I just read a book about WWII in which it is stated that Hitler only left a small force during the invasion of Poland as opposed to 70 French divisions plus a small BEF. So I thought about what if the Allies weren't as stupid as Hitler thought and invaded Germany? What do you think about what would've happened?

Hi Sergeant, we already have a couple of threads about this subject on the forum. In fact the French entered Saarland in 1939 and did not meet strong opposition. Unfortunatley General Gamelin did not push his advantage and with the exception of a few towns, the army did not push inland and prefered the phoney war and the so called security of the Maginot Line. It was a lost opportunity and Hitler won his gamble.

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What the French can accomplish depends on how much they alter their mobilization plans. The complete mobilization to the 70 divsions refered to was not accomplished overnight. It required a couple months. The Saar Offensive Skipper refered to was executed with the leading infantry divsions, and corps supporting units (extra artillery brigades and tank battalions) that were mobilized & ready in the first week. Thsoe were the units at the higherst state of readiness. Through the remainder of September the remaining first class divsions and part of the second string were mobilized. The third class units begain mobilizing in very late October.

This was little different from the Germans or any other nation. Taking two or three million reservists from the civillian world into combat ready units could not be accomplished overnight. the Germans and Poles had several weeks head start on mobilization over the French, and neither had called up all its third class units when the war started.

If the French had reorganized its mobilization plan drastically, and started it a few days earlier it could have had a army of four corps or eight divsions ready for offensive action. This would have included a mechanized corps of one armored divsion and a couple of the half horse/half mechanized 'cavalry' divsions. More important would have been the considerable ammount of extra artillery, engineers, and infantry support tank battalions. To rapidly break the German defense would require a robust assualt element, hence the extra artillery and support tanks.

However reorganizing the mobilization would have had to be started at least six months earlier, and possibly eight or ten months to be effective. Had the Frrench done so it is likely the Wehrmachts intellegence service would have identified it and the German initial mobilization provided a stronger defense in the West.

In theory a much larger offensive force could have been organized, but this would require up to two years to accomplish the changes in the French military system. And, such changes would have incurred considerable politcal trouble.

If the French did achieve suprise in assemblying a offensive force, ready to attack in the first week of September, the could have forced the German defenders back from the Saar. By using the Rhine river to help cover the east flank, and nuetral Belgium to cover the left flank the French could hammer back the weak German defense for a couple weeks. Then the reinforcements would begain arrivng from the East and the offensive would slow and eventually stall.

In theory there is the possiblity the local German commanders and their infantry would panic. These were susposed to be second rate reserve units, with inadaquate artillery, and AT guns. But, the existing French leaders were not well prepared to recognize such a opportunity if it occured, or take advantage of it if they did see it.

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I forgot my password, can I use yours?

Thats right. This is from the thread I created on the subject.

Operation Saar: A Lost Opportunity

Operation Saar: A Lost Opportunity
In September 1939, while the Germans concentrated on the fighting in Poland, the French army invaded Germany from the west.

By Kevin R. Austra


World War II in Europe was a week old when the French army edged across the frontier into Germany. On September 7, 1939, the German generals' great fear of a two-front war seemed to have been realized. It was inconceivable that the Germans could effectively counter the mighty French army with the Wehrmacht wholly engaged in Poland.

While German Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers peeled off into steep dives over Polish targets, French General Maurice Gamelin directed his Third, Fourth and Fifth armies to begin Operation Saar. The French armies marched into the Cadenbronn and Wendt Forest salients, where the German frontier jabbed uncomfortably into France. Light reconnaissance units crossed the border on September 7, followed two days later by heavy infantry and mechanized forces.

Surprisingly, there was absolutely no German response, and French foot soldiers passed vacant enemy positions. The much-touted Siegfried Line seemed abandoned. Despite its aggressive beginning, however, the French probe into the Saar evolved into such a leisurely stroll that German soldiers and officials were able to collect their belongings and depart well in advance of Gamelin's legions. In other areas on either side of the French border incursion, German and French customs officials chatted over their striped wooden highway barricades as if nothing was happening. Despite the declaration of war, border towns in France continued receiving an uninterrupted supply of electricity from German power stations. The new European war, it seemed, was a far cry from the horrible slaughter of World War I, 25 years earlier.

Throughout German villages, poilus found curious placards bearing printed messages such as: "French soldiers, we have no quarrel with you. We shall not fire unless you do." Instead of hurling artillery projectiles, the Germans parked loudspeaker vans blasting propaganda messages toward the French lines or erected billboards bearing messages of peace and goodwill.

French soldiers also received more lethal greetings, however. During their unhurried withdrawal, the Germans saturated the frontier with explosives. Fields were mined, doors were booby-trapped and some of the National Socialist (Nazi) signs on the walls harbored hidden explosives. The mere hint of an explosive obstacle was enough to halt the snail-like French advance for days. In one case General Gamelin personally ordered soldiers to clear a path through a suspected minefield by driving a herd of pigs through it. The rapid succession of detonations and resulting carnage did nothing to inspire the soldiers to advance deeper into the Reich.

By September 9, two motorized divisions, five tank battalions and artillery had crowded into a sliver of occupied German territory. In spite of overwhelming firepower, most of Gamelin's forces remained within sight of French territory. Their tanks, when employed at all, were committed in small, company-size raids on German frontier strongpoints or unoccupied pillboxes while VIPs from France watched at a safe distance.

In 1939 the French army possessed some of the best tanks in the world. Mechanically sound and powerfully armed, the tanks had armor thicker than that of any German tanks, and crews that were well-trained. If there was any shortcoming in the French tank doctrine, it was related to how the armor would be employed. With no training in large-scale tank maneuvers, the French tended to employ their armor in small, piecemeal attacks without coordinating infantry, artillery and air force operations.

In the rare instances when French tanks lumbered across the frontier within range of enemy guns, German 37mm anti-tank shells bounced harmlessly off the armor of the 33-ton Char B 1 bis tanks. The French tanks in turn fired back with high-velocity 47mm turret-mounted and 75mm hull cannons. The isolated exchanges, however, usually ended in a draw. The Germans would melt away and reposition their small-caliber cannons while the French tankers pulled back behind a protective line of infantry. These brief exchanges brought to light a serious design flaw in the French armor. The Char B 1 bis had its radiator vents on the side, at a point where a hit from small-caliber anti-tank shot could put the tank out of action.

Had French Military Intelligence known there were absolutely no panzers facing them, the situation might have been different. Not only was there no German tracked armor west of the Rhine, the Wehrmacht possessed no anti-tank weapons capable of defeating invading armor. Germany's strongest defense proved to be blitzkrieg newsreels that intimidated and duped French Intelligence.

Contrary to Nazi propaganda that alleged unlimited military potential, the German army lacked fighting equipment. Its units were drastically short of machine guns, machine pistols, artillery and tanks. The vaunted panzer force numbered a mere 200 Mark IV medium tanks--the most modern armor in the German inventory--which were armed with low-velocity 75mm guns. The remainder of the force consisted of hastily produced Mark II light tanks with 20mm cannons and turret-mounted machine guns and even more of the lightly armored Mark I, mounting only two machine guns. At best these light tanks, originally relegated to training exercises until heavier tanks became available, were suitable for mechanized reconnaissance. By the time armored units could be shuttled quickly to the Western Front, the French might already have occupied the Rhineland.

Germany's scarcity of motor transport resulted in the Wehrmacht's last-minute procurement of vehicles of all shapes and descriptions. The German army's hasty acquisition of an additional 16,000 civilian vehicles added to its maintenance burden. Many of these vehicles came from recently acquired Austria and Czechoslovakia. The problem of getting spare parts for trucks exceeded nightmare proportions, as there were 100 different types of trucks in army service, 52 kinds of cars and 150 different sorts of motorcycles. As a result, many of the Wehrmacht's reconnaissance troops rode in motorcycle sidecars painted in brilliant civilian paint schemes.

Taking a calculated risk, Hitler stripped the Western defenses in an attempt to guarantee overwhelming victory in the east. What remained west of the Rhine would have hardly sufficed to hold off a determined enemy attack. While battles raged in Poland, 43 diluted German divisions stretched the length of the western German border from Denmark to Switzerland. In the Saar, German First Army commander General Erwin von Witzleben counted 13 hollow divisions under his command.

The threat of an aggressive French offensive plagued the First Army commander daily. Witzleben, who had actually retired from the service some years earlier, was hardly suited to a field command. The general consistently found himself in uninspired assignments, and the Saar posting was no exception. Witzleben's defense was hampered by a lack of anti-tank guns and artillery and the fact that his infantry divisions were of low quality and equipped with machine guns of World War I vintage. Opposing Witzleben were 10 fully equipped French divisions anchored in the formidable defenses of the Maginot Line.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

The French were also surprised and alarmed by the German's widespread use of mines. In particular, the S-Mine for antipersonnel use was a shock. Advancing troops repeatedly entered fields of these mines that then jumped in the air and caused numerous and serious casualties.
The French were completely unprepared and untrained for dealing with such mines. Instead of either accepting the casualties and pressing or, or improvising clearance techniques, the chose to withdraw their forces instead.