If Japan hadn't fought with the Russians earlier in the war. And decided to to invade only Manchuria up to the border with Russia and signed in with the German/Soviet pack.

1)Would USA still place an embargo on Japan? If not,then?

Secretly Japan agrees with Germany to invade Russia in 41. With more or less of a holding action, keeping the Siberian troops occupied.

2)What then of the winter in Moscow? With no Siberian troops sent in as reinforcements. If Stalin decides to relocate and continue the fight after the fall of Moscow.

3)What then of Stalingrad? The Japanese decide to put forth all of their forces into pushing back the siberians due to an agreement with Hilter that if they do then he will share with Japan the oil from the caucasus'

1. I think that the US would still have initiated the embargo on Japan.
2. I think that the USSR would have the upper hand against Japan. Would the Germans take Moscow, I do not believe so. I don't know if the divisions that counterattacked the Germans in the Battle of Moscow were from the East but if those reinforcements were not available, all the Soviets had to do was stay put in Moscow. The Germans were so weak that they could not muster the strength to hold a victory parade at this stage.
3. Japan would be hard pressed to keep up the front due to lack of resources. The oil you refer to is a future asset but Japan needed it now. Also, the t-34 and even the older Soviet tanks were far superior to the most modern Japanese tankette.

In the end, Japan would not benefit from such an endeavor. The only course was expansion to the south for immediate resources it needed. Japan's war was a true war for economic growth. My two cents.

__________________

American by birth, TEXAN by the grace of GOD!

Chronologically, the US had started to "curtail" some shippments of certain products to Japan after the "Panay" incident, in spite of Japan's "apology" and payments in reparation. This was early on, and we (America) knew full well of the Nanking horrors which happened at the same time.

And don't forget that the Japanese couldn't make "secret deals" with Nazi Germany without the US knowing about it. Their diplomatic code (not their Naval code) had been broken for quite some time. The so called Purple Code wasn't really changed throughout the war years.

The Japanese Kwantung Army drew wrong conclusions from the easy successes of its first probes of 1937 into Soviet territories. The ill equipped and lead Communist border troops were easily swept from two small islands on the River Amur, on the border of Manchukuo. This easy "victory" of the Kwantung concluded that the Red Army must have serious logistical problems, related to the long distance between its eastern and western blocs (11 time zones, one rail line), just as it had been in 1904-05.

This compiled the Imperial headquarters' mistake, and the Kwantung Army command's mistake as per the Red Army and their allies the Mongolians. After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact by the three Axis powers, Stalin was alarmed at the possibility of the USSR being involved in a two-front war.

In July 1938, the Kwantung Army struck again, attacking troops of the Red Russian Independent Eastern Army in a hilly area, Zhanggufeng, on the eastern border of Manchukuo, close to Korea, they failed and were driven back. The Kwantung Army commanders "dismissed the reverse as 'forty percent of a victory' won in a difficult sector".

In April 1939 the 23rd Division of the Kwantung Army moved to a new target, Outer Mongolia; with orders to cross into Nomonhan, a deserted and disputed sector on the Manchukuo-Korean-Mongolian border. Japanese tanks, infantry and cavalry directed fierce attacks into this zone from May to July 1939, but were repulsed at all times by the defenders. Operations, on the Khalkan-Gol river, intensified rapidly. From May through July, Soviet bombers attacked into Manchukuo and Japanese bombers retaliated. The greatest air battles yet seen were taking place, with formations of 150-200 war planes deployed. Soviet anti-aircraft fire was effective and the Japanese airforce wasn’t.

Zhukov had arrived in June 1939. He arrived to find that the Kwantung Army had secured some vital high ground and quickly concluded his need for reinforcements. Before August 1939 he had acquired 550 front line aircraft, 500 state-of-the-art T34 tanks, twenty cavalry squadrons and thirty-five infantry battalions. He outnumbered the Kwantung Army three to two in infantry, by three squadrons in cavalry, and possessed a qualitative edge in armor. But above all, his army was to show a marked superiority in intelligence analysis, command, control and communication.

Zhukov was one of the first commanders to use radio signals intelligence to advantage, Zhukov sowed misinformation with the Japanese by broadcasting fictitious command orders, ciphered in codes he knew the Japanese could break. He led the Kwantung Army to believe that he intended only defensive measures. Richard Sorge, a Soviet agent of German-Russian parentage, the press attaché to the German embassy in Tokyo, also assisted, by providing Zhukov with the Japanese order of battle. This is the same Sorge to whom Stalin refered upon his capture and torture by the Japanese, "Richard Sorge? I know of no man named Sorge!"

The commanders of the Red Army and the Mongolian forces were well trained and experienced in battle as were the Japanese. The Mongolian General Choibalson, and Zhukov's Chief of Staff, General Shtern, were superior field officers. Zhukov’s control of preparations for the final critical battle was brilliant. His battalion and squadron commanders were not made aware that an offensive action was planned until three hours before the units moved out. The Kwantung Army had been misled, and many Japanese officers were away from their units at the time of the attack. A "German style" communications network assured tight control throughout the battle.

The Red Army's surprise assault began on August 20th, 1939, with a thrust across the border into western Manchukuo. Zhukov's version of blitzkreig was a combination of armor, artillery, air support, and infantry, and was more extensive than the Nazis version in some respects. The Red Army lightning assault pre-dated the German blitzkreig into Poland by thirty-three days, perhaps Zhukov read the same books as Guderian as per "armored attack"? (Fuller/Hart.DeGaulle)

At the battle of Khalkin-Gol (sometimes called the Battle of the River Halka, or by the Japanese the Nomonhan incident), Zhukov's force wiped out the Japanese 23rd Division, killing 18,000 Japanese troops. The Red Army and its Mongolian ally then demonstrated its absolute command of the battle by penetrating thirty kilometers further and stopping at the Manchurian frontier.

The Japanese Kwantung Army commander was now more than ready for a cease-fire, and in Tokyo Japan's political leaders hoped that the Soviet government would be content with a re-drawing of the disputed borders. The war had embarrassed Japan in many ways.

Beside another military defeat, where 18,000 of Japan's 60,000 battle force were killed, and probably another 20,000 wounded, the Imperial family was mortified by the desertion of Lieutenant Higashikuni, the twenty-three-year-old son of Prince Higashikuni, during the fight, a matter suppressed by Japan's censors.

Stalin was also happy to call it a day. Zhukov withdrew his force to the Manchurian border on August 13th 1939 and received orders to immediately move his heavy armour to the railhead, for rail transport to Poland. The USSR's slowness in biting off its slice of defeated Poland, a delay of fourteen days, can be explained by Stalin's concern to close hostilities in the east before moving militarily in the west.

The Red Army was still a major force in the east even with the removal of the Zhukov led armor and infantry. The Kwantung Army was also reduced for the "push to the south" for resouces. They couldn't sustaing their forces in the north, while the Red Army remained in large part to make sure they didn't try.

Hitler's Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23rd, 1939, was certainly seen by the Japanese government as a betrayal of the anti-Comintern Pact, and reinforced Japan's decision to use Hitler and the Nazis if possible, but never to trust them. The Nazi-Soviet pact was announced during a Japanese military disaster the same month. This combination required a revision by Japan of its policy to the USSR. Hostilities ended officially on September 16th, 1939 with handshaking and photographs of the commanders.

A commission was set in place to re-draw the vexed boundaries. Japan decided that it was not yet ready for an all-out war with the Soviet Union and on April 13th, 1941 the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed, with Japan unaware that Hitler would reverse his arrangement with the USSR and launch the Wehrmacht on Operation Barbarossa in a couple of months, in June of 1941.

With the Soviet Union now within the Anglo-American camp after June of 1941, albeit with the United States in non-belligerent status, Japan risked attack by the Russians in Manchuria and by the United States at sea.

A two front war on land and a sea battle as well, was undesirable, and likely to be calamitous. The Soviets were still well deployed on Manchuria's border (infantry, armored, and aircraft), and had shown their determination to fight, and defeat the Kwantung. Thus by mid-1941 the "Go South" strategy won preference with Japan to secure its needed resources in the south, diplomatically if possible, but by military aggression if necessary.

Clearly as events intensified in Europe, the commercial treaty on trade relations between the US and Japan lapsed, and their open support of Nazi Germany became apparent. Thus this was NOT renewed, and the embargoes began in incremental stages. First aviation fuel, then scrap metal, the copper and brass, and finally all petroleum.

All the above is from items I have put into my own files, sadly I didn't record the sources as well as I should have. My apologies. That said, here is an interesting item:

"The Japanese Government has taken note of the regulations governing the exportation of iron and steel scrap, dated September 30, 1940, amending the construction and definition of the term "iron and steel scrap" included in the regulations of July 26, 1940, and the announcement of September 26, 1940 to the effect that, under the new regulations, licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only.
The above-mentioned regulations refer to the Presidential authority derived from the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense", thereby suggesting that it was determined to be necessary in the interest of national defense to curtail the exportation of iron and steel scrap.
In view iron the situation of iron and steel scrap markets, the supply and demand of these materials and the volume shipped to Japan, the Japanese Government finds it difficult to concede that this measure was motivated solely by the interest of national defense of the United States.
"In the note of the Japanese Ambassador of August 3 the Japanese Government pointed out that the measure announced on July 26, 1940, in regard to the exportation of aviation gasoline, was tantamount to an export embargo as far as countries outside the Western Hemisphere were concerned. Compared to that announcement, the announcement under review may be said to have gone a step further toward discrimination by specifically excluding Great Britain from the virtual embargo.
"In view of the fact that Japan has been for some years the principal buyer of American iron and steel scrap, the announcement of the administrative policy, as well as the regulations establishing license system in iron and steel scrap cannot fail to be regarded as directed against Japan, and, as such, to be an unfriendly act. The Japanese Government hereby protests against the measures taken by the United States Government in connection with the exportation of iron and steel scrap.

The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, October 7, 1940

And this memo recorded by Cordell Hull:

[WASHINGTON,] October 8, 1940.

The Japanese Ambassador called at his request. He first expressed regret at the unsatisfactory relations existing between our two countries at this time. I replied that, in my opinion, this was not the fault of the Ambassador and myself, who have been untiring in our efforts to promote and preserve satisfactory relations between the United States and Japan.
The Ambassador then said that he was instructed by his Government to hand me a note dated October 7, 1940 (copy attached) relative to our scrap iron and steel embargo which was recently proclaimed.
He read a statement (copy attached) in support of the note mentioned above.
I replied to the effect that I would see what sort of written reply, if any, might be called for.
I then said that I might at this time, and without delay, state that this Government at all times must determine for itself such internal questions as those material to our program of national defense, as we are doing in the instant case, and that it would be impossible for any country engaged in the serious and urgent undertaking of carrying out of a program of national defense to allow every other outside nation to come in and pass upon the question of our needs of given commodities; that the embargo, as the Ambassador knows, applies to all nations except Great Britain and the Western Hemisphere. I remarked that some years this Government had been criticized for not imposing numerous embargoes, primarily from the standpoint of safety and national defense and peace, and that it was only at the height of our national defense preparations that we were imposing a few embargoes on important commodities.
I said that it was really amazing for the Government of Japan, which has been violating in the most aggravating manner valuable American rights and interests throughout most of China, and is doing so in many instances every day, to question the fullest privilege of this Government from every standpoint to impose the proposed scrap iron and steel embargo, and that to go still further and call it an unfriendly act was still more amazing in the light of the conduct of the Japanese Government in disregarding all law, treaty obligations and other rights and privileges and the safety of Americans while it proceeded at the same time to seize territory by force to an ever increasing extent. I stated that of all the countries with which I have had to deal during the past eight years, the Government of Japan has the least occasion or excuse to accuse this Government of an unfriendly act. I concluded with the statement that apparently the theory of the Japanese Government is for all other nations to acquiesce cheerfully in all injuries inflicted upon their citizens by the Japanese policy of force and conquest, accompanied by every sort of violence, unless they are to run the risk of being guilty of an unfriendly act.
The Ambassador again said that he very much regretted the serious differences between our two countries, but that he naturally hoped that trouble may yet be avoided. He added that any Japanese, or any American must know that strife between the two countries would be extremely tragic for both alike. To this I replied that, of course, it would be exceedingly unfortunate for such occurrence to take places. but I added that my Government has been patient, extremely patient, and that, the Ambassador will bear witness to the long and earnest efforts that he and I have made, and that I have made prior to his coming here, to promote and preserve friendly and satisfactory relations with Japan. I went on to say that we have stood for law and order and treaty observance and justice along with genuine friendliness between our two countries; that it was clear now, however, that those who are dominating the external policies of Japan are, as we here have believed for some years, bent on the conquest by force of all worthwhile territory in the Pacific Ocean area without limit as to extent in the South and in southern continental areas of that part of the world, and that we and all other nations are expected, as stated, to sit perfectly quiet and be cheerful and agreeable, but static, while most of Asia is Manchuriaized, which would render practically impossible all reasonable or satisfactory relations so far as other nations are concerned; and that corresponding lower levels of existence would be the ultimate lot of the people of most of Asia. The least objection to or taking of issue with Japan with respect to the foregoing matters would be called an unfriendly act, and, as Prime Minister Konoye said recently to the press, it would be the occasion for war so far as Japan was concerned. I added that, of course, if any one country is sufficiently desirous of trouble, it can always find any one of innumerable occasions to start such trouble. In brief, it is not left to the other country to participate in such decision.
The Ambassador undertook to repeat the old line of talk about how fair Japan proposed to be with respect to all rights and privileges of foreign nations within its conquered territory. He agreed that no purpose would be served now to go over the many conversations we have had with respect to these matters. I held up the succession of injuries to American rights and interests in China whenever he referred to the scrap iron embargo.
I reiterated the view that it was unheard of for one country engaged in aggression and seizure of another country, contrary to all law and treaty provisions, to turn to a third peacefully disposed nation and seriously insist that it would be guilty of an unfriendly act if it should not cheerfully provide some of the necessary implements of war to aid the aggressor nation in carrying out its policy of invasion. (emphasis mine) I made it clear that it is the view of this Government that two nations, one in Europe and one in Asia, are undertaking to subjugate both of their respective areas of the world, and to place them on an international order and on asocial basis resembling that of 750 years ago. In the face of this world movement, extending itself from day to day, peaceful and interested nations are to be held up to denunciation and threats if they dare to engage in any lawful acts or utterances in opposition to such wide movements of world conquest.
The Ambassador had little to say. He said virtually nothing in attempted extenuation, except that his Government would expect everybody to receive considerate and fair treatment throughout the conquered areas. He emphasized equal treatment, and I replied that when the best interests of other nations in peace and law and order were being destroyed, it was not a matter of any concern as to whether there was discrimination between the nations which were victims of such movements.

C [ORDELL] H [ULL]

Memorandum by the Secretary of State Regarding a Conversation With the Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi), 8 October 1940

It would appear that from 1937 on, the "die was cast" as per Japan's aggression, and the American responses in ever increasing economic pressure to "cease and desist" this and come back to "Most Favored Nation" trading status. Apparently the Imperial Japanese chose to ignore the economic, diplomatic problems and actually believe they could settle by force of arms what they couldnt by diplomacy and compromise.

Just my opinon of course, take it or leave it.

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.

Hello brndirt1,

I am impressed, very well researched on the Kwantung army and its actual fighting capabillity towards the Soviets.

I agree that it would have been suicide for the Japanese to attack Russia without having any assistance in regards to armor and aerial warfare from a third party.

Regards
Kruska

__________________

The world is grey - not black and white

It's not clear what you mean by this statement. To what war do you refer when you say,"If Japan hadn't fought with the Russians earlier in the war"? The only times the Japanese actually fought with the Soviet Union was a series of border incidents culminating in the disastrous (for the Japanese) Nomonhan war of 1939. It was this war which largely decided the Japanese government on it's "Go South" policy which it committed to in the summer of 1940.

The Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan was signed in November, 1936 and was directed at the Soviet Union. It contained a secret clause that in the even that either country became involved in a war with the USSR, the other country would maintain a neutral position. When Hitler signed the German/Soviet Non-aggression Treaty was signed in August, 1939 (while the Nomonhan war was in full swing) and caught the Japanese completely by surprise. They considered it a betrayal by Germany.

Japan had invaded Manchuria (nominally a province of China) in 1931, and by 1937 was fully involved in a major war with China. Japanese troops were attempting to subdue all of China and were as far south as French Indo-China by 1940. It was the invasion of French Indo-China in the summer of 1940 that caused the US to impose embargoes on scrap iron and steel and aviation gasoline on Japan in 1940. That prompted the Japanese to begin negotiations with the Dutch Colonial government in Batavia, NEI, to increase it's exports of petroleum to Japan. But by then Holland had been occupied by the Germans, and the Dutch in the NEI were reluctant to sell oil to any country which might possibly resell it to Germany. When Japan signed the Tri-Partite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, the Dutch refused further negotiations with Japan and the Japanese military and naval forces began preparations for war with the US, Britain, and Holland.

Even without the US embargo, Japan knew it could not fight a war with the Soviets while trying to conquer China and/or pursue a "Go South" policy. Therefore it's highly improbable that Japan would have ever agreed to attack the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 when it was already well on it's way to war with the US and Britain, no matter what Hitler promised.

The Japanese would also have been aware that the logistics of getting oil from the Caucasus region to Japan would be impossibly difficult and such a promise as Germany sharing oil from that region would be largely meaningless. As another poster has pointed out, Germany couldn't possibly capture the Caucasus until sometime in 1942, which was far too late to solve Japan's oil shortage problem.

So I believe the answers to your questions are;

1. Yes, the US would still impose the embargoes on Japan pretty much on the same schedules as historically.

2. No, the Germans couldn't count on any help from the Japanese in capturing Moscow and even if they could, it probably wouldn't be enough to change the outcome.

3. No, the same goes for Stalingrad. Besides that, any promise from Hitler of sharing the Caucasus oil probably wouldn't be believed and would have been discounted as being too little, too late and being physically impossible.

There are usually good reasons that history unfolds the way it does.

concerning the Kwantung Army on mainland China. This occurred during January 1945 as the Kwantung Army was really "handicapped" and emasculated when the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) ordered home approximately one-third of the Army's war materiel and large numbers of staff officers for homeland defense. They followed that up in mid-April (1945) when the IGHQ had more immediate matters to reflect on than protecting the border from the Soviets, who had not yet declared war but had denounced the "non-aggression pact" which had stood for five years. So yet another large group and its supply was then transferred to the home islands.

Consequently by the Summer of 1945, this Kwantung "army" had no artillery larger than 75 mm, few tanks (all light), no rockets, nor any modern anti-tank weapons, and little fuel for its light tanks. The newly formed 149th Infantry Division did not have a single piece of artillery in its possession!

By August of 1945, its strength was estimated at somewhere between 600,000 to 750,000, but the numbers fluctuated up and down (due to desertions and illness, etc.) in the IGHQ itself. The Army by that time was supposedly comprised of one light armored division, 25 infantry divisions, six independent brigades, and up to 25 security battalions (conscripted policemen). In order to prevent the USSR from discovering their alarming weakness in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army mobilized conscripts, reservists and fresh Japanese recruits to form new divisions and brigades to maintain the appearance of a formidable fighting force.

It is true that in early July 1945, the Kwantung Army was "numerically" expanded from 11 infantry divisions to more than 24 divisions. Unfortunately for the Kwangtung Army in reality, more than one-fourth of its entire combat force was mobilized only ten days prior to the Soviet offensive (8 of 24 divisions and 7 of 9 brigades) by early August, on paper. One of two very weak tank brigades was not formed until late July 1945, and both those light tank brigades were far removed in south central Manchuria, and had no fuel. However, much of its heavy weapons and ammunition reserves and best personnel had been transferred to the Pacific Islands forces, which left this as a counterinsurgency and border security force.

By August 1945, the Kwantung Army had pieced together a "combat force" of 1,155 old light tanks, 5,360 guns and 1,800 aircraft, all of them obsolete. Discounting Japanese forces in South Sakhalin, Korea and the Kuriles, the Soviets faced an inexperienced army with no training, few supplies, no uniforms, no steel helmets, no leadership, and mostly made up of local populace rather than native Japanese. In all totaling at the most; 710,000 men. Most of them were of course "non-Japanese" nationals. 20,000 or more of the true IJA men refused to surrender even when ordered to do so by the Emperor (they were sure it was a ruse) and fled into the Chinese mountains with their equipment and didn't surrender until about 1948 or so.

As a result of the Soviet's planning and offensive plan, they rolled over this "army", and took 594,000 prisoners (over 200,000 of which immediately joined the Red Army to fight their former masters), including 143 generals and 20,000 wounded (the wounded also joined the Red Army if they recovered). The Kwangtung Army suffered over 80,000 men and officers killed in combat which lasted less than two weeks.

Such are the results of military mis-calculations and desparation.

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.

I remember reading somewhere that the Soviets had a very good armored doctrine at least on paper prior to WWII. I think it was stated that this was one of the sources the Germans used in developing theirs.

I've read quite a few articles and essays on the Nomonhan War and I don't remember seeing any mention of T-34 tanks being involved. Where did you see this and could you cite the reference to their participation against the Japanese forces at Nomonhan?

My understanding is that the Soviet forces at Nomonhan were equipped mainly with the T-26 light tank, the BT series of tanks which preceded the T-34, and various amored cars. According to several sources I have seen, two prototype T-34's were tested in January, 1940, and mass production did not commence until July, 1940. This was almost a year after the Nomonhan war ended, and, if true, would make 500 T-34's at Nomonhan improbable.

Two good reads on the the Japanese VS the Soviets

August storm: the Soviet strategic offensive in Manchuria

Leavenworth Papers No. 7 (August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria)

Battle of Khalkhin Gol

Combined Arms Research Library

__________________


For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

As I've posted on this subject before:

Forces:
Japanese
The Japanese Kwantung Army (the overall command in Manchuria) had about 10 divisions in 1939, 9 infantry and one cavalry. The biggest armored unit was a single tank brigade with about 90 light tanks and tankettes. Additionally, there were 8 brigade sized border guard units occupying various fortified regions of the border. The 2nd Air army with about 100 aircraft total supported the ground troops.
By 1945 the size of the Japanese army in Manchuria had about doubled, at least on paper. However, many of the units were of poor quality and their armament was often inadequite.
In 1941 the Kwantung Army is still, more or less, the size of it was in 1939. The Japanese at this point have a total of 41 divisions in existance, so the Kwantung Army represents about 25% of the entire Japanese Army strength when Germany invades the Soviet Union.

Soviet:
On June 22 1941 the Soviets had in the Far East, Siberian, Central Asian and, Trans-Bakal military districts a total of 5 Armies, 16 Rifle corps, and 1 cavalry corps. There were a total of 28 Rifle divisions, 4 Cavalry divisions, 14 Border guard regiments, 3 Rifle Brigades and, 1 Airborne Brigade.
In mechanized units the Soviets had in the same districts:
2 Mechanized corps with 4 Tank Divisions and 2 Mechanized divisions in them. Additionally, there was 1 additional mechanized division, 1 mechanized brigade and , 3 motorcycle regiments in these districts.
The Soviets had about a 5 to 1 advantage in aircraft and about a 7 or 8 to 1 advantage in artillery.
On 1 July 42 the composition was:
7 Rifle corps, 4 cavalry corps, with 52 Rifle divisions, 30 Rifle Brigades and, 23 Cavalry divisions. Mechanized units included: 2 Tank divisions, 19 tank brigades, 2 motorized rifle brigades and, 1 mechanized brigade.
The Soviets still had about the same preponderance of artillery and aircraft they had a year before.

There is little doubt that had Japan attacked the Soviets they would have found themselves in very dire straights within a month or two of opening hostilities. If the US placed an embargo on Japan for increasing hostilites, a very likely proposition, Japan would have been badly hurt economically and in no position to open a war against the US or South East Asia.

This was then the core of the later North Korean Army.

Regards
Kruska

__________________

The world is grey - not black and white

Opps, I always seem to let my fingers start to fly when I am typing, and many (too many) times I fail to notice I have mis-numbered a Soviet tank. I generally just type T-34 out of habit without thinking it through.

I am sure this is what I did in this post. I would bet it was a combination of B-7s and T-28s that were in the Far East Red Army Command in their conflicts with the Japanese.

My mistake, sorry ‘bout that chief!

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.

Actually, I've read somewhere that the Soviets had a couple of brand new T-34s in the East. Not the whole lot you mentioned tough


Cheers...

Which was the exact reason for my "opps" post preceeding your own. There may have been a few sent to the Far East later, but at that time it was most likely the B7s and T28s which made up the entire armored vehicles (not counting armored cars and such).

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.