From Dunkirk to D-day...

Kai-Petri · #1 (**permalink**) April 22nd, 2006, 10:34 AM

Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to D-day (Military History & Policy S.)
Timothy Harrison Place

Between 1940 and 1944, although large numbers of British troops battled around the littorals of the Mediterranean and Burma, most of the British Army bided its time at home. Between Dunkirk and D-Day, those troops lived in a grey area, neither fully at peace nor properly at war.While they trained under virtually peacetime conditions, their colleagues overseas were gaining up-to-date battle experience. The lessons from that experience should have made the troops who crossed the Channel in summer 1944 the most thoroughly prepared soldiers ever to go into their first battle. Sadly, the results in Normandy confounded any such expectations, as in battle after battle the combat effectiveness of British troops, particularly infantry and armour, proved weak.Timothy Harrison Place traces the reasons for the British Army's tactical weakness in Normany to flaws in its training in Britain.This book paints a picture of an untried British Army working hard to learn its trade. Oblivious to the fact that it was always one step behind the enemy, this was an army cruelly let down by poor direction from the top.

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Any opinions on this?? Check the book review on the site as well.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/...177295-7579634

Mahross · #2 (**permalink**) April 23rd, 2006, 07:32 PM

Kai - This is a very good book. I was lucky enough to get a hardback version for only 5 quid!! it should have been 65 quid. His analysis is very good and he does offer a sound explination for the initial failure of the British Army in Normandy. Effectively he argues that the Army misunderstood lessons from North Africa and that these were translated into the home army. His major gripe is with infantry - armour co - operation and here he blames Monty for argueing that infantry and armour should not co - operate together. This was ok for in North Africa were infantry always had problems in an heavily motorised war but in N W Europe they were certainly needed. The best thing he does is place the initial failings into context unlike historians before him such as Hastings and D'Este.

I would suggest you read it in conjunction with these books in order to get a fuller picture:

Buckley, John, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2004)

French, David, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)

Hart, Stephen, Montgomery and Colossal Cracks: The 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Westview: Greenwood Press, 2000)

Ross

Jaeger · #3 (**permalink**) April 24th, 2006, 09:11 AM

Looking at some of the successful actions in the NW campaign, the Black Bull (11th Armd) fought well because they had training in inf/armd cooperation. Four infantry battallions and four armd regiments paired up into four combatgroups.
Gen 'Pip' Roberts must take a lot of credit for 11th Armd fighting record.

There was a general increase in armd infantry cooperation during the campaign in Europe, but they were at an disadvantage from the start. The optimal approach would have been to assign an armd bde to every inf division long before the invasion, and let them train together.

Mahross · #4 (**permalink**) May 1st, 2006, 11:06 PM

Jaeger - While 11th Armoured is probably the best British Armoured Division in NW Europe it by no means created the 'battlegroup' system used by the British. Just days after the Villers Bocage debacle, Operation Perch, 7th Armoured beganusing this system, far earlier than 11th Armoured who wouldn't start its use until Operation Bluecoat in August.

Ross

Jaeger · #5 (**permalink**) May 10th, 2006, 01:58 PM

Mahross

The use of Battlegroups in the British army was theorised and practised in the late twenties and early thirties. The first account I have read about British battlegroups in WW2 was in North Africa. Among the units using the concept was the famous 7th Armd.

As to the 11th not using BG before Bluecoat was not Pip Roberts decicion. He was ordered to let the 29th and the 159th brigade fight separate battles (as the rest of the Armd divs during the operations) and their combat record was not impressive. Bimbo Dempsey wrote. 'I have 500 Shermans idle on the beaches' He could afford to loose materiel, not infantry. Therefore the poor decision to have separate battles in the start of the campaign.

My point was that the Black Bull had years of training in tank/inf cooperation. The infantry trusted the tankers and vice versa. Most divisions did not have that advantage. Many infantery divisions would fight with growing respect and trust alongside the armd brigades as the war progressed.

The desert veterans were wary of the armd brigades ,since they had learned the difference in service provided from an army tank brigade and an armd. brigade.

The optimal thing would be for the inf divs to have earmarked armd brigades for the campaign in NW Europe, and given enough time to train together.

~~Squeeth~~ · #6 (**permalink**) October 19th, 2007, 12:18 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Mahross

Kai - This is a very good book. I was lucky enough to get a hardback version for only 5 quid!! it should have been 65 quid. His analysis is very good and he does offer a sound explination for the initial failure of the British Army in Normandy. Effectively he argues that the Army misunderstood lessons from North Africa and that these were translated into the home army. His major gripe is with infantry - armour co - operation and here he blames Monty for argueing that infantry and armour should not co - operate together. This was ok for in North Africa were infantry always had problems in an heavily motorised war but in N W Europe they were certainly needed. The best thing he does is place the initial failings into context unlike historians before him such as Hastings and D'Este.

I would suggest you read it in conjunction with these books in order to get a fuller picture:

Buckley, John, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2004)

French, David, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)

Hart, Stephen, Montgomery and Colossal Cracks: The 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Westview: Greenwood Press, 2000)

Ross

Got the lot and very good stuff indeed. I take Buckley's point that lack of 'doctrine' may not have been the failing it has been presented as, although having read so much of Hastings, d'Este et al the idea that the British army was more advanced than this was rather surprising. Albert Palazzo made a similar claim about the British army in WWI tho' less convincingly.

It's been nice to see the historiography of WWII caching up with that of WWI.