opponents began moving women into important roles in production.
The commitment to the doctrine of the short war was a continuing handicap for the Germans; neither plans nor state of mind were adjusted to the idea of a long war until it was too late to help win the war.
Germany's armament minister Albert Speer, who assumed office in early 1942, nationalized German war production and eliminated the worst inefficiencies. Under his direction a threefold increase in armament production occurred and did not reach its peak until late 1944. To do this during the damage caused by the growing strategic Allied bomber offensive is an indication of the degree of industrial under-mobilization in the earlier years.

So Speer was able to increase the armament production by 300% within three years despite massive allied bombing raids. Now imagine the increase that could have occurred from 1936-1940 without any allied interference.

The Allied commission in regards to the examination of Germany’s industry in 1945 concluded:

Im Bereich der Panzer kam es von 1941 bis 1944 unter Mitwirkung von Ferdinand Porsche auf eine Steigerung von 660 Prozent.

In reference to tanks, the increase under the assistance of Ferdinand Porsche reached 660% from 1941 to 1944.

Again I will repeat that my “if” forwarding has nothing to do with defeating/conquering Britain before attacking Russia.
But:
"IF” Hitler would have ordered full scale military production in 1936 (instead of 1944), placed Krupp instead of Goering in charge for industrial planning and opened up the war against Poland and the Western allies in Spring 1940 (having his Hitler-Stalin Pact in his pocket) who could have stopped the madmen and his war machine?

Regards
Kruska

__________________

The world is grey - not black and white

Facts?? I've seen no facts from you, just some silliness about Germany increasing it's industrial output by 400% across the board. Even if that was true, which I seriously doubt, it's irrelevant. It didn't help Germany in the slightest.

And if you want to assert facts, it's incumbent upon you to look them up and present them with appropriate citations. Take a look at the reference I made to Kennedy's book to see how it's done.



Well, if you think so, prove it by citing references that say so. It's obvious you don't even understand what Kennedy is talking about when he says "war-making potential". If you did, you wouldn't come back with a non-sequiter like "Germany increased it's industrial output 400% bla, bla, bla....". That is not the same thing as increasing war-making potential as defined by Kennedy. It involves a lot more than just piling up fighter planes on some airfield somewhere. What Kennedy means is that Germany's ability to effectively wage war decreased as time went along, and I defy anyone to find any reputable source that says otherwise.

For the rest of it, you have moved completely away from the original "what-if" proposition, and as it appears to be the case that you can't or won't present any arguments for the original question, this discussion is over as far as I'm concerned.

Before this thread gets out of hand, don't be the one who is left standing when the music stops.

__________________
Best Regards,
JW

Hello Devilsadvocate,

Increasing Germany's military output by 400% from 1942-1944 is not silliness but a fact.
Kennedy'd assumtion about potential is based entirely upon Germany on its own it does not include the potential of the occupied countries, such as France, the Benelux countries, Chechoslovakia, Polandetc. etc. not to mention the vast Russian areas such as the Ukraine.

The occupation of those countries add automatically to the potential which in not taken into consideration by Kennedy. As such the conclusion to say that the war making potential of Germany decreased as the war went on is already totally out. Did Kennedy further take into account 8 Million slavelaborers from 1941 onward?

As I am not familiar with Kennedy's sources and formulas in regards to his theory potential, I would even find it hard to believe that Britain was evaluated with 10%, France with 4,5% and Germany with 14%, (other sources state that the potential of France was even higher then that of Germany in 1938), not to mention the by Kennedy neglected build up of Germany's potential in the comming years, due to occupation of other countries. The annexation of Austria in 1938 already flushed 1.5 Billion RM of federal reserves into Germany's economy.

Again I will forward that if the warmachinery had been started in 1936-1940, Russia would not have been able to stop Hitler. Now maybe you can forward the Kennedy potential of Germany by adding the occupied countries plus the western part of Russia into account as of 1942.

"Nazi Germany can't win" written by Wilhelm Neckers and published in London 1939.

The following are cut outs of 4 military historians who debated about this book and the emphasisis of W. Neckers towards the war making potential.

Possony
Schiffrin
Sternberg
Neckers

In conclusion all 4 agree that the factor "war making potential" comes only into effect - once Hitlers Blitz strategy fails. A sudden victory over France and western Europe and a sucessfull Blitz war against Russia - would take the figures of the war making potential as of before the war out of the existing equation(1939) in regards to a continuation of a victorious Nazi Germany from 1941 onward.

Russel H. Stolfi an American military historian "Hitlers Panzer East" (Norman 1991) also refutes the claim in terms to the war making potential, to be the only or main decisive factor. Applying this "potential" as of 1940 (Reality and Myth 1966) Germany could not have been victorious against France - due to the rapid progress of the German advance however France's war making potential could not be utulized militarily.

Schiffrin "Military Strenght of the Powers 1938" and Stefan Th Possony also agree in 1938 that only a "Sudden victory" against the European western countries could counterbalance the differences in potentials of the "war making potentials" in favor for Germany and prepare the basis for a "longer" war against Russia and its allies.
Interestingly Schiffrin however forwarded that Germany's military might as of 1939 would not be able to succeed against Russia "The Military Strenght of the Powers" Army Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2 July 1939. (This was received as an astonishing view in Britain)

Schiffrin "Battle for the World" 1941, US magazin (The New republic) even states that after the entering of the USA - inspired by Britain, and joining forces with Russia "the present (1941) equal balance of war making potential" will change in favor for the allies.

Schiffrin analyses very correctly in 1942 "The Great Offensive"-December 1942, that the German failure to succeed in Winter 1941 (Battle for Moscow) in its only existing Strategy of speed (Blitz) turned the fortune of war against them. Germany was doomed since its only strategy was no more in effect.

The Swedish author G.Tonndorf forwards in "Krieg der Fabriken"1943 (War of the Factory's) that in the beginning of 1942 the industrial battle had turned in the favor for the allies.

It must have been very difficult to determin the war making potential in 1943, since J. Burnham "Total War" forwarded a fast and sucessfull end of the war against Germany towards the end of 1946 and another 2-3 years to crush Japan.

So Germany did as in history "blitzconquer" western Europe - but due to neglecting the "total war" production industry from 1936-1940 it simply did not have the necessary numbers to Blitz succeed against Russia by 1941/42 just as history shows, and thus enabeling history to get the USA alongside with Russia and Britain into the picture against Germany.

Regards
Kruska

__________________

The world is grey - not black and white

Maybe so, but the question is, was Germany 400% stronger in military terms relative to it's opponents in 1944 than it was in 1942? The answer is obviously no. Therefore Germany's war-making potential decreased rather than increased. Military production is only relevant if it can be effectively applied.



Of course it is. He clearly states that his figures are based upon the year 1937. Germany did not control any other countries in 1937. Nor could Kennedy include countries that Hitler intended to occupy. However, you must beware of ascribing too much value, in terms of war-making potential, to occupied countries because they come with a cost and the benefits cannot truly be counted to Germany until they are fully integrated into the German economic (includig logistical), military, and political systems.



That's because you still don't understand that Kennedy is talking about a concept that goes far beyond mere military strength to include economics, demographics, infrastructure, geographic advantages and disadvantages, and cultural factors. I'd bet anything that your "other sources" referring to France's "potential" were simply comparing the paper strength of France's army to that of Germany. A useless comparison as everyone found out in 1941.



Again, that's not part of the original "what-if" But even if it was, what you are talking about is simply "mobilization" of the economy to put it on a complete war footing. Germany's share of the world's actual war-making potential is still just 14.4%, about the same as the Soviet Union's at 14%. And Germany mobilizing it's economy completely in 1936-1938 is likely to have the unforeseen consequences, such as the western nations doing the same thing earlier. As for the Soviets stopping Hitler in 1941-42, it's going to unfold pretty much the same either way due to Germany's neglect of logistics and the Soviets ability to trade territory for time.



Another way of putting this proposition is, that if Germany doesn't force a surrender in six months, it will lose the war. I think that is a fair way of stating the situation. Germany could "bounce" a country and force a quick surrender if the country was militarily weak and/or irresolute, but if determined and able to trade space for time, such as Britain or Russia, Germany just didn't have to war-makibng potential to stay the course in a long war. I'd say that's a vindication of Kennedy's analysis and his concept of war-making potential concept.

Another way of looking at the concept is to consider the fact that as the war continued the Axis strength (war-making potential) decreased in proportion to the Allies because the factors that Kennedy included in his analysis had time to come into play. Germany might increase production of certain kinds of weapons, but that did not mean it became stronger, had more options, or military potential, it lost war-making potential as time passed.



This is simply a restatement of my analysis; Germany managed to subdue a few militarily weak or irresolute countries, France, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Poland, but didn't have the war-making potential to subdue stronger countries like Britain, and the USSR. The Axis combined, was exceedingly weak in terms of war-making potential and had no chance whatsoever of winning a war against the Allies which had three times the war-making potential of their opponents.

Hello Devilsadvocate,

Besides a mere statistic from Kennedy (which does not take into account any historic or “if” changes) I haven’t, seen any facts/literature posted by you that would support your argument or personal opinions.

Maybe you will find the following interesting to read since it is reasoned and documented, -not just a single table statistic – It shows, proves that my “if” assumption has all reasons to be a very realistic one. If Russia is “Blitzt” within 6-9 month, the GDP would be at par even with the entry of the USA in 1942/43. (As you can see countries such as Poland 94 GDP or Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway or Greece 76 GDP are not taken into account.

However my statement forwarded very clearly that “if” Hitler would have succeeded against Russia it would be very unclear whether the US would actually get involved in Europe’s ww2.

I also stated that the lack of German war machinery in 1941 due to a non total war production between 1936 and 1940 caused the failure of the war against Russia. Your assumption that if Germany had gone into total war production in 1936 it would have resulted in a similar reaction by France, Britain and Russia is not supported by the fact that both did not do so even under the historic occurrence in regards to Hitler’s buildup and Russia was already in 1937 on the same war production level as in 1941. After all Stalin had planed to build up his invasion army to strike in 1941-42, hoping for a war scenario in the West such as in 1916.

The following readout also proves you wrong in your assumption that Germanys GDP or war making potential did not increase during ww2. Its ratio towards the allies did not improve, but that is only due to the US entering the war and Russia not being conquered or robbed of more then half its GDP through Hitler’s occupation.

Further I would like to point out that the increase of the war making potential – based on the GDP – is inclined to so in regards to rationalization efforts and work hours increase, and not just by building new factories. Germany increased its work hours from 48,5 in 1939 to 72,5 in 1944 and introduced production rationalisation – therefore a 400% increase could be achieved.

Since you always point out that this is not according to the initial thread, I do not mind to move “my if” to a new thread.



please klick to see the statistic


The GDP story of World War II is richer than such analysis suggests. GDP is a rough measure of economic power and decision makers probably make their determinations based on the results of the previous year. From this assumption the following statements may be derived from the estimates of GDP during the war years

In 1939, France and the UK confronted Germany (which included Austria) over Poland. The ratio of Anglo-French GDP to that of Germany/Austria was 1.25 for 1938. Allied GDP was superior to that of Germany/Austria.

However, on the eve of war, Nazi Germany announced a treaty with the USSR. The Nazi-Soviet Pact certainly neutralized the economic weight of the USSR and it may have been interpreted as a German/Austrian alliance with the Soviet Union. In the latter case, the ratio of Allied/Axis GDP shifts to 0.64 and the Allied expectation is to lose.

During the battle of France, in 1940, Italy joined the war on the side of Germany/Austria. In terms of 1939 GDP, the Allies to Axis ratio now stood at 0.86 because of the addition of Italian GDP to the Axis.

With the loss of France to the Allies, the Allies to Axis ratio dropped to 0.51 as the UK stood alone against the combined economic power of Germany/Austria and Italy. With the addition of French GDP, the Allies to Axis ratio plummets to 0.38 and an Axis victory seems economically certain. British intransigence, epitomized by Churchill's poignant bluster hid the hopelessness of the Allied cause from the public. Realistically, only the hope of a Soviet or American entry into the war on the Allied side provided any solace.

Adding the 1940 GDP of the USSR to that of the UK shifted the Allies to Axis great power GDP ratio to 1.31, giving the Allies the economic advantage lost with the entry of Italy in 1940. However, with French GDP included in the Axis tally, the ratio was 1.01. Hitler said of the war with the Soviet Union that "the world will hold its breath."

With the addition of Soviet GDP to the Axis, Japan engaged on the Axis side and the United States on Allied side, the ratio would be at 0.94.

At the end of 1941, the Axis had every reason to believe the war against the Allies was economically winnable. The reality of an undefeated USSR, however, gave Churchill every reason to say "we will win after all,"

This analysis shows that while by 1942 there was a substantial Allied economic advantage, measured in GDP, this did not exist at the beginning of the war in 1939. In fact for a period of time the Axis commanded greater GDP than the Allies. Suggesting that the Allies had a GDP superiority from the start is wrong and misses the dynamics of World War II.

It is worth noting that from a lead of 1.25 in 1939, the Allies were reduced to a miserable 0.38 by 1941. There was nothing preordained about the recovery of GDP that followed.

It is unreasonable to believe that Allied decision makers were particularly confident of economic dominance until well into 1942, regardless of their public pronouncements.

Regards
Kruska

__________________

The world is grey - not black and white

according to your reference here, they don't even agree with what you are saying, because you seem to have picked out of that reference statments which only agree with your argument and not disagree with it. You have left parts out for example, it starts of as.

I personnaly think that this is a load of **** and although apparantly on paper is possible, in reality this is far from the truth. Why? Because if this was possible, Hitler would have done it, Germany would have increased its production by your 400%, yet they didn't, Why? Because it clearly was not possible in reality.

Another point is that your whole argument appears to be that the axis forces could defeat the 1940-41 western allied armies. Ok, again in theory yes, but then why did the Germans lose the BoB? Why did they lose in North Africa? Because in reality they couldn't, and this is even before bringing the USSR and the USA into the equation.

You also keep bring up the fact that the Germans could use captured enemy factories within occupied countries. You fail to rememeber, that merely taking over a factory dosn't automatically mean it starts churning out tanks and guns. This takes time to rebuild the factory, which means more materials taht Germany is short on to be allocated, as well as men and trucks (that are already short in supply).

Yes I know that you said the Germany starts her build up eariler, but I just don't see how this is possible.

__________________
They shall grow not old as we that are left grow old Age shall not weary them, nor the years condemn
At the going down of the sun and in the morning
We shall remember them. Lest We Forget