"By March of 1942, the War Department planned to have 165 heavy bombers and 240 fighters based in the Philippines. The 7th Bombardment Group (H) staged in California and B-17s of its 38th and 88th Reconnaissance Squadrons were en route when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor" Taken from wiki.

That's just over 400 aircraft scheduled for delivery in March alone. Add six months to the equation and you wouldn't be far from the over all total.

That's correct. The ship was diverted to Manila immediately following Pearl Harbor and the gun carriers, minus the guns, plus all of the other vehicles and cargo were amalgamated into the the USAFFE Forces.

I've read all of the Hyperwar stuff on the reinforcement of the Philippines and none of it adds up to the four US divisions, 44 submarines, and 1,000 planes you previously claimed.

Your conclusion that 400 aircraft were "scheduled" to arrive in March, 1942, is in error. The quotation says that "By March, 1942, the War Department planned to have 165 bombers and 240 fighters based in the Philippines." That includes units already there in 1941, and doesn't mean all those planes would be delivered in one month, nor does it mean that deliveries would continue at 400 planes a month.

Nice try, but there is no way the Philippines would be garrisoned with 1,000 modern combat aircraft by the fall of 1942. And Mac's pipe dream of 200,000 well-trained Filipino troops can be discounted. In actual fact, he barely was able to mobilize 80,000 poorly equipped and untrained Filipino troops, which despite their undoubted courage, were more or less worthless against the Japanese troops.

I should have said that there would have been 400 aircraft in the PI by March, 42, but as was further quoted: "Within a few months, this number would have been RAISED CONSIDERABLY." Hap Arnold said that "We must get every B-17 availiable to the Philippines as soon as possible."

"His statement was not an exaggeration. On the outbreak of war there were 913 U. S. Army aircraft scattered among the numerous overseas bases. This number of aircraft included 61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers and 636 fighters. More than half of the total of heavy bombers and one sixth of the fighters were already in the Philippines.43 Within a few months this number would have been raised considerably." Added to this number were B-24 Liberators that were now coming off the assembly lines. These too were slated for duty in the far east.

Your blanket condemnation of the fighting abilities of the Filippino troops is highly incorrect and defies logic. The largely untrained Filippino's fought very well at Abucay Hacienda, Layac Junction and a number of other places during the long double retrograde manuever onto the Bataan peninsula. Later they proved their worth during the Battle of the Points and throughout much of the campaign on Bataan, as they held most of the line there. As far as numbers go, IIRC, the final number was 137,000 men overall at MacArthur's command, because many of the divisions were never fully mobilized given the historical time frame.

"Raised considerably" and "We must get every B-17 available to the Philippines as soon as possible." mean nothing in terms of real numbers. The Philippines were by no means the only deserving areas in line for reinforcement, and as far as aircraft were concerned much was dependent on production rates. After all, the "Europe First" policy was still in effect and both Britain and the US commands were giving much higher priorities to shipments to the Soviet Union. the other problem, of course, was that the aircraft themselves could fly to the Philippines, but ground echelons and maintenance equipment, vital to the continued operation of those aircraft, required shipping which remained in critically short supply for more than two years after Pearl Harbor. It's extremely doubtful that, even had the supply routes remained open, there would have been a 1,000 modern combat aircraft in the Philippines by the end of 1942.

Your blanket condemnation of the fighting abilities of the Filippino troops is highly incorrect and defies logic. The largely untrained Filippino's fought very well at Abucay Hacienda, Layac Junction and a number of other places during the long double retrograde manuever onto the Bataan peninsula. Later they proved their worth during the Battle of the Points and throughout much of the campaign on Bataan, as they held most of the line there. As far as numbers go, IIRC, the final number was 137,000 men overall at MacArthur's command, because many of the divisions were never fully mobilized given the historical time frame.[/QUOTE]

I did not condemn the fighting abilities of the Filipino troops, please do not put words in my mouth. I said most were untrained and ill-equipped which is manifestly true. I specifically said very many of them performed heroically and courageously, which was also true, but they were no match for the Japanese troops they faced. If they had been, even with Mac's bumbling, the defense of the Philippines would have had a much different outcome. I do not believe MacArthur ever had 137,000 Filipino troops under his command in the Philippines. It's true that the mobilization of Filipino troops was never completed, but it's also true that many troops never showed up for mobilization, and many who did, couldn't be even partially equipped and many of these simply went back home.

Do you have any documentation concerning the four US divisions you claimed were slated for the Philippines? I remember something about Marshall offering MacArthur a National Guard division just before the war started, but Mac turned it down claiming he had enough troops; so I'm skeptical about the four additional divisions you mentioned.

Also the total of 44-45 submarines you claimed seems questionable. I'm aware that the Navy had no plans to send additional reinforcements to the Asiatic Fleet because it had been ordered to stand on the defensive in the Pacific and needed every ship and plane just to safe guard the Strategic Triangle and the supply routes to Australia.

Like any army of new conscripts, there will be those who will run, those who would not know what to do, and those who'll keep a level head. I certainly understand what you meant, DA. As one author have said, war is a brutal Darwinian process.
John, I've read the Hyperwar too and it's a good source. There were certainly reinforcements being sent to the Philippines but these were diverted after the attack on Pearl Harbor and Clark. Now, if those reinforcements had arrived, it could've been put to good use. Southwest Pacific Vet who was in the diverted convoy, saw it differently, though. He was glad the convoy was diverted or he could've been trapped in Bataan, too. At least that's his sentiment on the matter.

Right now, I see the discussion revolving around numbers. I remember a lively discussion on the reinforcements issue in another thread.
Now on the offensive, I would say what the USAFFE could do is to conduct local offensives to restore the line. It's highly unlikely the garrison could push the Japanese back into the sea. Local offensives, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely so Mac's on the losing end in the long run.
DA, you kept pointing out that Mac should've stuck to the original plan. I see your point. If Mac had done so, he would've been in a better material shape. But I have to point out that the plan also included that he would be reinforced. That part of the plan was rescinded.
Allow me to take some historical liberties and alter the timeline a bit. It's what I think could make a general offensive feasible.
A. Mac follows the original plan AND his air force survives with very few losses in the first Japanese attacks.
B. With Mac successfully holding out, the Japanese MIGHT decide to refocus its attention in the Philippines and POSSIBLY suspends other offensives.
C. This relieves the pressure earlier for the Allies, forcing the higher commanders to reconsider sending reinforcements to the PI. Under the original plan, the US Navy would escort the reinforcements but the hit on Battleship Row "crippled" the Pacific Fleet. But since it's seen that the PI garrison is delivering good results, then it wouldn't be a case anymore of reinforcing defeat.
If that happens, Mac would've the fresh troops and supplies to strike back.
My scenario, admittedly, plays fast and loose with historical facts because it's the only way I can think of for conducting a sustained general offensive. Bottomline, at least for me, without those reinforcements and reconnection to a supply base, the PI garrison couldn't mount a general offensive.

__________________
That's about it,
Fil

The NEI was the main prize. And the Japanese would have bypassed the PI if required. Unless the allies could resupply Mac from the sea, then he's on a tether or will slowly lose effectiveness due to logistics issues.

The original Japanese Army plan for the "Strike South" scenario omitted the invasion of the Philippines, however, the Japanese Navy, pointed out that the Luzon Straits constituted a "choke point" through which shipments of oil from the NEI must pass to reach Japanese refineries. It would have been possible for the US to use it's possession of the Philippines to again cut off oil shipments to Japan, so the seizure of the Philippines was seen as necessary to exploit to capture of NEI oil resources.

The only problem with this reasoning is it ignores the fact that, for the US, the Philippines were far down on it's list of strategic priorities in early 1942. The strategic war plans of the US had always assumed that there was a fair chance that the Philippines would be captured by Japan and that a campaign would have to be fought to recapture them at some point. The world situation as it developed in 1940-41, simply reinforced this concept, and it was almost a pre-conceived notion for US planning staffs, by then that the Philippines could not be saved.

The most likely reaction to any perceived success in delaying the Japanese capture of the Philippines would not have been the reinforcement of this temporary success, but to use the time bought for the creation of some defensive line further south which would have had a more realistic chance of stopping the Japanese advance short of the NEI oil resources. If I remember correctly, this possibility was even discussed hypothetically by US war planners, and it was Eisenhower who recommended such a strategy, if it became feasible.

Oh, I certainly agree with you on the drawback of my scenario.
However, as I've pointed out, I played loosely with the historical parameters.
I add a political dimension here. The US had never lost US land before to a foreign power. And if Mac had obeyed his side of the plan and if he could show the American public that he was successful in holding the Japanese at bay, the administration would court political suicide if reinforcements, even token reinforcements, are not sent to help Mac and his troops recover lost ground in a local offensive.
I'd even pair this with a defensive line further south. If Mac is still successfully holding out when that defensive line is established, reinforcements would be forthcoming and a good offensive counter punch would be surely mounted.
The more I look at this, Mac has to hold out longer first before being able to go on the offensive. And the only way, at least for me, would be for him and his forces to last until the arrival of the rainy season which starts in June. Of course, this supposes that Mac had followed the prewar plan. I have more in mind but I'd stop here so I can learn what you guys think.

__________________
That's about it,
Fil

I finally found the numbers I was looking for. Hap Arnold placed the re-armament of the Philippines on their number one priority list. It was decided that 165 B-17's and B-24's and 230 modern fighters be assigned to the Philippines by the end of 1942. This does not include all of the light, medium and dive bombers, torpedo planes, PBY Catalina flying boats, training, liason and transport aircraft that would naturally have to be sent to make up a well rounded air force. There were no appreciable numbers of aircraft sent to Europe during the last six months of 1941. Everything that could fly was sent either by boat or flown directly to the PI.

I did not condemn the fighting abilities of the Filipino troops, please do not put words in my mouth. I said most were untrained and ill-equipped which is manifestly true. I specifically said very many of them performed heroically and courageously, which was also true, but they were no match for the Japanese troops they faced. If they had been, even with Mac's bumbling, the defense of the Philippines would have had a much different outcome. I do not believe MacArthur ever had 137,000 Filipino troops under his command in the Philippines. It's true that the mobilization of Filipino troops was never completed, but it's also true that many troops never showed up for mobilization, and many who did, couldn't be even partially equipped and many of these simply went back home.

Do you have any documentation concerning the four US divisions you claimed were slated for the Philippines? I remember something about Marshall offering MacArthur a National Guard division just before the war started, but Mac turned it down claiming he had enough troops; so I'm skeptical about the four additional divisions you mentioned.

Also the total of 44-45 submarines you claimed seems questionable. I'm aware that the Navy had no plans to send additional reinforcements to the Asiatic Fleet because it had been ordered to stand on the defensive in the Pacific and needed every ship and plane just to safe guard the Strategic Triangle and the supply routes to Australia.[/QUOTE]




I've got some information that the 37th Infantry Regiment that was supposed to ship out for the PI from San Francisco on 8 December, 1941, likewise a battalion of M-3 Grant medium tanks that were awaiting shipment from Louisiana. These tanks were later sent to North Africa. I'm still looking for the other stuff.

Still wouldn't be close to 1,000 combat aircraft. And Hap Arnold may have been keen to get every aircraft possible to the the Philippines in 1941-42, but he wasn't the sole arbiter of that decision. He reported to the JCS and Roosevelt, both of which had concerns about supplying aircraft to the British and Soviets, as well as outfitting US forces elsewhere. Despite what you claim, the Philippines did NOT have top priority, with those who counted, for US aircraft production; that distinction went to the defense of the continental US.

I gather you've dropped your claims about the four US divisions, and 44 (or 45 subs, I forget now which)?

But the Secretary of War was keen on the idea and gave top priority to reinforcing the PI with all available B-17's and B-24's at the expense of Lend Lease and US defense. In short, dozens of commands were stripped of aircraft that were crated up and sent to the PI, or in the case of the B-17's, flown there. Likewise, Congress appropriated and forwarded hundreds of thousands of dollars in airfield construction money to the PI in the latter half of 1941, so you see, the Philippines DID have top priority for the alocation of US bomber and fighter aircraft.

Continental US defense went a-begging in favor of Hemisphere Defense, according to US Air Force Documents. "The proposed transfer would have left only 17 B-17's within the continental US. Eleven of these were obsolete B-17 A and B models. Five B-17-E models were undergoing trial flights. 12 B-17's of the Hawaiian Department were also being readied for the flight to the Philippines." "General Spaatz expressed the hope that an additional 48 B-17's and B-24's could be dispatched" from the US to the PI by 6 December.

And let me tell you something else, buster. By my count, there would have been well over 500 aircraft in the PI by just March of 1942 alone, had the Japanese not attacked, given what was planned and what was already in the pipeline and this doesn't even begin to include what would have been available by September. The vast majority, if not all of the A-20's, B-25's and B-26's that fought over New Guinea would have been based on Luzon as well. Lastly, I don't respond well to derision. If you want to discuss this calmly like two historians, then fine, we can do so. Otherwise, this will soon degenerate into a pissing contest where nobody wins and everyone loses. So, back-off Mac!

US Air Force Historical Study III Army Air Action in the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies

I think you'd do well to re-evaluate the wording and tone of my posts. Nothing in either indicates anything other than well deserved skepticism. So you can just stow your righteous indignation. I am discussing this particular issue calmly and courteously, and find your huffiness absurd, and your motivation for it somewhat suspect. I suggest you take a deep breath, calm down, and proceed with a little less over-sensitivity.

As for the priorities; No, the Philippines were receiving special attention in the latter half of 1941, but they did NOT have a higher priority than continental defense, nothing did. The fact that some bombers originally assigned to continental commands were subsequently sent to the Philippines was because it was judged that there were not immediately needed for continental defense. There is no evidence that this would have continued, nor that the Philippine reinforcements would have continued flowing, month after month, at the highest possible levels, as you seem desperate to suggest.

"By your count..."? Well, maybe so, but that's still a bit short of your original "count" of "over 1,000 aircraft". Again, I ask, what about your claim that four US divisions would have been sent, or that the USN had definite plans to send additional subs? Have you found documentation, or simply dropped the claims?

I don't think you can look at this in isolation; you have to remember the context of the wider war. Roosevelt and Marshall certainly had a lot more on their plate than what was viewed in the US as a local setback in the Philippines. There was a wider Japanese offensive (that still would have taken place no matter how successful MacArthur might have been on Luzon) in the Pacific that had to be arrested. The Coral Sea was fought in May, and Midway in June. The Japanese seized bases in the Aleutians during the battle of Midway and that impinged on the JCS directive to defend the Strategic Triangle.

In the ETO, the British were holding on by their finger tips in North Africa, and something had to be done to aid them; Operation Torch turned up on the JCS radar screens in August, IIRC. And there was the punishing U-boat campaign off the East Coast of the US that was seriously bleeding the Allied shipping pool. That doesn't even include the situation in the Soviet Union, which both Churchill and Roosevelt were worried about keeping in the war. Given these issues, and others, it was not surprising that Roosevelt agreed with his advisers that the Philippines weren't worth the effort to reinforce them. That was especially true since it was plain to see that any reinforcements the US could reasonably expect to send in the near future would only sustain continued resistence for a limited period, certainly not long enough to save the Philippines from eventual surrender.

In June/July, 1942, the long term US plans envisioned for the Pacific included a slogging match in the Solomons for the rest of 1942, and a Central Pacific drive that wouldn't start until the end of 1943. Under the best of circumstances, neither of these initiatives would get anywhere near the Philippines for at least another two years and even that estimate depended on things breaking the Allied way both in the PTO, and in the ETO. Even with substantial reinforcements, the most optimistic planners could not see Mac holding out on Luzon for anything like two years.

And the world-wide shipping shyortage weighed heavily on Roosevelt's mind; every one of the Allies was screaming for more ships, and they were painfully slow in arriving from the building yards. Roosevelt couldn't justify wasting twenty or thirty merchantmen on a gesture when it would not contribute to the ultimate victory.

As for the domestic political aspect you mention, it simply wasn't there. Very few in the US thought of the Philippines as exactly being "US soil" especially since Tydings-McDuffie; in fact, a substantial portion of the US public breathed a sigh of relief when that act was passed precisely because they viewed the Philippines as a defense liability and now that burden would shortly disappear. Also Roosevelt and the JCS, exercised quite a bit of influence over the US media; they could spin deveopments in the Philippines pretty much however they wanted, especially if Mac appeared favorably in the account. So, no, denying reinforcements to the Philippines, even if Mac achieved some sort of local success, wasn't "political suicide" for Roosevelt. In fact, to do so would have won him the support of the Army and Navy planners, as well as that of our British allies; something that may not have been crucial to Roosevelt, but was certainly useful political capital

The fact was, that no one in the entire US defense establishment believed retention of the Philippines was crucial to Allied victory, except perhaps MacArthur. The whole rational of the effort to reinforce the Philippines in the latter half of 1941, was not to retain them in case of Japanese attack, but to deter that attack from happening in the first place. When it became obvious that deterrence wasn't in the cards, the attitude in Washington was, well, that didn't work, so let's not throw good resources after bad. Of course, everybody felt really bad about the troops who had just been condemned to death or long-term imprisonment as POW's, but most military men who were in the know as to what was going on, advised that no further resources be wasted on the Pacific; Eisenhower, during his stint on the planning staff, even suggested that Australia was not critical to Allied victory, but was overruled by Marshall and Roosevelt for political reasons revolving around relations with the Brits.

There simply was not enough reason in the Allied camp, for anyone to argue strongly for the reinforcement of a hopeless cause already far behind Japanese lines, when that reinforcement would cost precious resources which would yield far better results in a multitude of other places.

Yes, DA. I certainly do share your view about looking at the trees and the forest. That's why (again I say this) I pointed out that the only way that I could see was to play fast and loose with historical facts.

Sticking closer to historical facts, the days of Mac's forces in the PI were certainly numbered. Mac underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese and his Filipino and American troops paid the price.
At what point then in the campaign could an offensive by the US garrison do the most good?
Logically, it would have been at the time when the Japanese were still landing and not established a firm beach head. However, the reality was that the beach defenses collapsed utterly. Only when the Japanese were breaking through and racing down Luzon did Mac finally order his forces (the North and South Luzon Forces) to fall back into Bataan.
The next best time to go on the offensive against the Japanese is when the Japanese units were strung out during the race.
The US garrison would've been consolidated by this time at their first defense line in Bataan. And that would've been in Layac Junction.

The main thing to note, however, is that whatever gains this hypothetical offensive might have had would have been fleeting, if not temporary.
Mac's forces were surrounded. They couldn't get out. No friendly units can come in.

That's why I propose that it would've been better for the US garrison to hold first and hope to last until the start of the rainy season (around June). By this time, the US and its allies historically had more options than they did in the beginning.
And if the forces in the PI were still in good shape after the Japanese debacle in Midway, it's entirely possible some things could have developed. The key to the Bataan garrison's survival wasn't an offensive but to still be in fighting form once the US Navy defeats the IJN.

Personally, I don't have any other ideas left for this what if. I've said what I know. I certainly learned a few new things and been forced to look at old facts and data under a different light thanks to John and DA.

The survival of the Bataan garrison and the launching of a hypothetical offensive depended on two main factors: having an intact air force and a secure route for the US Navy to bring a relief convoy through with minimal loses. However, the Japanese removed these factors from the US with the successful Japanese attacks on Clark and Pearl Harbor.

PS Took me a while to post. Have not been able to post as often as I had before. Been busy lately with taking care of my dad who's in hospital.

__________________
That's about it,
Fil