Chamberlain Supported Russia

Piat · #1 (**permalink**) August 6th, 2008, 09:13 PM

War seemed inevitable and Britain had to choose an Allie to have an agreement with, either Poland or Russia. Chamberlain and his government were delusion about Russia because they thought it was a country still hell bent on promoting communist revolutions all over the world, but Stalin was no Bolshevik and wasn't concerned about converting the world to communism, he was more concerned with defending his country. And surprisingly Britain thought Poland would be able to hold there own better then Russia could.

Now because of Britain's distrust of Russia and Russia's distrust of Britain with bad offers (that if after an attack on Poland led to an attack on Britain or France, Russia would help but not vise versa if Russia was attacked) Russia decided to sign the Nazi-Soviet pact and then two days later Britain signed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Poland.

But what if there had of been a Russian-British pact so if either was attacked then the other would help. How would Hitler respond to this?

Za Rodinu · #2 (**permalink**) August 6th, 2008, 09:25 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Piat

...delusion about Russia because they thought it was a country still hell bent on promoting communist revolutions all over the world, but Stalin was no Bolshevik and wasn't concerned about converting the world to communism, he was more concerned with defending his country.

Ehhh, actually that was more or less what the stalinist "Socialism in One Country" proposed, as opposed to the troskyite "Permanent Revolution" theory ... Surprised?

Actually it would have been interesting if the French-British mission that was in Moscow negociating a pact at the same time as Molotov was dealing with Ribbentropp had a broader remit and had more authority, in short if those people knew what they were doing, but History is what it is, not what it wasn't...

From Wikipedia:

Quote:

Franco-British negotiations with the Soviet Union

In March 1939, Hitler's denunciation of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was taken by the Soviets as a clear signal of Hitler's aggressive intentions. In April, Soviet foreign minister Litvinov outlined a French-British-Soviet alliance, with military commitments against Fascist powers, but Chamberlain's government procrastinated (partly because the Soviets demanded too much – impossible troop commitments, Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, complete reciprocity, and the right to send troops through Poland).[citation needed]
Chamberlain, however, had already on 24 March, along with France, guaranteed the sovereignty of Poland, and subsequently on 25 April signed a Common Defence Pact with Poland. Consequently, Stalin no longer feared that the West would leave the Soviet Union to fight Hitler alone; indeed, if Germany and the West went to war, as seemed likely, the USSR could afford to remain neutral and wait for them to destroy each other.
Negotiations between the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom for a military alliance against Germany stalled, mainly due to mutual suspicions. The Soviet Union sought guarantees for support against German aggression and recognition of the right of the Soviet Union to act against "a change of policy favorable to an aggressor" in the countries along the western Soviet border. Although none of the affected countries had formally asked for protection by the Soviet Union, it nevertheless announced "guarantees for the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey, and Greece", the so-called "cordon sanitaire" erected between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The British and French feared that this would allow Soviet intervention in neighboring countries' internal affairs, even in the absence of an immediate external German threat.
However, with the Third Reich now demanding territorial concessions from Poland in the face of Polish opposition, the threat of war was increasing. Although telegrams were exchanged between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union as early as April 1939, the military missions sent by the Western Powers (on a slow transport vessel) did not arrive in Moscow until August 11, and were given no authority to conduct talks resulting in binding agreements or to sign treaties. [my bold - Za]

During the first phase of the negotiations begun in April 1939, the Anglo-French side was unwilling to create a formal military alliance as suggested by the USSR. However, the Western leaders soon gave up and suggested a military alliance in May. A couple of proposals were made by both sides. On June 2, 1939, the Soviet Union submitted its proposal, which suggested tripartite military action under three circumstances:

in case a European Power (i.e., Germany) attacked a contracting party;
in case of German aggression against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, or Finland (all of whom the contracting parties had promised to defend);
in case of the involvement of a participant in war due to rendering assistance to a European country which has pled for aid.

This proposal was discussed for the next two months, until the Western allies eventually accepted it almost completely. Molotov suggested signing the (political) alliance treaty together with the military treaty, for which Western delegations were sent to Moscow. [5]
The military negotiations lasted from August 12 to August 17. On August 14, the question of Poland was raised by Voroshilov for the first time. The Polish government feared that the Soviet government sought to annex disputed territories, the Eastern Borderlands, received by Poland in 1920 after the Treaty of Riga ending the Polish-Soviet war. Therefore, the Polish government refused to allow the Soviet military to enter its territory and establish military bases[citation needed].
Three weeks into August the negotiations ground to a halt, with each side doubting the other's motives. It should also be noted that the Soviets had already had contacts with the Germans throughout the spring of 1939.[6] The Soviet Union pursued secret talks with Nazi Germany, while conducting public ones with United Kingdom and France [7]. From the beginning of the negotiations with France and Britain it was clear that Soviet position required agreeing to their occupation of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania [7]. Finland was to be included in Soviet sphere of influence as well[8]. The public nature of talks with France and Britain increased the pressure on Hitler by Stalin to heighten his price in reward for alliance with the Soviets [7].

Za Rodinu · #3 (**permalink**) August 6th, 2008, 09:53 PM

Hmm, read this too:

Charles Tansill, Back Door to War (1952)

Among others:

d. Britain and France Make New Overtures to Russia

The Western democracies were ignorant of the secret negotiations that were being carried on between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Daladier had some doubts about Russian assurances, but he had no idea that the Nazi-Soviet accord was really moving towards an early conclusion. Léger expressed to Bullitt the opinion that "there were eighty chances in a hundred" that the Anglo-French conversations with Molotov in Moscow "would be concluded successfully in the near future." But there were other difficulties:

Relations between Poland and France had again become extraordinarily unpleasant. At a moment when it was absolutely essential for the French Government to know the exact thoughts of the Polish Government with regard to Danzig, the Polish Ambassador in Paris was so nervous and irritable that it was impossible to have any really intimate conversation with him. He had insulted both Daladier and Bonnet so grossly that Daladier would no longer see him and Bonnet could get nothing out of him. Similarly, Beck in Warsaw had no relations of an intimate nature with the French Ambassador. As a result, all the French Ministers from Daladier down were reluctant to do anything of a concrete nature for Poland. He [Léger] believes that both France and England should give loans to Poland and send airplanes to Poland at once in order to convince the Germans that France and England are determined to support Poland if Poland should become involved in war with Germany. The Polish Ambassador was entirely right in his demands for such assistance; but his manner of presentation ... was such that he killed his own case.(27)