I concede that a hundred Stuart tanks, several dozen M-2 halftracks mounted with 75mm anti-tank guns, plus attached jeeps and bren gun carriers is a sizable force, John. However, the more I look at the subject of Weaver's force and the question of if his unit could've been used as a spearhead for a hypothetical Mac offensive in the PI, the more questions are raised on the quality of his unit. Sure, Weaver had good numbers on paper but it seems to me now after reading more about the subject in the past several weeks, his unit was "raw."
As you rightly pointed out earlier, similar units made a good account of themselves in other areas of the Pacific. However, those units had the advantage of learning the lessons from past mistakes in the use of such units against the Japanese. Weaver and his unit didn't have this benefit.
And as pointed out earlier by DA, Weaver's unit was operating under a hamstrung logistical chain.
I used to think differently but now a part of me have to describe Weaver's force now as a "paper tiger" because of the difficult circumstances he had to face through no fault of his own.

__________________
That's about it,
Fil

I'm not saying that the end results of the campaign would have been any different, but the Americans did stand their ground at a number of places during the long retreat into Bataan. Had large numbers of armor and supporting vehicles been committed to these operations even to the extent of making local counterattacks, it may have badly upset the Japanese timetable for conquest even further, putting them temporarily on the defensive, buying badly needed time for the USAFFE Forces and allowing them to pour more supplies and foodstuffs into Bataan.

MacArthur's and his staff had, at least, from July, 1941 until January 6, 1942 to prepare the Bataan peninsula for a protracted defense. Five months was more than enough time, had MacArthur obeyed his orders. MacArthur's orders were to conduct a defense of the Bataan peninsula according to the Rainbow War Plan. Bataan was to have been fortified and supplied with everything needed for an extended period of time prior to the Japanese attack.

MacArthur ignored those orders until December 23, 1941, less than two weeks before the last American and Filipino troops entered Bataan. Even then more could have been done, but MacArthur's staff failed to issue timely orders to move food and other supplies into Bataan. The failure to properly defend Bataan was entirely MacArthur's and his staff's responsibility. Even the most brilliant and courageous of fighting retreats could not have overcome the ill-judgment and tardiness of the Commanding General and his bumbling staff. That Weaver, or any other junior officers, should be held accountable for these failures when they themselves were the victims of deplorable leadership at the highest levels is, at best, ironic.

The only reason that any foodstuffs and supplies made it into Bataan in the levels that existed during the siege is because General Beebe took it upon himself, against orders to begin secretly shipping supplies there from the Manila warehouses and Quartermaster depots as early as the second week of December. There was a decided lack of Army deuce and a half trucks to accomplish this task, so local ships and barges were pressed into service. So much ammunition of every type and caliber was sent into Bataan that they never ran out for the duration of the siege.

News which, of course, was greeted with great enthusiasm by the starving American and Filipino troops on Bataan.

You are forgetting about President Quezon. Had MacArthur abandoned Luzon and fled immediately into Bataan at the start of war, Quezon would have declared Philippine neutrality and tried to cut a deal with the Japanese. He would have stood down the Filippino troops already in uniform and MacArthur would have been left with a few understrength US regiments to fight the Japanese. That's one of the reasons that MacArthur initially went on the offensive against the Japanese, seeking to counter their landings with largely green, untrained Filippino troops.

No, I'm not forgetting Quezon. He suggested to Roosevelt that the Philippine Commonwealth be declared neutral, and General MacArthur appended his lukewarm support for the suggestion. Roosevelt said "no" in no uncertain terms, and that was the end of the idea. Quezon did not have the authority to order Philippine troops to "stand down"; they were under Federal control and MacArthur was their commander. MacArthur never went "on the offensive" against the Japanese, but he did try to defend against the landings with poorly trained, ill-equipped, Filipino troops because he had informed General Marshall, in the fall of 1941, that he would soon have nearly 200,000 trained, well-equipped Filipino troops, and to do otherwise would expose his lie.

MacArthur refused to accept WPO-3, and deceived Marshall and Roosevelt as to his ability to successfully defend the entire Philippine archipelago. That deception led to the ill-advised American attempt reinforce the Philippines. MacArthur simply misjudged the entire situation, lied to his superiors, and subsequently allowe the Japanese to destroy his air force on the ground. Had he faithfully followed his original orders Bataan would have held out far longer, although it probably wouldn't haven materially changed the course of the war.

I'm still not convinced about Quezon. The two of them were at loggerheads before Pearl Harbor over the defense of the PI and Quezon seriously considered invoking neutrality with or without Washington's blessing. In fact, he lamented America's "Europe First"
war plans while still on Corregidor, saying to the effect that "a distant relative is being threatened far away while a younger sister is being raped here."

Pardon my use of the word "offensive." What I meant to say was that MacArthur's troops sought to counter the Japanese landings at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay. They were unsucessful in their attempts.

I don't agree that MacArthur allowed the Japanese to "destroy his air force on the ground." He ordered Brereton to send the B-17's back to Del Monte on Mindanao until a mission could be flown against Formosa. Brereton instead, allowed the bomber crews to remain at Clark Field to attend a big party in his honor that evening. The bomber crews were already angry at having to extend their tours in the PI. Their actions were bordering on insubordination and Brereton sought to smooth things over. He was much more the cause of the bomber force's destruction than MacArthur was. For the good of the service, it would have been far better had he been courtmartialed and cashiered rather than to go on and be the person responsible for not ordering a second paratroop drop during Market Garden in 1944.

John, DA, here's something about Quezon's situation during the Japanese invasion and the matter of declaring neutrality.
In the years before the war, there was a strong debate on how to deal with the Americans in the Philippines, even after the last organized resistance group had been crushed. One side pushed for working within the US system to gain independence. Another group was the Federalists, who maintained that the Philippines should remain under the US. This group died a natural death in the 1960s.
Anyway back to 1941-42, Quezon was with the first group and this group defeated the Federalists. With the Federalists in decline, though still retaining a strong voice, Quezon would have a hard time even within his government to declare neutrality. Though Quezon's group was for independence, both groups have one thing in common: they were both pro-American. This would have discredited Quezon's declaration of neutrality in the eyes of the Japanese.
And if Quezon had actually declared the country neutral, I don't doubt that the US government would have found a way, even on paper, to have someone on the Federalist side take over. Still, such an attempt would just be saving face for the US because with the Japanese already on a rampage in the PI, the US wouldn't be in a position to enforce its decision.
Now a question under John's scenario:
Were there enough airfields in Bataan to base US aircraft in the Peninsula if more had survived the attack on Clark? And if there were, the next question would be what about aviation fuel and spare parts?
Given the historical situation, ammunition was plentiful in Bataan but the rest of the stuff were limited.
Another thing comes to mind: If Macarthur had went on the offensive in the PI and broke through, what then? The PI was already isolated and there was little chance for additional supplies to be sent given the situation in the Pacific.
The only thing that Mac could've achieved with that offensive is to reopen his local supply lines to bring in more food into Bataan. On the debit side, that offensive would've reduced the US garrison's store of irreplaceable fuel and ammo. I don't doubt that the Japanese would've concentrated to crush Mac if he had went on a successful offensive. Such a thing would've been a loss of face for the Japanese and they would move to redeem their honor. Another thing, with the PI still in US hands after that hypothetical Mac offensive, the Japanese (of course, they wouldn't know what we know now) would have a potentially devastating threat to their sea lines of supply and communications.
Given these, a successful Mac offensive would have brought on only partial relief for the US garrison while the Japanese, at least at that stage of the Pacific war, still had the capability to reinforce at will.

__________________
That's about it,
Fil

Well, whether you think Quezon could have unilaterally declared "neutrality" or not, it was a dead issue by the time the Japanese hit the beaches at Lingayan Gulf. If Quezon lamented the "Europe First" policy that was about all he could do about it. The fact is Quezon was a minor player in the big picture and dependent on the US's good will. Had quezon made it difficult for US strategy, Roosevelt would have seen to it that he was replaced in some way.

As for who was responsible for the loss of MacArthur's Air Force, it doesn't matter whether it was Brereton or MacArthur; the planes were destroyed and MacArthur was ultimately responsible. It's a facile argument to say that Mac ordered Brereton to send the planes to Del Monte, when Brereton spent hours on the morning of the 8th., trying to get permission to launch a raid on Formosa. What did Mac and his staff think, that Brereton was going to magically transport them all up from Del Monte? Hell, given the cricumstances, Mac should have at least ASKED where his heavy bombers were? He didn't even do that.

As far as I know there were no airfields on Bataan that could handle a B-17. In fact, I don't think there were any airfields on Bataan that could even accommodate fighters, but I may be wrong on that. The real problem with basing the bombers anywhere but Clark Field was that there were no support facilities (repair, supply, ordnance) anywhere in the PI but there. Even Del Monte Field did not have much beyond fuel and possibly some minor ordnance; it certainly couldn't have supported a sustained bombing campaign.

As for MacArthur launching a counter-offensive, it's really a fantasy. He not only didn't have the capability to pull it off, but even if he had, it only would have been a temporary setback for the Japanese. And MacArthur's forces would have been in worse shape afterward, even if they had been successful. MacArthur's problems really started in August, 1941, when he deceived Marshall and Roosevelt into believing he would soon have 200,000 well-trained, equipped, Filipino troops. He never could have mobilized that many trained troops and he should have known it. If Marshall and Roosevelt have been aware of the real situation in the Philippines in the summer of 1941, they never would have wasted any reinforcements there.

There were three improved fighter airstrips on the Bataan Penninsula. They were Maviveles, Cabcaben and Bataan airfields. At least one of them had a large number of bomb proof revetments dug, far more than the numbers of serviceable aircraft that were actually at hand. They were awaiting for the aerial reinforcements that never arrived.

MacArthur was banking on the Japanese not attacking in the Pacific until after the coming monsoon season was over, later in 1942. Had they done so, then MacArthur would have had the 200,000 well trained Filippino-American troops that he was relying on to hold the Philippines with. In any case, the US Navy did not posess the necessary warships and fleet train of suport ships necessary to mount a serious relief mission for Luzon until after 1943, so the end results would have most likely been the same.

Del Monte had enough support, fuel and ordinance to supply the "Royce Raid," a three day series of air raids on Japanese shipping and infrastructure in and around Luzon using B-17's and B-25's that were flown nonstop from Australia to Delmonte. These raids were flown a few days before the Doolittle Raid on Japan and got lost in the press.

If MacArthur was "banking" on the Japanese attack being launched after the monsoon season in 1942, then he was a fool. The American war plan assessment was that the Japanese attack would come during the dry season in December or January (see; HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Fall of the Philippines [Chapter 4]). Mac was certainly privy to this assessment and, more importantly, he had received a number of war warnings from Washington, the last one at the beginning of December stating that hostilities could be expected to commence in a matter of days.

As for MacArthur being able to mobilize "200,000 well-trained" Filipino troops by the spring of 1942, he had been responsible for training those Filipino troops since 1936, and the mobilization in 1941, of said troops proved that he had failed miserably. Why would anyone think that an additional five or six months would magically produce well-trained troops? MacArthur knew, or at least should have known, that those troops were a chimera; they didn't exist, and couldn't be conjured up, no matter how much boasting MacArthur did in the press.

That's pretty much what I said; there was only enough fuel and some ordnance to support a handful of bombers, in this case 10 B-25's, and 3 B-17's (which were either destroyed or badly damaged before making a significant number of sorties) for a couple of days of raids on surrounding Japanese airfields and shipping. Certainly not enough to sustain a significant bombing campaign.

MacArthur had been getting war warnings from Washington throughout much of 1941. The final warning in November was only one in a long string of them and was probably filed away with the others.

By September, 1942, when the monsoon season was over, there would have been 4 US Divisions, two of them armored, plus 1,000 aircraft, 45 submarines and 150,000 tons of fresh supplies on and around Luzon. This doesn't take into account the ten Filippino Infantry Divisions that would by that time be completely equipped and fully armed. The radar net would be up and fully functional as well.

Re: the Royce Raid. It wasn't a matter of how many aircraft that Del Monte could support. It was a matter that there were only 13 B-25's and B-17's that made it to Mindanao for the raid. The rest either turned back or were being repaired in Australia. By the time of the first sortie of the raid, Luzon had already surrendered.

So MacArthur, responsible for the defense of the Philippines, knowing that the assessment of the war planners is that the Japanese attack will come sometime in December or January, knowing that Washington is continuing to send a series of increasingly urgent war warnings, knowing that the negotiations between Japan and the United States are failing, knowing in late November, 1941, that the Japanese are conducting air reconnaissance of the Philippines, and knowing, in the very first days of December, 1941, that Japanese military transport convoys are moving south near Formosa and in the direction of Malaya, continues to bank on the Japanese attack not coming until the latter half of 1942? That is either monumental arrogance or monumental stupidity; more likely a combination of both.

All very nice, but one of the two main reasons that Roosevelt and Marshall were convinced to risk reinforcing the Philippines in the first place was Roosevelt's deliberately deceptive statement that he would have 200,000 "well-trained" Filipino troops available in the early part of 1942. MacArthur knew that was a false and completely impossible boast.

BTW, Where do your numbers come from? I know of no plans to send US armored divisions to the PI. And given US aircraft production in 1941-42, 1,000 aircraft in the PI seems very optimistic. And the Navy was NOT committed to reinforcing the Asiatic Fleet with anything beyond the dozen modern subs sent in the fall of 1941, so where do the additional 15 subs come from?

Ok, you seem to have some numbers on the fuel and ordnance situation at Del Monte; what was available? And how many planes were originally scheduled to operate out of Del Monte for the Royce Raid? If it was more than just an advanced staging field, as I have always read, what was available in terms of ground support and maintainance?

DA, I understand your view about what you believe is Macarthur's disregarding an attack in December. However, I have to point out that there were other US and Allied commanders who were psychologically ill prepared when the actual Japanese blows fell.
Regarding the assessments you mentioned, well I would give Macarthur the benefit of the doubt. He was the commander on the scene and he made the call. Unfortunately, it was the wrong call. So you're right that it's ultimately Mac who bears the responsibility.
John, for the purposes of this what if, I think that DA has a point in saying that Mac technically deceived Washington with his overglowing reports of the state of the locally raised troops. On the other hand, a part of me tends to think that Mac could've been misled by those officers below him who had a direct hand in the mobilization of the Filipino troops.
Since I'm trying to look at all possible angles (at least the angles that I can think of) maybe Mac based his assessment on the state of Filipino troops on what he saw of the readiness of the Philippine Scout Regiment, which was a regular unit of the US Army.
DA, if Mac did base his assessment on what he saw of the Philippine Scouts, then it would be fairer to say he was guilty of short sightedness not necessarily involved in a deliberate attempt to mislead those in the US

Okay, going back to the basics of this what if...
John, DA I don't think that for Mac to attempt an offensive in the Bataan campaign is a fantasy. Sometimes a desperate move works wonders, whether in the short term or long run. Often, it doesn't and woe to the guy who made the desperate move.
Today, we know that there was a point in the campaign that the Japanese forces facing the Bataan garrison were worn out and had fewer soldiers on their feet than the US garrison. If Mac or his subordinate commanders had known this, they could've conceivably taken advantage of this. But they didn't. Now, if the US commanders had known this, I believe they would've acted and launched an attack with what they had available just for the limited goal of breaking out, relieving the pressure on the peninsula, and bringing more foodstuff in.

John, if Mac had been correct in his assessment, then he would've gained the time he needed. However, the fuel state of the Japanese forced the event.

__________________
That's about it,
Fil

Well, my point isn't that Mac was the only senior commander taken by surprise, it's obvious that others, given what they knew, or reasonably should have known, blew it, big time. My point is that Mac held himself out to be a master of strategy, a brilliant war leader, etc. etc. etc. Yet he ignored basic logic and allowed his own ego to mislead him. He certainly wasn't the only man to do this in that period, but his talent for self-serving PR allowed him to escape the consequences he deserved.

As for the troop training issue, I think it's clear that Mac screwed that up, and when Washington needed input on what the situation was, he lied to cover up his incompetence. The guy had been hired in 1936 to set up and train the Philippine Armed Forces; after nearly five years what did he produce? The "mobilization" of Filipino troops in 1941 showed that most of the troops that were supposedly "trained" by Mac's system were completely useless as military personnel. The ten divisions he boasted of to Washington were nothing but confused rabble, unable in many cases to load their rifles without further instruction; to me, a competent general makes it his business to personally make sure that his troops, know what to do when issued orders, and are competent at the tasks assigned to them. It's not all that difficult for an experienced officer to observe training exercises and see what is done correctly and what is done incorrectly; Mac either failed to do that, or lied to Roosevelt and Marshall when he told them his troops were well-trained. It's a shame that this failure on Mac's part reflects so badly on the Filipino troops who, in many cases, performed heroic, self-sacrificing acts in bravely facing a ruthless enemy.

Personally, I blame Mac for it was his responsibility to make sure the troops were trained, and he failed and then lied about that failure to protect his "reputation". Those lies had serious consequences in men killed, resources wasted, and other people's careers blighted. Subordinate officers might have misled Mac as to the state of training of his troops, but that is something that Mac, as overall leader, should have personally verified. That, after all, is why we have a chain of command with specific responsibilities; the commanding general is responsible for making sure that everyone below him carries out their duties as ordered.

As for an "offensive" against the Japanese in the Philippines in early 1942, I see absolutely no possibility of any such hope; it clearly is a fantasy to think it might have occurred, or that any offensive could have anything more than a local "success". One of the critical requirements for a successful offensive in any conflict is an accurate intelligence picture of the enemy situation; for whatever reason, neither Mac nor any of his senior officers had that. Another requirement is good staff work; Mac's staff was obviously confused, suffering from poor organization and leadership, and working at cross purposes. To a certain extent, that reflects Mac's poor leadership and judgment, but it's an issue nevertheless.

Third, The Japanese held the initiative, and by the time there was any chance of Mac seizing it back, his forces had been degraded to the point they were barely able to defend themselves, let alone launch an offensive. The Japanese air supremacy, in particular, made any kind of counter-attack extremely ill-advised. And Mac's paucity of well-trained, experienced troops who could be relied upon to handle the unforeseen contingencies to be expected in an offensive, made a counter-offensive nothing but folly.

Point taken, DA. Well reasoned post as usual.
I agree that Mac ultimately has to be responsible for the shortcomings and the level of unpreparedness of his command. As we've discussed in a different thread, Mac was lucky he escaped the fate of Kimmel et al.
It seems to me that John and I share the same view that an offensive is possible and you've taken the opposite view.
Despite our differing views, we all share one point: had Mac launched a successful offensive, it would not change the outcome of the Japanese campaign in Bataan. John points out that a successful offensive against the Japanese would've delayed the Japanese in a worst manner.

After reviewing this thread again, I decided to look at the situation from a "Japanese" point of view. As the "Japanese" commander, I'd welcome the US offensive. I'd let them come out and willingly give ground.
For me, it would mean that the US and Filipino troops would be in the open and relatively easier to hit. That beats trying to dig them out from their entrenchments. And I know that pushing out would mean that the US would be expending valuable fuel and ammo which are highly unlikely to be replaced. Plus, I would still be holding Manila.
I think of it as a balloon inflating. Once I think it's expanded enough, I'll burst the balloon.

__________________
That's about it,
Fil

Just a point - The IJN/IJA were on the offensive in the Netherland East Indies well before Bataan fell.

Even if Mac wins his offensive, there is still the issue of him being surrounded, running out of ammo and fuel and medicine. And just waiting to be destroyed piecemeal.

Well, I respect your opinion that an offensive was a possibility for MacArthur, I just don't agree that he had the resources to make an offensive a reasonable alternative to a dogged defensive. One point with which I'm sure you will agree, is that MacArthur launching an offensive would allow Japanese air supremacy to be a larger factor in the fight; Japanese air power would have had more opportunities to strike at Mac's forces if they were on the offensive.

I found this recently.

"In a letter prepared on 5 December 1941 but never sent, General Marshall outlined for General MacArthur what had been and was being done to strengthen USAFFE. "Reinforcements and equipment already approved," he said, "require over 1,000,000 ship tons." Fifty-five ships had already been obtained and approximately 100,000 ship tons of supplies were en route, with twice this amount ready for immediate shipment to ports of embarkation. Requests for equipment for the Philippine Army, except those for the M1 rifle, had been approved, and uncontrolled items of supply were being shipped as rapidly as they could be assembled and loaded on ships. "Not only will you receive soon all your supporting light artillery (130 75-mm. guns]," Marshall told MacArthur, "but 48 155-mm. howitzers and 24 155-mm. guns for corps and army artillery." Except for certain types of ammunition, the defense reserve for the U.S. Army by July of that year. Three semimobile antiaircraft artillery regiments were scheduled to leave the United States soon, but the 90--mm. antiaircraft gun could not be sent since it had not yet been fully tested. A sum of $269,000,000 had been requested from Congress for the support of the Philippine Army, and early passage of such legislation was expected. "I assure you," Marshall closed, "of my purpose to meet to the fullest extent possible your recommendations for personnel and equipment necessary to defend the Philippines."[65]
The last vessels carrying supplies to the Philippines were assembled in convoy in Hawaii and on 7 December were still on the high seas. In the convoy were the 52 dive bombers of the 27th Bombardment Group, 18 P-40s, 340 motor vehicles, 48 75-mm. guns, 3,500,00 rounds of .30- and .50-caliber ammunition, 600 tons of bombs, 9,000 drums of aviation fuel, and other heavy equipment and supplies. Also aboard were the two light field artillery battalions and the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H)."

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Fall of the Philippines [Chapter 3

More information:

Added to this:
Some additional information taken from the "Green Books."

"The schedule of shipments finally established in November provided for sending to the Philippines some 20,000 troops, about one third of them Air Force units, on eleven troopships to sail from fan Francisco between 21 November and 9 December 1941.32 The Holbrook, carrying 2,000 troops and equipment (the 147th Field Artillery Regiment and the 148th Field Artillery Regiment minus one battalion), and the Republic carrying 2,630 troops and equipment (the 2d Battalion of the 131st field Artillery Regiment, the 7th Bombardment Group, and 48 Air Corps officers), sailed from San Francisco 21-22 November. Convoyed by the USS Pensacola, they were due to arrive in the Philippines on 14 January 1942.

Sailings for 15,000 troops were scheduled for 5-9 December. The President Johnson with 2,500 troops the 2d Battalion of the 138th Field Artillery Regiment and three squadrons of the 35th Pursuit Group), the Etolin with 1,400 troops " including the 218th Field Artillery Regiment minus the 2d Battalion) and the Bliss sailed from San Francisco on 5 December 1941. The following day the President Garfield sailed from the same port with the remainder of the 35th Pursuit Group.33

In addition to the 30,000 U.S. Army troops present, and those due to arrive in the Philippines, there were 80,000 troops in the Philippine Army, including the ten divisions to be activated by 15 December. The total strength of General MacArthur's command--present, en route, and under orders--amounted to about 137,000, considerably less than the 200,000 he had estimated as sufficient for defensive operations.34

The Far Eastern Air Force had 35 four engine bombers and 107 P-40E's on hand, and 38 more P-40E's and 52 A-24's (dive bombers) were en route in the Pensacola convoy. In addition, 37 pursuits and 48 four-engine bombers were due to leave the United States by 6 and 10 December, respectively. As for ground force matériel, equipment for one antiaircraft regiment had recently arrived, as well as 105 tanks and 50 self-propelled 75-mm. guns (tank destroyers). Forty-eight 75-mm. guns were en route (with the Pensacola convoy), and more guns and a considerable amount of ammunition were scheduled to be shipped.35 "

Lastly, there was also the 34th Infantry Regiment awaiting shipment from San Francisco, as was a battalion of M-3 Grant medium tanks in New Orleans, Louisiana.

Where the 57 Canadian bren gun carriers came from:


dated December 19, 1941. Here are the contents of the letter:

"Subject Canadian Boats in Manila

It was determined from Command McKinley, Canadian Royal Navy Reserve that there was one boat in Manila that had supplies on it for the Canadian Government. The manifest was in the hands of the Quarter Master's General's Office in Ottawa, Canada. Colonel Spearing, of this latter's office furnishes the following information:

- 446 tire assemblies
- 90 tires
- 6 carton tubes
- 20 cases motor truck stores
- 1600 pieces of auto parts
- 45 Harley Davidson motorcycles
- 25 boxes of Harley Davidson parts
- 15 3-ton cahsis, cabs and special bodies
- 48 3/4 ton trucks with van bodies
- 2 3/4 ton trcuks with water tanks
- 57 universal gun carriers
- 153 cases of autoparts
- 190 boxes of auto parts
- 2 loose packages
- 6 sedans
- 48 trucks
- 15 trucks with van bodies
- 1 box auto parts.

All motor vehicles are boxed. Total ship tonnage 1836; total weight tonnage 693. this equipment is the complete equipment of two motorized infantry battalions and all vehicles are FORD and GMC. Any arrangement for transfer of this propertry should be handled through the Master General of the Ordnance. The boat is the SS DON JOSE, either in Manila or in Mindanao.

Singed

CP GROSS
Colonel, General Staff
Chief, Transportation Branch"

"In July 1941 the air force in the Philippines was still a token force, unable to withstand "even a mildly determined and ill-equipped foe."30 Air Corps headquarters in Washington had been urging for some time that additional planes be sent to the Philippines and the Joint Board, early in 1940, had proposed an increase in air strength for the island garrison.31 The following July 1941 Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of the newly created Army Air Forces, came forward with the strongest proposal yet made for the reinforcement of the Philippines. This proposal called for the transfer to the Philippines of four heavy bombardment groups, consisting of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit groups of 130 planes each.32 These planes, wrote Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, chief of the Air Staff, would not be used for an offensive mission, but to maintain "a strategical defensive in Asia.33"

"By now the War Department was fully committed to an all-out effort to strengthen the air defense of the Philippines. General Arnold, in a letter to the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force on 1 December, expressed this view when he wrote: "We must get every B-17 available to the Philippines as soon as possible."42 His statement was not an exaggeration. On the outbreak of war there were 913 U. S. Army aircraft scattered among the numerous overseas bases. This number of aircraft included 61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers and 636 fighters. More than half of the total of heavy bombers and one sixth of the fighters were already in the Philippines.43 Within a few months this number would have been raised considerably."


"

John, the Canadian Eqmt list ..... was that for their battalions in Hong Kong?