As for those making comments on Rommels style of leadership... I would recommend reading 'Inside the Afrika Korps' by Colonel Rainer Kriebel COS of 15th Panzer Division.

It gives a good analysis of his potential genius and tha fatal flaws of Rommel's generalship from a German POV.

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

Not only did they have more, but horses didn't pull them and, above all, they fired better and more accurately, whether it was the excellent radio and telephone communications of the Anglo-Americans or the massive bombardments of the Soviets.

Not really. What about the nature and the immensity of fighting in the eastern front? How about the typical General Staff belief of infantry fighting of immediate counter-attacks and frontal assaults? How about the Iváns' though resistance? What about merciless and constant urban fighting (in which the German had all against them)? What about the Red Army developing an impecable notion of operational art and incredibly well-performed battles?

6 million, against 4 million Germans. That's a proportion of 1:1,25, not such a big difference.

However, Germany didn't take more than 100.000 KIAs anywhere since the invasion of Poland until 'Barbarossa'.

Western front

1939 - 1940: 61.033*
1941: 11.033*
1942: 12.000*
1943: 11.000*
1944: 244.891*

Various theatres

1939 - 1940: 41.000*
1941: * 43.000*
1942: 48.132*
1943: 78.099*
1944:* 278.419*
1945: * 57.495*

Now, what if we consider that the Germans tended to waste men? Not only Hitler with his stand-by orders and unrealistic counter-offensives, but the mediocre German tactics like those of armoured attacks late in the war? (see the 'Like Butter' thread and specially T. A.'s magnificent post)

Rommel lost because there was no actual overall offensive plan nor close co-operation between the Axis nations in the Mediterranean. And ultimately he lost because he failed evaluate the strategic situation, ignored his superiors and failed to use his deep influence on the Führer.

Not all the time. As stated above, in 1941 and early 1942 North Africa was one of the many theatres demanding much British military power, which was fighting pretty much alone against Germany, Italy and Japan.

That force was not overwhelmingly larger, was often under-supplied, under-strenght, not as well-equipped, trained or with tactics as good as the enemy's. A tactical genious, yes. A good general and leader, yes. But nothing more.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Yes, but if you think about the latter part of the war, the Germans were on the retreat very often and its easier to be shot in the back then in the chest if you're not expecting it. The German Army practically fell apart under the Russian Offensive, plus they were ill equipped for the Winter which also claimed more Germans then Russians. Still, 2 Million Men is a HUGE difference. And Russia had millions of more men they could throw at the Germans so they werent pushed to their limits like the Germans were (you dont see the Russians having to resort to old men and youn boys to fight like you see the Germans doing).

North Africa was a Side-Show as far as Hitler was concerned - he really didnt care about it, as Russia was a far larger problem. Everyone is entitled to their own opinions, but i think Rommel was a Genius. You have to look at what he did with what he did - smaller force, outdated weapons, practically useless Italians, very little air support, very little supplies for what he needed, fighting against a larger force (the Allies had twice the amount of tanks that Rommel had, but he leveled them down to about the same size). Using 88's disguised as sand-dunes and actually making it work is pretty impressive, so is making the enemy believe that a VW is a Tank. He had an uncanny ability to recognise a weakness and exploit it. A few times, if the Brits had reacted differently, he would have been pretty F'ed. And then when he was being pressed on two sides retreating into Tunisia, he managed to launch a devastating attack against the US who, where he broke through, had ideal ground to defend.
I do not remember the name of the ridge, but there were entrenched Allied troops there and the Germans managed to sneak behind them using a captured allied tank and capture 30+ men in the middle of the night. Thats pretty witty if you ask me. Again, he didnt have the manpower or supplies to press his attack like he would have wanted to, but it sure gave a wakeup call to the Americans.

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He captured 1000 Italians with 25 men in WW1.Using clever ruses, sounds as I recall to make them think there was more of em. He won the Pour Le merite from this event.

He was the 1st person to use the flak 88 as an anti tank weapon in France 1940.His idea.

The recent Armchair Gerneral magazine has him on the cover. The article said he was not reckless as some would have you believe, rather his manuevers were well thought out & calculated in advance. Essentially he outthought & outfought his opponents in north Africa.

I don't think it worked like that… the attackers, most of the time, tend to have more losses than the defenders, unless they (as the Germans) insist in tactics of immediate counter attacks. And that was precisely what the Germans did, because it was their typical General Staff doctrine.

Why? Because the Red Army threw huge masses of men and matériel against the Germans or because it simply fought better and better with the years?

Germany had a total population of 70.000.000 people in 1939. The USSR 180.000.000.

Germany mobilised a total of 14.014.000 men for the Eastern Front from 1941-1945. The USSR mobilised 34.476.700.

Germany caused 14.700.000 military casualties to the USSR and the USSR caused 10.758.000 on Germany. That means that 1,37 Soviet soldiers were killed, wounded, missing or captured for every German soldier. BUT 76% of the German armed forces were put out of action, and only 42% of the Soviet ones.

The Soviet Union, however, even if she had a much larger population and industry than Germany, she didn't have the amount of slave work force nor the same level of industrial and agricultural development as Germany either. That's why by 1945, at the peak of its efficiency and power, the Red Army was reaching its manpower limit.

Yes, every one is entitled their opinion, but Rommel was not such a genious. I do recognise that he indeed was:

But this is not accurate:

In February 1941, when Rommel arrived in Africa, the crisis the Italians were facing and that he had been called to fix, had past. General O'Connor's Army was soon canibilised and replaced with one totally unexperienced in desert warfare at every level, from private to general. Even O'Connor himself had to pull back, when becoming commander of the British forces in Egypt.

7th armoured division was pulled back, and its front had to be covered by 2nd armoured division, which had been deployed in North Africa in January 1941. The two veteran regiments, which had fought with O'Connor, were withdrawn, and only remained 3rd armoured brigade (equipped with worn out light and medium tanks) and another improvised armoured brigade (equipped with captured Italian tanks). 6th Australian and 2nd New Zealand divisions went to Greece. 9th Australian division, which took over from 6th, sent two brigades to Greece and had little reinforcements from 7th Australian division. Two brigades were spread out near Benghazi and a third was in Tobruk. Important engineer, supply, staff and other services were mostly in Greece and the air cover was substantially reduced.

Moreover, lieutenant general Philip Neame VC was not the brightest of generals… even if he had been a better commander, the British C.-in-C. had too many things to care of at the time Rommel was conquering Cyrennaica, facing an ill-equipped, badly-trained, badly-deployed, badly-supplied (the British were facing such confusion that they destroyed their own petrol depôts to avoid capture), with bad tactics and awkward command system, not to mention that the 'Tiger cubs' (tanks) sent from Great Britain had to be re-fit for desert warfare, were inferior to the German designs and couldn't be deployed all at the same time.

Sir Archibald Wavell had to deal with a Prime Minister urging him to counterattack, the catastrophees in Greece and Crete, the Abyssinian campaign, the presence of German bombers at Syria, an Arab revolt in Iraq. Besides, thanks to the Luftwaffe and its attacks on Malta, among other things, the Royal Navy's presence in the Mediterranean (which meant no more 'Tiger cubs' and interrupted communications for Wavell) was rapidly diminishing. During the first months of 1941 the RN lost 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers and were heavily damaged 1 aircraft carrier, 3 battleships, 6 cruisers and 7 destroyers.

Rommel had MANY advantages over de British. The Axis had the best part on those days.

A very good tactician, indeed. But when have I disputed this?

He went on with his attacks and won many tactical victories, but without an overall strategic objective. That is nothing more but a waste of resources.

Not really. Wavell, Auchinleck and Alexander were far better generals than Rommel, they just have too many thinks to focus on, whilst Rommel could afford being a corps commander and deal only with his own front. Then Monty came, and easily oottought and outfought Rommel, making him dance to the tune he played.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

"(He went on with his attacks and won many tactical victories, but without an overall strategic objective.)"

I can't imagine where this idea comes from. Of course he had an overall strategic objective. Suez & Egypt was the objective. the very notion is absurd.

The British had yet another major advantage over Rommel. Enigma. They were recieving & breaking radio messages from the beginning of Rommels arrival. & yet couldn't even push "that" advantage. How many advantages did the Brits need?

Indeed Rommel out fought & outfought his opponents til the weight of material advantage was overwhelming in favor of allies. He lost due to things beyong his control. Rodina mentioned his not exploiting his being in Hitlers favor. That's absurd, Hitler was pychotic. no one could control him.

Monty did not easily outfight Rommel. Some Brit commanders wanted to quit at el alamein. It was anything under the sun but "easy". Monty had tons more supply & Rommel ran out of gas.

That sounds nice, indeed. But what was the objective in that 'strategy' (which, by the way, he didn't share with the Italian or German General Staffs, nor Hitler, his C.-in-C.)? Was it destroying the British armed forces in North Africa or seizing this territory and occupying it?

What the-hell did Rommel want Suez for if he couldn't understand that that miserable island in his rear, in the middle of his communications line, was much much more important and vital for the campaign?

What use would Egypt had for Germany? Yes, the British lose their naval base at Alexandria and controll over the eastern Mediterranean…

Hey! Wait a second! The Germans did have controll over the eastern Mediterranean: they had the Balcans and the Greek isles under their controll and they did nothing with it, remember? And, of course, the Royal Navy can use more bases in Palestine, Cyprus or Sirya… Gibraltar and Malta.

Now, let's suppose the British lose Suez, then they have to move their communications with the Indian and the Pacific from the Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope, as they in fact did during the harshest moments of the siege of Malta. Now, how is Rommel going to defend Suez against British presence in Palestine and Sudan? Or his rear in Morocco and Argelia? Will he press on to Palestine, Iraq and then into the Caucasus? Then into India to assist the Japanese? (Does this plan includes keeping Malta still on British hands?)

Come on! That is what is absurd. By defeating the British in Egypt, British military power isn't permanently crippled. British presence in the Mediterranean is not going to disappear because of it. And, of course, Germany is not going to invest more time and resources on this theatre, almost irrelevant to her main war effort.

Seems like Rommel failed to see it, unsurprisingly, even if his intelligence reports were good to some extent. He was sent to North Africa to prevent Italy being kicked out from the Mediterranean, not to kick Great Britain out (something utterly impossible).

He became a legend, won many tactical and propaganda victories, yes, but in the end Great Britain was not kicked out. Germany and Italy were, being deprived in the process of thousands of ships, planes, tanks, guns, men, ammunition…

Rommel didn't have a great strategical vision, and he reinforced failure at Tobruk and El Alamein, and kept throwing his men into combat with minimal posibilities of success. He didn't take care of logistics, morale, training, careful planning and build-up. Monty did and that's why he won.

The material advantage was not that overwhelming. That is being unfair with the British VIII Army and its commanders, who, through learning many harsh lessons, developed a very complete and very powerful fighting machinery.

They, unlike the Germans, evaluated very well what had to be done, how it had to be done and with what. They made their plans accordingly. Auchinleck managed to keep his Army in one piece and led Rommel into a trap where he had the advantage. Montgomery later knew that he couldn't beat Rommel with his forces in the state they were, and then trained, equipped and inspired them.

First, it was me, Friedrich. And second, Rommel convinced Hitler to leave Malta alone, that it didn't need to be invaded. Rommel assured Hitler, egotistically and wrongly, that he, if given the aircraft to be used at the Maltese invasion, could take Suez all by himself. Hitler listened to him, and doomed the campaign.

No, no, no. Montgomery had gained all the initiative and used it to his favour. Rommel, un-fit to non-mobile attrition battles, didn't perform as energetically as in the previous month, and fell into all traps Monty had laid for him.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

There is a point worth making about Enigma/Ultra decriptes that people often forget...

Besides the fact that sometimes the info was out of date, the level of secrecy with regards to ULTRA was a mild hinderance.

Ultra transcripts of Enigma decodes may have been VERY useful but in many cases those recieving the info did not know of the sources origin. Due to the high level of secrecy involved with ULTRA very few people knew the actual origin of these decoded messages, especially early in the war. Even some high ranking commanders were not aware of the source of the ULTRA information. It was not thought safe to disclose the source of the intelligence in case an officer 'In The Know' was captured and divulged to his captors that the Enigma code had been broken.

Thus without knowing the origin of the info it was often not as useful as it could have been and was often treated as any other intelligence source. Commanders did not read the transcripts and say "Ha Ha! A German message that has been decoded!!!" Some did not place much reliance on the source. Perhaps the best example of this is Freyburg on Crete who virtually ignored the info in the ULTRA transcripts as he did not know the origin and could therefore not realise its significance.

To look at the flip-side, at Arnhem the intel on the Germans was not trusted as it came from a source that had been penetrated by German counter-intelligence... Even though the info was quite accurate.

Intelligence is only useful when you know its origin... and then only if you trust its source.

So bear that in mind with regards to ULTRA decrypts of Enigma messages... Useful but maybe not as much as they could have been for obvious reasons...

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

They did use this intelligence nonetheless. The problem for the British was that they would often plan for the orders Rommel recieved from above, then Rommel would disobey & do his own thing, which would throw off the Brit plans.

As for longrange plans in North Africa, the idea beyong capturing Suez was to push on into the middle east oil fields.

"(No, no, no. Montgomery had gained all the initiative and used it to his favour. Rommel, un-fit to non-mobile attrition battles)"

No no no. Rommel planted 10.000 anti personnel mines & very nearly stopped British at el alamein. Initiative was gained through mammoth material buildup. With help from uncle sam. Even in 41 the US sent aircraft supplies in red cross ships to north Africa.

Actually I have to say I was looking at Rommel's plans for defences in North Africa tonight and they are quite impressive. Well thought out inter-linked fire positions with an extensive use of mines...

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

BTW,

how interested Hitler was in the Africa situation all along? I think he was only interested in sending loads of troops and tanks ( Tigers as well ) only when the battle had been lost in Africa really and they lost all the material for nothing, I think. It was again a political decision to send all the forces in Africa when they should have been deployed in numbers in Italy and Southern France by late 1942. Of course Italy was going out of the war but losing the 300,000 men altogether was a terrible blow for the axis forces. And by leaving Africa a couple months earlier would not really have changed much ( except politically ) but having the troops and armor would have mattered.

As well it has been supposed in some books that Rommel by telling Hitler all the time that he was short of tanks, oil etc made himself sound quite stupid. Thus Hitler did not care when it should have mattered most to send help in Africa. And of course Hitler was already "hands full" with Stalingrad...( The Russian counter-attack however started on 19th Nov and on November 4th, Rommel started his retreat )

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Initially it was to be a holding action in North Africa, but Rommel went on attack instead, & was so successful that Hitler became very interested as conquest of Egypt meant that middle east oil was achievable.

So perhaps initially political,but very much strategic by 42. It has been reported he became obsessed with control of meditteranean sending large portion of Atlantic U-boat fleet to med to the protests of Donitz.

And Rommel overrated his forces' capacity to do it, whilst Monty's speciality was to evaluate his own force's real capabilities. He did it wonderfully at El Alamein. That is why he refused to launch a precipitated attack.

[QUOTERommel planted 10.000 anti personnel mines [/quote]

Yes, and this proves my point. Rommel was a master of tactical innovative devices, yes. Also, it proves what I have just stated. Monty did not throw in his forces until he had carefully prepared the means to overcome these mine fields.

Well, yes then. It had nothing to do with the British doing almost everything better. Sheer brute force defeated the Germans...

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

wow this is allot of information. im getting confused

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i think that soon the draft will get so bad thatthey will take babys tie gernades to them then launch them off catupults at the enemies. Thats a real Baby Boomer

"(That sounds nice, indeed. But what was the objective in that 'strategy' (which, by the way, he didn't share with the Italian or German General Staffs, nor Hitler, his C.-in-C.)?"

This is false. It was Hitler that mentioned Rommel would break through Egypt & link up ultimately in Caucasus-baku area with German forces coming down from north.

The decision about Malta was not arrived at overnite. Kesselring wanted it taken 1st before Rommel advanced. Rommel wanted to advance before Brits could amass even more material advantage. There is validity in both points of view.

Erwin Rommel was one of the best (Yet worst) planners in all of military history. He made great discions durning his time in North Africa, yet in D-Day, he greatly failed, by putting much more defenses at the shorter route. But, his failure was also due to Hitler. Hitler didn't let him have many tank [img]graemlins/tiger.gif[/img] [img]graemlins/panzer.gif[/img] divisions, so the Germans were greatly outnumbered in Normandy. After the allies took France, he bassically disappeared from history. If he died, I don't think it would make much of a difference. [img]smile.gif[/img] Hope this helps! [img]graemlins/salute.gif[/img]

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The objective of war is to not die for your country, but to make the other bastard die for his! - General Patton
Older men declare war. It is the youth that must suffer. - General Patton