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Old October 10th, 2004, 11:28 PM
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Reading latest WW2 mag & about the Hurtgen forest battle, which lasted 5 months! The American advance through France into Germany was done for the most part efficiently & fairly rapidly. This was one exception. The article mentioned the extensive planting of trees by the Germans as extra obstacles. Clever.

2 questions; If this op had never taken place & the soldiers involved were stationed & deployed elswhere, would this have speeded up the allied advance or was it too small of an event to matter in overall strategy?

& this planting of trees as obstacles, how extensive did they do this? Obviously the trees were transplants as trees don't grow fast enough to plant new ones.Any data?
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Old October 12th, 2004, 07:16 PM
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Cool

I'd never heard of the tree-planting before. If they were planted in the aerly '30s, pine trees could have had ten years' growth by the fighting of '44.
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Old October 12th, 2004, 07:22 PM
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Yes, but we would have to credit the strategist who thought of that plan with incredible powers of foresight.

Who could have foreseen the Huertgen forest was to play the part it did??

In the '30s the Dutch government had their own version of the New Deal, which included the forestation (?) of the south west part of Amsterdam, now known as the Amsterdam Forest. It used to be all meadowland. Maybe the Germans had similar projects to get the unemployed to work, or was the war industry the only thing they could come up with???

BTW, Is Whiting's book on Huertgen usable as a credible source??? I am looking for some good sources on this battle.
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Old October 12th, 2004, 08:05 PM
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it wasnt planted as a defensive measure, its was a government tree farm, ie a lumber source

you cut it down, replant it, repeat in 20 years,
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Old October 12th, 2004, 08:27 PM
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Yes - and when you think about it, Germany was always going to be on the offensive, not the defensive.

And Whiting as a credible source.... [img]graemlins/no.gif[/img]
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Old October 13th, 2004, 09:58 AM
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Yes, I suppose it could have been incidental. The Germans were puzzled why the Americans attacked here because the heavy forest made use of fighter bombers near impossible. US losses were higher than German in this battle.
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Old October 14th, 2004, 03:23 PM
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The battle for Aachen was a well fought victory. The American forces used mobility and maneuver to envelope the objective. German forces were sucked in in a futile attempt the relieve the situation.

By contrast the lessons learned at Aachen were lost in the battle that followed. The Huertgen campaign was a monumental cockup.

Ernest Hemmingway described it as "Passchendaele with tree bursts".

In terms of defeat, the Huertgen should be compared with Market Garden. While the latter was a bold move that failed, the former was a poor plan that was doomed to failure. While the latter could not be stopped once put in motion, the former ground on for month after month, achieved little or nothing and cost as much in terms of casualties. Why the American high command continued the campaign in true World War One spirit is a question that should be addressed.

Some good references can be found in "GI Offensive in Europe" by Peter R Mansoor.
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Old October 15th, 2004, 12:51 PM
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Bit of an unknown frontier to myself as well.

from the net:

http://www.bayerworld.com/Honor's%20Thesis%20-%20Huertgen%20Forest%20Paper.htm

They are right, when they argue that the forest itself has very little strategically value. However, what makes the forest important is the Roer River. More important than the Roer River are the dams that control the river’s flow. The only way the Americans could capture the dams was to enter the forest. Without control of those dams, the Allies could not move over the Roer River because the Germans could blow up the dams, cutting off any American troops that had crossed it.

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At 1805 hours on 11 September, a patrol lead by Sergeant Warner W Holitzinger crossed into Germany near the village of Stolzemburg, a few miles northeast of Viaden, Luxembourg.

When Holitzinger encountered the Siegfried Line, he and his men found that most of the pillboxes and the defenses were unmanned. General Collins, on reading this report, felt that if they attacked the Siegfried Line now, they could easily break through it, before the Germans had time to reorganize

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During World War I, General Pershing had major problems with German troops attacking his flanks out of the Argonne Forest. Well aware of Pershing’s problem, Collins was adamant on making sure his flanks were protected. To secure his flank Collins decided to move troops to the north and take the hills surrounding Aachen. To protect his right flank Collins would move troops into the northern part of the Huertgen Forest. The goals would be to capture some of the northern towns and keep the Germans in the forest. Collins could then be sure that his flanks would be protected. This is how the battle of the Huertgen Forest began.

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The Americans’ initial success was due to the fact that the Germans believed the main American attack would focus on Aachen and had left the Stolberg Corridor and the Huertgen with minimal defenses. When the Germans realized their mistake they were able to counterattack and throw the Americans off base. By 13 September more German reinforcements had also begun arriving in the forest to further improve the defense. The ill supplied Americans were inexperienced and did not know how to fight against pillboxes. Their training at home had not taught them the techniques they would need to survive in the wooded areas. “When the Germans, secure in their bunkers, saw the GIs coming forward, they called down presighted artillery fire, using shells with fuses designed to explode on contact with the treetops. When men dove to the ground for cover, as they had been trained to do and as instinct dictated, they exposed themselves to a rain of hot metal and wood splinters. They learned to survive a shelling in the Huertgen by hugging a tree.That way they only exposed their steel helmets.”

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After General Collin’s failure to break through the Stolberg Corridor, there was no question as to why American troops should attack into the Huertgen Forest. There were Germans in the forest and Hodges wanted them cleared out.

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The Americans were making the right attack for the wrong reasons. The Americans often underestimated the Germans’ will to defend the forest. Hitler came to this conclusion after meeting with his Generals: “In subsequent discussions about which terrain might be relinquished with least impunity, it was decreed that holding in Aachen sector was paramount. The Allies must not be allowed to cross the Roer River. In Particular, the Germans were to maintain at all cost bridgeheads west of the Roer at Juelich and Dueren.”

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By judging all of the sources, it can be concluded that the American commanders probably realized the threat the dams posed by the end of October. All of the attacks into the forest from the beginning of November to the end of February were made with the dams in mind.

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The 28th is the oldest division in the armed forces of the United States, and its nickname was the Keystone Division, because of the Keystone patches that members wore on their shoulders. After its fighting in the forest, it was called the Bloody Bucket Division.

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November attack:

There are two main reasons that the attack failed. First, the Germans controlled Hill 400 or Castle Hill, which was located north of Schmidt in the Brandberg-Bernstein Ridge. From this hill the Germans were able to view the American troops’ movement and could easily call down artillery fire upon them and order counterattacks. “The Germans were on the high ground looking down on us,” reported Lt. Preston Jackson

The other big problem the Americans had was their inability to move armor through the forest to reinforce Schmidt. Try as they might to clear the Kall trail, the Germans found a way to mine it again.

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The American attacks into the forest during November were conducted to achieve two goals: have the 28th Infantry Division capture the town of Schmidt, and clear a path through the forest so that once the dams were captured, the Americans could march across the Roer and into the heart of Germany. The first goal was a complete failure while the second had achieved some success. To defeat heavily entrenched German troops, the Americans really needed a combination of infantry, armor, and airpower. The bad weather had severely limited the air attacks in November. Most of them were either delayed or canceled and the ones that were launched had limited effect. The Americans also had trouble with their tanks. They could not effectively move them through the forest. When they did managed to use armored units, the battles were successful, but without them, they were failures.

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On 20 October General Patton was worried that a dam near Metz could be used by the Germans to flood a river and isolate his troops from support. Therefore he ordered American aircraft to blow up the dam so it could not be used by the Germans. General Hodges tried the same thing with the Roer River dams. If he could blow up the dams, it would isolate the Germans on the west side of the river, away from reinforcements and supplies in Germany. By the time the Americans had cleared out the Germans east of the Roer, the river would have moved back to its normal size and the American troops could cross it. The Royal Air Force would be put in charge of the mission. The attacks kept being postponed due to the bad weather. The dams were bombed on 3, 8, and 11 December. Minimal damage was done to the Urft and Schwammenauel Dams and the Allies concluded that the only option they had would be to capture the dams.

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December battle: castle Hill

Instead of an artillery bombardment to weaken German resistance, the Rangers opted to surprise the enemy. At dawn on December 7th they charged the hill.

At first light, shouting “Let’s go get the bastards!,” and firing from the hip, the Rangers charged. They got through the snow-covered field despite the small arms and mortar fire, and started up the hill. Four machine guns were firing point blank on the Rangers, who kept moving up the hill, yelling and firing. Sgt. Bud Potratz remembered hollering, “Hi ho, Silver!”

By 0830 they had managed to chase the remaining German soldiers down the hill and began reinforcing it. Germans began firing their artillery on the Rangers and German infantry made five counterattacks to retake the hill. They also launched an attack against Bergstein, where the American command center supporting the Rangers lay. The Rangers in the city thwarted the German counterattack, and the Hill and Bergstein remained in American possession. In 1995 a Ranger by the name of Lieutenant Lomell who had stormed Point Du Hac in Normandy and Castle Hill remarked, “June 6, 1944 was not my longest day. December 7th 1944, was my longest and most miserable day on earth during my past 75 years."

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By 12 December the tanks managed to break the siege and Gey and Strauss were firmly in American hands. With the towns under American control the Americans could begin the move west to the Roer River. It had taken the Americans from 16 November to 12 December to clear a way to the Roer River. The dams had still not been captured but when the attack against Schmidt came, the Americans would not have to worry about fire targeting them from Castle Hill. The new attack could be launched from the captured towns in the north as well as from the southwest of the forest and the Americans no longer had to worry about German reinforcements from the north.
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Old October 16th, 2004, 02:43 AM
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Nice post.

It is interesting that Bayer quotes MacDonald's book the Sirgfreid line but fails to quote from the same author's book "The Battle of the Huertgen Forest" in which MacDonald states that neither side realised the value of the Roer Dams until well into the battle.

But I take issue with the statement about guarding flanks.

Quote:
During World War I, General Pershing had major problems with German troops attacking his flanks out of the Argonne Forest. Well aware of Pershing’s problem, Collins was adamant on making sure his flanks were protected.
This is straight out of world war one doctrine and discounts lessons that should have been learned (were learned by Monty) about how to conduct a Blitzkrieg.

The lesson of Blitzkrieg is that Armoured divisions escheloned in column prevents any threat from flank attack by virtue of the strength of the forces arriving directly behind the spearhead. The key is to upset the balance of the enemy and to continue to attack in order to deny the opponent from setting up a defendable line.

This does not happen in a drawn out slug fest lasting several months. And the Generals in charge of the American thrust in Huertgen should have known that from the experiences of 4 years of bloody struggle only 30 years earlier.

The Roer Dams had no stregic value unless an assault was made to cross the Roer. And no plans were in the works to make such an attack. Had the Roer been threatened after the successful assault on Aachen, those dams would not have been destroyed in a defensive measure since no plans were made to do so. It was only the dedicated attack through the Huertgen that alerted the Germans to the strategic value of the dams.

So a bold move to cross the Roer and capture the dams from the German side if necessary was not contemplated. Why? Because Monty's bold plan to capture Arnhem had failed and no Allied commander was going to suggest another bold plan.

Consequences?

The battle for the Hurtgen Forest and tens of thousands of casualties, mainly American and mainly green troops.

By this time in the war the American high command had not learned the fundamental lesson that the best way to defeat a defended position was to go around it. This lesson was taught to the world by the German Panzer Divisions in every campaign until 1941.

The frontal attack on the forest virtually destroyed the 9th Infantry Division as a viable organization. This was, after all, an infantry v infantry slugfest where the American ace cards of artillery and air support could not be played. So one after another infantry division was fed into the meat grinder. The Keystone Division replaced the 9th I.D. and was, according to MacDonald, "thrown to the wolves". After two weeks of action the Division although being numerically up to strength was so short of experienced personnel that it was considered to be only 20% combat effective.

The best comment from Bayer is contained in Bayer's very first paragraph yet he offers no explanation for his astounding statement.

Quote:
World War II histories about the European theater spend much of the time talking about the D-Day invasion, Operation Cobra, Market Garden, The Battle of the Bulge, and the final surrender of Nazi German. These events all occurred between June-September 1944 and December-May 1944-1945. Very little time is spent on the events that occurred between September and December of 1944.
It could be that all the good news of 1944 was overshadowed by the inexcuseable failure by Montgomery in his attempt to take a bridge too far. To suggest that American planners and generals could make a similar mistake would be embarrassing.
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