That is indeed the most usual reaction.

And I am sure that it was just the same inside of Pearl Harbor at 0756 on Dec.7'41.

AFAIK. the size of the incoming force changes not a historical thing when there were NO Americans looking for one at all.

The OTL history is full of instances when an early warning of the incoming Japanese air attacks on Pearl Harbor COULD have been sounded, yet NONE AT ALL were. I think because the American defenders of the day could just NOT bring themselves to believe that Oahu, the "Fortress of the Pacific" could be attacked at all, LET ALONE by the scrawny little Japanese, while the battleships of the Pacific Fleet were MOORED inside.

Yet the OTL Japanese did it all the same. Foolishly as it turned out 4 years later but in 1941, who could know what would come to pass ?

Save, I suggest, for Yamamoto ...

IMO, with the Allied oil embargo in place, the Japanese Empire was already dying and had little more to loose by going out fighting.

Not at all old chap....Not everything....If there is something I dont know, I'll gladly hand over to Wtid45....He will cover the gaps...

Most of us learn lots from this place, and gladly thank those that change our interpretations on some matters we think we knew about.

For instance, I never knew, Germany could so easily have overcome the British in 1940, or Gibralter fell to the enemy, or even that Germany never lost a battle whereby their units had a majority of Germanic accents and not Russian.

Pearl harbour was just a fly in the ointment of ww2. In fact the war never started till 1941.

Monty raced south through the Ardennes to save the surrounded US troops in 44 and if only he had himself put on a parachute and jumped out of a dakota then market garden would have been won.

We learn lots on here...We need more factual knowledge at times though...so stay on board old chap.

Wtid45 will fill in any knowledge you may lack on the Brecon theatre of operations. Thats a place in Wales the Welsh invented to make the English tough enough to win world war 2.

Urqh is well and truly back

__________________
WHEN YOU GO HOME, TELL THEM OF US AND SAY, FOR YOUR TOMORROW,WE GAVE OUR TODAY. Epitaph on the Kohima memorial .

formerjughead observed,

Your plan is "Island Hopping" in reverse.

I hadn't thought of it that way but yes, it is. Just as the OTL Japanese historically did themselves during the first 6 months of the Pacific War.

So what beaches would the Japanese land on?

One 17,000 ton cargo-liner anchors in the darkness just off of Bellows Field, another at the southern end of the barrier reef protected Kaneohe Bay. Both inside that Bay if the wind/waves/surf are bad off Bellows.

If the Marines at Wake repulsed an IJN landing force why wouldn't the Oahu defenders be able to do the same thing?

If my ATL surprise is accomplished, the 22,000 packed in US Army troops asleep in their Quadrangle bunks at Schofield Barracks will be hit by the aircraft adjusted 16" and 14" gunfire of two IJN battleships. With another two BBs in reserve should the HE ammunition run low. Thousands will die before even getting out of bed, let alone getting to their unprepared beachfront positions, which my IJA and JSNLF troops had already crossed in the darkness, several hours before.

Look at a 1941 highway map of Oahu. Aside from the coastal ring (2 lane only) highway there are VERY few roads over which American troops can move their heavy artillery from Schofield/Shafter to the many potential landing beaches. And even an IJN destroyer could interdict any American movement at all along the coastal highway, often built so close to the ocean that salt spray fell on the pavement on windy days.

There will be savage ongoing fighting to be sure but I MUST get my 1LW Japanese ashore to seize commanding terrrain positions while the peacetime American defenders are still stunned and reeling from the ongoing KB and CF attacks. A second IJA division will follow ashore on the next night, Dec.7-8'41.

The Japanese were beaten at Midway and almost beaten at Wake why would you expect them to be any more successful attacking a larger target?

No surprise in either case.

The Americans at Midway greatly benefited by their code breaking advantage at Midway AND by then had 6 long months of combat to "get the cobwebs out". 'Twouldn't be that way on a still peacetime Oahu on Dec.7'41.

Wake #1 was a fluke as happens in all wars. First, Wake #1 happened well AFTER Dec.7'41 so that the American defenders there at least KNEW that they were at war with the Japanese. A Japanese air raid some hours previous had alerted the Americans that "something was happening". The American CAC gunners hit the supporting light Japanese warships well and an aircraft bomb set off some Japanese torpedoes (or was it depth charges ?) on deck. The landings never even got started as the Japanese force sailed away to rethink the situation

I think the Japanese knew that invading Hawaii would have been too costly and a "raid" on Pearl Harbor was the most effective way to accomplish neutralizing the American fleet.

Clever of you to agee with the historical record but why do you then bother to post to a "what IF" board ? The historical record leads to the defeat of the Japanese Empire, as Yamamoto surely well knew even BEFORE the bullets started flying.

The point of my ATL Invasion Hawaii scenario is to discuss how the Japanese Empire MIGHT have just squeaked thru and survived a short war with America, instead.

The odds are extremely high that a two-division landing force, proceeding in convoy, would be spotted by aircraft or vessels before they could close to within 100 miles of Oahu. There may not have been any regular patrols far from Oahu, but there were numerous military training flights and commercial flights among and around the Hawaiian islands in 1941. In addition there were dozens of naval and commercial vessels plying those waters, any one of which could easily have spotted a convoy of that size. I'm not saying that it absolutely would have happened, but the risk was definitely very high that it could happen, and military planners don't accept high risk factors.

See; USN Pacific Fleet Ships Not At Pearl Harbor

There is no way that the Japanese IGHQ is going to invest so much time, and so many resources, and risk so much when the odds of some random event ruining everything is so high. Dabrob forgets that the Japanese Army ran things, not Yamamoto. Yamamoto may have been a gambler, but he wasn't insane, and neither was the Army General Staff nor the IGHQ. No way would they approve such a fantastical scheme.

Moreover, Dabrob heavily overestimates the capabilities of the Japanese military in making assault landings over defended beaches. The idea that that more than 10,000 troops could secretly be landed on such beaches in complete darkness is nonsense. My brother-in-law (my wife's eldest brother) witnessed, as a 12 year-old boy, the Japanese landings at Miri in December, 1941. At that time, he was living with his family just south of the town on a hill overlooking the landing beach. The Japanese landing force arrived in several ships at about 2:00 AM, and the noise of the anchor chains running out as they anchored awoke his family. They watched as the Japanese spent several hours launching boats, loading troops, yelling orders, shooting off red and green flares, and generally making a huge commotion among much confusion. Of course, the landing was mostly unopposed, but the Japanese, at that time, had no idea of Miri's defenses. The Japanese assault troops began landing at first light, and by then everyone in the town was aware of the invasion, and many people had fled into the jungle.

It is generally impossible to put a large number of troops on a beach without making a lot of noise. And that, given the situation on Oahu in December, 1941, would guarantee that with the dawn would come an intense air and naval attack on the Japanese landing forces. It's usually conceded that an assault landing cannot prevail under air and/or naval attack.

I'd go along with DA again here...I try not to make a habit of such things but he is infuratingly correct again in my view.

They would have had as much success if they had done a two pronged attack...with one heading for California and maybe in unison with Nazi's who could have arranged to land on British beaches at same time, and surprise the lot of us, our fathers and grandfathers all asleep at the end of the piers as the boats tied up.

urqh replied with

Monty raced south through the Ardennes to save the surrounded US troops in 44 and if only he had himself put on a parachute and jumped out of a dakota then market garden would have been won.

I knew THAT already. LOL !

...so stay on board old chap.

I certainly intend to but I'm just not sure of how much I'll be able to intelligently contribute to non-Oahu subjects.

Wtid45 will fill in any knowledge you may lack on the Brecon theatre of operations. Thats a place in Wales the Welsh invented to make the English tough enough to win world war 2.

My mother is English and I've been bodily THROWN out of two pubs in Haye-on-Wye so that should count for something, shouldn't it ?

Dabrob....You are definately most welcome....Hay On Wye...Put the canoes in and off to Monmouth...many a serviceman has done that route...and I saw my best mate thrown out of a pub in Hay once....we would have gone with him, but it was market day and beer was half price....priorities and all that...

Welcome aboard.

The 37mm ammuntiion had arrived. Unfortunately, it was still aboard ship in Pearl Harbor, awaiting unloading. Re: "the 12" mortar issue." Your readings are highly incorrect. Those 12" mortars fired both AP and HE mortar shells. Granted, there weren't nearly enough of the HE shells on Corregidor, but Seaward Defense Commander Paul Bunker devised a plan to convert the AP rounds into HE by removing the 0.5 second delay pellet from the shell, making it into an instantaneously bursting mortar shell. Those 670-lb shells worked all too effectively against the Japanese during the siege of Bataan's "Battle of the Points" and later, the siege of Corregidor. So you see, those seacoast mortars could and would do great damage to "your" ATL Japanese invasion troops.

Lastly, all of your horse drawn artillery would be without horses as all of them would either be seasick and incapacitated for several weeks, in the act of dying from shipboard fever or already dead from the long sea voyage. Horses die like flies after long periods of being pent up in a closed environment.

A 10 knot naval convoy covers 200 nm in 20 hours. This means the Japanese in order to land their main force will either have to do so many hours after the first attacks take place or, they will have to risk being spotted at sea long before they arrive.
Even a force sailing at 20 knots covers this distance in 10 hours and risks detection.

As for taking out the coast defenses:

First, the Japanese don't know were everything on Ohau as far as coast defense is located. They have the major fixed batteries and forts but know little of the mobile defense systems like the 155mm guns, 240mm howitzers, 8" rail guns, 12" rail mortars and many of the smaller positions. They also have only a sketchy knowledge of the fire control systems and their locations.
This the US found out later from captured maps and intelligence gathering during the war.
The US fire control system in 1941 included both remote and co-located fire direction towers and positions. There were central plotting locations at the major batteries that could direct the fire of both their own guns and those at other locations. The Harbor Defense of Honolulu Command Post was on Diamond Head in an underground facility inside Fort Ruger for example. The system also had radio as well as telephone communications available.

Then there are just numerous military bases and installations all over the island including:
Fort Weaver
Fort Kamehaheha
Fort Shafter
Fort Armstrong
Fort De Russey
Fort Ruger
Schoefield Barracks
Wheeler Field
Bellows Field
Haleiwa Field
NAS Kaneohe
NAS Barbers Point
Ewa Field (USMC)
Hickham Field
NAS Ford Island
Mokuleia Field
Among others.

These are scattered over the entire island. This too is a problem.

Then there is the issue of where to land. Much of the coast of Ohau is unsuitable for an amphibious assault. Were beaches are suitable the US did place some defenses to quite a bit of defense. Any attempt to land on the south (eg., Pearl Harbor) side would also have run into the standing destroyer picket in the "submarine exclusion zone" just as the Japanese midget subs did. Sinking of the Ward or other US ships moving in this area is possible but not without their almost certainly warning Hawaii it is under attack.

We also know from the amphibious assaults the Japanese did make that they were less than efficent in unloading and then running into the beaches. This too has been pointed out.

The overall picture is one that they may have been able to muster the forces to make such a landing but it was going to be a rough fight to take the island and very near impossible that they could manage a win out of it.

It is true that horses can become "sea-sick", but they cannot vomit due to their physiological construction, this is because of a tight muscle valve around the esophagus. However, they develop an illness which mimics, but is NOT colic which can be fatal, it is simply a "nausea" which can be easily treated with hyoscine (which has been around since 1880) before departure or while at sea.

The biggest problem with transporting horses by sea is that they become stressed when confined to dark enclosed spaces, and can lash out at their fellow equines, their handlers, or even the sides of the ship in which they are being transported. This is why "horse killers" were often aboard ship, not to put down those who became "sea-sick", but to eliminate those who had gotten so stressed out they were a danger to themselves and others.

I don’t know the breed of horse the Japanese used as draft animals during WW2, but the largest of their local breeds like the Hokkaido were tall for Japanese breeds, at the shoulder, 13-13.5 hands, and believe me that is short for a true horse (a hand is 4"). Because of this "smallish trait" (less than 13 hands) of indigenous Japanese equines, the authorities discouraged breeding purebred Kiso, Hokkaido, Tokara, and Miyako breeds and encouraged a crossbreeding program between the them and larger western horses. During the pre-WW2 period (1939) a government program was even administered for the purpose of castrating all purebred Kiso males. And until then the Kiso had been prized for their use as military horses as they seemed fearless in battle, but were not good as draft animals. An even smaller pony, the Yonaguni was found in the south, but surely not used as or for military draft animals.

That cross breeding policy nearly eliminated "pure-blood" Japanese horses, like the Miyako breed. It, like the Hokkaido breed were short, not ponies, but smallish horses. During WW2 they were crossed with larger imported stallions to increase their size to around 14 hands for draft purposes. There was another indigenous draft horse, the Taishuh but I don’t know how common they were in the WW2 period, since very few survive today with a few sperm and ova in "cold storage" at the Animal Husbandry Center in Hokkaido.

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.

All too true on all counts, but the very fact that the horses would have been penned up in closed, dark holds for nearly a month aboard ship would disqualify them from any heavy lifting duties for the invasion, because their muscles would have atrophied, they would still be drugged-up and a large number of them would still be extremely sick or already dead.

There is the problem, not sea-sickness exactly, but atrophied muscle, and either stressed out, or doped up beyond use. I wonder how long it takes a horse, if he/she survives the trip, to get his/her "land legs" back after said sea voyage?

__________________
Happy Trails,
Clint.

Back in the day, it took a number of weeks for a horse to completely recover from a long ocean voyage. This was a major reason that the British Army didn't send any large numbers of badly needed cavalry regiments to the American Colonies during the Revolutionary War, as they could rely on losing a prohibitively large number of horses during the long sea voyage.

But they made the run in toward Hawaii at a considerably fast speed. And even 14 knots is more than most cargo ships can handle. "ILW"?
Was he? I thought he was ordered to abort the mission if discovered. The northern Pacific was not completely empty. They did choose that route because it was the least likely to be discovered but it was not empty.
I do. Let's look at this in a bit more detail.

1) Not only does the battle fleet put to see but most of the rest of the navy as well as a huge transport fleet. Most of the latter of which are not usually needed for gunnery training.
2) It's a time or rather severe stress on the diplomatic front. People are expecting the Japanese to do something.
3) Is radio silence typical for gunnery practice? If not then the there are going to have to be a lot of ships out there sending messages. However
radio intercept types were pretty good at identifying what ships the messages came from at that point in time so trying to mimic that many individual ships is going to be problematic.

Gents,

I'm back from a Sunday of riverine warfare. The final tally was Robert 3 / Trout 0. Although I was nearly wounded by a "skunky" old beer. Fortunately, I had several pre-chilled replacements "in the line". Ya gotta love planning.

First though, a question. I note that no one has yet responded to my posting #37 here, "What events, in your opinions, would cause General Short to surrender Oahu ?"

Perhaps none of you are reading my postings ? That certainly seems to be the case for one or two of you wrt my landing plans.

Or, am I not allowed to ask questions here for some reason ?

I'll attempt to reply to your individual postings over the course of the day.

I had no idea that there were so many horse lovers hanging out here ?

Horses can follow narrow and steep mountain footpaths such as found on Oahu while trucks, don't do nearly so well there.
Horses aren't totally silent but they are much quieter than running truck engines.
Horses can graze on the local vegetation while trucks, can't.
You can always eat a still dizzy horse if you have to while that doesn't work nearly so well with a truck.
Horses will unload themselves by swimming ashore on their own. Japanese trucks, well known for being stubborn that way, just plain refuse to do so. Period. Ever. Even if you bodily drop them over the side of the ship.
Without going too deeply into it, the JSNLF "patrol boats" are far too small to be horse transports and those troops don't need horses anyway. The three regiments of the 7th IJA Infantry Division do need a few horses to pull thier 6 organic AT guns and another 6 organic 76mm field guns but at 20 knots, each of the three BIG Asama Maru class cargo-liners will cover the 3,400 miles between Yokahama and Honolulu in just 7 days. After some 9 years of landing horses on the China coast, I'd think the IJA to be somehow familiar enough with horses in war to be able to regularly exercise a few for that minimal 7 day passage time. Thet weren't complete idiots, afterall.


I'd also like to take this opportunity to apologize for the way in which my Invasion Oahu is being presented here. It has grown into a hypothetical plan of monsterous size and complexity, yet we jump "here, there and everywhere" all thru it, as questions come up one by one. All without even an overall rough outline being presented to you all to aid in keeping it all sorted out. My problem being that I am just one person with only a very few spare hours per day available to respond to all of your postings. I am also hampered by a lack of computer graphics skills, otherwise I could present a map or two which might help you all considerably.

I make no promises as to when anything useful will arrive here but I will make attempts in both categories.

lwd responded with,

But they made the run in toward Hawaii at a considerably fast speed. And even 14 knots is more than most cargo ships can handle. "ILW"?

My first landing wave (1LW, not ILW, although that could work too as short for "Initial Landing Wave") arrives in 9 vessels each capable of 20+ knots.

Certainly, once surprise is no longer so vital, follow-on IJA troops for successive night's landing waves (2LW, 3LW and so on) will arrive off of Oahu after the Dec.6-7'41 groups, even though they left before, since they would be slower.

Was he? I thought he was ordered to abort the mission if discovered.

Only if "discovered" (which, in my ATL, I define as, discovered and reported because Yamamoto couldn't sink the discoveror before a radio mesage was sent out) more than 3 days out from Oahu.

Please don't forget that the OTL KB had 3 IJN submarines scout out some 60 miles ahead so that any potential discovering ship could be avoided instead and that in my ATL, the pre-approved cargo-liner Tatuta Maru would also be out ahead as a scout, leading the invasion towards Oahu.

In the OTL, Nagumo had the choise of returning to Japan if "discovered" two days out from Oahu but was historically ordered to attack anyway if reported only one day offshore.

Having an ATL Yamamoto along, in command, makes order alterations so much quicker and easier.

The northern Pacific was not completely empty.

There were indeed some American cargo vessels and a Yankee tanker or two running "lend/lease" thru Alaskan waters to the Russians in Vladivostock but they were never anywhere near Hawaiin waters.

They did choose that route because it was the least likely to be discovered but it was not empty.

Save for albatross and whales, for all practical Oahu attack purposes, I believe that it was. If you have a sourced list to the contrary, please present it to us all here for further investigation and lively, spirited discussion.

1) Not only does the battle fleet put to see but most of the rest of the navy as well as a huge transport fleet. Most of the latter of which are not usually needed for gunnery training.

As per the OTL, most of that ATL Japanese shipping is clearly heading south for Mindanao, Malaya and Thailand.

The Combined Fleet battleships taking gunnery practise in the (more southerly) Bonins is entirely in line with the Japanese habit of providing "distant support" for any of their naval ventures that might run into unexpected trouble. As per the OTL, I do still assign two IJN BBs to move much further south as a counter to the historical Force Z British BB moves between the Indian Ocean and Singapore.

2) It's a time or rather severe stress on the diplomatic front. People are expecting the Japanese to do something.

As per the OTL, my Japanese are indeed still openly moving large formations towards Mindanao, Malaya and Thailand. What other "something" would you prefer that they do as a realistic distraction cover for the invasion of Hawaii ?

3) Is radio silence typical for gunnery practice? If not then the there are going to have to be a lot of ships out there sending messages. However radio intercept types were pretty good at identifying what ships the messages came from at that point in time so trying to mimic that many individual ships is going to be problematic.

I don't believe that I have ever typed "radio silence" wrt faked CF gunnery practise in the Bonins. The term "radio deception techniques" was used IIRC. As per what Nagumo's Kido BUtai historically did. They left their regular radio operators behind in Japan, with orders to send fake radio messages daily that would make it seem like the IJN's biggest carriers were still in Japanese home waters. My ATL CF would do similar by sending the regular BB radio operators by ship to the Bonins from where they would transmitt truely inpressive BB gunnery scores back to Tokyo AND to the evesdropping Americans/British.

You mean here:

Fort Hase
(Marine Corps Base Hawaii - Kane'ohe Bay)
(1918 - 1948/present), Mokapu
Originally known as Kuwaahoe Military Reservation and then Camp Ulupau until 1942. Occupied the eastern portion of the Mokapu Peninsula. ..... Battery Kuwaahoe two 240mm howitzers (1927 - 1941) was also on Ulupau Head (foot of west rim, site destroyed in 1992). There was also East Beach Battery (1941 - 1942) four mobile guns in Ulupau Crater (two guns sent to Wailea Point), replaced by Battery East, and ....

( Hawaii Forts: page 3 )

I am thinking a single ship would not stand a chance to land very many troops. Even any troops that made it to shore would have a tough time defeating the ringed defense of the Island. The North Shore consists of Beach area and High Ground.........the US controlled them all

There is no way that a Japanese BB is going to get close enough to Oahu to make that attack. As soon as a Japanese BB came within 100 miles of Hawaii the US Navy would have sortied and run the IJN out of the area.

Again I am going to refer you to :
( Hawaii Forts: page 3 )

You will find interesting that there were already field pieces in place all along the North Shore............many on railway carriages.

You need to realize that the propaganda of "America at Sleep" just prior to WW2 was manufactured to gain support for FDR declaring war. "From Here To Eternity" is not an accurate depiction of American forces in Hawaii prior to 7 Dec. 1941. The US had already began to establish a more "realistic posture" and were something more than "sleeping" in 1941.

There were 2 US Army Infantry Divisions and 1 Marine Brigade in Hawaii prior to the attack.

( The Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941 - United States Army, Pacific )

President Roosevelt: "The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world."

Because that is the "Fun" of the "What If" threads. You get to pour your heart and soul into creating a situation that everyone else gets to refute and debunk (i.e. tear apart).

You provided an outstanding argument that was as well thought out as it was presented.

Kudos to you.

Brad

__________________
"Logos, Philos, Arete"

After spending weeks aboard ship, those horses will barely be able to walk, let alone swim. You can torture them all you want, but sick horses with atrophied muscles won't respond like Secretariat running in the Kentucky Derby. They will simply collapse and die. The US Army tried a like-minded manuever during the Spanish-American War, during the Invasion of Cuba, where they threw their horses over the side of the transports, expecting them to swim to shore. A very large percentage of the horses drowned, or started swimming back towards Florida where they too drowned. Even eating those drugged horses could make your own troops sick.

The horses that do make it to shore will need weeks of rehabilitation before they will be capable of any work.

John, it seems that while you were composing a reply for !0:48am I was editing at 10:33am. As per my slightly altered message, the Japanese horses would only be on-board my 3 big cargo-liners for some 7 days, not for weeks.

I believe that you exaggerate the consequences.

In any case, we do know that the IJA used more horses during the Pacifc War than they did trucks, and still somehow managed to beach land on and capture island after island from their Allied defenders for the first 6 months. It seems to me that the IJA well knew how to take care of it's horseflesh.

How does one avoid the US Coast Guard offshore patrol, not to mention the hundreds of fishing boats that ply their trade in the waters surrounding Oahu, both day and night? I'm sure that a number of those boats had radios to communicate with the shore.

I do not exaggerate the consequences. The aforementioned massed horse drownings did occur during the Spanish American War and this was after only a day or two at sea, in the time that it takes to sail the 90 miles between Tampa and Cuba. The IJA might have used more horses than trucks in the Pacific War, but they didn't use them right after being unloaded from a ship. They would need days to recover from the voyage.

Dabrob,

I realize that you are realtively new to the forum and I realize that you are trying to denote your quotes, but I need for you to follow the forum standard, please.

You can hit the quote button at the bottom of the post to be quoted or select Multioff turning it into for each post of a multi-post quote. In other words, if you want to quote only one person use . If you want to quote several members in your post, use the button.

You will see the passage(s) to be quoted like this, with quote tags around it: [QUOTE=dabrob;403305] quoted passage [/quote}* in your previewed reply.

It will look like this in the forum:

If you wish to break up a passage and address small parts of it, type this: [quote] quoted passage [/quote}* with the quote tags around each section of what you are referencing.

It will look like this: If you need more assistance, let me know.


*Substitute a "]" for the "}" in the example, otherwise you would not see the tags, the example would appear as a quote.

__________________
Best Regards,
JW

When looking at the possibilities of the Japanese Landing an invasion force on 7 December, one must keep in mind the logistics of the situation. At the start of hostilities Japan pressed much of its merchant fleet into service to support its conquests and transport the troops needed. Oil was the number one resource Japan needed most but also needed rubber and tin. 11 Divisions were earmarked for various planned invasions of Malaya, NEI, Philippines, Hong Kong etc. Japan’s merchant capabilities of the time necessitated that one or more of these planned invasions could not be completed along with an invasion of Hawaii. Japan not only needed the natural resources which compelled them south historically, but needed them as fast as possible. To make an invasion of Oahu even remotely possible, Japan has to give up some of the other invasions. The most likely candidates for this would be to cancel the invasion of Malaya with the 25th Army, and possibly Hong Kong by the 38th Division. This would give Japan 5 divisions to land in Oahu.

The next problem to overcome is where and when to land. Any landing made by the Japanese after the morning air strikes have occurred will meet heavy resistance on the beaches. Any aircraft still capable of flying will be on hand to torment the invasion force, as well as any and all ships still capable of leaving port. Airfields would undoubtedly have been the primary targets of the landing. Odds are that the Japanese will break up the invasion, making no less than three separate landings around the island, none of them supported by the other. Waiting until after the air attack would also mean that Japanese landing ships are waiting just over the horizon on 7 December. Being that close to shore almost guarantees that the US recon flights spot the force long before the carrier aircraft arrive. Landing at night would give a slight edge of surprise to the Japanese but also negates any effects on aircraft the raid has. Knowing of a landing force just off shore the AF and Navy would be ready to pounce at first light.

IMHO no invasion of Hawaii could hope to be accomplished in less than three weeks. The carriers were unable to stay indefinitely to provide air cover for any invasion. On the return trip from the raid two of the carriers were diverted to assist in the second invasion of Wake Island. Nagumo protested stating that the carriers had insufficient fuel for the air wings. One could argue that the oil in Hawaii would be more than enough for six carriers, but they would be unable to draw from the stores until after they have been captured and are relatively safe from air or naval attack. This would only occur after Oahu has been neutralized. The Japanese fleet would have been forced to retreat after maybe a week off the shores of Hawaii. Even a week is giving a lot of leeway to the Japanese. With no air cover or fleet support for the forces on land the US begins to hack away at the Japanese left behind.

Such spirited defenses of US forces on Wake and the Philippines leaves me every reason to believe that shortly after any landing, the US forces would regroup and toss the invaders back into the sea. Such a defeat would have crushed Japan on day one.

__________________
"Don't one of you fire until you see the whites of their eyes! Powder is scarce and must not be wasted. Fire low! You are all marksmen and could kill a squirrel at a hundred yards. Reserve your fire and the enemy will all be destroyed! - Israel Putnam, at the Battle of Bunker Hill, 1775
"War is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others." - Karl von Clausewitz

Myself, I think that Japan could have landed perhaps 4-500 marines somewhere in the islands and perhaps led a suicide raid to utterly destroy Pearl harbor, this would have been much more effective then a long land battle and im sure the convoy ships needed to support a garrison (If they won) could have been better used in the pacific.

If they succeeded in destroying most of pearl and the grisly ship hulls pockmarked the bottom of the port then it would have set back the USA at least 1 year in starting a pacific campaign.