As a Frenchman, the consistency of your post would be the same as mine if I said that the Brits could have held Crete for a year.
Having 3M soldiers and "defensive lines" as you call them, is a great thing. Coordinating , modernizing and having strong communication systems is another matter. Only General de Gaulle, the father of French Armor Tactics, was trying desperately to convert generals to the ideal of using tanks WITH infantry, not as two separate and distinct forces.
my 2c

UN Spacy,perhaps you'll find something of interest in 12. of February 2009. article of this section, ' What if Germans executed original plan for case yellow? '.

Just to nitpick... Glantz & Pleshhakov describe the Soivet mobilization extending far back before 22 June. The 13th Army assembling in White Russia was made up of mostly reserve units that had been called up in May and early June. Other units from that spring 'mobilization' of reservists had been distributed to the armies along the borders. This 13th Army comprised a large part of the soldiers that attempted to defend Minsk & environs from Guderians mechanized group in July.

Other reserve units had been called up earlier in the spring, tho my impression is that was on a much smaller scale than the May/June group. Warning orders and preliminary steps had been taken for activating many more reserve formations during June, before the 22.

Seperate from these reserve units was the bulk of the class of conscripts due to be ordered to reserve status in the first half of 1941 were retained on active service. A portion of those conscripts scheduled for rotation to reserve units in 1940 were retained on active service as well into 1941. That retention of 'trained' conscripts in the standing formations served to help expand the standing army and made the later mobilization of reserve units faster.

Last, the call up of conscripts in 1939, 1940 and the first half of 1941 was increased over the usual numbers of the 1930s. That also allowed the expansion of the quantity of ground combat and service or support units in those years. So, in Stratigic terms the Soviet mobilization went back into 1940. In operational or tactical terms the decision to not alert the standing armies and to keep them in the barracks offset much of the advantage of the extra soldiers available in June 1941.

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I find it interesting that many here have lauded the Germans for the quick decision-making. Later in the war, we're told, the Allies (or at least the Americans) enjoy a huge advantage over the Germans because decisions can be made at a much lower level. For example, on D-Day no one wanted to wake Hitler. Had German decision-making become more centralized during the course of the war, or were the Americans just that far ahead in their thinking?

the story that no one wanted to wake Hitler (popularised by The Longest Day ) has been disputed .

It importance has also been disputed. During the landings at Salerno there were armored divisions present including the Herman Goering armored division but the invasion was still successful. Also, on June 6 the 12th SS Panzer division did attempt an assault between sword and Juno beach but was heavily slowed by Allied air superiority and was ultimately repulsed.

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"If you want peace work for justice" -Pope Paul VI

Jon

Hitler was a notorious insomniac, and in spite of Dr. Morrel’s injections of the German version of Demerol he rarely went to bed before 2:00 am, and rarely arose before 10:00 am. As the invasion became more and more likely he would stay awake pontificating until 5:00 am, and only arise by 2:00 pm, on that morning, he may well have just gone to bed when the first reports started coming in from the Normandy coast. Whether or not he was "asleep" and others feared to wake him, or simply not functioning at the time of the Normandy invasion it is of little moment.


He (Hitler) remained convinced for most of June that the Normandy invasion was a diversion and the real invasion was yet to occur at the Pas d’Calais. Either way, his reaction would be to hold the forces needed to thrown the allies back into the sea.

And I myself think this whole "the Germans were hide-bound, waiting for orders from superiors" is hogwash. At least from the Captain rank down, from the Colonel ranks up, perhaps. From the mid-level officers through the NCO and enlisted personnel they thought and acted well on their own without specific orders, or by improvising. Brokaw’s book (Greatest Generation)simply echoed the words of Stephan Ambrose (Citzen Soldier), and that work was influenced by his own rabid pro-Americanism as to their contributions to the allied cause.

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Happy Trails,
Clint.

The rapid decision making thing is misunderstood. Read Doughty 'The Seeds of Disaster' to understand what this is about. In simple terms a French commander & his staff were trained to write detailed orders with full blown annexes and appendices specifing in detail what the subordinante units were to do. Back in my officer days I was trained to do the same. It takes hours to compile these things for even a simple battalion attack.

The Germans were also trained to write such orders, detailed written attack plans have thier place. HOWEVER like me the German commander & staff were also trained to operate using fragmentary orders, simple mission statements, and brief messages that outlined what was to be done. To operate sucessfully this way the commanders and subordinate have to have a degree of understanding and have to have a fair ammount of training time with this method.

The French, with the exception or the cavalry, were not trained beyond the detailed order and elaborate coordinating measures that went with it. When things evolved faster than the commanders staff could rewrite new orders to change the scheme of manuver they fell behind in the OBSERVATION DECISION ACTION loop. When some of the French commanders attempted to react quickly with brief orders that simply outlined intent and which left out all the details their subordiantes usually failed to understand and floundered about in confusion.

My summary here is overly simplified and leaves a lot out, but try to understand the French doctrine of 'The Methodical Battle' made their tactical operations deliberate and much slower than the Germans. (Again the French cavalry being a exception) The actions of the highest commanders like Hitler or Gamelin are a seperate issue.

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Well I believe France could've survived if America was in the war.

In 1940 , with an army that was a the time smaller than the Romanian one?
The U.S army started recruiting massively in November 1940 only and they were not at war, nor had they the intention to jump in, unless they were attacked.

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To show the accuracy of Hearts of Iron 2, even if, as France, you maintain full-strength and latest technology weapons and vehicles, if you haven't gone above and beyond in the French doctrine (the German type of doctrine gives an early advantage), you're still doomed.

The extended Maginot Line has a chance of survival in the game, but makes life much worse later. France cannot handle a war of attrition against Germany, especially if Germany deigns not to invade Russia yet.

As for the tanks and fighters, France's arsenals were rather motley and their units not so organized. After all, they've had only about 10 hectic months to prepare for an invasion they were sure were coming in a wholly different area.

Improving the uniformity and organization of the units would have gone a long way towards French survival. Even in retreat, if it was kept orderly, the French could have a chance of counterattack or eventual halting of the advance. Their lack in organization and doctrine were equally responsible for this shortcoming.

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"Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed."

Is it similar to the French strategy of Defence in Capitulation. This is the country with one of if not THE highest desertion rate for troops in WW1 if I remember correctly...on their own soil. Good Grief!. Third world pacific island nations could have put up a better fight.

A very different breed to the British. I think the would have put up a much more impressive guerilla struggle than the French on dream or brag about. If as many Frenchmen served in the resistance as has been claimed then the Germans would have been kick out of France faster than they arrived.

I guess we will never know what would really have happened if France had put up a decent fight.

HOI2 rocks. For all it's flaws, there is nothing better and that includes HOI3 (at least until HOI3 v1.3 anyway) graphics mean nothing, depth is everything!

Persist with France..difficult but doable.

What Soar21 says is very essentually true. Initial troop quality/leadership and disavantages in Industrial capacity are all against you..so try for as much encirclement as possible. Trap and destroy as many german divisions as possible. In the end it's a biy gamey though as the A1 will make mistakes the Germans would not.

I read in a book called Soldiers of the Night, the story of the French Resistance, that a guy name Degaule tried to get the army to release the tanks and fight them in a mobile fashion. The higher authority did not do this and as a result the greatest tank force in Europe was misused and effectively eliminated from the battles until it was too late. It's a shame that pride and tradition effectively extended the war.

Im assuming that you are referring to Charles de Gaulle, the general of the Free French Forces and later president of France??

and yes he did.

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The war against Russia will be such that it cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion. This struggle is one of ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness. -Adolf Hitler

One must be careful when discussing then Col. De Gaulle. His 1937 (date may be wrong) book on tank tactics was well received outside of France. Both Eisenhower and Patton read it as did Heinz Guderian. Guderian (fluent in many languages), read de Gaulle, Fuller, and Lidell-Hart’s books and essays and credited those works with helping shape his own armored tactics, but the book itself cost De Gaulle in that he was removed from the promotion rotation. His innovative tactics flew in direct contrast to the defensive strategy of the French military. Their "lost generation" was exactly why they devoted their resources to building the Maginot Line. He was also reprimanded for publishing without permission from the Army and political office controlling the military if I am not mistaken.

The higher-ups in France also saw the book as "non-French" in that it advocated offensive tactics rather than defensive. They believed (incorrectly) that they would fight the last war over, and against the same foe. De Gaulle's book was called; Vers l’armée de métier (Towards a Professional Army, also known as The Army of the Future in English).

In this book he advocated the French abandon their "nation at arms" policy with conscription creating the bulk of their army, and instead turn the army into a fully professional service. He also advocated complete motorization for the army and increasing the number of tanks and SP-Artillery pieces. This book made quite an impression inside and out of France, and it got de Gaulle in very hot water (that was when he was removed from the promotion lists). I have also read that liberal political parties objected to the idea of a small, professional army serving the government because it might be used to suppress dissent or revolution. The "professional army" was seen as antithetical to the "people's army" that many considered the best guardian of their liberte. This undoubtedly sprung from the fact that during the French Revolution the "citizen army" battled the professional army who defending the "royalists". The "citizen army" was also the backbone of Napolean's armies, which was considered a novel concept in Europe at the time.

When de Gaulle was proven correct in 1940 when the Nazis attacked (even though he was relatively young), he was promoted and given command of one of France's four DCR divisions, but by then it was far too late to make any difference in the outcome. He was also the 3rd Republics last secretary of war, although his term in office only lasted a few days before the French Armistice was signed, and de Gaulle escaped to Great Britain to carry on the war from there.

The works of de Gualle in France, Fuller, and Liddel-Hart in Great Britain were all ignored in their own countries. Or actively supressed by their own military. Both Patton and Eisenhower in the US wrote works on advanced tank tactics, but when "Ike" was called on the carpet for his publication, Patton took the hint and never had his essay published. Only the Germans were reading and listening when it came to armored tactics it appears.

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Happy Trails,
Clint.

I'm not a great admirer of "a guy name Degaule" but he deserves better than that .

IMO his book is overrated, AFAIK De Gaule didn't have any practical experience with tanks until after he wrote the book and it shows, the 1940 DCR were very close to the Division de choc he proposed with a "heavy" and a "medium" regiment in the tank brigade and proved a lot less capable in real life mobile warfare than the panzers. As the name implies the Division de choc is optimized for breakthrough not manouver and shock not mobility is it's main strength.

There's noting in De Gaule against the set piece battle mindset as he probably didn't understand that the radio and internal combustion engine combination required much faster command reaction times than infantry moving on foot.

The big German advantage in 1940 was radios and the superior C3i capability they provided, the mostly radioess French were unable to fully exploit the advantages of mecanization, the Germans usually could react with a speed the French could not match.

Overrated or not, the book existed. After WW1 it must be remembered that the French armor was, at the time, on the cutting edge of tank development.

In 1936 their sloped armor, medium SOMUA S-35 (Société d'Outillage Mécanique et d'Usinage d'Artillerie; SOMUA) was considered the best medium tank in the world, and was itself supposed to be radio equipped. There were supposed to be two radios installed. Buy due to a shortage of shock resistant radios about 80% of the S-35s did not have them. So it wasn’t the "best" due to lack of radios and the weakness where the hull halves "bolted" together, and the clumsy turret layout was also proven to be a major flaw. But it too existed pre-war, although in relatively small numbers.

BTW, de Gaulle was more of an overall, combined forces proponent than strictly an armor expert. However his book emphasized independent armored spear-heads, and mechanized shock troops working together.

De Gaulle lectured at the French War College where he worked closely with Henri-Philippe Petain. Over the next few years the two men demanding a small, mobile, highly mechanized army of professionals.

De Gaulle's military ideas appeared in his book, The Army of the Future (1934). In the book he also criticized the static theories of war that was exemplified by the Maginot Line. The book was unpopular with the politicians and the military who favoured the idea of a mass army of conscripts during war. In 1936 de Gaulle was punished for his views by having his name taken of the promotion list.

In 1938 de Gaulle published France and Her Army. This book caused a disagreement with Henri-Philippe Petain who accused de Gaulle of taking credit for work done by the staff of the French War College.

On the outbreak of the Second World War de Gaulle took over command of the 5th Army's tank force in Alsace. He soon became frustrated with the military hierarchy who had failed to grasp the importance of using tanks in mass-attacks with air support.

When the German Army broke through at Sedan he was given command of the recently formed 4th Armoured Division. With 200 tanks, de Gaulle attacked the German panzers at Montcornet on 17th May, 1940. Lacking air support, de Gaulle made little impact on halting the German advance.

De Gaulle was more successful at Caumont (28th May) when he became the only French commanding officer to force the Germans to retreat during the German Invasion of France.

Goto:

Charles de Gaulle

And while this isn’t exactly "on point" as to his armored service; General Charles de Gaulle was one of the pioneers of modern armored warfare as practiced in the Second World War. His writings, although initially ignored, eventually led to his assuming command of the newly-created French 4th Mechanized Division in May, 1940, just as the German invasion began. The counterattack he made did not save his country, but was one of the few bright moments in the national disaster

Goto:

The World at War: Charles de Gaulle

France, viewing itself as being pacific and defensive at the time, was bound to be anti-motorization. Important political leaders also adopted this attitude toward large armored formations. For example, Léon Blum, leader of the Socialist Party and Prime Minister from 1936-37, was convinced that de Gaulle and the High Command were; conspiring to create an aggressive army of "shock and speed." He felt that such a conception was a "menace to peace." (Leon Blum, "A bas l'armée de métier!" Le Populaire, December 1,1934, p. 1.)

And let’s not neglect that the first French armored division was not even created until October of 1939, de Gaulle couldn’t very well train nor command something that didn’t exist. By the time Germany attacked in May of 1940, France had only three untrained armored divisions in existence with a fourth being created under the command of de Gaulle. Sadly for France it was political considerations and military traditions, not advances in military doctrine or equipment, which had determined the shape of France's defensive and offensive ability. And this also determined it’s short term future.

So in answer to the OT, without a major shift in political and military thinking and application it was doomed to the outcome it suffered.

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Happy Trails,
Clint.

Well I will try to bring up some opportunities that are missed by French. Some of them are not very realistic but still

As far as I know, Rhineland is an important region that has access to Germany's industrial Ruhr area. I guess they occupied it in 20s. So if they could manage to hold it at their hand maybe things could be different.

Also during the Phoney War, Allies were inactive. Maybe if there was an offensive (not like Saar) at that time as promised to the Polish, they could force the Germans for a negotiation. Actually, I am not very fond of the appeasement policy of Allies

Apart from those, when Germans first bypassed their lines, the government was in a mood of defeat. The Germans was maybe at their most vulnerable state during the beginning of the offensive but French could not act. I am not saying it is easy to reorganize at that moment, but I wish they could.

I thank you, UN Spacy. After nearly 4/5 months I have IMMERSED myself in this game, and I am uber 1337 now! XD

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Easily the most overpowered tank in history. Seriously - dual 280mm cannons?! It's not like the Allies had a tank with 200mm of armor!

Shirer's book is good. Fall of the Third Republic maybe?

The factors already discussed wouldn't have been changed unless Gamelin was ousted, he stood in the way of much of what has been discussed. Significant factions of the French government desired a defeat for their own personal gain as well.

Their best bet was to send a few thousand troops into the Rhineland to chase the Germans off. If your game has that option, take it.

IMO the French, including De Gaule, never did develop a theory of mecanized warfare, Vers l'armée de métier (the army of the future in English) is not as good a blueprint as Guderian or Fuller. BTW the book, as I understand it (I had a French edition), doesn't criticise the Maginot but states the need of a professional mecanized force for manouver in Belgium in addition to the conscript mass. It reads suspiciously like the failed Dyle-Breda plan.

Quote:

Originally Posted by brndirt1 In 1936 their sloped armor, medium SOMUA S-35 ...

I'm familiar with french tank design and they are probably the best availabe in 1939 (though I have a weakness for the BT series) provided they could get to the fight, but the assumption of set piece usage stressed armour over reliability and comunications and eventually the better coordinated panzers drove rings around the more numerous but slower French tanks that mostly ended up abandoned due to breakdowns and lack of fuel.

De Gaule's reationship with Petain would require a long thread by itself and was strongly influenced by politics. De Gaule was a very "political" soldier.

You are forgetting the DLM and DLC, the DLM (division légère mécanique) were contemporary to the first panzers, De Gaule, not being a cavalryman, had little or nothing to do with them. IIRC the SOMUA S35 is a cavalry tank was used mostly by the DLMs while the DCR had the B1Bis in the heavy and Hotchkiss H35 and Renault R35 and R40 in the medium regiment. The B1bis was even more impressive than the SOMUA but clearly a breaktrough not a manouver machine.

The reality was quite the opposite then. It was Germany that could not win a War of attrition with the Entente. That was the whole reason for Sickle Cut that can almost be seen as a desperate gamble. France and Britain enjoyed a large advantage in production, natural resources, and foodstuffs whereas Germany was dependent on the Soviet Union. A Germany that could have been partially constricted via blockade as they had been in WWI.

The Germans did enjoy a 2:1 advantage in manpower, or military aged males. But in terms of who preferred to fight a long war, it was undoubtedly the French who were hoping for an epic defensive battle in which the Wehrmacht flung its forces on them and suffered heavy casualties as the French industry churned out tanks, much needed tactical bomber aircraft, and more of--well--everything!. Everything for their vaguely planned offensive to take place in the summer or fall of 1941 that never was...

I don't know where you're getting this silly stuff on "industrial capacity (sic) disadvantages." It was the Germans that never committed to a full war economy until well after their doom was sealed in a two-front War. The French real industrial out put and potential was actually far greater in the long run...

I am not certain, but I believe two of the posters got off on a game scenerio or something. Hearts of Iron? Not "reality" exactly, but a gaming strategy. I could be mis-remembering that though.

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Happy Trails,
Clint.