Hey guys, hows it going? I was wondering the other night as I was watching old black and white war movies and enjoying the acting and what not and then I watched a documentary on the battle of Jutland and such. Anyways, what if after the first world war, Germany had there entire surface fleet still. It wasn't scuttled at Scapa Flow(?) and the treaty of Versailles and the rest of the Naval treaties did not get in effect. I also would like to add, that if it does matter that the other nations would keep there navies (except Austria because of its breaking up with Hungary and whatnot)

How would this create a different atmosphere? Would there be another Jutland? Or would Hitler scrap all the old ships for panzers?

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I assume what you are saying is that instead of losing WW I, Germany managed to force a stalemate and the belligerent nations simply adopted the status quo ante bellum?

It probably wouldn't make much difference overall, The HSF was an expensive luxury which Germany could not afford to maintain for long. The German navy would quickly downsize (probably mothballing some of the dreadnoughts and scrapping the rest) and attempt to create a much smaller, but more modern fleet of much more useful vessels like cruisers and destroyers.

If Germany retained her fleet, it would probably be included in the Washington Naval Conference in 1922, and would find it's fleet restricted by treaty, if not by practical economic restrictions imposed by the international monetary crisis of 1930. When Hitler comes to power in 1933, Germany would find itself in pretty much the same economic situation and the German Navy would again be last in line for rearmament. The most likely outcome is that the KM would find itself saddled with out of date ships totally unsuited to any mission it might be assigned; the principles of "block obsolescence" would make for an even weaker German navy than actually was the case in WW II. Picture vessels like the Schleswieg-Holstein forming the backbone of the KM.

The Germans would still be laboring under the same problems that they faced throughout WWII, a decided lack of fuel oil to propell all of the vehicles, aircraft and ships.

I suspose they could leave the ships coal fueled and transfer the cost from the oil fuel economy. Of course coal fuel would leave the warships even more inferior to Britians fleet.

On the other hand having this legacy fleet parked in Kiel in 1935 instead of sunk at Scapa Flow would mean a lot of high quality scrap steel for building tanks. The guns might be of some sort of use as heavy artillery.

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Some were used during the was as Rail guns and Coastal guns. So that would have been a possibility. Imagine all those extra Guns if they were on the Atlantic Wall?

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There are a number of questions that need to be answered before proceeding to the question at hand. These include:

1. How much of the fleet was worth keeping by 1939?
2. How would Germany have fit into the Washington Naval Treaty? How many ships would they be allowed?
3. Would Germany opt for new construction during the inter-war period or for extensive refits like the Italians did?
4. What other changes to their fleet would result from having a larger battle fleet? Would Germany develop carriers sooner? Would they still opt for a submarine campaign and built these in preference to other ships?

Good points all. I would say that any German Battleships built after 1915 would still be capable of keeping up with most modern fleet units of 1939-45.

Hard to say about the Washington Naval Treaty, as it would all be speculation.

Given their history of cruiser refits, I would hazard a guess to say that any German WWI BB's would be extensively refitted, just like the Italian Battleships were.

Whether the Germans developed their own aircraft carriers or not in the early 1920's would depend as to how much attention that their own Naval attache's paid towards the revolutionary actions of England, the United States and Japan.

Regarding U-boat warfare. That too would depend as to who was at the political helm of Germany during those key, rebuilding years of the mid to late 1930's. There was only so much time and only so much space in the ship building yards, while the overall status of the German Army was being substantially upgraded, drastically improved and motorized.

I would think that the following might be a reasonable starting place for this:

The Germans in the early 20's are party to the Washington Naval Treaty. They receive a ratio of about 2 (The ratio for capital ships was US 5, UK 5, Japan 3, Italy and France 1.75) giving them 8 or 9 battleships. They are forced to either scrap or sell the remaining ships.
We can assume that the battleships not retained are scrapped. This gives the Germans a surface fleet of capital ships say, as follows in 1925:

4 Baden class battleships (assumes they finish the class using material from scrapped ships and new production to hurry the process)
1 Mackensen class battlecruiser (assumes they finish the lead ship of this class as a counter reply to Hood)
3 Derfflinger class battlecruisers
Possibly one of the König class battleships as well.

During the late 20's and 30's the Germans refit these ships as allowed under the Treaty as did other nations. The following might be the expected modifications:

All are converted to straight oil firing.

The Badens are given a mixed steam diesel plant. They have their bows extended giving the clipper style "Atlantic" bow increasing their beam to length ratio and speed to about 23 or 24 knots. Their casemated secondary armament is removed and replaced with 12 turretted 15 cm guns in dual mounts. An antiaircraft battery of 16 10.5cm AA guns is installed. Deck armor is increased and armor forward and aft removed to save weight. The ships are bulged to increase the depth of the torpedo defense system. But, these bulges are far less extensive than on British ships as the Badens already have a decent torpedo defense system. The main battery is increased in elevation to 30 degrees.

The Mackensen and the three Derfflinger class undergo similar modification but have an all-steam plant and can make about 30 knots.

The Germans go with new construction and build a single aircraft carrier in the late 20's. This gives them over a decade to figure out how to operate a carrier at sea. New battleship construction is limited by finances so the Germans opt not to build any new ships until the late 30's when they begin a class similar to the Bismarck but with 16" guns and a more modern armor arrangement.

Submarines still play a significant role in German strategy. They still expect to be the inferior fleet in a war with Britain so continue to build subs in anticipation of a Guerre de Course. Their biggest problem is fuel. The fleet spends most of its time tied to the pier due to fuel availability and cost of operation.
However, the Germans particularly after Hitler comes to power do make cruises to "show the flag." This historically was done to a lesser extent due to the small size of the German navy. Having a battleship visit New York or Tokyo would be very prestigious for Germany.

A very well reasoned approach to the question; I would agree on most points.

Until quite late in the 1930's, the German Navy was planned almost exclusively to counter the Navies of Poland, France, and Italy; it seems likely that this focus would not change much.

However, since the Washington Naval treaty was designed to avoid a naval armaments "race" and, by implication, maintain the status quo, I would think Germany would demand, and receive, a somewhat higher ratio for capital ships than 2. I think Germany would be on par with Japan and would be entitled to a ratio of 3; this would give her a total of 315,000 tons for battleships/battle cruisers, and 81,000 tons for aircraft carriers. Since Germany would presumably be building ships in response to the British G3/N3 program and probably wouldn't have any carriers laid down, she would most likely be allowed to finish a couple of these vessels as carriers, just as the US and Japan were allowed to convert the Lexington/Saratoga and Akagi/kaga to large carriers.

Germany still wouldn't have the strategic reasons for these carriers that the US, Japan, and to a lesser extent, Britain, would have, but she would probably build them and operate them for a few years before scrapping or mothballing them. Since Germany's HSF was anything but, and historically operated mostly in the North Sea or Baltic, it would be easy for the German navy to accomplish it's fleet scouting functions much more cheaply with long range land, or sea planes.

Block obsolescence is still going to be a problem for the German Navy unless Germany spends a great deal of money on rebuilding her older vessels just as Italy did. Germany, due to financial considerations. will probably be forced to make a decision between continuing to operate her carriers, and updating her battleships and the battleships will probably benefit. Historically, Germany's sub fleet didn't start to get rebuilt until about 1936-37, mostly because Donitz had achieved higher rank by then, and that probably won't change.

a lot depends on the German naval strategy chosen. Is it to be a sea control strategy vs nations like Poland, France, & Italy. Or a raiding strategy? Is there any indication in the books which the German naval leaders favored in theory in the 1920s & 1930s, before Hitler muddied the water so to speak.

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Not Really. The HSF was originally conceived as part of a hybrid "fleet in being" scheme called the "risk theory". The idea being that, even though Germany couldn't out build the Royal Navy, it could pose enough of a naval threat that Britain couldn't afford the risk of trying to destroy it. Obviously, that didn't work. No matter what the Germans would like to do with their Navy, economics and geography combined to relegate the German navy to a subsidiary role in Europe.

Historically, the German Navy in the 1920's and 1930's was limited by (the Versailles) treaty to the role of coastal defense and it does not appear that much thought was given to any other use. Even after Hitler came to power and negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, it does not appear that the political leadership gave much direction beyond a desire for naval modernization and expansion; the German Navy was still a distinctly regional force with regional aspirations. The strategy of a guerre de course was more or less imposed on the KM by default.

Of course, it's entirely likely that, had remnants of the HSF remained in existence, this may have changed somewhat. But the harsh reality for Germany and the German Navy remains that Germany was, and is, a land power. There was simply no logical national strategy which justified a large fleet whose mission was "sea control". That is why battleships and aircraft carriers really made no sense for the KM.

The Germans did have an alternative they could have used their fleet for in WW 1 or, if they had more of one in WW 2. That alternative is simple attrition.
For the Germans, a land power, a fleet is a luxury that is not entirely necessary. For Britain, a sea power, a fleet is obligatory and must be maintained. The German alternative is simply to force the British into engagments with the objective of simply sinking as many ships as possible almost regardless of own losses. At Jutland, the Germans should have stayed and fought the battle to a decisive (and bloody) end.
Britain would then be forced to build and man replacements as they would still need a fleet. The Germans have the position of being able to pick and choose what they will build. In this case, the Germans might choose to revert to the Guerre de Course and put a number of surface raiders along with more submarines to sea in the immediate aftermath.
Britain, now having a large portion of their fleet sunk or damaged is forced into repairing and replacing it. This puts a crimp in building ships to counter the German shipping war.
Had the Germans still had 8 to 10 battleships and a carrier or three to go with them in WW 2 the same approach could be taken. The Germans don't have to win at sea for the British to lose.

What you are describing is the concept of Tirpitz's "Risk Theory", and it was the German Navy which declined to run the "risk", not the RN. It's not a viable strategy for Germany unless the KM can inflict a highly disproportionate ratio of losses on the Royal Navy. Simply reducing the RN on a one for one basis does Germany no good whatsoever, because when the Germans have run out of ships, the RN still controls the sea. And the N-squared law dictates that the larger navy will always suffer fewer losses than the weaker navy. In addition, geography works against the KM conducting fleet operations, especially those of carriers

The strategy of Guerre de Course is the strategy of a weaker navy and cannot, by itself, defeat a sea power unless combined with an effective blockade.

You are right about this, and this is also what happened.

The Washington Treaty indirectly affected the German Navy, as it limited armaments at sea. It was agreed that battleships should have their guns restricted to 16in calibre and that cruisers should be no larger than 10 000 tons with 8in guns.

The tonnage under this treaty was measured with US ton, which is slightly heavier than the British or Imperial ton, used in the Treaty of Versailles.

In Germany, people became quite happy about these developments when they saw the possibility of sidestepping the peace treaty in favor of the Washington Treaty.
By this ploy, German ship sizes could be increased up to 15% without changing tonnage numbers.

In fact, Germany was now in an unique position among maritime nations, as her naval planners was quick to percieve.
The German designers came up with the idea of building a ship that would be too fast for any enemy battleship and much superior to a cruiser.

With this concept the so called "pocket battleship" was born; its high speed enabled it to run away from a battleship and blast a cruiser out of the water from outside the range of the cruiser's guns.

Regards
RAM

The German Navy was not subject to the Washington Naval treaty and they in no way benefited from it. The ships of the German Navy were restricted by the Versailles Treaty to a maximum of six heavy cruisers of 10,000 tons (imperial), and they could only replace ships they were scrapping. The so-called "pocket battleships" were designed to replace capitol ships that were much larger. As Breyer states, the design criteria was simply to make the ships as capable as possible within the 10,000 ton limit. Despite all the contemporary hype, the "pocket battleships" were not really that innovative merely being large cruisers with heavy guns and a decent turn of speed.

When war came, it turned out that the "Panzerschiffs" as the Germans called them, couldn't outrun contemporary battleships, much less battle cruisers, and were barely able to out gun regular cruisers. They were largely failures as capitol ships, although they did well as large commerce raiders. However, that was a niche that was rapidly being closed out by modern radio communications and long range aircraft patrols, In reality, the KM found them to be much less useful than is commonly assumed.

It wasn't until June, 1935, that Hitler negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Treaty that allowed the KM to expand to a size that was 35 % of the Royal Navy. Since the size of the RN had been somewhat reduced by the Washington Naval Treaty, this actually worked to reduce the size to which the KM could expand after 1935. The KM was, however, allowed by the Anglo-German naval Treaty to build real capitol ships up to the size limitations imposed by the Washington Naval treaty and the later London treaty.

There was very little naval development of significance in Germany during the 1920s.

The first pocket battleship Deutschland splashed into the water on May 19th 1931.
One of the biggest challenges at the time was the propulsion system.
It was decided to use diesel engines.
It was essential to test the design before it was installed into a major warship, so the prototypes was installed into the artillery training ship Bremse, which was launched in January 1931.

This worked well, and the Deutschland, Admiral Graf Spee (1934) and Admiral Scheer (1933) had 8 MAN 9 cylinder DDM engines installed.
This gave them a speed of 26 to 28.5 knots.

These ships were a transition from the WWI era warships to the modern warships of WWII.
With the speed of development in war ship construction during the 1930s, they were outdated at the out-break of WWII.

However, they were important stepstones in rebuilding the "Kriegsmarine".

Regards
RAM

It's a myth that the Washington Naval Treaty inspired the Germans to build ships larger than they were allowed under the Versailles Treaty. Versailles specified 10,000 Imperial tons as the maximum allowable size for German warships; they simply cheated (probably inadvertently due to inexperienced designers) on the weight of the Panzerschiffs and were able to get away with it because no one had any effective way of actually determining the weight of warships. Significantly, the Germans always claimed the Panzerschiffs were 10,000 tons displacemen